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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to critically assess the diplomatic performance of the 
European Union (EU) in its neighbourhood, namely in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus 
after the inauguration of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Lisbon 
Treaty announced the need for a stronger, more efficient, more coherent EU in world 
politics. This implied, inter alia, that in third countries, the former Commission 
representations have been transformed into Union Delegations that represent the 
EU. Besides this, the Treaty changes opened an opportunity for coordination 
between national and EU level diplomacy in order to obtain a more effective 
collective effort. These changes where focused on EU’s overall performance, which 
has been a salient issue on the agenda of European policy-makers. The issue of the 
EU’s performance in the ‘wider Eastern Europe’ remains poignant, not least because 
of current developments in its ‘neighbourhood’ (such as the crisis in Ukraine, 
Moldova’s downturn in its democratization efforts or the inclusion of Belarus on the 
list of most repressive countries in the world).  
While the Brussels-based part of the EEAS has captured the attention of both 
academic and non-academic literature, this thesis turns its focus to the performance 
and diplomatic practice of the EU in third countries, i.e Moldova, Ukraine and 
Belarus. When talking about European diplomatic performance abroad, a key focus 
in the thesis is on practices through which the details of everyday practices that form 
and shape the performance of any actor is explored. In order to do so, the 
investigation conducted for this research is guided by three assumptions on the use 
of EU diplomacy in overcoming its foreign policy dilemmas. Looking at performance, 
then, implies examining EU diplomatic practices against pre-set goals; evaluating the 
cooperation between member-states (MS) embassies and Union Delegations 
towards formulating and implementing a ‘common approach’; and, conducting a 
screening of diplomatic capabilities on the ground. 
Findings show that the EU delegations represent the EU as a whole, became 
communication hubs on the ground and took the lead on cooperation with the EU 
MS’ embassies. Empirical evidence revealed that, in practice, the Delegations 
continued to conduct aid-driven diplomacy, as a legacy from the former Commission 
representations. And, that the coexistence of national and EU diplomacy was 
marked, at times, by MS opting out of the common approach in favour of parallel 
actions. While the Delegations in these countries have grown in size and, most 
importantly, have diplomats as staff members; the development of the Delegations 
also came with an intra- and inter-institutional tension on the ground that echoed 
Brussels institutional dynamics. Lastly, a comparative evaluation of EU diplomatic 
performance in Eastern Europe more generally uncovered multistakeholder 
diplomacy, burden-sharing, bloc diplomacy, unilateral diplomatic actions and 
interest-driven diplomacy as key drivers and dividers in EU’s attempt to address its 
foreign policy dilemmas.  
ii 
 
Acknowledgments 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Mike H. Smith, 
who has provided continuous support and encouragement, valuable advice, 
meticulous guidance and intellectual input. It goes without saying that this thesis 
could not have been completed without his gentle yet throughout questioning of my 
ideas, approaches and (sometimes unsubstantiated) claims. The discussions and 
feedback session we had were fruitful not only in developing this thesis but have also 
made me become a better researcher. I am also grateful for the depth of his 
understanding of my personal circumstances when the state of my health did not 
allow me to fully commit to conducting research. His kind support and reassurance 
throughout the last 5 years have been indispensable. I cannot express my gratitude 
enough.  
I would also like to thank all my second supervisees: Dr Giulia Piccolino, Professor 
Helen Drake and Professor Dave Allen. Many thanks go to Dr Giulia Piccolino who 
has stepped in as my second supervisor in my final year of research and who offered 
her support in dealing with the logistical issues that led to the completion of the 
thesis. A great deal of appreciation goes to her predecessor, Professor Helen Drake, 
who provided very encouraging yet thought-provoking advice that helped me 
advance my thesis. A special mention goes to Professor Dave Allen, Helen’s 
predecessor, who unfortunately is not with us to see my thesis completed, but who 
was my first contact point before I arrived at Loughborough and helped me 
overcome the bureaucratic obstacles for embarking on this academic endeavour in 
the UK.  
The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the generous 
funding during 2012 and 2014 from the INCOOP Marie Curie Initial Training Network 
(ITN) financed by the FP7 programme of the European Commission. Hereby I thank 
the network leaders and conveners, Christine Neuhold and Sophie Vanhoonacker, 
as well as my INCOOP fellows. I am also grateful for the Research Studentship 
offered by the School of Social, Political and Geographical Sciences at 
Loughborough University that facilitated the conduct of the on-going research related 
to my PhD.  
I take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to colleagues and staff at the 
Department of Politics, History and International Relations who were extremely 
welcoming and supportive. I would like to thank Jeremy Leaman, Pauline Dainty, 
Frances Seller, Audrey Pridmore and Professor Lee Miles. Special thanks go to 
Professor Ruth Kinna for her continuous helpful advice and encouragement. I am 
greatly thankful to Simon Smith and Matt McCullock for making me feel welcomed at 
the Centre for the Study of International Governance where I spent time to develop 
my analytical framework and had the opportunity to organise research meetings, 
conferences, seminars and workshops. 
The empirical part of this thesis would not have been possible without the openness 
and cooperation of various EU and national diplomats in Moldova, Ukraine and 
Belarus who gave me their time and valuable expert knowledge. Without the detailed 
information provided by them during the interviews, the substance of this PhD would 
render senseless. I am also grateful to civil society representatives and the civil 
iii 
 
servants from Moldova and Ukraine who dedicated their time to share their 
experience and know-how, which proved valuable for checking the validity and 
reliability of this thesis. My field-work would not have been possible without the help 
of Ganna Bazilo, who unconditionally hosted me in Kiev, and made her network of 
contacts as well as her professional expertise available for me. A special mention 
goes to Alena Shuba, without her support and contacts, the field-work to Belarus 
would have been impossible. Hereby I extend my thanks to her colleagues at the 
Office for Democratic Belarus who hosted me in Minsk during my research trip.  
I am also grateful to Palgrave Macmillan, Routledge, Taylor & Francis, Brill for their 
permission to reproduce material previously published: 
 2018. [with I. Romanyshyn] The Challenge of Analysing the ENP. In T. Schumacher, A. Marchetti 
& T. Demmelhuber (eds.), Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy 
 2018. (ed.) [with D. Papadimitriou. and C. Surubaru] The European Union and Central and 
Eastern Europe: Assessing Performance, Routledge 
 2018. EU External Representation Post-Lisbon: The Performance of EU Diplomacy in Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine. In F. Bicchi and H. Maurer (eds.), European cooperation abroad: 
European diplomatic cooperation outside EU borders, Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Special 
issue, vol. 13 (1), 75-96. 
 2017. (ed.) [with D. Papadimitriou. and C. Surubaru] Assessing the performance of the European 
Union in Central and Eastern Europe and in its Neighbourhood, East European Politics, Special 
issue 1, Vol. 33, 1-16 
 2016. [with G. Bosse]. The EU’s Eastern Partnership with Moldova: A ‘best case’ scenario for EU 
security community building? In P. Rieker (Ed.), External Governance as Security Community 
Building. Palgrave, 49-77 
 2015. [with M.H. Smith] EU and member state diplomacies in Moldova and Ukraine: Examining 
EU diplomatic performance post-Lisbon’, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Special 
issue 1, Vol. 19, 1-25 
Certainly, my post-graduate experience would not have been the same without the 
company and friendship of my fellow PGRs at Loughborough as well as at 
universities around the world with whom we shared the best and the worst of times 
with me and supported me morally and intellectually. For their close friendship and 
for making my PhD journey exciting and more pleasant, I would like to thank Cristian 
Șurubaru, Iulian Romanyshyn, Martina Kuhner, Katia Vozian and Dana Depo. I 
would also like to thank Nikola Tomic, Cristian Niţoiu and Stijn van Kessel. I would 
also like to express my sincere thanks to fellow PhD students, early-career and 
senior academics with whom I interacted at UACES, EUSA and ISA conferences. 
Their comments and constructive criticism offered a fresh perspective to my 
research at each occasion. I gratefully acknowledge all my colleagues from the 
Politics Department at Maastricht University. Special thanks go to Professor Tannelie 
Blom who had patience and wisdom to guide me towards taking a ‘leap of faith’ into 
the world of postgraduate research. On the way to my PhD, the academic 
endeavours we took together with Dr Giselle Bosse inspired me to deliver better 
academic results; for which I remain extremely thankful. 
Many thanks go to my closest friends, who were there for me, to share the joys and 
dissapointments of life, during the process of starting, developing and finishing my 
thesis. Victoria Rudi and Artur Vacarciuc, thank you for your unconditional love and 
support and always being there for me no matter what. Olga Skriabikova and Iryna 
Rud, our Maastricht friendship brought me constant happiness and your academic 
journey was a source of inspiration. Elena Leșan, thank you for all the genuine 
iv 
 
moments of laughter and discussions about life. Cătălina Bojescu, my post-cancer 
buddy, thank you for your inner light and for uplifting my spirit. Natalia Tofan and 
Alexandru Smulco, you always made me feel at home and I treasure this dearly. 
Nata Albot, all the way from Canada, you knew how to elevate my spirit and your 
human nature inspired me endlessly. Alina Bugăescu, Adriana Barilov and Adriana 
Beniuc, your honest friendship is and will remain absolutely invaluable. Radu Ion, 
thank you for bringing bliss back into my life and for making me feel better. Olga 
Bostan, Irina Zuza, Dean Campbell, Cristina Avornic, Olga Coptu and Tetiana 
Vasylenko your kind attention to me helped me to achieve this result. I have been 
blessed with so many friends in Moldova, Ukraine, the Netherlands, USA and United 
Kingdom and I wish to sincerely thank them all. 
Last but not least, my deepest gratitude goes to my family. I thank my parents, Elena 
and Iurie Baltag for the gift of life, for trusting in the power of my mind and character, 
for always supporting my choices and being there for me at all times. I am grateful 
for your sense of humour in those difficult, darkest hours and for your words of 
wisdom, encouragement and being proud of me for simply being who I am. Your 
unconditional love is priceless. I thank my grandparents, Ecaterina Baltag, Emilia 
Bezede and Simion Eftodi, who unfortunately are not with us, but whose love and 
wisdom served as constant inner guidance. I thank my grandpa Inochentie Baltag 
who contributed to Moldova’s independence and academia and who, indirectly, 
inspired my academic choices in life. I am grateful to my aunt, Tatiana Eftodi, and 
cousin, Ana-Maria Eftodi, for believing in me, for caring for me and for being an 
indispensable part of my life. An important member of the family, that I cannot 
disregard is our beloved cat Mitzu, the most amazing pet we have ever had! Without 
any doubt, I dedicate my thesis to my family. 
 
  
v 
 
Table of contents 
 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................... ii 
Table of contents ........................................................................................................ v 
List of Tables and Figures ......................................................................................... vii 
List of Annexes ........................................................................................................... ix 
List of Acronyms ......................................................................................................... x 
Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Research questions and Focus .................................................................................. 4 
1.2. Analytical framework .................................................................................................. 5 
1.3. Methodological considerations ................................................................................... 6 
1.4. Structure of the thesis .............................................................................................. 10 
Chapter 2. Framing EU international actorness ....................................................... 14 
2.1. The substance of EU international actorness ........................................................... 15 
2.1.1. EU international actorness: presence, opportunity, capability ........................................... 15 
2.1.2. EU actorness: from civilian to diplomatic ........................................................................... 21 
2.2. The substance of EU diplomatic actorness ............................................................... 25 
2.2.1. Diplomacy: representation, communication, negotiation ................................................... 26 
2.2.2. The diplomatic system of the EU: actors in EU diplomacy ................................................ 31 
2.3. EU foreign policy dilemmas in Eastern Europe ......................................................... 42 
2.3.1. EU actorness entrapped in foreign policy dilemmas .......................................................... 42 
2.3.2. Use of diplomacy to deal with foreign policy dilemmas: working assumptions .................. 49 
2.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 53 
Chapter 3. Analysing EU diplomatic performance .................................................... 55 
3.1. Performance: definitions, approaches and perspectives ........................................... 57 
3.2. The practice turn in IR and EU studies ..................................................................... 59 
3.3. Operationalization: how to measure diplomatic performance? .................................. 62 
3.3.1. Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................... 63 
3.3.2. Relevance ........................................................................................................................... 66 
3.3.3. Capabilities ......................................................................................................................... 69 
3.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 71 
Chapter 4. EU diplomatic performance in Moldova .................................................. 73 
4.1. Background of EU-Moldova relations ....................................................................... 74 
4.1.1. From PCA to ENP .............................................................................................................. 74 
4.1.2. From ENP to EaP and the Association Agreement ........................................................... 76 
4.1.3. EU and MS diplomatic representations in Chisinau ........................................................... 77 
4.2. Effectiveness: sustainability of ENP goals ................................................................ 80 
4.2.1. Level of adaptation/alignment to EU rules and norms ....................................................... 81 
4.2.2. The role of diplomatic actors in Chisinau ........................................................................... 85 
4.3. Effectiveness: representing the Union ...................................................................... 93 
vi 
 
4.4. Relevance: ‘common approach’ in Chisinau ............................................................. 97 
4.5. Capabilities: diplomatic resources in Chisinau ........................................................ 104 
4.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 114 
Chapter 5. EU diplomatic performance in Ukraine ................................................. 118 
5.1. Background of EU-Ukraine relations ...................................................................... 119 
5.1.1. From PCA to ENP ............................................................................................................ 119 
5.1.2. From ENP to EaP and the Association Agreement ......................................................... 121 
5.1.3. EU and MS diplomatic representations ............................................................................ 123 
5.2. Effectiveness: sustainability of ENP goals .............................................................. 127 
5.2.1. Level of adaptation/alignment to EU rules & norms ......................................................... 128 
5.2.2. The role of diplomatic actors in Kiev ................................................................................ 134 
5.3. Effectiveness: representing the Union .................................................................... 142 
5.4. Relevance: ‘common approach’ in Kiev .................................................................. 147 
5.5. Capabilities: diplomatic resources in Kiev ............................................................... 157 
5.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 170 
Chapter 6. EU diplomatic performance in Belarus ................................................. 174 
6.1. Background of EU-Belarus relations ....................................................................... 175 
6.1.1. From PCA to isolation ...................................................................................................... 175 
6.1.2. From isolation to EaP ....................................................................................................... 177 
6.1.3. EU and MS diplomatic representations in Minsk .............................................................. 179 
6.2. Effectiveness: sustainability of ENP goals .............................................................. 184 
6.2.1. Level of adaptation/alignment to EU rules & norms ......................................................... 184 
6.2.2. The role of diplomatic actors in Kiev ................................................................................ 188 
6.3. Effectiveness: representing the Union .................................................................... 195 
6.4. Relevance: ‘common approach’ in Minsk ............................................................... 198 
6.5. Capabilities: diplomatic resources in Minsk ............................................................ 204 
6.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 210 
Chapter 7. Drivers and dividers of EU diplomatic performance in Eastern Europe 213 
7.1. Effectiveness: goal-attainment in Eastern Europe .................................................. 214 
7.2. Relevance: corporate diplomatic practices in Eastern Europe ................................ 218 
7.3. Capabilities: a screening of resources in Eastern Europe ....................................... 223 
7.4. Drivers and dividers of EU diplomatic performance ................................................ 228 
7.5. Conclusion: dealing with foreign policy dilemmas through diplomacy ..................... 234 
Chapter 8. Conclusion ............................................................................................ 242 
References ............................................................................................................. 253 
Annexes ................................................................................................................. 282 
 
  
vii 
 
List of Tables and Figures 
List of Tables: 
Table 1: Prerequisites of EU actorness 17 
Table 2: Prerequisites of (EU) Diplomatic actorness 30 
Table 3. EU network of Delegations abroad, 2015 34-35 
Table 4. National diplomatic missions worldwide, 2014 38-39 
Table 5. EU diplomatic missions worldwide and presence in Moldova, 
 Ukraine and Belarus, 2015 
39-40 
Table 6. Distribution of EEAS and Commission staff in the Delegations in 
 Eastern Europe 
40 
Table 7. National and EU diplomatic missions in Moldova, 2015 78 
Table 8: EU financial aid to Moldova 1991-2014 (indicative amounts) 79 
Table 9. Approximation rate of EaP countries to the EU: Moldova 81 
Table 10. EU acts transposed into Moldovan legislation, 2007–2013 82 
Table 11. Moldova’s progress 2005–2012 85 
Table 12: Communication infrastructure between MS embassies and 
 EUD in Moldova 
91 
Table 13: Head of EU Delegation in Chisinau: 2005 – 2015 107 
Table 14. National and EU diplomatic missions in Ukraine,2015 124 
Table 15. Distribution of EEAS and Commission staff in the EU 
 Delegation in Ukraine, 2015 
125 
Table 16: EU financial aid to Ukraine 1991-2014 (indicative amounts) 126 
Table 17. Approximation rate of EaP countries to the EU: Ukraine 129 
Table 18. Legislative acts transposed on energy and energy efficiency 
 in Ukraine 2008-2015 
130-131 
Table 19. EU financial assistance offered to Ukraine 2007-2015 137 
Table 20: Communication infrastructure between MS embassies and 140-141 
viii 
 
 EUD in Ukraine, 2011-2015 
Table 21: Head of EU Delegation in Kiev: 2004 – 2015 164 
Table 22. National and EU diplomatic missions in Belarus: 2015 180 
Table 23. Distribution of EEAS and Commission staff in the EU 
 Delegation in Belarus, 2015 
181 
Table 24: EU financial aid to Belarus 1991-2014 (indicative amounts) 182 
Table 25. Approximation rate of EaP countries to the EU: Belarus 185 
Table 26: Communication infrastructure between MS embassies and 
 EUD in Minsk, 2014 
194 
Table 27: Head of EU Delegation in Minsk: 2008 - 2015 206 
Table 28: Drivers and dividers of EU diplomatic performance 228 
Table 29: Codification of interview data on Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus 284 
 
List of Figures: 
Figure 1. Distribution of Staff in Delegations, 2015 (per regions) 36 
Figure 2. Proportion of Member States diplomats as Head of Delegation 
 2011-2015 
37 
Figure 3. EU budgetary support offered to Moldova 2007-2015 87 
Figure 4: Structure of Work in EU Delegation in Chisinau 106 
Figure 5: Internal organisation of the EU Delegation in Chisinau pre-Lisbon 109 
Figure 6: Internal organisation of the EU Delegation in Chisinau in 
 2013-2015 
111 
Figure 7: Internal organisation of the EU Delegation in Kiev pre-Lisbon 165 
Figure 8: Internal organisation of the EU Delegation in Kiev 2013 - 2015 166 
Figure 9: Structure of Work in EU Delegation in Kiev 169 
Figure 10: Internal organisation of the EU Delegation in Minsk, 2014 207 
  
ix 
 
List of Annexes 
 
Annex 1: List of conducted interviews 2011-2016, EU diplomatic community in 
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus       282 
Annex 2: List of conducted interviews with civil servans and civil society 
representatives         284 
Annex 3: Interview guide        287 
Annex 4: RQDA and its application      289 
Annex 5: EEAS organisational chart      291 
 
  
x 
 
List of Acronyms 
AA Association Agreement 
AGORA European Commission’s online system for planning and 
organising meetings 
AP Action Plan (ENP Action Plan) 
BELMED International Accreditation of Testing Laboratories for Medical 
Products and support to healthcare in Belarus project 
Benelux A politico-economic union of three neighbouring states: 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg 
CEE Central and Eastern Europe 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CoE Council of Europe 
COEST Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
COREPER Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States to the European Union 
COREU Abbreviation from French: CORespondance EUropéenne. It 
represents the EU communication network between the 28 
EU countries, the Council, the EEAS and the Commission 
CS Civil society 
CSDP The Common Security and Defence Policy 
CSP Country Strategy Paper 
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
DG DevCo Directorate-General for International Cooperation and 
Development (European Commission) 
DG Relex The Directorate-General for the External Relations (European 
Commission) 
DG Trade Directorate General for Trade (European Commission) 
EaP Eastern Partnership 
EEAS European External Action Service 
xi 
 
ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument 
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy 
ENPI European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument 
ERASMUS EU exchange student programme 
Erasmus 
Mundus 
Cooperation and mobility programme in the field of higher 
education (exchange for students from EU and third 
countries) 
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy 
EU European Union 
EUD/EUDs EU Delegation(s) 
EUSR European Union Special Representatives 
FP7 Seventh Framework Programme for Research and 
Technological Development (EU instrument for funding 
research in Europe) 
FRONTEX European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
FSJ Freedom, Security, Justice 
GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council 
GSP EU's Generalised scheme of preferences 
HoD Head of Delegation 
HoM(s) Head of Mission 
HoS Head of Section 
HR or HR/VP High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IR International Relations 
MATRA The Dutch Fund for Regional Partnerships 
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MOST Mobility Scheme for Targeted People-to-People-Contacts, 
Belarus 
MS Member-state(s) 
xii 
 
 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NIP National Indicative Programme 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
RELOAD Support to regional and local development in Belarus 
programme 
RQDA Qualitative Data Analysis software 
Sida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
SNEs Seconded National Experts 
TACIS Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States 
TAIEX Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument  
TCA Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
Tempus Programme which supports the modernisation of higher 
education in the Partner Countries of Eastern Europe, Central 
Asia, the Western Balkans and the Mediterranean region 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TWINNING European Union instrument for institutional cooperation 
between Public Administrations of EU Member States and of 
beneficiary or partner countries 
UN United Nations 
WB World Bank 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
1 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) today has a strong presence in the international arena – it 
is the third largest grouping in the world in terms of population, counting almost 500 
million; it generates one quarter of global wealth and 50% of global Overseas 
Development Assistance originates in Europe. It aims at a leading role in such areas 
as exporting democratic standards to its neighbours or in combating climate change. 
Via its established network of Delegations, the EU maintains relations with almost all 
countries in the world. Although the EU’s presence in world politics is uncontested, 
its capacity to influence the external world, i.e. the EU’s actorness remains an area 
of research interest (Allen & Smith, 1990; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; Smith, 2006; 
Zielonka, 2011). The aim of a stronger and more coherent European Union has been 
reinforced with the Lisbon Treaty (European Council, 2007) with the introduction, 
inter alia, of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The creation of the EEAS 
and the upgrade to Union Delegations on the ground can be seen as an innovation 
of this last Treaty in the sense that it increases the visibility of the EU and raises its 
profile in international affairs (Lloveras Soler, 2011). With a ring of instability that 
surrounds the EU from the Eastern Europe to the Caucasus, the Middle East and the 
Horn of Africa, European diplomacy is in great demand and perennial questions 
regarding EU (diplomatic) performance arise. 
The 2013 review of the EEAS1 highlighted as one of the strengths the enhanced 
partnership with the member-states, and the 2015 EEAS strategic planning review2 
emphasized that against the background of the challenges in the neighbourhood EU 
diplomacy should seize the opportunity for coordination between national and EU 
level in order to obtain a more effective collective effort. In third countries, the former 
Commission representations have been transformed into Union Delegations that 
amount today to circa 139 Delegations and Offices, representing the European 
Union and maintaining relations with single countries, groups of countries and with 
international organisations (Austermann, 2014; Baltag & Smith, 2015; Drieskens, 
2012). Similar to the EEAS, the Union Delegations are staffed, in different 
                                                   
1 The full text of the EEAS 2013 Review can be accessed here: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf 
2 The full text if the EEAS Strategic Review ‘The European Union in a changing global environment’ (2015) can be consulted 
here: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/strategic-review-european-union-changing-global-environment 
2 
departments, with a mixture of personnel from the EEAS, the Commission, but also 
local employees. Similar to member-state (MS) embassies, EU Delegations are 
tasked with traditional diplomatic functions: to represent the EU as well as explain 
and implement its foreign policy. Outside Brussels, the EU’s diplomatic capacity 
remains represented by member state embassies and the EU delegations (now 
under the EEAS). It is the latter two that represent the EU diplomatic actors in third 
countries. With the inauguration of the EEAS, the Union Delegations and member-
state actors are expected to cooperate, exchange information and contribute to 
formulating and implementing the ‘common approach’3. Through policies such as the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) the EU works with its neighbours to the East 
and South to foster security, stability and prosperity - work that is being done also 
through the activity of its diplomatic actors on the ground. 
The emphasis on good performance is a recurrent theme in the EU’s policies, 
treaties and strategies that highlight the need for an enhanced coherence, internal 
coordination, coupled with projecting more efficiently the EU’s values and interests 
externally (Commission, 2013, 2014a). Diplomacy, understood as the practice of 
diplomacy, first of all, refers to the means by which actors pursue their foreign 
policies (Berridge, 2015) implying ‘the management of relations between actors’ 
(Barston, 2013). The focus on diplomacy therefore draws attention to the way and 
manner in which the EU conducts its foreign affairs with other actors, i.e. third states 
or other groupings. Taking into account that the EU and its member-states often 
share legal competence in the area of foreign policy, it is important to shift the 
research focus to developments post-Lisbon and to understand how and whether the 
changes brought about have had an impact on EU diplomatic performance. This 
means that any discussion about EU diplomatic actorness is closely linked with the 
focus on performance and diplomatic practice.  
This becomes even more relevant now that the EU’s institutional design has 
acquired the EEAS which “will help strengthen the European Union on the global 
stage, give it more profile, and enable it to project its interests and values more 
efficiently” (EEAS, 2016, para 3). For EU diplomacy specifically, the introduction of 
the EEAS reinforces the aim of a stronger, more efficient and coherent European 
                                                   
3 Art. 32 of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that both the MS embassies and the Delegations “shall cooperate and shall contribute 
to formulating and implementing the common approach” in third countries 
3 
Union since the unification of the diplomatic efforts of the European Commission, the 
Council Secretariat and that of the EU member states is embraced. Subsequently, in 
third countries, EU diplomatic performance, represented by the EU delegations and 
MS embassies, is of key importance to research. The need for reform in EU 
diplomacy pre-Lisbon related to the coexistence of EU and MS diplomacy with 
parallel rather than coherently intertwined direction: issues related to institutional 
competencies and diplomatic representation abroad; institutional as well as national 
and EU level power struggles; and general confusion regarding leadership in 
diplomatic activity on the ground just to name a few (Baltag, 2018; Smith, Keukeleire 
& Vanhoonacker, 2016; Telò & Ponjaert, 2016; Baltag & Smith, 2015; Petrov, 
Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2012; Smith, 2013a, Smith, 2013b). In this sense, the 
Lisbon Treaty introduced a number of changes to EU diplomacy in Brussels and on 
the ground: the EU acquired legal personality; there was established a single 
institutional framework for external relations; Delegations were taken under the 
authority of the High Representative (HR/VP) with the Heads of Delegations coming 
from the EEAS; Delegations took over the functions of the rotating Presidency, and 
were tasked with working out the relations between national and EU diplomatic 
representations abroad4. 
While the EEAS captures the attention of both academic and non-academic 
literature, the development of the relationship between the EU and national 
diplomatic services in neighbour countries has received less attention (Austermann, 
2012; Austermann 2014; Hanses & Schaer, 2012; Drieskens, 2012; Baltag & Smith, 
2015; Baltag, 2018). The issue of coordination between EU diplomatic actors in 
neighbour countries is not uncontested. At the end of 2011 this issue was addressed 
through the joint letter of the Foreign Ministers of several member states5 to the 
EEAS which encouraged the optimization of the EU Delegations (EUDs) and MS 
embassies cooperation and communication infrastructure in order to improve the 
coherence of EU external action (Eurotradeunion, 2011). In practice member states 
have been reluctant or cautious in embracing the new setting of cooperation in 
pursuing their foreign policy objectives (Blockmans, 2012; Comelli & Matarazzo, 
2011; Petrov, Pomorska, & Vanhoonacker, 2012). Research emphasizes that EU 
                                                   
4 See TEU, art 4.3. 
5 Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden. 
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performance remains constrained by member states’ willingness to cede 
competences in one issue area or another or by a clear lack of a unified position 
(Baltag & Smith, 2015; Van Schaik, 2013; Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2011; 
Blockmans, 2012). Therefore this thesis taps into the specific post-Lisbon aspect of 
EU diplomatic actorness, questioning the EU’s diplomatic performance abroad and, 
in particular, the dynamics of the practice of EU diplomacy exercised by MS 
embassies and EU delegations. 
 
1.1. Research questions and Focus 
The aim of the thesis is to critically assess EU diplomatic performance in its 
immediate neighbourhood in the East (Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus). The general 
research question guiding this research, namely ‘To what extent has the EU 
developed as a successful diplomatic actor since the inauguration of the EEAS?’, is 
not a simple question and does not necessarily translate into a simple answer. The 
development of the EU diplomatic system post-Lisbon comes rather as an example 
of challenging the traditional actorness and practice of diplomacy; hence the answer 
is anything but simple. Therefore, the lead research question requires detailed 
examination through addressing the following sub-questions: 
- How does one study the success of EU diplomacy? 
- How does the EU conduct/perform its diplomatic relations in third countries 
since the inauguration of the EEAS? 
- How has the Lisbon innovation in diplomacy been manifested on the ground 
and has it addressed the main pre-existing challenges? 
To answer the overarching questions that guide this thesis, three performance 
criteria are designed: effectiveness, relevance and capabilities. Acknowledging the 
difficulties of examining performance, the three criteria are operationalised through 
linking, in the analytical framework, organizational studies, EU international 
actorness studies, the practice of diplomacy and the practice turn in international 
relations (IR) and EU studies. In its analysis, the thesis addresses a number of 
criticisms raised pre-Lisbon regarding European diplomatic cooperation, such as: 
lack of leadership, questions concerning representation and hence, the issue of 
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continuity and coherence between EU and MS in three Eastern European countries: 
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. Especially when in third countries the consolidation 
of the EU’s system of diplomacy relies not solely on Union Delegations, but also on 
MS embassies; and since the Treaty6 foresees the cooperation between the two, the 
thesis uncovers the particularities of the practices of European diplomatic 
cooperation among EU delegations and national embassies in these three Eastern 
neighbours. The focus of the analysis is not so much on the diplomatic relationship 
with these countries per se, but rather on uncovering to what extent the cooperation 
between EU and MS diplomatic representations adds to the EU’s aim of achieving a 
stronger, more efficient and coherent European Union in external relations. Finally, 
the thesis is based on the analysis of field-work data collected7 between 2011 and 
2016 in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus that allow us to zoom in on the practices of 
EU diplomatic performance in Eastern Europe.  
 
1.2. Analytical framework 
When talking about European diplomatic performance abroad, the focus is on 
practices: as the modern definition of diplomacy also identifies it, it is about the 
practice and the management of relations between actors. The prevailing mode of 
evaluation in this thesis does not focus on the examination of EU’s success or failure 
in one policy area or another. Especially since scholars have outlined the EU’s 
capacity to influence its external environment (Allen & Smith, 1990; Ginsberg, 2001; 
Hettne, 2011; Wunderlich & Bailey, 2011); this thesis focuses on the external 
dimension of EU actions, i.e. diplomatic practices. The rationale behind studying EU 
performance in international politics stems from the academic debate which calls for 
increasing focus on the EU’s results and achievements in world affairs (Ginsberg 
2001; Mahncke 2011). As one scholar put it, the academic community ‘should […] 
engage in a debate of what the EU does [and] why it does it” (Smith 2010a, p. 343). 
Yet, so far the scholarly research dedicated to exploring and unpacking the notion of 
EU performance and focusing on diplomatic practices has been scarce. Notable 
examples include the studies that analyse EU performance in multilateral institutions 
(Oberthür et al. 2013; Jørgensen & Laatikainen, 2013) and those that explore EU 
                                                   
6 See TEU, art 4.3 
7 More details on field-work and interviews conducted are presented in section 1.3 of the Introduction. 
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foreign policy and diplomacy as ‘community of practice’ (Adler-Nissen, 2008; Bicchi, 
2011; Bicchi, 2014). More common, however, is the focus on EU impact, EU role 
performance, EU legitimacy and EU effectiveness in international affairs (Smith 
2000; Ginsberg 2001; Van Schaik 2013; Elgström and Smith 2006; Bickerton 2007; 
Smith 2010b; Vasilyan 2011; Smith 2013; Romanyshyn 2015). Within EU studies 
more generally, the practice turn8 is a rather recent research development that “will 
allow to grasp otherwise uncharted experiences and practices that are crucial for the 
performance of European integration” (Adler-Niessen, 2016, p. 88). 
For the purposes of this thesis, the analytical framework9 borrows from 
organizational management (more specifically: performance) literature that focuses 
on practice as the unit of analysis. In this thesis, looking at performance implies 
examining and evaluating EU diplomatic practices against pre-set goals as well as 
understanding how everyday practices inform the EU’s actions. It also allows us to 
explore the relationship between national and EU level in the new post-Lisbon 
setting, where the EU delegations perform traditional and new diplomatic functions: 
representing the Union and also cooperating with national embassies. And lastly, it 
allows us to conduct a screening of capabilities and to understand how these pertain 
to the diplomatic realm. In order to do so, this thesis adapts the operationalization 
offered by organisation performance literature (Lusthaus et al., 2002) and proposes 
to measure performance in relation to three criteria: effectiveness, relevance and 
capabilities. This thesis couples the discussion regarding the practice turn in IR and 
EU studies with the one on performance to uncover the nature of these diplomatic 
practices. Therefore, the analytical purpose here is not to study the cause-effect 
relationship, but rather the dimensions of everyday diplomatic practices in third 
countries: “how things are supposed to be, and the political universe of how they 
very often actually are” (Sharp, 1999, p. 5).  
 
1.3. Methodological considerations 
The epistemological position of this thesis is interpretivist, as knowledge derived 
from it includes the interpretation and understandings of people regarding the social 
                                                   
8 More details on the practice turn in EU and IR studies are explained in Chapter 3. 
9 The analytical framework and the operationalization of the three criteria is further elaborated in Chapter 3. 
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phenomena explored in this thesis (Matthews & Ross, 2010), such as EU diplomatic 
practice more generally, and more specifically the relations between the EU and 
national diplomatic actors. The theoretical contribution of this thesis is the 
development of an analytical framework to examine EU diplomatic success and the 
focus on practice as the unit of analysis. The investigative nature of the analytical 
framework stems from a set of proposed assumptions (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.2.) 
that are not causal in nature but rather associative: “the belief that there is a 
relationship between two concepts, but not necessarily that the relationship is 
causal” (Matthews & Ross 2010, p. 59). The unit of analysis is the practice of 
diplomacy: focusing on practices allows to “zoom in on the quotidian unfolding of 
international life and analyse the ongoing accomplishments that, put together, 
constitute the ‘big picture’ of world politics” (Adler & Pouliot, 2011, p.1) which relies 
on qualitative methodology such as fieldwork (Adler-Niessen, 2016). 
This thesis embraces a qualitative research-design based on an exploratory case-
study. As Yin (1993) explains, this type of research involves field-work and data 
collection conducted before the final definition of study questions and hypothesis. In 
the case of the case-studies for this research, field-work was conducted after the 
establishment of the research questions but prior to defining the assumptions, 
especially important when investigating diplomacy, i.e. the practice of diplomacy. In 
this regard descriptive and evaluative research questions are central to this 
research. Questions concerned with the study of the success of EU diplomacy and 
how the EU has addressed pre-Lisbon challenges via its innovation on the ground 
(‘to what extent is the EU a successful diplomatic actor after the introduction of the 
EEAS’, ‘how does one study the success of EU diplomacy’ and ‘how has the Lisbon 
innovation in diplomacy manifest on the ground and has it addressed the main pre-
existing challenges’) are evaluative as the questions are concerned with the value of 
diplomatic practice in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the descriptive questions 
examine how the EU conducts diplomatic relations post-Lisbon in an attempt to 
describe and quantify EU diplomacy in Eastern Europe. 
It is important to note that an exploratory investigation rests on assumptions and 
expectations about behaviour and practices, which can then be re-shaped and 
developed further after the exploration. Given the fact that the research questions 
were defined in advance of the field-work itself, this allowed the formulation of more 
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structured ways of gathering data. At the same time embracing an exploratory 
investigation, allowed the development, during field-work, of a set of exploratory 
research questions concerned with the understanding of the diplomatic practices 
such as: ‘what are the diplomatic practices in third countries after the inauguration of 
the EEAS?’ and ‘what are the drivers and dividers in the conduct of EU diplomacy 
post-Lisbon?’. In addressing these exploratory questions we could acquire 
information in areas where there is limited prior understanding of EU diplomacy in 
Eastern Europe (these findings are presented in Chapter 7). 
There are certain concerns raised by such an approach: as Yin (1993) explains, “the 
major problem with exploratory case studies is that the data collected during the pilot 
phase are then also used as part of any ensuing case study” (p. 6). To address this, 
triangulation was used to map data from different sources and to cross-check the 
findings. Therefore, in terms of data analysis, the evidence for analysis was 
extracted from the data triangulation of secondary data, official documents and elite 
interviews. Hence data extracted from the elite interviews has been corroborated 
against other interviews, policy papers, Commission and EEAS reports, newspaper 
articles and existing academic literature. Furthermore, this thesis relies on process-
tracing “to obtain information about well-defined and specific events and processes, 
and the most appropriate sampling procedures” (Tansey 2007, p. 765). Process-
tracing helps us to address the problem with an exploratory case-study as it does not 
only deductively but also “inductively uses evidence from within a case to develop 
hypotheses (or in the case of this thesis, working assumptions) that might explain the 
case” (Bennet & Checkel, 2012, p. 7).  
Overall, the methodological techniques employed in this thesis are collecting data 
from primary and secondary sources, conducting elite interviews combined with 
process tracing (and practice-tracing, given that practice is the unit of analysis). Data 
for this research has been systematically collected from both primary and secondary 
sources; a literature review has been carried out: manuscripts, policy papers, 
academic journal articles, laws, news articles as well as elite interviews, relevant to 
the research questions under study have been examined. These sources provide 
insights for the analytical framework of the thesis; offer archival as well as up to date 
information on the conduct of EU diplomacy in Eastern Europe and its development, 
on the background of EU relationship with the three Eastern European countries, on 
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project funding by the MS embassies and the EU delegations, on the means of 
communication and information-sharing as well as mechanisms of European 
cooperation abroad between MS embassies and the EU delegations.  
The empirical contribution of this thesis, therefore, consists of probing working 
assumptions by applying them to three case studies of the three EU neighbours - 
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus - where both EU and MS embassies are present. 
Permanent changes and developments in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood 
represent a challenging context for EU diplomatic actorness and all three countries 
represent a test-case for EU diplomatic performance and European cooperation 
abroad. After the Orange revolution in Ukraine, the radical change of government in 
Moldova in 2009, the appearance of civil society (CS) in Belarus, coupled with the 
presence and activity of EU diplomatic actors, it seemed that the EU was in a very 
good position to engage successfully with the East. On the one hand, countries 
belonging to the ENP and in the case of these three countries to the specific 
dimension called the Eastern Partnership (EaP) are involved in an enhanced 
relationship with the EU: superior economic cooperation, visa liberalization and for 
some of them, the negotiation of new association agreements (Commission, 2008). 
On the other, these countries face human rights, market liberalization and energy 
security issues, political instability and strong Russian influence and/or dependency. 
Therefore it is of interest to this thesis to reveal the practices of cooperation between 
EU Delegations and national embassies on the EU’s immediate border, where EU 
ambitions are high: the case studies include the biggest and oldest established 
Delegations (Ukraine: 1993) and the smallest and most recent ones (Moldova: 2005 
and Belarus: 2008) in the neighbourhood. Ukraine is the biggest Delegation out of all 
established in a European Neighbourhood Policy country; while Moldova and 
Belarus are the smallest after Libya, Syria and Israel. 
Between 2013 and 2016 field-work for data collection was undertaken in Moldova, 
Ukraine and Belarus. The author conducted 48 in-depth semi-structured interviews 
with representatives of the EU diplomatic community: 12 EU diplomats (out of which 
7 EEAS and 5 Commission), 34 national diplomats and also 5 local staff members 
(see Annex 1). Interviews were also conducted with civil servants and civil society 
representatives from the three countries (see Annex 2). All interviews followed a 
guide (see Annex 3), lasted 60 minutes on average and have been codified and 
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made anonymous. The elite interviews were conducted in a semi-structured form 
(Matthews & Ross 2010; Berg, 2009)10. In this type of interviews “questions are 
typically asked of each interviewee in a systematic and consistent order, but the 
interviewers are allowed freedom to digress [and] probe far beyond the answers to 
their prepared and standardized questions” (Berg, 2009, p. 107). Questions were 
focused on the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and their incorporation in 
daily diplomatic practices. Interviewees were asked to give concrete examples based 
on their experience at their respective mission and explain them. This in turn, 
underpinned a focus on the practices of EU diplomatic performance in Eastern 
Europe. The semi-structured interviews are used to explain the post-Lisbon 
innovations, their implementation and implications on the ground. These elite 
interviews were also used to explore diplomats’ experiences and opinions regarding 
the practice of EU diplomacy after the inauguration of the EEAS as well as their 
cooperation in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus with other national and EU diplomats. 
When expressing their opinions, the interviewees identified and elaborated on the 
positive and the negative implications of the Lisbon changes on the ground. 
Interview data analysis has been done via RQDA, a computer assisted data analysis 
software for qualitative research that allows coding, sorting and memo-ing of a 
bigger interview data-set (the details of the software, how it works and how it was 
used are described in Annex 4). Besides facilitating the management of transcribed 
interview data, this package assists in triangulation and allows the identification of 
further themes to be explored in research (which are outside the scope of the thesis). 
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
Following the Introduction, the thesis conducts an analytical literature review of four 
strands of relevant literature, namely the one that discusses the EU as an 
international actor, the one regarding the practice of diplomacy, the one on 
performance and the one on ‘the practice turn’ in international relations and EU 
studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 2 the discussion focuses on 
analytically summarising EU actorness and the practice of diplomacy. It is important 
                                                   
10 While using the semi-structured interviews reference throughout the thesis; some sources on qualitative research methods 
refer to these as semi-standardized (Berg, 2009). As a data collection method the explanation is similar, this thesis considers 
them synonymous. 
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to understand the different prerequisites that define EU international actorness in 
order to show the effects of actorness in EU’s neighbourhood. It is also essential to 
understand the notion and function of diplomacy and the developments of the 
diplomatic system of the EU. This chapter should be read as an umbrella chapter 
that explains what the EU is as an international actor, what diplomacy is about and 
what the EU professes vs. how it achieves it. Chapter 2 shows that in its immediate 
neighbourhood, the EU’s actorness faces challenges that entrap it in certain foreign 
policy dilemmas. The EU and its member states are wobbling between the choices 
of values vs. interest-driven decisions, problems of collective action and choices of 
rule-transfer vs geopolitics. These challenges used to drive MS and EU institutions 
apart in the past and are still relevant today. These dilemmas inform the reader 
about EU international actorness and reflect certain EU ambiguities. These 
ambiguities link back to prerequisites of EU international actorness and the functions 
of diplomacy. Given the innovation proposed by the Lisbon Treaty, the general 
expectation in this sense is that a successful diplomatic actor should manage to 
solve or bypass the three dilemmas through the practice of diplomacy. Hence this 
chapter concludes with a set of working assumptions for overcoming the dilemmas 
via the use of diplomacy that will be revisited in Chapter 7.  
After presenting how diplomacy might address the dilemmas in the end of the 
second chapter, Chapter 3 proposes how to analytically address the guiding 
research question: ‘To what extent has the EU developed as a successful diplomatic 
actor after the inauguration of the EEAS?’ To critically assess EU diplomatic 
performance in its immediate neighbourhood in the East, namely in Moldova, 
Ukraine and Belarus, the analytical framework relies mainly on two sets of literature 
– one on organisational performance and one on the ‘practice turn’ in IR and EU 
studies. We adapt commonly used indicators from the organisational studies 
literature and identify 3 criteria, namely effectiveness, relevance and capabilities that 
we conceptualise in this chapter with the help of the practice turn in IR/EU studies. 
Looking at performance in this way implies examining and evaluating EU diplomatic 
practices against pre-set goals (effectiveness). It also allows us to learn about the 
relationship between the national and EU levels in the new post-Lisbon setting, 
where the EU delegations perform traditional and new diplomatic functions: 
representing the European Union and also cooperating with national embassies 
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(relevance). Finally, it allows us to conduct screening of capabilities and to 
understand how these pertain to the diplomatic realm (capabilities). The chapter 
concludes by discussing the link between these three criteria and the working 
assumptions proposed at the end of Chapter 2 about how EU’s dilemmas might be 
addressed through diplomacy. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide the reader with the empirical analysis of the thesis. 
Structured in the same manner, these chapters will firstly present a brief overview of 
the Moldova-EU relations, Ukraine-EU relations and Belarus-EU relations 
respectively. This section lays the foundation for the discussion of effectiveness in 
the subsequent section. As explained in Chapter 3, effectiveness is a criterion that is 
assessed on two dimensions, one that explores the degree of democratic 
governance in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus and the other that investigates the 
diplomatic practices of representing the Union in these countries. The relevance 
section then evaluates how EU and member-state embassies in Moldova, Ukraine 
and Belarus cooperate and contribute to formulating a common approach. Finally, 
the capabilities section elaborates on the importance of diplomatic capital, presenting 
evidence on EU’s diplomatic resources and instruments on the ground. Thus, 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present, in a structured manner, the empirical evidence 
collected during the field-work conducted in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus 
respectively, as well as data collected from the study of secondary sources (such as 
policy briefs, legislation, national and international reports as well as academic 
findings from scholarly literature on Moldova and the EU, Ukraine and the EU and 
Belarus and the EU). 
A discussion of the findings presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 is conducted in 
Chapter 7 that shows the application of the three criteria that have been discussed in 
Chapter 3. Whereas the previous three chapters present empirical evidence on a 
country by country basis, this chapter compares and contrasts the findings of the 3 
individual case-studies. It provides insights on EU diplomatic practice in Eastern 
Europe more generally and identifies drivers and dividers in the conduct of 
diplomacy more specifically. Chapter 7 will then revisit the set of working 
assumptions for overcoming the dilemmas via the use of diplomacy presented in 
Chapter 2 and will discuss them in light of these findings. 
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The final chapter of this thesis provides the reader with the general conclusion and 
focuses on the implications of the analytical framework and the argument. Chapter 8 
will initially revisit the research question and afterwards, critically reflect on the 
analytical framework used. The concluding chapter will also discuss the methodology 
used and will explore the implications of conducting such research for policy and 
politics. Besides summarizing the findings of this research Chapter 8 will 
acknowledge its limitations and propose further avenues for research. 
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Chapter 2. Framing EU international actorness 
The aim of this chapter is to unwrap the complexity of the European Union through 
conceptualising the EU as an international actor: bringing forward issues of EU 
international actorness discussed by the scholarly community and proposing a set of 
working assumptions on how the changes that result from the Lisbon Treaty, with the 
inauguration of the EEAS, relate to a successful EU as a diplomatic actor. As noted 
earlier, the overarching research question of this thesis – ‘to what extent has the EU 
developed as a successful diplomatic actor after the inauguration of the EEAS?’ – 
does not come with a straightforward or simple answer. In its external relations, the 
European Union is characterised mainly by civilian and normative actions coupled 
with the pursuit of certain interests. The European Union exports norms and rules 
pertaining to democratic governance; more specifically it promotes security, stability 
and prosperity in one region of the world or another. Scholars identify certain issues 
and have certain expectations in relation to the EU’s international behaviour. The 
highlighted issues summarise that the EU combines its civilian approach with soft 
imperialism and a sort of pragmatism. It remains criticised for member-states still not 
speaking with one voice, for not claiming its geopolitical role or for applying double 
standards - promoting values while pursuing certain interests. In the first section of 
this chapter, the prerequisites of EU international actorness are identified and the 
application of these prerequisites in action is then discussed. 
Subsequently, the second section of the chapter focuses on conceptualising 
diplomacy in order to understand what a diplomatic actor embraces. In terms of 
diplomatic actorness the European Union is present and involved in international 
affairs via its network of 139 Delegations and offices that challenge traditional forms 
of diplomacy. As a non-state actor it has opened Commission representations that 
have been upgraded, as a result of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, to Union 
Delegation status and have acquired a diplomatic personality. In third countries the 
latter carry out the EU’s foreign policy objectives and are involved in exporting EU 
rules and norms. Developing an extensive diplomatic presence worldwide should 
add value to the EU’s efforts in its neighbourhood and facilitate dealing with the 
issues identified by scholarly research such as the EU’s visibility or leadership. 
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The European Union is a complex actor with a unique organisational setup; any 
research on the EU as an international actor needs to consider this complexity. A 
discussion about what the EU professes and how it achieves it beyond its borders 
and specifically in Eastern Europe is presented in the third section. The analysis 
here shows that the EU’s actorness faces specific challenges in its neighbourhood 
that entrap it in three foreign policy dilemmas. These dilemmas show the complexity 
of the EU as an international actor, serve as background for informing the reader 
about EU international actorness, and provide a reflection of these specific EU 
ambiguities. The latter link back to prerequisites of EU international actorness and 
the functions of diplomacy. After the inauguration of the EEAS, the upgrade to Union 
Delegation implies that the Delegations represent the Union, that they cooperate with 
member-state embassies on the ground, exchange information and contribute to 
formulating and implementing the ‘common approach’. Given such an innovation 
related to the EU diplomatic actorness proposed by the Lisbon Treaty, the general 
expectation in this thesis is that a successful diplomatic actor should manage to 
solve or bypass the three dilemmas through the practice of diplomacy. Hence this 
chapter concludes with a set of working assumptions for overcoming the dilemmas 
via the use of diplomacy that will be revisited in Chapter 7. 
 
2.1. The substance of EU international actorness 
The discussion in this section and labelling of the EU as one type of power or 
another, but especially criticisms of it, refer, in general terms, to certain prerequisites 
that the EU is expected to have when interacting in international politics. Authors 
mention goals, interests, capability (military might), presence, EU norms and their 
promotion that one can refer to as prerequisites. The first section focuses on 
analytically summarising the different factors that define EU international actorness 
in order to show the effects of actorness in the EU’s neighbourhood. 
 
2.1.1. EU international actorness: presence, opportunity, capability 
The external actions of the European Union represent a central topic throughout the 
scholarly literature on the role and actions of the European Union in the international 
arena. This is due to the myriad of political and diplomatic interactions the EU is 
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involved in outside its borders. From the early’s 90, when the EU was struggling to 
build-up ‘long-standing foundations’ for its international role till today, the EU is 
shaping its ‘identifiable and specific role’ in international relations (Allen & Smith 
1990, p. 23 and p. 26; Hill & Smith 2011). The EU is constantly involved in the 
international arena, inter alia, through trade, development aid and human rights 
promotion. This political activism leads scholars to look for different prerequisites of 
EU as an actor on the international arena as well as to develop different typologies of 
EU actorness. 
 
Prerequisites of EU actorness 
According to Allen and Smith (1990), actorness is defined by presence, which is in 
its turn defined by several factors: one’s credentials and legitimacy, one’s capacity to 
act and mobilize resources and one’s place in the perceptions and expectations of 
policy makers (p. 21). They refer to Western Europe, neither a sovereign state actor 
nor a dependent phenomenon in international relations, but an actively present actor 
in international interactions. Western Europe is further described as a flexible actor 
with a collective yet pluralistic identity, with different priorities in the reordering of the 
political world order, of which other international actors are aware of (idem).  
Based on the definition of ‘presence’, Jupille and Caporaso (1998) discuss further 
analytical criteria of EU actorness. According to the authors, actorness is defined by 
actor capacity in global politics which is assessed based on the following four main 
components: (1) recognition – acceptance by other international actors; (2) authority 
– actors’ legal competence; (3) autonomy – independence from other actors 
combined with institutional distinctiveness and (4) cohesion – an actor able to 
formulate and articulate internally consistent policy preferences (ibidem).  
EU actorness literature then focuses on the evolution of the EU as an external policy 
actor and proposes three broad categories of constructing actorness: presence, 
opportunity and capability (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). Presence conceptualizes 
EU’s relationship with the external environment and refers to the EU’s ability to exert 
influence outside its borders; opportunity refers to the external factors that either 
constrain or enable EU actorness; and capability denotes EU capacity to react 
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effectively to its external environment (i.e. external opportunities and expectations) 
through the use of its instruments (ibidem).  
 
 
In discussing presence, Bretherton and Vogler (2006) broadly follow the 
conceptualization of Allen and M. Smith (1990) and explain the concept as a 
consequence of EU’s internal dimension rather than purposive external action, it 
refers to the ability to exert influence beyond its borders and shape them. EU action 
or inaction is shaped by a context, defined as opportunity; an opportunity that EU 
takes or refrains from. This opportunity links to Hill’s (1993) ‘capability-expectations 
gap’ that affects the EU. It is the expectation of the EU to perform in its international 
role of conflict-manager, pacifier or any other role that is directly linked to the EU’s 
ability to agree, combined with availability of resources and instruments. This is to 
say that the presence of an opportunity does not directly feed back into EU action or 
inaction but is instead a complex constellation of factors. Resources and instruments 
are just one dimension envisaged by the EU’s capability as a category of EU 
actorness. It refers to further requirements such as: shared commitments to values; 
domestic legitimation of decisions relating to external policies; ability to identify 
priorities and formulate policies in a consistent and coherence manner and the 
availability and capacity to use policy instruments (Sjöstedt, 1977 as cited in 
Bretherton & Vogler 2006). Whether the EU chooses to use civilian or soft 
imperialism instruments, in evaluating its international identity, authors highlight that 
implementation is inconsistent due to certain clashes of interest, for example the 
Table 1: Prerequisites of EU actorness 
Actorness 
Presence 
 Legitimacy 
 Authority 
 Recognition 
 Autonomy 
Opportunity 
 Factors that influence actorness 
 ‘capability-expectations’ gap 
 Cohesion 
 Perception of external policy makers 
Capability 
 Capacity to react to external environment 
 Instruments 
 Resources 
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clash between economic and strategic interest: “material interests can prevail over 
the longer-term agenda of promoting human rights or democracy and of regional 
cooperation” (Smith 2008, p. 236). 
To sum up, as shown in Table 1 above, one may identify presence, opportunity and 
capability as the three main prerequisites for EU’s international actorness. It is 
against them, that research discusses EU international actorness and the key 
problems of EU actions vis-à-vis its neighbours.  
 
Exploring the prerequisites of EU actorness 
Scholars examine presence, opportunity and capability from different perspectives 
and emphasize, empirically, certain challenges and issues for EU international 
actorness. Touching on all three prerequisites, Smith (2008) emphasizes that the 
EU’s international identity is closely linked with the effectiveness of achieving policy 
goals. The author identifies the issue of unity among member-states and institutions; 
the issue of EU double standards – “the EU should do as it wishes others to do”; and 
the issue of policy instruments – whether the EU has the appropriate instruments or 
can use these appropriately in discussing EU’s effectiveness. In pursuing new 
analytical ways of examining EU role and impact in international politics, Elgström 
and Smith (2006) consider opportunity and capability, namely: EU goals and values, 
EU instruments and its institutional construction as making the EU’s international 
participation distinctive. The authors explain that the EU’s objectives are ‘milieu 
goals’ that “aim to shape the environment in which the actor operates” (Elgström & 
Smith 2006, p. 2); that its policy instruments are of civilian nature - economic and 
diplomatic instruments, persuasion and positive incentives or constructive 
engagement; and that through its institutional construction an externalisation of 
principles and rationales generic to domestic politics has been made possible. 
Acknowledging the EU’s presence as “more than a dwarf and less than a 
superpower” (Ginsberg 2001, p. 9), scholars show that through its actions and 
inactions the EU still suffers from the ‘capability-expectations gap’. Others framed a 
different gap, namely: “[the EU’s] normative power of attraction and its weak 
empirical power to do things” (Zielonka 1998 as cited in Ginsberg 2001, p.9). EU 
acknowledgement and strategic use of its external environment alongside EU 
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external coherence, i.e. opportunity, for instance, are the conditions that are reflected 
in Ginsberg’s study of EU’s political impact. The study shows that there are 
instances where the EU has some political impact and there are other instances that 
reveal the opposite; the EU either failed or has deliberately chosen not to act. 
Ginsberg (2001) proposes to consider several sources that stimulate EU foreign 
policy actions. One of these sources is external stimuli that influence the 
development of the EU as an international political actor – economic crisis, financial 
crisis, interaction with external partners. Second – the politics of scale introduced by 
Ginsberg in explaining how EU collective action is more beneficial, less costly and 
comes with more leverage than acting unilaterally; which is happening through the 
use of multilateral diplomacy.  
Third, for Ginsberg, national actors are an important source – member-states upload 
their foreign policy interests to the EU level which, in turn, has a download process in 
the form of the foreign policy impact on member-states. Given the growing number of 
members of the EU, coalitions of the willing may be formed that will account for 
flexibility in foreign policy decision-making and it is emphasized as a source that 
stimulates foreign policy in general. Furthermore, each member-state comes from a 
different domestic environment with a different political culture that shapes policy 
preferences and accounts for their conduct on the European level; this conduct is 
also interrelated with the activity of NGOs both internally and externally that have the 
power to influence policy choices. Last but not least, European interests and actors 
also influence EU foreign policy actions, especially in instances of convergence of 
EU foreign policy interests. Thus the EU’s impact depends on external coherence, 
which is a reflection of internal coherence (the issue of collective action, the process 
of uploading foreign policy preferences, the influence of domestic environment) 
alongside dependence on factors and actors from the external environment. 
More specifically, in relation to its neighbours, it is through conditionality that the EU 
has influenced internal and external policies of those non-member states that want to 
associate with it, a case particularly relevant for the big bang Eastern enlargement in 
2004-2007. A strand of research, external governance11, has focused on Central and 
                                                   
11 The basic definition of external governance (a more legalistic approach) refers to impact/effectiveness through explaining that 
it refers to parts of EU acquis that are being transferred to non-EU states and are adopted nationally (Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier 2004; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2011). The framework of external governance conceptualizes the relationship 
between the EU and its neighbours emphasizing the process of transfer of EU rules and norms as well as their impact on these 
countries (Lavenex 2004; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004; Schimmelfennig & Wagner 2004, etc.). This relationship is 
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Eastern European countries (CEE, part of the Eastern enlargement process), and 
the current non-EU member states, part of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) and reflects on the EU’s presence, opportunity and capabilities. In both cases, 
the analysis centres on the study of effective rule-transfer. For instance, in the case 
of the CEE, research concludes that rule-transfer is more effective when the EU 
offers rewards in form of assistance, association agreements and EU membership 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2011). The 
process of rule-transfer is successful since it applies the mechanism of EU 
conditionality; the implementation of reforms and the change of democratic 
institutions in these countries are driven by the promise of EU membership. Rule-
transfer also relies on the other two mechanisms of social learning and lesson 
drawing that explain that “a state adopts EU rules if it is persuaded of the 
appropriateness of EU rules” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004 p. 676) or, 
according to the lesson-drawing mechanism, “a state adopts EU rules, if it expects 
these rules to solve domestic policy problems effectively” (ibidem).  
In contrast to the positive effect on the CEE, the EU has not had a similar effect in 
the neighbourhood because reforms mainly stagnate and are not implemented, just 
adopted. The example of the ENP countries further highlights the importance of EU’s 
actorness (through the combination of prerequisites it entails). It is in this region that 
the prerequisites of EU actorness face challenges and thus the EU’s effectiveness 
overall is questioned. Scholars emphasize that, even without a membership 
perspective, the relationship between the EU and the ENP countries takes place on 
the basis of extension of the EU’s norms, rules and policies and it looks like the EU 
has the power to trigger reforms in ENP countries (Freyburg et al. 2009; Lavenex 
2004; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009; Gänzle, 2008; Kelley, 2006; Lavenex & 
Schimmelfennig, 2011 and others). Nonetheless, research on the effectiveness of 
rule-transfer has predominantly called attention to the fact that such conditions as 
domestic costs and credibility of conditionality have prevailed in the case of Eastern 
enlargement rule-transfer (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004). Authors explain that 
when the EU applied ‘democratic conditionality’ (fundamental political principles of 
the EU, the norms of human rights and liberal democracy), the size of domestic 
                                                   
characterized by the process of the transposition of the EU rules in these countries; which implies the transfer of the EU rules, 
their adoption and implementation by the non-member states (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005). 
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costs profiled a response to EU rules while in the case of ‘acquis conditionality’ 
(specific rules of the acquis communautaire) EU rule transfer was shaped by the EU 
membership perspective that outweighed domestic costs (ibidem). This is to say, for 
instance, that choosing appropriate instruments and considering the neighbours 
internal environments was of key importance to the effectiveness of EU actions. 
In conclusion, EU international actorness implies its presence in the international 
arena, where the EU is recognized and accepted as a player, where it interacts 
outside its borders and shows its capability, i.e. its capacity to mobilize and utilize 
instruments and resources and where a range of factors constrain or enable its 
actorness, i.e. opportunity. It is these prerequisites that lay the foundation for 
conceptualizing the EU as a certain type of actor, to which the next sub-section now 
turns. 
 
2.1.2. EU actorness: from civilian to diplomatic 
Early research (Duchêne 1972) depicts an EU, that despite not having military force, 
has the power to influence other international actors via diplomatic, economic and 
legal means; and thus the EU presents itself as ‘a model of reconciliation and 
peace’. Scholars suggest a ‘civilian power’ EU that focuses on economic interests 
and goals and promotes legal principles and standards of multilateral cooperation in 
international affairs. Research shows that enlargement is one of the solid examples 
of building a project of reconciliation and of peace for the accession states on the 
one hand; and for the international community on the other; hence underlining the 
EU’s status as a civilian power (Feldman 1998, as cited in Ginsberg 2001, p.433). 
Whereas this is noticeable in the case of today’s EU internally, externally, after failing 
to stand out as an actor during the Balkan War in the early 90s some referred to it as 
a ‘political dwarf’ or a ‘paper tiger’ (Almond 1994, as cited in Ginsberg 2001) and 
questioned its powers.  
Later, after the EU’s increasing focus on security and defence, as well as 
development of some military means, scholars came to question the EU as a civilian 
actor and discuss it as a ‘military power Europe’ that needs to strategize its defence 
policy (Bull 1982; Manners 2002). In practice, the EU has not focused on showing off 
its military might. On the contrary, the EU’s foreign policy actions more often than not 
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are projected on the background of a normative basis; a basis that aims at security 
and stability at its borders. And even more so, it comes with material benefits – 
access to the EU internal market. Consequently, scholars refer to the EU’s role in 
international relations as a regional power (Raik 2006; Telò 2007; Wunderlich & 
Bailey 2011). Authors argue that the EU is stronger and more influential as a 
regional power through its ability to promote stability and democracy, especially 
visible in the Southern and Eastern enlargement cases: projection of norms and 
values outside its borders makes the EU a powerful regional actor (Raik 2006). As 
part of the emerging global governance system, the EU becomes the reference point 
in the new regionalism studies; an example of “fostering regional stability, regional 
policy co-operation, regional economic convergence and regional political co-
operation” (Wunderlich & Bailey 2011, p.5).  
As argued by Manners (2002) the EU’s “ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in 
international relations” (p.239) is the motive of EU actions. This portrays the EU as a 
‘normative power’ in international relations; and some argue that because the EU did 
not become a project of military superpower but an economic one, its impact in 
international politics is unique (Ginsberg 2001). Manners (2008) further consolidates 
the argument of a normative power EU, emphasizing that the norms that the EU 
promotes in its treaties and policies represent a ‘constitutionalization’ of the EU 
becoming one of the strongest normative powers in the world. Indeed, EU norms are 
comprised in its treaties, policies, declarations and other acts. This offers the EU the 
opportunity to use in international relations a novel instrument – norm diffusion - of 
such norms as peace and liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights, social 
solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance 
(Manners 2002)12.  
But the EU as a normative power comes with certain limitations. Outside its borders, 
EU normative power “is sustainable only if it is felt to be legitimate by those who 
practice and experience it” (Manners 2008, p. 46). There are those that question the 
EU as being strictly normative be it regionally or globally (Hyde-Price 2008; Wood 
2009; Zielonka 2011). These authors put an emphasis on the fact that the EU acts 
                                                   
12 It is also important to note that there is an overlap between the conceptualisation of the EU as normative power and the EU 
as a rule-transferer: as researchers on the CEEC and external governance have also observed (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 
2004; Lavenex & Schimelfening, 2009 and others) 
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as a ‘calculator not a crusader’ (initially argued by Hyde-Price, 2008, p. 29), in view 
of its (and its member-states’) underlying interests and strategies. In this respect 
Hyde-Price (2008) highlights three instruments that the EU holds and intertwines 
them in foreign policy – ‘collective economic interests in global trade’; ‘collective 
shaping of regional milieu’ and ‘second-order normative concerns’. Whereas the 
intent behind EU actions may have a normative foundation, in practice these 
correspond to political, economic or strategic interests. Following a similar 
argumentation, Wood (2009) shows that in its quest of energy security, the EU is 
nothing more than a normal power; a category that Wood (2009) ascribes to “actors 
[who] are pragmatic and materialist in their aims and policy orientations” (p. 116). 
Earlier research on EU foreign policy has also suggested that the implementation of 
foreign policy is done by the EU through pragmatic means (Smith 2008). 
In analysing how the EU conducts its foreign policy relations, Hettne and Söderbaum 
(2005) discuss whether the EU influences its neighbours via civilian power or soft 
imperialism. The authors argue that the EU has already an impact on the 
international arena through its mere presence (due to its demography, economy 
etc.); yet a stronger presence is felt when the EU applies its actorness (defined as 
capacity to act). This, in turn, relies on the relationship between internal coherence 
and external impact. It is in circumstances of strong actorness that the EU can 
exercise civilian power more effectively. In this sense, “Europe will be able to 
influence the world order towards its own preferred model of civil power, dialogue, 
respect for different interests” etc. (ibidem, p. 539). Whereas civilian power Europe is 
based on the importance of values and norms, soft imperialism is codified in relation 
to the nature of negotiations – dialogue-like vs. imposition. EU soft imperialism, as 
the authors define is “soft power applied in a hard way that is an asymmetric form of 
dialogue or even the imposition or strategic use of norms and conditionalities 
enforced for reasons of self-interest” (p. 539). The authors have identified four 
different forms of EU relations with its neighbours from enlargement to stabilization 
to bilateralism to interregionalism; and the conclusion is that it varies on a case by 
case from civilian power Europe to soft imperialism. As a general overview, 
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depending on issue area the EU changes from more civilian (environment, 
development) to more imperialism (security, trade) in all the four forms identified13. 
Whereas the official relations take place under the umbrella of civilian norms, goes 
the argument, in practice their implementation take the form of imposition of those 
norms as a function of EU’s self-interests. According to some this may happen 
because the EU itself does not resemble a Westphalian state but rather a neo-
medieval empire, characterized by soft, flexible borders, multiplicity of institutions, 
pacification of the external environment as policy aim and mainly civilian instruments 
as policy means (Zielonka 2008). Zielonka (2011) further investigates the EU civilian 
power that promotes universal norms in comparison to other international actors 
such as United States, China and Russia and concludes that “the EU may not be 
such an exceptional actor in normative terms as is often suggested” (p. 299); so it is 
an ordinary power rather than unique. Earlier, Smith (2006) highlighted that also in 
its choice of foreign policy objectives, the EU is not such a unique international actor; 
its uniqueness comes with the legal character of the EU’s relations with neighbouring 
countries and the use of persuasion rather than coercion. Unique or ordinary, for 
practitioners, the EU may well not be a superpower but it could be a model power – 
in trade relations, in environment issues, in investment strategies, in international law 
and human rights issues – through common action, through developing shared 
values and setting global standards, thus becoming a role model for others to follow 
(Miliband 2007). 
With the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty even more attention has been geared 
toward the EU’s diplomatic actorness. Today the EU has a vast diplomatic network, 
membership in a variety of international organizations, it maintains bilateral and 
multilateral diplomatic relations as well as conducts thematic diplomacy such as 
economic, cultural or parliamentary, with a growing diplomatic infrastructure. The 
Brussels-based role of the EEAS and the development of the relationship between 
the EU and national diplomatic services in third countries have both received 
academic and non-academic attention (Allen & Smith 2012; Austermann 2012 and 
                                                   
13 (1) enlargement - is the relation that refers to acceding countries to the EU and is evaluated as a shift from civilian to soft 
imperialism as this relationship evolved from political and security dilemmas; (2) stabilization – pertinent to the EU’s relation 
with the ENP countries are also categorized as soft imperialism since it is an asymmetric partnership based on conditionalities 
imposed by the EU; (3) bilateralism – implies a series of EU bilateral relations that it developed with the USA, Russia, China, 
Mexico, Brazil, Japan etc. This relationship tends to incline towards a EU civilian power as the balance of power inclines not to 
the EU advantage and (4) interregionalism – refers to EU’s relations with more distant neighbours in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. 
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2014; Balfour and Raik 2013; Bátora 2013; Duke 2014; Drieskens 2012; Hanses & 
Schaer 2012; Henökl 2014; Hocking & Smith 2011; Pomorska & Juncos 2013; 
Merket 2012; Maurer & Raik 2014; Rijks & Whitman 2007; Vanhoonacker & Reslow 
2010; Wouters & Duquet 2011). Some emphasize the post-Lisbon opportunity in 
developing EU diplomatic assets (Baltag & Smith 2015; Melissen 2013;); others 
reveal how member-states seem reluctant to embrace this new setting of 
cooperation in pursuing their foreign policy objectives (Blockmans 2012; Comelli & 
Matarazzo 2011; Petrov, Pomorska, and Vanhoonacker 2012). The fast pace of 
challenges occurring in the EU’s neighbourhood, coupled with the complexity of the 
overall outstanding issues in international affairs, create the need for a strategic 
approach in EU diplomacy; and “also require the combined diplomacies of the EU 
and the member states to work for its acceptance by the rest of the world 
community” (Emerson et al. 2011). 
The discussion in this section is part of the broader context of EU actorness that 
forms the background of EU diplomatic performance. It is important to understand 
the different prerequisites that define EU international actorness in order to show the 
effects of actorness in EU’s neighbourhood. It is essential at this point to understand 
the notion and function of diplomacy and the developments of the diplomatic system 
of the EU. Therefore, in order to discuss EU diplomatic actorness in detail, the next 
section now turns to summarising the main features and functions of diplomacy in 
order to understand what diplomatic actorness entails. Through presenting the 
European diplomatic system we are now moving away from the discussion on EU 
actorness to the ways in which this actorness can be pursued and implemented via 
the means of diplomacy. 
 
2.2. The substance of EU diplomatic actorness 
Following the discussion on the prerequisites of EU international actorness and how 
the scholarly community has conceptualized it, the focus of this section is on 
diplomacy and specifically on EU diplomatic actorness. States and other actors 
constantly interact on the world arena where they rely on their diplomatic 
machineries; and, most recently, the EU has invested in further institutionalising its 
own. In a rapidly changing world, the character of diplomacy, the traditional means of 
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foreign policy, has changed in form while its main functions remain the same. The 
European Union is a new actor on the international arena in terms of diplomatic 
practice and more specifically, in terms of challenging the traditional forms of 
diplomacy. It has shaped the context of EU diplomatic methods when it started to 
participate as a bloc in multilateral diplomatic settings and when it opened (former) 
Commission delegations in neighbour countries. It is a non-state actor that has 
developed a diplomatic machinery that carries out tasks outside of Brussels and the 
activity of which is developing further forms of diplomacy. The first section explains 
the main functions of diplomacy as well as conceptualizes it and also explains the 
European diplomatic system and discusses its actors. 
 
2.2.1. Diplomacy: representation, communication, negotiation 
Literature on diplomacy emphasizes that the most common confusion made is in 
using the term diplomacy as synonymous to foreign policy and negotiation (Nicolson 
1963; Berridge 1995; Bátora 2005; Bátora & Hocking 2009). Whereas these may be 
seen as synonyms, foreign policy and diplomacy have two separate identities; the 
two are interrelated and the latter derives from foreign policy. Foreign policy is the 
responsibility of the Cabinet, whereas diplomacy is the execution of that policy by 
professionals of this field14 (Nicolson 1963). The clear-cut distinction between the 
two, to which scholars subscribe is as follows: 
“The distinction between foreign policy as the substance of a 
state’s relations with other powers and agencies and the purposes 
it hopes to achieve by these relations, and diplomacy as the 
process of dialogue and negotiation by which  states in a system 
conduct their relations and pursue their purposes by means short 
of war, is worth preserving, especially as an aid to clear thinking.” 
(Watson 1982, p.II). 
The first distinction, that this thesis also embraces, argues that diplomacy is the 
implementation of foreign policy; and diplomats work on the basis of instructions that 
they receive (Leguey-Feilleux 2009). Diplomats thus do not design foreign policy, but 
                                                   
14 There may be some exceptions to this such as for example- summit diplomacy, used by governments at conferences in 
which the heads of state meet for face to face negotiations 
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their reports and information are important elements in the formulation of that policy. 
Diplomacy is thus the interaction between different players on the international 
arena, all pursuing their own foreign policies. Foreign policy, as Jönsson and Hall 
(2005) argue, is “an attribute of states” (p. 14). Diplomacy, in turn, refers to its 
implementation (Bull 2002); “one of the instruments through which [foreign policy] 
can be effected and the procedures through which actors communicate in systemic 
ways” (Bátora & Hocking 2009, p.115). Through using such a definition of diplomacy, 
scholars emphasize that diplomacy is about the conduct (management) of 
international relations (Nicolson 1963; Johnson 1964; Barston 2013; Leguey-Feilleux 
2009). For instance, Nicolson (1963) argues that the “function of diplomacy is the 
management of the relations between independent States” (p.80); Barston (2013) as 
well defines diplomacy as the management of relations between states and between 
states and other actors. A group of authors emphasize this as well (even though they 
depart from the Webster definition) when they discuss different aspects of diplomacy 
(Livingstone 1964); diplomacy being referred to as “the conducting of relations 
between nations, as in making agreements” (ibidem, p.130). They advance this 
definition and argue that the conduct of relations between nations takes place with 
the purpose of promoting and defending a country’s vital interests, solving conflicts 
of interests through negotiation, through the use of persuasion and mutual 
understanding. In practice, diplomacy also refers to the methods and techniques 
used by actors during their interaction on the international arena. A derivative of the 
above mentioned definitions emphasizes the process of diplomacy and defines it 
respectively: “a method of political interaction at the international level – and the 
techniques used to carry out political relations across international boundaries” 
(Leguey-Feilleux 2009, p.1). 
Hence, we can sum up the definitions of diplomacy rather as Bull (2002) did in 
discussing diplomacy and international order: those that refer to the conduct of 
international relations between states by peaceful means; those that consider the 
management of international relations by negotiation and the ones that refer to 
application of intelligence to the conduct of international relations.  
Representation, negotiation and communication are referred to as the key functions 
of diplomacy that represent a necessary condition for the existence and maintenance 
of international relations (Nicolson 1963; Berridge 1995; Barston 2013; Leguey-
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Feilleux 2009; Pigman 2010). Firstly, representation, as one of the main functions of 
diplomacy, is key for the relationship and international interaction of actors. As 
Barston (1997) explains, it consists of formal and substantial dimensions. Formal 
representation refers to diplomatic protocol and participation in official events, while 
the substantive dimension is of higher importance. The latter refers to explaining and 
defending one’s national policies as well as interpreting those of the other actor 
(Barston 2013). Others also list representation as a primary function, closely linked 
to communication and then the following broad functions such as: negotiation, 
protection of citizens and commercial and legal interests, promotion of cultural, 
economic and scientific relations; policy advice and preparation (Jönsson 2002). So, 
dialogue between actors, communication and negotiation take place through 
representation.  
Secondly, negotiation represents an important element in defining diplomacy: “the 
conduct of international relation by negotiation” (Berridge 1995, p.1). There is a key 
distinction to be made between diplomacy and negotiation, which is one of the main 
functions of diplomacy: 
“Diplomacy is the management of international relations by 
negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and 
managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the 
diplomatists.” (Nicolson 1963, p.15) 
As Nicolson (1963) states, diplomacy and negotiation are not identical; diplomacy 
refers to the machinery and those processes via which negotiation is carried out. 
When discussing aims and policies of states, some define diplomacy as “negotiation 
between political entities which acknowledge each other’s independence” (Watson 
1982, p.33). As Berridge (1995) explains, diplomacy happens, through negotiation, 
with the aim of achieving one or another objective. The latter may vary from 
recognizing certain conflicting interests and agreeing on a compromise in order to 
identify common interests and agreeing on joint actions; it may also be a 
combination of these. Negotiation rather than the use of force is a function of 
diplomacy. Negotiation can be understood as a form of dialogue between states, 
hence it relies on communication, another function of diplomacy. 
29 
Watson (1982), departs from the definitions provided by both Oxford and Webster 
dictionaries, in assessing the nature of the diplomatic dialogue and defines 
diplomacy via the existence of a dialogue between states. This brings in the focus on 
an important dimension and function of diplomacy – communication. Communication 
relies on information-gathering, information-negotiating and identifying other actors’ 
intentions which become central attributes of communication especially in an era of 
complex international relations where ‘information ricochets around the world’ (Bull 
2002; Berridge 1995; Battersby & Siracusa, 2009). Scholars constantly outline that in 
diplomatic relations communication is existential. Feltham (2004) emphasized that 
the communication revolution has produced an impact on the development of 
diplomatic relations. Berridge (2005) dedicates the second part of his book 
“Diplomacy: theory and practice” to the important functions of diplomacy beyond 
negotiations, emphasizing the role of information exchange. The author explains that 
in both bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations communication is omnipresent – 
ranging from face-to-face diplomacy to telephone/internet diplomacy. 
Communication is quintessential for diplomacy; it is that dimension of diplomacy on 
which all other functions rely. As Neumann (2008) explains it, “clear communication 
of intent is a key diplomatic task” (p. 25). 
At this point we can revisit the prerequisites identified in Table 1 for international 
actorness and add the diplomatic functions (see Table 2 below). In this way, an 
international presence of the EU as a diplomatic actor happens via representation, 
as the EU requires recognition, legitimacy and authority in the receiving country. 
Through embracing this function, a diplomatic actor establishes a diplomatic 
infrastructure, which, traditionally is represented by the ministries of foreign affairs 
and the network of embassies and diplomatic representations abroad. The functions 
of communication and negotiation facilitate the enforcement of the other two 
prerequisites – opportunity and capabilities. The established diplomatic machinery in 
the receiving state is the one that is involved in identifying and evaluating the 
capabilities and intentions of other actors; in collating the information received from 
other embassies and sources and communicating a coherent picture on the 
developments in the receiving country to the foreign affairs ministry in the capital of 
the sending country and if required, “putting forward to the government a choice of 
appropriate responses to them” (Watson 1982, p. 123); determining the options 
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available to a government and preparing the basis for a policy or new initiatives; 
identifying key emerging issues through reporting on political, social, economic and 
other matters as well as reducing friction between bilateral or multilateral relations if 
and when a conflict arises (Watson 1982; Barston 2013). 
 
Table 2: Prerequisites of (EU) Diplomatic actorness  
Diplomatic 
Actorness 
Presence via the 
function of 
representation 
 Legitimacy 
 Authority 
 Recognition 
 Autonomy 
Opportunity via 
communication and 
negotiation 
 Factors that influence actorness 
 ‘capability-expectations’ gap 
 Cohesion 
 Perception of external policy makers 
Capability via 
communication and 
negotiation 
 Capacity to react to external environment 
 Instruments 
 Resources 
 
A diplomatic actor relies on the fulfilment of the functions of representation, 
communication and negotiation by its machinery. The international interaction among 
actors takes place through the practice of diplomacy that advises, shapes and 
implements foreign policy. More specifically, diplomacy helps articulate, coordinate 
and/or secure certain interests. For a diplomatic actor, this implies representing an 
actor; identifying key issues on political, economic, social or other levels in a third 
country and reporting back; conducting an evaluation of the situation in partner-
countries and preparing the basis for a new policy or initiative or its upgrade; 
negotiating agreements and/or building consensus to avoid conflicts; and last but not 
least articulation and coordination of certain foreign policy interests (Nicolson 1963; 
Livingstone 1964; Watson 1982; Berridge 1995; Barston 2013; Leguey-Feilleux 
2009).  
For a state actor, an analysis of the conduct of diplomacy of one actor pays attention 
to the ministries of foreign affairs and the embassies or diplomatic representations 
around the world today. This is the diplomatic machinery that represents the means 
that advises, shapes and implements foreign policy as well as a means through 
which interests are represented, articulated and coordinated. The discussion on the 
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paradigm of diplomacy, hence, goes beyond the mere distinction between foreign 
policy and diplomacy, and also accounts for the involvement of foreign policy actors 
in diplomacy; and today, diplomacy is not only left to professionals, such as trained 
diplomats, but also to Heads of Governments and parliamentarians, to civils cociety 
organisations and multinational corporations and in the EU to the President of the 
Council, the High Representative and the Commissioners among many others.  
Since the EU is a non-state actor and is not a traditional diplomatic actor, the next 
section is dedicated to mapping out all EU actors that are part of its diplomatic 
machinery, hence it discusses the diplomatic system of the EU, exploring its 
evolution and current organisation in order to position the actors on the ground – the 
EU Delegations and member-state embassies, of interest to this thesis. 
 
2.2.2. The diplomatic system of the EU: actors in EU diplomacy 
Significant changes have been made in the foreign policy design of the European 
Union from the 1992 signing of the Maastricht Treaty that allowed member-states to 
undertake common actions in this field. The innovation regarding diplomacy in 
particular came with the establishment of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), the EU’s diplomatic service which facilitates carrying out the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This is not to say that there was no diplomacy 
carried-out before this, one must acknowledge that the European Union was 
engaged in a form of diplomatic activity: for example, the first delegation in the 
history of the EU was the one of the European communities opened in 1954 in 
London by the European Coal and Steel Community and since 1989, as Bruter 
(1999) shows, 56 new Commission delegations were opened. These were official EU 
representations with no diplomatic functions, but rather information and 
communication offices which were more technical or economic rather than political 
and were not necessarily seen as a fully-fledged diplomatic arm of the EU. 
In 2010, based on a proposal to the Council of Ministers by the High Representative, 
Catherine Ashton, and after the adoption of a resolution by the European Parliament, 
the EEAS was established and formally launched in January 2011. The aim of this 
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Decision was to establish a fully functional autonomous body15 of the European 
Union under the authority of the High Representative (HR), to ensure consistency 
across the different areas of external relations, including policy areas and institutions 
such as the Council and the Commission. The EEAS hence became the EU’s 
diplomatic service, with most of the daily work carried out by five departments that 
cover the Americas, the Greater Middle East, the Asia-Pacific, Africa and Europe 
and Central Asia (the detailed organisational chart is provided in Annex 5). 
According to the Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS is the central administration that has its 
headquarters in Brussels and also has a network of EU Delegations in third countries 
and international organisations (see Table 3 below). As the EEAS Human Resources 
report indicates there were 4,189 staff members (both statutory staff and external 
staff) working for this organisation towards the end of 2015, out of which 1,928 
(46,02%) worked in Brussels and 2,261 (53,97%) in the Delegations (EEAS, 2016a). 
In practice, the overall diplomatic architecture of the EU involves a series of actors 
such as the HR, the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), other EU institutions, 
such as the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament, the 139 
Delegations as well as member-states’ diplomatic representation. Below is a brief 
description of actors at the central level such as the EU HR and other institutions and 
the ones on the ground such as the Union Delegation and the national embassies (of 
interest in this research). 
 
EU High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission 
It was the Amsterdam Treaty that introduced in 1999 the position of ‘High 
Representative’ (HR) for the CFSP first held by Javier Solana. The role of the HR 
was to contribute to preparing, formulating and implementing EU policy decisions; to 
coordinate EU Special Representatives (EUSR); to conduct and maintain political 
dialogue with third parties and therefore provide assistance to the European Council. 
In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty further developed the role of the HR; now called the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and also 
including the post of the Vice-President of the Commission undertaken first by 
                                                   
15 Some would argue that it was not an autonomous body as it was esentiallly an instrument of the member-state, but as the 
EEAS has further developed we refer to it as an autonomous body. 
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Catherine Ashton and after 2014 by Federica Mogherini. The EEAS is tasked with 
supporting the HR/VP in the overall conducting and developing of the CFSP; with 
coordinating all aspects of external relations, including trade, humanitarian aid and 
crisis response, development and the neighbourhood policy; building consensus 
between EU member-states on their priorities and attending the meetings in the 
European Council; participating in the European Parliament debates on CFSP 
matters as well as representing the EU in international institutions. 
 
EU Special Representatives 
Since 1996 the European Union has deployed EUSRs to different regions around the 
world and to different countries based on a specific theme, such as human rights, for 
example. They support the work of the HR and promote EU’s policies and interests; 
they play an important role when it comes to crisis-management issues in their 
efforts of consolidating peace, stability and the rule of law in such places like 
Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, Central Asia or Kosovo, just to name a few (EEAS, 
2015). 
 
Other EU institutions 
The EEAS is also tasked to provide support and cooperate with the diplomatic 
activities of the European Council, the European Commission, the European 
Parliament as well as the diplomatic services of the member-states. The body that 
defines and provides the general guidelines and principles of the CFSP is the 
European Council, where the heads of states and governments meet. The steering 
of EU foreign policy takes place within the Foreign Affairs Council meetings that are 
chaired by the HR/VP and that bring together the Foreign Ministers of the EU 
member-states. The EEAS is mandated to implement and follow up on the policies 
determined by the Council. The cooperation with the European Commission, that is 
the EU’s supranational body, envisions embracing a comprehensive approach in EU 
foreign policy. The Commission has policy initiative and also links CFSP to other 
relevant policy issue areas. The HR/VP has responsibility for chairing the monthly 
meetings of the Commissioners that deal with foreign policy related issues such as 
trade or development. It was the Commission that established the wide network of 
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Commission representations and hence, was the first to play the role in EU’s 
external representation abroad. And finally, the HR/VP is responsible to report on 
both, her activities and on foreign policy matters, to the European Parliament which 
is directly elected by the citizens. It is the Parliament that has the power to approve 
the annual budget for CFSP (together with the Council). 
 
Union Delegations  
The EEAS in 2015 operated 139 Delegations worldwide (presented in Table 3), out 
of which 103 were bilateral delegations responsible for the EU’s relations with a 
single country (for example: EU Delegation in Moldova, Ukraine or Belarus), and 
another 12 – responsible for a group of countries or a region (for example: EU 
Delegation to China, also responsible for Mongolia); 7 regional delegations, 
responsible for another delegation (for example: EU Delegation in Senegal, 
responsible for Gambia); 5 regional delegations dependent from another delegation 
(for example: EU Delegation in Colombia is dependent from the EU Delegation in 
Ecuador); 4 representation offices (for example: EU Office in Kosovo) and 8 
multilateral delegations to international organisations (for example: to African Union, 
UN and others).  
 
Table 3. EU network of Delegations abroad, 2015 
Type List of countries 
Total 
number 
Bilateral 
(responsible for 
single country) 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Burkina Faso 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haïti 
Honduras 
Iceland 
Iraq 
Israël 
Ivory Coast 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea 
Kyrgyzstan 
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Serbia 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Somalia 
South Africa 
South Sudan 
Sudan 
Syria 
Swaziland 
103 
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Burma/Myanmar 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Chili 
Congo Rep. 
Congo Dem. Rep 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Djibouti 
Dominican 
Republic 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
FYROM 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Lybia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United States of 
America 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Bilateral 
(responsible for 
groups of 
country or a 
region) 
Barbados 
China 
Fiji 
Gabon 
India 
Indonesia 
Jamaica 
Kazakhstan 
Mauritius 
Saudi Arabia 
Sri Lanka 
Switzerland 
12 
Regional 
(responsible for 
another 
delegation) 
Australia  New Zealand 
Colombia  Ecuador 
Guyana  Trinidad and Tobago 
Nicaragua  Office Panama 
Solomon Islands  Vanuatu 
Senegal  Gambia 
Thailand  Laos 
7 
Regional 
(dependent 
from another 
delegation) 
Ecuador  Colombia 
Gambia  Senegal 
Laos  Thailand 
New Zealand  Australia 
Trinidad and Tobago  Guyana 
5 
Representation 
offices 
In China (Hong Kong) 
West Bank and Gaza Strip 
Kosovo 
Taiwan 
4 
Multilateral 
delegations (to 
African Union 
UN 
8 
36 
international 
organisations) 
WTO 
OECD/UNESCO 
FAO-Holy See-Order of Malta 
CoE 
UN/IAEA/OSCE 
ASEAN (covered by the Delegation in Indonesia) 
Total 139 
Source: Data compiled by the author in 2015 based on the information provided on the EEAS website 
 
In terms of regional distribution, the 2,261 EEAS staff members were deployed (in 
2015) mostly to Africa (33%) and Europe and Central Asia (20%), followed by the 
other regions as can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Staff in Delegations, 2015 (per regions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data compiled by the author from the 2016 EEAS Human Resources report 
 
A Delegation may comprise both EEAS and Commission staff, according to the 
Decision establishing the functioning of the EEAS that specifies that in areas where 
the Commission exercises powers it may also issue instructions to the HoD. Besides 
the 2,261 EEAS staff members posted to the Delegations there were another 3,541 
staff members of the European Commission working in the Delegations (in 2015 
according to EEAS, 2016). A significant number of staff placed in the Delegations 
were local agents (1,107 members): local agents are employed by the EEAS for 
manual or service duties and are working in places outside the European Union, 
according to local law (ibidem). The Delegations also must be able to respond to the 
needs of the European Parliament. In relation to the member-states, the Delegations 
are expected to share information and work in close cooperation with the latter as 
Americas 
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well as offer support to them in diplomatic matters including consular protection of 
the citizens of the EU. At the end of 2015 out of 434 seconded national experts 
(SNEs) in the EEAS 58 were based in the Delegations (13,36%) and the vast 
majority were “cost-free” (entirely paid by their sending MS).  
Within one Delegation, European civil servants, national diplomats and local staff 
work together under the authority of the Head of Delegation (HoD). It is the HoD that 
is responsible for the overall management of a Delegation, is in charge of ensuring 
the coordination of all actions of the EU overseas, has the power to represent the 
Union and is accountable to the HR/VP. As the Human Resources report shows, at 
the end of 2015, there were 282 managers in the EEAS, including officials, 
temporary agents16 and SNEs17: 90 staff members occupied middle management 
posts and 29 staff members occupied senior management posts in Brussels while in 
the Delegations: 144 occupied middle management and 19 senior management 
posts. Out of 134 HoDs, 63 posts were occupied by Member State diplomats (this 
number grew to 47% as Figure 2 shows), of those, 16 were nationals of Member 
States who joined the Union in 2004, 2007 and 2013 (25%). All EU nationalities were 
represented at the Head of Delegation level, with the exception of five Member 
States: Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovakia (EEAS, 2016). 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of Member States diplomats as Head of Delegation, 2011-2015 
 
                                                   
16 Temporary Agents in the EEAS are essentially staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States 
contracted to fill temporarily permanent establishment plan posts in the EEAS. 
17 Seconded National Experts are employed by a national administration and seconded to the EEAS. 
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Source: Data provided by the 2016 EEAS Human Resources report 
 
 
Member-states’ diplomatic representations 
The classic embassies are an old tool of diplomacy, dating back to the mid-1450s, 
and are until today an important foreign policy means of representation and are 
involved in activities of negotiation, communication, and engagement with the 
government and public in the host country, information gathering and sharing as well 
as consular work (Leguey-Feilleux, 2009; Watson 1983). 
 
Table 4. National diplomatic missions worldwide, 2014 
Country 
 
No. foreign representations 
worldwide18 
Out of which 
total number of embassies 
Austria 371 83 
Belgium 399 93 
Bulgaria 143 74 
Croatia 140 54 
Cyprus 158 45 
Czech Republic 259 88 
Denmark 492 74 
Estonia 196 34 
Finland 438 73 
France 721 165 
Germany 569 155 
Greece 268 84 
Hungary 288 77 
Ireland 163 58 
Italy 661 124 
Latvia 171 34 
Lithuania 180 39 
Luxembourg 156 30 
Malta 180 23 
Netherlands 446 111 
Poland 290 89 
Portugal 298 71 
Romania 310 92 
Slovakia 203 64 
Slovenia 111 37 
                                                   
18 Including consulates, honorary consulates, trade representations and other diplomatic representations (such as offices). 
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Spain 498 119 
Sweden 441 89 
United Kingdom 432 149 
 highest number of embassies 
 lowest number of embassies 
Source: Data compiled by the author in 2014 based on the websites of the above embassies, their Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the EEAS as well as the www.embassypages.com website. 
 
In third countries, besides Union Delegation there is a wide diplomatic network of MS 
national embassies – diplomatic representation that allows them to establish and 
maintain relations outside their national borders. Table 4 above shows that in 2014 
France, Germany and Italy were among the member-states that had over 500 
foreign representations worldwide; and together with the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Spain had over 100 embassies worldwide. 
 
Overview of the EU diplomatic network in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus 
 
Table 5. EU diplomatic missions worldwide and presence in Belarus, Moldova and 
Ukraine, 2015 
Country 
 MD UKR BLR 
No. foreign 
representations 
worldwide19 
Out of which 
total number of 
embassies 
Presence 
Austria 371 83  √ √ 
Belgium 399 93  √  
Bulgaria 143 74 √ √ √ 
Croatia 140 54  √  
Cyprus 158 45  √  
Czech Republic 259 88 √ √ √ 
Denmark 492 74  √  
Estonia 196 34 √ √ √ 
Finland 438 73  √  
France 721 165 √ √ √ 
Germany 569 155 √ √ √ 
Greece 268 84  √  
Hungary 288 77 √ √ √ 
Ireland 163 58    
Italy 661 124 √ √ √ 
Latvia 171 34 √ √ √ 
Lithuania 180 39 √ √ √ 
Luxembourg 156 30    
                                                   
19 Including consulates, honorary consulates, trade representations and other diplomatic representations (such as offices). 
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Malta 180 23    
Netherlands 446 111  √  
Poland 290 89 √ √ √ 
Portugal 298 71  √  
Romania 310 92 √ √ √ 
Slovakia 203 64 √ √ √ 
Slovenia 111 37  √  
Spain 498 119  √  
Sweden 441 89 √ √ √ 
United Kingdom 432 149 √ √ √ 
EU 140 140 √ √ √ 
 no presence 
 highest number of embassies 
 lowest number of embassies 
Source: Data compiled by the author in 2014 and updated in 2015 based on the websites of the above 
embassies, their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the EEAS as well as the www.embassypages.com website 
 
The development of the EU diplomatic system comes indeed as an example of 
challenging the traditional forms of diplomacy while it still relies on stationing of its 
representatives in host countries, hence adhering to the backbone of diplomacy i.e. 
posting diplomatic missions to third countries. An overview of the EU diplomatic 
network worldwide, represented by both the member-state embassies and the EU 
Delegations, shows that between 2014 and 2017 EU had a growing diplomatic 
network, comparable to some of the biggest member-states: it ranked fourth (after 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom) compared to the 28 member states (see 
Table 5). 
 
Table 6. Distribution of EEAS and Commission staff in the Delegations in Eastern 
Europe 
Eastern Europe 
 Staff 
 Commission EEAS  Total  
Countries 
Belarus 17 10 27 
Moldova 26 11 37 
Ukraine 74 28 102 
Source: Data drawn from Bicchi & Maurer (2018), Table 2, page 16 (staff numbers have been provided 
to the authors by EEAS staff in March, 2016) 
 
The Lisbon Treaty in particular impacted the former Commission representations and 
specifically the political dimension of European diplomatic cooperation abroad, it is 
however interesting to note that the number of EEAS staff by early 2016 in the 
41 
Delegations in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus was still lower than that of Commission 
staff (see Table 6).  
In both Belarus and Moldova, the European diplomatic system was represented by 
member-states and EU diplomatic representations: 15 in Belarus and 15 in Moldova. 
The diplomatic community is rather small and EU actors play a major role in this 
community: “we conduct diplomacy on two main levels. One, more concrete, 
involves dealing with local authorities in the host country and thus developing 
bilateral relations. And another, a broader one, to try to create a proper climate and 
atmosphere to serve peace and development, especially for the younger generations 
to come” (interv. 28). In Belarus, given the geopolitical context of the country and the 
crisis in Ukraine, diplomacy is about “spreading of national and EU good ideas” 
within a small group of diplomats “where everyone knows everyone” (interv. 34).  
In Ukraine, the EU diplomatic community was represented by almost all member-
states, 26 national embassies the EU delegation, with only Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Malta not having a diplomatic representation in Kiev. Here, the diplomatic community 
is rather large, and as a result EU diplomatic actors have to always maintain contact, 
be involved, be competitive and very active in order to be heard and seen. The 
conduct of diplomacy becomes “a skill that helps maintain foreign relations in a 
supportive, cooperative manner and we are involved in change-related processes 
and influences in host countries” (interv. 18). Both an EU and a member-state 
“diplomat should know what is really going on; to try to influence the situation in 
order to reach the goals of my country” (interv. 21). 
In Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, both the EU Delegations and the MS embassies 
carry out the EU’s foreign policy objectives and are involved in exporting EU rules 
and norms. Developing an extensive diplomatic presence worldwide should add 
value to the EU’s efforts in its neighbourhood. Whereas the set-up of the EU’s 
diplomatic architecture secures it with presence and representation, central to this 
thesis is its performance. On the background of progress in certain areas of foreign 
policy (areas like deploying operations under the ESDP/CSDP), scholars emphasize 
the issue of the ‘coordination reflex’ (White 2001) which underlines that there may or 
may not be a collective commitment issue not only to reach agreements but to 
effectively coordinate actions. In the following section, central to the discussion is 
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what the EU professes and how it achieves it beyond its borders and specifically in 
Eastern Europe. Such an analysis is key in order to show the symptoms of the 
problems of EU actorness in Eastern Europe and propose how EU diplomacy might 
be relevant to overcoming these, labelled below as foreign policy dilemmas, through 
proposing a set of working assumptions. 
 
2.3. EU foreign policy dilemmas in Eastern Europe 
Central to the discussion in this section is what the EU professes vs. how it achieves 
it beyond its borders (Wood 2009). The analysis below emphasizes that in its 
immediate neighbourhood the EU’s actorness faces challenges that entrap it in 
certain foreign policy dilemmas. The EU and its member states are wobbling 
between the choices of values vs. interest-driven decisions, problems of collective 
action and choices of markets and institutions vs geopolitics. These challenges used 
to drive MS and EU institutions apart in the past and are still relevant today. Given 
the changes related to the EU diplomatic actorness proposed by the Lisbon Treaty, 
the general expectation in this thesis is that a successful diplomatic actor should 
manage to solve or bypass the three dilemmas through the practice of diplomacy. 
Hence this section concludes with a set of working assumptions on how EU 
diplomacy might be relevant in overcoming these dilemmas. 
 
2.3.1. EU actorness entrapped in foreign policy dilemmas 
An analytical evaluation of the literature on EU’s effects in the neighbourhood allows 
us to identify three main foreign policy dilemmas that EU is confronted with. The 
reluctance of member states to submit certain areas of decision-making to the EU 
level, the issue of coordination of positions and cooperation, deployment of 
humanitarian assistance are just a few from a range of EU foreign policy dilemmas. 
Pruitt and Kim (2004) describe dilemmas in foreign policy as certain “trade-offs 
among the [...] strategies, in the sense that choosing one of them makes choosing 
the others less likely” (p. 39 as cited in Feste, 2011). Foreign policy dilemmas often 
arise from a need to seek balance between objectives and resources, means and 
aims, long-term and short-term solutions (ibidem). Weighed against their costs, 
benefits, appropriateness and legitimacy, these choices lay the foundation of a 
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strategic approach to the foreign policy (Missiroli 2010). Notably, it is in the EU 
context that foreign policy dilemmas present themselves particularly prominently due 
to the complexity of the EU’s institutional architecture, its deep embeddedness into 
international processes and policies and unresolved issues of the EU’s identity in 
world politics (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008; Hill & Smith 2011).  
 
Values vs interests 
This dilemma is straight-forward in portraying the conflicting nature of the 
relationship between normative and material dimensions of the EU’s external 
relations. Whereas the dilemma is straightforward it is not that simple to distinguish 
analytically between values and interests as these may be seen as part of the same 
competition for priority especially in bringing stability and security on the EU’s 
borders. Nonetheless, the distinction sheds light on a specific dichotomy in EU 
external relations pertaining to the goals of its policies (Carlsnaes, 2008): while the 
EU more often than not defines the objectives of its external policies within the ENP, 
when it comes to action, those normative principles are frequently downplayed by 
competing (economic) interests (Carothers, 2011; Youngs, 2004; Lappin, 2010). This 
is especially important in the Eastern neighbourhood, as the EU justifies its policies 
in the region with a discourse of ‘shared values’ and ‘joint ownership’. The EU is 
trying to balance between the two despite the general tendency of how MS may 
agree on general and common EU goals such as democracy or human rights; 
fundamentally they may disagree on the mechanisms of achieving them (Smith 
2011). Although it can be argued that the EU can “[perform] effectively in the pursuit 
of some material interests” (Thomas, 2010, p. 3), the pursuit of these interests 
should not discredit or prevail over the values. Research on the ENP questions the 
extent to which EU is value-driven or interest-driven in its policy and whether the 
latter reflects on EU’s emphasis on political values rather than economic ones 
(Bosse, 2007). Findings show that the ‘value dimension’ of the ENP is due to 
“strategic bargaining and trade-offs between the member-states and beween the 
member-states and EU institutions, rather than a wider EU-level agreement on a set 
of shared political values” (ibidem, p. 58); which links back to EU’s stated 
commitment to ‘shared values’ while offering everything ‘but the institutions’ to its 
neighbours. This offers room for the EU’s ambiguous approach in external relations 
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especially when the democracy promotion agenda is pursued alongside other EU 
agendas on economic interest, security and strategic diplomacy (Cardwell 2011; 
Kurki 2012). Values and interests are cornerstone categories of foreign policy 
strategies that lie at the centre of the long debates between (neo)liberal and 
(neo)realist camps in International Relations. While the EU more often than not 
defines the objectives of its external policies as promotion of the principles of 
democracy and rule of law, effective multilateralism and cooperation, when it comes 
to action those normative principles are frequently downplayed by competing 
economic and security concerns (Youngs 2004; Bosse 2007; Carothers 2011; 
Gawrich et al. 2010; Wetzel 2011).  
The trade-off between value and interest-based considerations might damage 
severely the credibility of EU actorness in Eastern Europe. For example, recent 
research on external governance hypothesizes that the efficiency of rule-transfer is 
dependent on the embedding of democratic rules, norms and principles in the EU 
acquis; or on the trans-governmental interactions between the EU and its 
international partners in third countries (Lavenex & Shimmelfening 2011). This 
implies that the EU is a credible legal actor perceived likewise by the international 
actors that interact with it. Research indirectly raises questions of EU credibility in the 
way in which it designed ENP tools – the Action Plans – in vaguer terms, with 
unclear finality or link between the EU conditions and rewards (Casier 2011a). Or, 
while the EU seems to be willing to offer more ‘tangible rewards’ via the ENP’s 
Eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) financial support is limited or is 
not yet made available and the finality of it remains ambiguous (Casier 2011a; 
Schmidtke & Chira-Pascanut 2011). This ‘politics of half-open door’ (Timmermann 
2003 as cited in Schmidtke & Chira-Pascanut (2011)) highlights the issue of EU 
credibility. On top of this, the emphasis in research on the geopolitical and economic 
interests that prevail over the ‘shared values’ of democracy and human rights 
stipulated in the ENP further draws attention to issues of EU credibility (Belyi 2012; 
Bosse 2007, 2009; Gawrich et al., 2010; Wetzel, 2011 and others). This is especially 
important in Eastern European countries such as Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus 
where the EU justifies its policies with a reference to ‘shared values’ and ‘joint 
ownership’.  
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Cardwell (2011) explains how the EU, through the Treaty of Lisbon, embraced a 
mandate of democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective in relation to 
neighbouring countries as it aims to establish good neighbourliness and prosperity 
based on the EU’s values. Several observations are noteworthy from the author’s 
analysis of EU’s democracy promotion in external relations. First, this is done without 
providing a clear definition of ‘democracy’ (ibidem). Second, the ‘common’ or 
‘shared’ values discourse is questionable, as “the nature of what values are ‘shared’ 
can be varied according to the EU’s own interests” (p. 25). And third, the EU is more 
likely to be successful if it successfully exports its model of democracy, as in the 
long-term, the EU benefits from stability and economic prosperity of its neighbours 
around the world. In mapping out EU democracy promotion in action, Cardwell 
(2011) identifies two tendencies. One refers to a positive form of democracy 
promotion, meaning improving some aspects of democracy and human rights in 
neighbour countries through use of conditionality. This can be done expressly, 
through its policies/measures, or implied – when the EU projects the vision of 
democracy/democratic standards without having it as a particular aim. The second 
one refers to a negative form of democracy promotion, that applies the same logic of 
conditionality as in the positive form, but applying sanctions when a third state does 
not rectify the situation. This is also done by the EU expressly – suspending aid, 
imposing sanctions and using human rights clauses in its agreements; or implicitly 
(more difficult to identify) - using conditionality indirectly “by implying to a third state 
that relations could be improved by following the example of its neighbouring states” 
(p. 29). Whichever form the EU chooses to apply it is still criticised for “the double 
standards in EU democracy support, the weaknesses of the existing structures in 
pushing for democracy, and the continuing rigidities in the EU’s civil society support” 
(Kurki 2012, p. 6).  
 
Problems of collective action 
The focus of this dilemma is on member states. Research emphasizes the 
importance of EU collective international action for the “European states to make an 
effective impact on the shaping of global politics” (Whitman & Juncos 2009, p.6) and 
brings forward evidence regarding the EU’s potential for collective action and 
success in maintaining solidarity (Smith 2006; Stewart 2010). Yet, EU collective 
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action towards other actors is exposed to the negative effects of member states’ 
autonomous moves. Hence, “when member states disagree, or are at cross 
purposes, this can be a disaster for EU” (Stewart 2010, p.15). Although the idea of 
the CFSP upgraded by the Lisbon Treaty was to spur convergence of MS’ interests 
that should lead to collective action, the reality often shows the opposite. When 
important national interests are at stake member states often opt to avoid EU-level 
instruments and act unilaterally in external relations (Hill 1998; Rummel & 
Wiedermann 1998; Smith 2006; Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008; Thomas 2010). 
Moreover, in their bilateral policies towards third countries member states might even 
find themselves in competition with each other (Youngs 2009; Youngs 2011; Casier 
2011b). Bilateral policies and divergent approaches towards third countries, regions 
or international organisations may significantly undermine the common EU policy 
and, consequently, the EU’s impact in those settings. In this sense, a common vision 
(a vision channelled in terms of actions) towards one country or one region in the 
perspective of minimization of the negative effects of the bilateral relations is crucial. 
As emphasized by a group of scholars this relates to the extent to which the EU can 
reach internal agreement and then project it and support it through actions 
accordingly; acting as one in bilateral or multilateral settings remains an important 
indicator of the EU’s performance internationally (Laatikainen & Smith 2006). In 
evaluating the EU’s global role, Stewart (2010) concludes that in relation to certain 
partners like China or Russia, there is lack of consensus among member-states, the 
latter maintain bilateral relations with them that are not aligned to the EU’s bilateral 
strategy “and a weak EU diplomacy in the face of powerful states espousing a 
fundamentally different world view to that of the EU” (p. 16). Assessing the EU’s 
response to the Libyan crisis, Koenig’s (2011) research shows that “nearly every 
aspect of it was marked by vertical incoherence” (p. 28), i.e. mini-lateral action 
undertaken by certain MS that showed inconsistencies with the diplomatic course 
agreed upon at EU level. Whether it is the EU’s relations with its strategic partners, 
like Russia or China or other neighbours from the ENP countries, the EU’s 
performance in international politics depends on its internal cohesiveness: “if there is 
a consolidated internal actor identity, there should also follow some sort of external 
actorship, having more or less impact in different places and issue areas” (Hettne 
2008, p.2).  
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Rule-transfer vs geopolitics 
The third dilemma is related to the EU’s geopolitical identity in world politics. It refers 
to the debated issue of EU’s ontological choice between geopolitical and market 
based solutions in relation to other actors in a particular region (Casier 2011c; Belyi 
2012; Kazantsev 2012; Grevi 2012). It is argued that in its dealings with external 
actors the EU is balancing between a pragmatic, even technical, cooperation driven 
by economic considerations and legalistic approach, and an increasing necessity to 
accommodate its geopolitical role if the EU wants to be more influential (Youngs 
2007; Youngs 2009; Thomas 2010; Vasilyan 2011; Bosse & Schmidt-Felzmann 
2011). In practice, the EU lacks pan-European market mechanisms in energy20, for 
instance, and if MS deliberate on energy security they do so as a state-led priority 
instead of a European one while masking geopolitical trends in rule-based discourse 
(Youngs 2007). It can also be assumed that the EU’s inability or unwillingness to 
assume a strong geopolitical posture might negatively affect its credibility among 
partners and hence diminish EU’s impact. For example, earlier studies on EU 
governance and the relationship with its neighbours explain that EU external 
governance is conditioned, inter alia, by security reasons; it is the concern about 
security at EU borders that defined ENP’s focus, inter alia, on justice and home 
affairs, environmental and energy policy (Lavenex 2004). This is explained through 
the ‘geopolitical boundary’ and the ‘legal/institutional boundary’, identified by Smith 
(1996), both of which feature the export of EU rule of law outside its borders based 
on security considerations, institutional contacts and a ‘community of law’. Other 
studies (Gänzle 2008; Bengtsson 2008) follow up this observation and reiterate that 
the EU-ENP relationship is also influenced by the EU’s geopolitical boundary, in 
particular by the shape of the EU-Russia relationship. These observations point to 
the geopolitical position of the region of Eastern Europe. It is in the Russian sphere 
of influence; the EU’s Eastern neighbours were a part of the Soviet Union or the 
                                                   
20 In order to show the dichotomous dynamic of this dilemma, energy is chosen as one of the most prominent examples when it 
comes to Eastern European neighbours and is one of the key dimensions of interest in EU-ENP relations (Bosse, 2011). It is of 
outmost importance for this dilemma as, on the one hand, EU MS are dependent on Russia in this area as well as Moldova, 
Ukraine and Belarus, to whom Russia provide loans and subsidises energy supplies, and grant access to the regional market 
(Bosse, 2012). 
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Soviet bloc for 45 years and still remain under Russia’s close watch and sphere of 
interest.  
The inverse of this statement is relevant in this case: additional involvement of 
international actors (such as the Russian Federation in a region of its own interest 
like Eastern Europe) who are usually non-supportive of the EU can counterbalance 
EU’s rule-transfer efforts. Dimitrova and Dragneva (2009) indicate in their research 
that in the EU-Ukraine relationship, the Russian Federation, having particular 
leverage power over Ukrainian politics, influences rule-transfer. Or as Schmidtke and 
Chira-Pascanut (2011) point out, recently, the EU agenda in the former Soviet Union 
states is contended by the Russian one. These geopolitical observations have been 
only sporadically mentioned and have not been thoroughly examined when 
analysing EU rule-transfer to the ENP countries. Some argue that the EU “should 
devise a proactive strategy and act upon it, irrespective of the ramifications this may 
have on the relations with such powers as Russia and/or the United States” 
(Vasilyan 2011, p. 357). In relation to the Russian Federation for example, by 
assuming a greater geopolitical role and tying its energy relations with Russia to its 
foreign policy objectives the EU can resist Russia’s ‘energy weapon’. Moreover, 
through engaging in realpolitik the EU can send the right signals to Moscow that 
when it comes to issues of strategic importance, it is Brussels, and not member 
states’ capitals, which the Kremlin needs to negotiate with. 
This is not to propose that the EU should abandon or underplay its wide and 
beneficial cooperation with Russia. It is to say that rather than constantly looking at 
its common neighbours in Eastern Europe through the lens of Russian interests, the 
EU needs to shape its actions in the region in line with its policies and design its 
instruments accordingly. If the EU’s approach to Eastern Europe is based on rule-
transfer, then emphasis on democracy promotion in official rhetoric alone does not 
suffice, especially when “EU energy security concerns have also been driving the 
European Commission to develop even closer ties [with Eastern neighbours]” 
(Bosse, 2011, p. 451). For example, the EU’s political rapprochement with Belarus 
coincides with EU’s growing dependence on Russian energy and on the background 
of Russia-Ukraine gas crises (as described in Chapter 6). 
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2.3.2. Use of diplomacy to deal with foreign policy dilemmas: working assumptions  
The three dilemmas presented above reflect three ambiguities of EU international 
actorness; ambiguities that arise during the EU’s interactions in international politics. 
These ambiguities or symptoms of EU actorness link back to prerequisites of EU 
international actorness and the functions of diplomacy. They show that the EU has 
major challenges to overcome related to its goals (values vs. interests), to achieving 
coherence and convergence in actions (problem of collective action) and related to 
its political stamina and the range of instruments it uses (markets and institutions vs 
geopolitics). The Lisbon Treaty was intended to address these challenges in foreign 
policy via, inter alia, setting a new institutional framework. This framework brings 
together EU external policy tools within the EEAS through which a unification of the 
diplomatic efforts of the European Commission, the Council Secretariat and that of 
the EU member states (MS). In this manner the Treaty sets out to answer to the key 
international challenges and claims to establish the basis for more effective and 
coherent external action. This is due to the developments in EU’s external action of 
creating the EU’s diplomatic arm, the EEAS. Hence the central question of this thesis 
arises: to what extent has the EU developed as a successful diplomatic actor after 
the inauguration of the EEAS? As already noted, the general expectation in this 
sense is that a successful diplomatic actor should manage to solve or bypass the 
three dilemmas through the practice of diplomacy. The unpacking of the analytical 
and methodological problems of understanding success is a challenging 
undertaking. Therefore having set an exploratory research design allows us to 
propose a set of assumptions as a research instrument (explained in detail in the 
methodology section 1.3 of the Introduction.) which are not statistically tested but 
provide for a certain mode of associative relationships (Patidar, 2013). 
 
1) Post-Lisbon EU diplomacy with an institutional distinctiveness is able to articulate 
its own stated objectives 
Analysing an actor’s performance can be based on an evaluation of their specific 
tasks, policies and procedures (Gutner & Thompson 2010; Cohen & Levinthal 1990; 
Zahra & George 2002). This allows the examination of how narrow functions are 
performed and whether these have been successfully executed. The values vs 
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interests dilemma clearly identified a conflicting nature between material and 
normative dimensions of EU external actions. A way to address this is to go back to 
the goals and objectives set by the EU. For instance, the EU’s own ‘horizontal’ 
strategies (Treaties) and/or country-specific agreements (European Neighbourhood 
Policy, Association Agreements) often contain a set of objectives whose fulfilment 
can be used as a measure of its success. These are officially presented in 
declarations of the European Council and/or key policy announcements by senior EU 
officials. Clearly explaining the EU’s goals, fostering their understanding in third 
countries is part of the EU’s public diplomacy strategy. On the ground especially 
diplomacy becomes the tool for the EU to secure its set objectives.  
The expectation of this assumption is, first of all, that on the ground the Union 
Delegation fully embraces its diplomatic function of representation in all aspects of 
external relations, on the one hand. It also implies, on the other hand, that MS’ 
diplomatic representations on the ground are perfectly comfortable with such a 
distribution of roles. The flaws of the pre-Lisbon institutional system are often linked 
to the lack of continuity and leadership. The system of rotating Presidencies implied 
that third parties had to constantly adjust to the new interlocutors, which usually 
impacted negatively on EU visibility and created an institutional chaos for the Council 
Secretariat to bridge the gaps or address inconsistencies (Vanhoonacker & 
Pomorska 2016). In third countries, while some Presidencies were able to show 
strong leadership, others lacked resources or were reluctant to engage (Baltag & 
Smith, 2015). Therefore, in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, the EU, as a successful 
diplomatic actor, should acknowledge the importance of a strong non-fragmented 
leadership and strengthen EU continuity in external relations. 
Besides the Lisbon Treaty, the ENP becomes an obvious key reference point for this 
assumption as it is the umbrella-framework for the official relations between the EU 
and Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. The EU leadership, with the creation of the 
EEAS, has yet again singled out the ENP as one of the three priorities for the EU’s 
international relations (Ashton 2010). The way in which EU’s evolving institutional 
ecosystem has affected the articulation and execution of EU policy in Eastern 
Europe has not been clear cut. Following the attribution of legal personality to the EU 
via the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Delegations are designed to communicate “values, 
policies and results of its projects toward third country stakeholders” (Duke 2013, p. 
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25) as the latter now represent the combined interests of the EU’s external action. 
Hence, second of all, the expectation of this assumption is that in Eastern Europe, 
there is an ability of European and national institutions (i.e. EU Delegation and MS 
embassies) to implement the ENP’s set policy goals of promoting democratic 
governance in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. 
 
2) The changes in post-Lisbon diplomacy imply convergence of member states actions 
and build up coherence 
The importance of cohesion has been reaffirmed by the Lisbon Treaty and also 
emphasized by EU’s second High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, at her European Parliament hearing 
(European Parliament 2014) and is central in the political guidelines of the Juncker-
led Commission (Commission 2014b). Divergence of member states’ interests and 
that of interests among Brussels institutions is the most cited reason for the 
dysfunctionalities of the EU’s strategy in international politics. The literature 
emphasizes the importance of EU collective international action for the “European 
states to make an effective impact on the shaping of global politics” (Whitman and 
Juncos 2009, p.6) and brings forward evidence regarding the EU’s potential for 
collective action and success in maintaining solidarity (Smith 2006; Stewart 2010; 
White 2001). The collective action dilemma has emphasized these issues showing 
how disagreement among member-states or member-states and the EU can be 
detrimental to the EU. For example, the cases of crisis management in the context of 
the ENP (i.e. Moldova, Ukraine or Belarus) have highlighted the predicament of 
collective action based on unanimity (Ker-Lindsay 2015, 2014; Papadimitriou & 
Petrov 2012; Whitman & Wolff, 2010). Moreover, this is at the core of the Lisbon 
Treaty itself which aims at greater coherence (i.e. strengthening EU coordination in 
external relations) which is to be achieved specifically through the cooperation 
between the member states’ diplomatic missions and the EU delegations in third 
countries (Article 32 and 35 TEU and 221 TFEU). 
Against this background, the expectation of this assumption is that, for the EU as a 
diplomatic actor, acting collectively should become especially relevant since there is 
a direct emphasis on cooperation among EU Delegations and MS embassies on the 
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ground. This implies that as a successful diplomatic actor the EU relies on the 
practice of multilateral diplomacy where cooperation is key. It is not only in Brussels 
that the EEAS linked national and EU diplomatic efforts but also on the ground and 
expectations are high in relation to this cooperation. In this sense it is assumed that 
EU diplomatic actors in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus (i.e. EU Delegations and MS 
embassies) are engaging in a set of diplomatic practices that facilitate their 
cooperation towards formulating and implementing a ‘common approach’ as the 
Lisbon Treaty expects. Therefore, the upgraded structural development by the 
Lisbon Treaty should have spurred convergence on the ground in a manner that 
leads to collective action. 
 
3) The level of supranational activism through post-Lisbon diplomacy strengthens EU 
capabilities 
In order to exert and reach a successful performance in international affairs the EU 
has at its disposal various instruments. These instruments define “how, who and 
within which organizational structures to do things in order to attain the defined goals 
and objectives” (Lenschow et al., 2005, p. 805) as well as the ability to adapt to 
change, assimilate new information and use this for innovation (Cohen & Levinthal 
1990; Zahra & George 2002). The rule-transfer vs geopolitics dilemma exposed EU’s 
conflicting nature in choice of mechanisms in third countries – economic and 
legalistic versus geopolitical ones – that more often than not does not play to its 
advantage. Still, the external institutional capacity of the Union, in the context of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), has improved. The process has 
accelerated further since the Treaty of Lisbon and the creation of the EEAS. With the 
EEAS, the EU’s institutional design was meant to help strengthen the European 
Union on the global stage, give it more profile, and enable it to project its interests 
and values more efficiently (Treaty, 2007). The foundation of the EEAS as a new 
institution – referred to as the EU’s diplomatic arm – meant the upgrade of 
Commission representations, already present in third countries, to Union 
Delegations. The establishment of the Service brought together the diplomatic 
dimension from the European Commission, the Council and the Member States 
under the umbrella of one institution; an institution that comes to represent the 
diplomatic service of the EU on the ground via these Delegations (and its 
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cooperation with MS embassies). It was clear that the idea behind the Lisbon Treaty 
in relation to the EU in external relations was to transfer diplomatic tasks to one 
institution with the goal of creating a coherent and effective structure.  
Taking this into consideration, the expectation of this working assumption is that a 
successful EU diplomatic actor may bypass or solve the aforementioned dilemmas 
through manifesting strong capabilities on the ground. Here EU diplomatic 
capabilities should presume a strong diplomatic esprit de corps as creating a 
common European diplomatic culture within the Delegations and the institutional turf-
wars have been much contested (Juncos & Pomorska, 2014; Duke, 2016 and 
others). As scholars noted, diplomacy depends upon “personal relations, common 
experiences and mutual knowledge” (Mendez de Vigo, 2002, p. 6 as cited in Duke, 
2016), therefore competenteces and knowledge are central to this assumption. 
Furthermore, it is not only representing the EU on the ground that matters here, but 
also the way the communication function of diplomacy is embraced: information is 
key in the accumulation of diplomatic capital on the ground and renders an actor its 
influence (Adler-Niessen, 2008). In this sense, the Treaty expects an increased 
degree of information exchange among the EU Delegations and MS embassies on 
the ground (art. 35). Hence, the expectation of this assumption is that the EU 
delegations play a central role as an informational network hub in Moldova, Ukraine 
and Belarus. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has unwrapped the prerequisites of the European Union’s development 
as an international actor and highlighted certain issues in the way the EU embraces 
these prerequisites: such as the EU combining its civilian approach with soft 
imperialism and a sort of pragmatism. It remains criticised for MS still not speaking 
with one voice, for not claiming its geopolitical role or for applying double standards - 
promoting values while pursuing certain interests. The changes in EU foreign policy 
that came with the inauguration of the EEAS and the upgrade to Union Delegations 
come in parallel to the foreign policy dilemmas that the EU has been facing in 
neighbouring countries to the East such as Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. This 
analysis showed how EU actorness faces specific challenges that entrap it in three 
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foreign policy dilemmas presented in the third section. In terms of diplomatic 
actorness the European Union is present and involved in international affairs via its 
network of 139 Delegations as shown in the second section of the chapter. 
Developing such an extensive diplomatic presence worldwide should add value to 
EU’s efforts in its neighbourhood and facilitate dealing with these dilemmas. The 
upgrade to Union Delegations implies that the Delegations represent the Union, that 
they cooperate with MS embassies on the ground, exchange information and 
contribute to formulating and implementing the ‘common approach’ together with MS 
embassies. Taking this into consideration, this chapter concludes with three working 
assumptions that generally show how we expect the EU, as a successful diplomatic 
actor, to solve or bypass the three dilemmas through diplomacy. Therefore, the next 
chapter details an analytical framework to answer the general research question of 
this thesis - ‘to what extent has the EU developed as a successful diplomatic actor 
after the inauguration of the EEAS?’ – and will offer the analytical tools for the 
revision of the working assumptions in Chapter 7. The analytical framework 
operationalises three criteria that served as reference points in collecting the 
empirical evidence presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
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Chapter 3. Analysing EU diplomatic 
performance 
The issue of the EU’s performance in the ‘wider Eastern Europe’ remains poignant, 
not least because of current developments in its ‘neighbourhood’ (such as the crisis 
in Ukraine or Moldova’s downturn from success story to a captured state), the 
uneven pattern of reform across some of the recently admitted states (such as the 
turmoil in Hungary or the ongoing monitoring of Bulgaria and Romania in the area of 
rule of law), and the evident slow pace of progress and even back-sliding in parts of 
the Western Balkans (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia). These cases, inter alia, 
illustrate that the EU’s performance in the area is neither linear nor uncontested; 
questions regarding EU performance thus persist. Performance has been a salient 
issue on the agenda of European policy-makers and remains a recurrent theme in 
the EU’s policies and treaties. The European institutions have placed a great 
emphasis on the performance and ultimate effect of their policies. Much of the EU’s 
own discourse puts emphasis on ‘performance’ as a key driver of its policies and 
engagement with its partners (Commission 2008, 2011, 2015a). In parallel, the 
scholarly literature on EU performance generally questions to what extent the EU 
addresses the most important challenges and whether its instruments are fit for that 
purpose. With a ring of instability that surrounds the EU from the Eastern Europe to 
the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, European diplomacy is in 
great demand and perennial questions regarding EU (diplomatic) performance arise. 
This thesis questions ‘To what extent has the EU developed as a successful 
diplomatic actor after the inauguration of the EEAS?’ To critically assess EU 
diplomatic performance in its immediate neighbourhood in the East, namely in 
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, the analytical framework relies mainly on two sets of 
literature – the one on organisational performance and the one on the ‘practice turn’ 
in IR and EU studies. To analyse and assess success is a notoriously challenging 
task. The analytical framework therefore borrows from organizational performance 
literature. Organizational performance focuses on practice as the unit of analysis in 
order to evaluate: to assess the clarity of the objectives and the vision of an actor. 
This allows us to understand the direction of the implementation of these objectives 
and to reflect on how much progress has been made towards the goals. A 
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performance exercise entails learning to the same extent about what is working and 
what is not. This ultimately may lead to improving, which comes with the capacity to 
adopt and adapt as a performance exercise explores the variety of organisational 
practices (Behn, 2003; Pidd, 2012).  
The body of literature that deals with the EU and diplomacy as a set of practices, of 
interest to this thesis, is the practice turn in IR and EU studies that is part of the 
analytical framework. Scholars put an emphasis on the importance of looking at 
practices especially because it allows us to uncover everyday practices that are not, 
usually, the focus of scholarly research (Adler and Pouilot, 2011). A practice-oriented 
approach, hence, gives the opportunity to understand what is happening on the 
ground (Adler-Nissen, 2016) or, more specifically, to discover the relationship 
between EU and national level diplomacy in third countries. Since there is limited 
scholarly knowledge on what is happening in diplomacy on the ground, incorporating 
practices in this analytical framework will allow us to discover practices that are of 
importance to our general knowledge for the EU diplomatic performance. 
Furthermore, organisational studies, more generally, are interested in what people 
actually do. As some argue, coupling a practice turn with organisational studies can 
“bring new ways of seeing and new questions to ask” (Simpson, 2009). For 
organisational studies scholars, a practice turn becomes a bridge for different levels 
of analysis: “from the very micro (what people say and do); to the meso (routines); to 
the macro (institutions)” (Miettinen et al., 2009, p. 1309). 
When talking about European diplomatic performance abroad, the focus is on 
practices, as the modern definition of diplomacy also identifies it. The examination of 
EU’s success (or failure) is based on its overall performance in the region of Eastern 
Europe and is not based on the evaluation of the success or failure in one policy 
area or another. Especially since scholars have outlined EU’s capacity to influence 
its external environment (Allen & Smith, 1990; Ginsberg, 2001; Hettne, 2011; 
Wunderlich, 2011); this thesis focuses on the external dimension of EU actorness, 
on its actions and achievements. Therefore, the analytical purpose here is not to 
study the cause-effect relationship, but rather the dimensions of everyday diplomatic 
practices in third countries: ‘how things are supposed to be, and the political universe 
of how they very often actually are’ (Sharp, 1999). In this thesis, looking at 
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performance implies examining and evaluating EU diplomatic practices against pre-
set goals. It also allows us to explore the relation between national and EU level in 
the new post-Lisbon setting, where the EUDs perform traditional and new diplomatic 
functions: representing the Union and also cooperating with national embassies. And 
lastly, it allows us to conduct a screening of capabilities and to understand how these 
pertain to the diplomatic realm.  
This chapter first conceptualises the notion of performance before operationalising 
the criteria for assessing performance. It then reviews the practice turn in 
international relations and EU studies and shows how it links to the performance 
approach. The chapter concludes with the operationalisation of three criteria: 
effectiveness, relevance and capabilities. This operationalization is adapted from the 
organisational studies (performance) literature (Lusthaus et al., 2002 and others) and 
the practice turn in IR/EU studies literature (Adler and Pouliot, 2011 and others). 
 
3.1. Performance: definitions, approaches and perspectives 
The rationale behind studying EU performance in international politics stems from 
the academic debate which calls for increasing focus on the EU’s results and 
achievements in world affairs (Ginsberg 2001; Mahncke 2011). So far the scholarly 
research dedicated to exploring and unpacking the notion of EU performance has 
been scarce. Notable examples include the studies that analyse EU performance in 
multilateral institutions (Oberthür et al. 2013; Jørgensen & Laatikainen 2013). More 
common, however, is the focus on EU impact, EU role performance, EU legitimacy 
and EU effectiveness in international affairs (Smith 2000; Ginsberg 2001; Van 
Schaik 2013; Elgström and Smith 2006; Bickerton 2007; Smith 2010b; Vasilyan 
2011; Smith 2013b; Romanyshyn 2015; Baltag and Smith 2015). Much of the 
literature has linked EU performance to EU effectiveness (a subset of the wider 
notion of performance), emphasizing that increasing effectiveness may render the 
EU more legitimate in the eyes of both its member-states and its partners (Edwards 
2013; Bouchard et al. 2013; Smith 2013a; Bretherton & Vogler 2013; Smith 2010b; 
Lavanex & Schimmelfennig 2011; Börzel & Risse 2007). Externally, scholars have 
examined the EU’s performance in major multilateral settings such as the United 
Nations (UN), the World bank (WB) or the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
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(Oberthür & Groen 2015; Jørgensen et al. 2013), during negotiations in different 
policy settings (Romanyshyn 2015; Dee 2015; van Schaik 2013) or more recently 
investigated EU diplomatic performance (Baltag & Smith 2015; Baltag, 2018). 
Performance is one of the key terms transgressing different intra and inter-
disciplinary boundaries. It has been defined in comparative politics as a way to 
measure the performance of political institutions in Western democracies (Eckstein, 
1971; Keman, 2002; Roller, 2005) or the management of governments (Ingraham et 
al., 2003). The concept has been widely used in policy sciences (Howlett & Ramesh, 
1995; Peters & Pierre, 2006) mainly as a way to measure performance management 
(Bouckaert & Halligan 2006). The dictionary-based definition of performance 
emphasizes the complexity of studying performance in general: it implies performing 
a task or a function as well as the capabilities of a system to perform these tasks and 
how successfully they are performed (according to the Oxford Dictionary). For an 
organisation, performance implies that a task is done effectively, efficiently, in a 
relevant manner to its stakeholders, and maintains financial viability (Lusthaus et al. 
2002). Others see performance as “an organisation’s ability to achieve agreed-upon 
objectives” (Gutner & Thompson, 2010, p. 231). For a political system, performance 
implies an evaluation of the system, namely of its outputs (Almond et al. 1996, 
Eckstein 1971); and the capacity of the system to convert inputs effectively into 
outputs. As Roller (2005) emphasizes, performance refers to the dimension of 
action. This implies the action of carrying out a task and how well it is executed. In 
other words the study of performance implies examining the outcome produced and 
the process – the effort, efficiency and capabilities used to accomplish the outcome.  
Performance measurement and evaluation is central to public administration and 
organisational studies literature. In general terms, performance is conceived as a 
process of an actor executing a task or function. Scholars of public policy and 
comparative politics define the concept as a way to measure: the performance of 
political institutions in Western democracies, the management of governments, or 
performance management (Keman 2002; Ingraham et al. 2003; Peters & Pierre 
2006; Howlett & Ramesh 1995; Bouckaert & Halligan 2006). The manner in which 
performance is assessed frequently depends on the eye of the beholder: an insider’s 
viewpoint is operationalised in cooperation with internal actors and tends to be 
prescriptive in character, whereas an outsider’s perspective is more distanced, 
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backward-looking and concerned with the relative success of policies or actions 
(Versluis et al. 2011). Performance auditors widely rely on an input-output model of 
process management derived from economics (Neely 2004). Accordingly, public 
agencies are evaluated with respect to the amount and type of resources (time, 
finances, expertise and other assets) that are transformed in an organised way into a 
product of an added value. The results of this transformation process include both 
tangible products or outputs (number of clients served) and rather diffused outcomes 
(improved quality of a service). The same holds true for political systems: 
performance implies an evaluation of outputs, outcomes, as well as the process – 
the effort, efficiency, and capabilities used to accomplish the outcome (Eckstein 
1971; Roller 2015).  
Acknowledging the difficulties of defining performance, this thesis conceptualizes 
performance in broader terms, incorporating both the outcome and the process of 
achieving that outcome. The aim here is to go beyond the positivist explanations and 
to explore the details of everyday practices that form and shape the performance of 
any actor. As Adler-Niessen (2016) emphasizes the practice turn “has had 
considerable success in organisation and management studies” (p. 88), it looks into 
the meaningful patterns of action and hence, draws attention to the significance of 
everyday practices in analysing the EU. Practice is not reduced to the 
implementation of a theoretical model and actions do not necessarily pave the way 
for a premeditated design: “practice can be oriented toward a goal without being 
consciouly informed by it” (Pouilot, 2008, p. 261). Coupling organisational studies 
with the practice turn in IR and EU studies, as elaborated in the following section, 
puts into perspective our understanding of how performance actually works, in 
practice. 
 
3.2. The practice turn in IR and EU studies 
Studying diplomacy and more specifically the micro-practices and everyday conduct 
and management of international relations raise an important research avenue into 
the building blocks of world politics. The study of international practices is significant 
as it allows us to focus on what practitioners do; and uncovers the many faces of 
world politics which is “made up of a myriad of everyday practices that too often get 
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overlooked in scholarly research” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011, p. 2). As Bicchi and 
Bremberg (2016) point out, it is with the turn to practices that research can 
understand ‘the big picture’ via the ‘stories’, the details from those stories and via 
conducting ‘slow research’ (Bicchi & Bremberg, 2016; Kuus, 2015). Even more so, a 
practice-based research has the capacity to describe important details and features 
of global politics as something that is routinely made and remade in practice (Nicolini 
& Monteiro, 2017). It uncovers aspects of everyday European integration both ‘from 
above’ and ‘from below’ and provides us with a deeper understanding of this process 
(Adler-Nissen, 2016). The added value of practice-oriented studies is in uncovering 
what is happening “‘on the ground’ in apparently trivial moves that turn out to be 
crucial for European integration” (ibidem, p. 99). 
Whereas in international relations the ‘practice turn’ started from understanding 
textual practices, this thesis subscribes to the definition of practices understood as 
‘competent performance’ which incorporates both actions and behaviour thus 
including the material dimension of a deed performed and the meaning of that deed 
(Adler & Pouliot, 2011). As Adler and Pouliot (2011) conceptualise, “practices are 
socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less 
competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background 
knowledge and discourse in and on the material world” (p. 4). This is to say that 
practices rely on background knowledge and the interplay between material and 
discursive worlds: practices, therefore, structure interaction via communication as 
well as material artefacts and accumulated knowledge. In this way, practices are 
conceptualised as “patterned actions that are embedded in particular organised 
contexts and, as such, are articulated into specific types of action and are socially 
developed through learning and training” (Corradi et al., 2010 as cited in Adler & 
Pouliot, 2011). Understood in terms of performance, practices are not identical to 
preferences or beliefs, they have patterns, i.e. occurring over time and space, that 
structure interaction among actors. When defining practices as performance, 
scholars explain that a practice is identified by history, social constituency and 
perceivable normative dimension (Nicolini & Monteiro 2017) and can be more or less 
competent or can be done correctly or incorrectly (Adler & Pouliot, 2011). EU 
performance can therefore be measured not only by looking at the clear-cut outcome 
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but also by accounting for processes and establishing patterns of actions and how 
those (in)form EU performance. 
When performed by collectives in unison, scholars identify corporate practices which 
are “structured and acted out by communities of practice, and by diffusion of 
background knowledge across agents in these communities, which similarly 
disposes them to act in coordination” (Adler & Pouliot, 2011, p.8). When it comes to 
organisations, practices are then structured by “practical rules, understandings, 
teleoaffective structures, and general understandings” (Schatzki 2012, p.16). It is not 
a state that undertakes corporate practices, but rather a community of 
representatives, such as the EU member states and the EU institutions for example, 
that enter patterned relations due to their similar background dispositions and an 
existent organised context. Yet, practices are not only structural, they can also be 
individual or agential, framing actors, “who, thanks to this framing, know who they 
are and how to act in an adequate and socially recognizable way” (Rasche & Chia, 
2009 as cited in Adler & Pouliot, 2011, p.16). In sum, practices are defined by the 
link that they provide between ‘doings’ and ‘sayings’ as “an organised constellation 
of different people’s activities” (Schatzki 2012, p.13). Therefore, having as focal point 
in research practices, it refers not to just any practice, but to “socially meaningful 
patterns of action” (Bicchi & Bremberg, 2016, p. 394).  
Pouliot (2008) explains that the logic of practicality is not identical with the logic of 
appropriateness, of consequences or of arguing, instead “practices are the result of 
inarticulate know-how that makes what is to be done self-evident or 
commonsensical” (Pouilot, 2008, p. 257). While diplomacy is traditionally understood 
via instrumental rationality, strategic action and cost-benefit calculations, the author 
emphasizes that the practical and inarticulate nature of diplomacy is pointed out 
through practitioners (Pouliot, 2008). It is through practices that diplomatic skill and 
background knowledge is identified, goes the argument; hence embracing a 
practice-oriented research helps “bringing the Background to the foreground” 
(Pouliot, 2008, p. 269). In her review of the practice turn in EU studies, Adler-Nissen 
(2016) points to those studies that highlight the importance of everyday practices for 
analysing the EU and European integration. Scholars working on ‘Europeanization’ 
and ‘socialization’ focused on routinized or everyday practices without necessarily 
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considering the practice approach methodologically (Wiener, 1998; Cini, 2007; 
Radaelli, 2008). It is the scholarship on organisational and public management that 
have been closest and successful in capturing practice as the unit of analysis and, 
therefore, the everyday of European governance (Adler-Nissen, 2016). 
In this thesis, diplomacy is seen as set of practices. As Kissinger (1994) points out, 
diplomacy is not a science but rather an art; therefore the study of diplomacy cannot 
be reduced to theory but rather can be fully captured through uncovering practices 
as there is knowledge within the practice (Pouilot, 2008). Scholars that became 
recently interested in the practice turn in EU studies have also pursued the argument 
that there is a huge body of background knowledge in daily practices to be 
uncovered by researchers (Pouilot, 2008; Adler-Nissen, 2016; Bicchi & Bremberg, 
2016). Bicchi and Bremberg (2016) in discussing practice approaches in the case of 
European diplomacy point out that “practices are best understood as “accounts of” 
European diplomatic practices, rather than “accounting for” them” (Bicchi & 
Bremberg, 2016, p. 395). Hence focusing on practices as unit of analysis facilitates 
moving beyond explaining how certain processes take place in EU diplomacy and 
moves attention to patterns of actions, especially relevant to research since there is 
no common agreement on what the practice of diplomacy generally means. 
Diplomacy is understood here as a practice of daily interactions with a specific trait of 
“European diplomacy is fuzzy at its borders” (Bicchi & Bremberg, 2016, p. 369) and 
that seems to carry “the tension between the aim of forging “an ever closer union” 
and trying to keep their separateness visible” (Adler-Nissen, 2014 as referred to in 
Bicchi & Bremberg, 2016, p. 396). Therefore, the incorporation of the practice 
approach in the analytical framework of this thesis facilitates a better understanding 
of what is happening on the ground where European and national practices intersect. 
 
3.3. Operationalization: how to measure diplomatic performance? 
In organisational and management studies, the most commonly used indicators to 
measure performance of public or private agencies are the “three E’s”: economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness (Pidd 2012). While economy refers to the inputs or costs 
of production, efficiency refers to the ratio of output produced per a number of input 
units. Effectiveness, in turn, measures the degree to which outcomes of the process 
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meet the objectives of the agency. Besides the “three E’s”, scholars also highlight 
the importance of relevance and financial viability to discuss the needs of 
stakeholders and to assess resources (Lusthaus et al., 2002). In the study of public 
policies, scholars rely on such indicators as equity (an extent to which benefits are 
equally distributed across recipients) and political feasibility (probability of policy 
being adopted in the view of political constraints). The last criterion points to the 
importance of the broader context and environment, including ideology and 
worldview, in which the performance measurement is embedded (Rossell 1993; 
Gutner & Thompson 2010).  
We adapt these commonly used indicators from the organisational studies literature 
and identify 3 criteria, namely effectiveness, relevance and capabilities, that we 
conceptualise in the sections below. Looking at performance implies examining and 
evaluating EU diplomatic practices against pre-set goals (effectiveness). It also 
allows us to learn about the relationship between the national and EU levels in the 
new post-Lisbon setting, where the EU delegations perform traditional and new 
diplomatic functions: representing the European Union and also cooperating with 
national embassies (relevance). Finally, it allows us to conduct a screening of 
capabilities and to understand how these pertain to the diplomatic realm 
(capabilities). 
 
3.3.1. Effectiveness 
Effectiveness is generally defined by the extent to which an organisation is able to 
fulfil its goals (Behn, 2003; Lusthaus et al, 2002; Gutner & Thompson, 2010). It is a 
cross-cutting concept which is widely used in a variety of disciplines. The literature 
on public policy-making ties the notion of effectiveness to the achievement of specific 
policy goals, i.e. policy implementation (Héritier, 2012). The international relations 
literature also widely discusses the notion of effectiveness (Hasenclever et al., 1997; 
Hegemann et al., 2013). Analysing the performance of international environmental 
regimes, Young (1999) argues that effectiveness is a multi-faceted concept that may 
take on different forms: legal effectiveness (compliance with contractual obligations), 
economic effectiveness (the ratio between meeting the objectives and amount of 
resources spent), normative effectiveness (achievement of justice, participation and 
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other values), political effectiveness (changes in the behaviour and interests of 
actors). Similar rationalistic understanding of effectiveness is demonstrated by the 
scholars working in the fields of organizational studies and public management 
(Lusthaus, 2002; Meyer, 2002). Effectiveness is understood as an ability of an 
organization to successfully fulfil its objectives. Goal attainment is probably the most 
common interpretation of effectiveness, although its analysis can raise some 
challenges, especially when the goals are not clearly formulated, contradict each 
other, overlap or are scattered across different priority hierarchies (Gutner and 
Thompson, 2010). 
As a diplomatic actor, the EU’s purpose is to secure its foreign policy objectives; in 
third countries, this should be done via its diplomatic machinery. Some even argue 
that “without outputs that are effective in meeting their objectives and influencing 
international outcomes, the EU would lose internal confidence and outward influence 
as an international actor” (Ginsberg, 2001, p. 444-445). From this perspective, the 
EU’s ability or failure to link means and ends in a specific external context feeds 
back the notion of effectiveness. Effectiveness is also related to what EU scholars 
initially categorize as presence (Allen & Smith, 1990; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006 and 
others), i.e. the EU’s relationship with its external environment. It is also important to 
acknowledge that it is a challenging task to evaluate EU goal achievement. As 
Lusthaus et al. emphasize (2002), for political systems it is often a challenge to 
identify the goals, especially those that are not stated. In discussing the dimension of 
effectiveness as goal achievement, Jørgensen et al. (2011) also put an emphasis on 
the fact that “objectives can be so broad as to render them nearly meaningless for an 
assessment” (p. 604).  
To examine whether the EU secures foreign policy objectives is a challenging but not 
an impossible task. It is the Lisbon Treaty and the ENP that serve as reference 
points in this thesis, from which we can derive some sort of benchmarks against 
which the performance of the EU can be assessed.  
The central definition of effectiveness – goal attainment – is widely replicated in the 
study of the EU’s external relations with its neighbours (Delcour, 2007; Delcour & 
Tulmets, 2007; Freyburg et al., 2009). Article 21(2) of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) sets a broad list of the EU’s goals in the international arena which include 
65 
support for democracy, rule of law, human rights, preservation of peace, conflict 
prevention and strengthening of international security, integration of world economy, 
eradication of poverty, multilateral cooperation and good global governance. In 
relation to Eastern European neighbours the majority of these are reflected in the 
ENP. Drawing on the EU’s experience of the Eastern enlargement, domestic change 
and transformation in the third countries has become the main yardstick against 
which the EU’s impact is measured (Grabbe 2006). For that purpose, the 
neighbourhood countries need to embark on the long-term process of convergence – 
Europeanization – that implies a selection, adoption and application of the EU’s rules 
in their domestic political systems (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009). If the ENP’s 
rationale was to stabilize the EU’s new borders through promoting democracy and 
market economy in the neighbouring countries then it is important to examine the 
sustainability of democratic standards in these countries, i.e. whether the EU in the 
long term ensures democratic practices to the extent to which the latter become the 
normal way of doing things. In order to so, it is important to examine the changes 
that are happening in these countries through identifying the level of adaptation of 
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus to EU rules and norms. 
Building a ‘ring of friends’ in Eastern European countries does not happen without 
the activity of the EU diplomatic actors, namely the Union Delegations. On the 
ground, these are tasked, according to the Lisbon Treaty, to represent the Union (art. 
221 TFEU) and to closely cooperate with national diplomatic missions. The post-
diplomacy Lisbon practices regarding the legal personality of the EU on the ground 
have been of interest to scholars of EU diplomacy (Duke, 2016; Vanhoonacker & 
Pomorska, 2016). One important development since the inauguration of the EEAS is 
that Union Delegations, on the ground, are representing the EU in all aspects of 
external action. To understand, then, how the EU becomes a diplomatic actor on the 
ground, an investigation of how both EU and national diplomats understand the 
‘representation of the Union’ function given to the Delegations and what sort of role 
the Delegation plays after the inauguration of the EEAS is necessary. Scholars that 
study diplomacy from a practice perspective argue that “European integration over 
time has led to certain diplomatic practices “anchoring” others in a European setting” 
(Bicchi & Bremberg 2016, p. 398). In this sense, the focus is on the repeated 
interactional patterns among national and EU level diplomacy on the ground and 
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how these, in turn, make changes in European diplomatic practices possible; such 
as the Union Delegation representing the EU in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. 
Therefore, an investigation of how EU and national diplomats participate in 
diplomatic practices grasps the process of daily diplomatic activity and shows 
regularities or irregularities over time (Adler & Pouliot, 2011) in relation to the 
established goals. 
 
3.3.2. Relevance 
Assessing performance in relation to ongoing relevance implies the extent to which it 
meets the needs and requirements of its stakeholders and clients and is able to 
maintain their continuous support. This is to say that “organizations need to be 
relevant to both funders and clients, and must reconcile the differences” (Lusthaus et 
al 2002, p.119). Performance in this sense is assessed as the ability of an 
organisation to keep in line its established goals, programs and activities with the 
needs of its constituents and stakeholders. Hence, stakeholders and clients need to 
be supplied with goods and services they need and want. As organizational 
performance scholars emphasize when assessing relevance, it is important to 
discuss the level of satisfaction of stakeholders and clients (Lusthaus et al. 2002; 
Mitchell 2002). Stakeholders and clients are those most involved and with a vested 
interest in the outcome or contribution of the organization (Barclay & Osei-Bryson 
2010). This is to say that stakeholders, through buying shares, and clients, through 
buying products or services, judge the relevance of these products or services. It is 
also important to note that stakeholders and clients may have similar or divergent 
views and expectations that can render constructive or destructive outcomes 
(Barclay & Osei-Bryson 2010; Bourne & Walker 2006).  
To extrapolate this dimension to the EU, relevance is assessed both vis-à-vis EU 
member-states themselves and their citizens as well as relevance gauged in terms 
of MS satisfaction. Are Member-States satisfied with the practice of EU diplomacy in 
third countries? Do they feel that their expectations are met? At this level, relevance 
vis-à-vis member-states links back to authority, autonomy and cohesion (Jupille & 
Caporaso, 1998) or, in performance terms to representation, delegation and 
coordination (Jørgensen et al., 2011). Examined as a dimension of performance, one 
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needs to consider the implications of political cohesion, i.e. the ability to articulate 
consistently policy preferences (Thomas 2012; Metcalfe 1997). The importance of 
cohesion has been reaffirmed by the Lisbon Treaty and also emphasized by EU’s 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica 
Mogherini, at her European Parliament hearing (European Parliament 2014) and is 
central in the political guidelines of the Juncker-led Commission (Commission 
2014b). Considering cohesion refers to consistent alignment of common actions 
among stakeholders. It thus strongly relates to vertical coherence that deals with the 
relationship between the EU and national level and examines whether the two are in 
line and that MS reinforce EU-level efforts (Koenig, 2011).Relevance vis-à-vis MS 
links back to such functions as delegation and cooperation. For the EU as a 
diplomatic actor this aspect is especially relevant post-Lisbon since in Brussels, the 
EEAS linked national and EU diplomatic efforts and expectations were high in 
relation to cooperation with member-states on the ground. Whether EU stakeholders 
find it relevant can be assessed in relation to the extent to which all parties engage in 
acting collectively. This, in turn, reflects on the EU’s overall coherence, recognised in 
the broader multilateral governance context and as Koenig (2011; 2016) emphasizes 
“there is general agreement that incoherence increases the risk of duplication, 
inefficient spending and ineffective policies” (Koenig, 2011, p. 16)21. In practice, for 
the EU as a diplomatic actor this implies engaging in multilateral diplomacy. As 
Watson (1982) emphasized, in multilateral diplomacy cooperation is key - the 
decision taken by one actor affects another one as well as the performance of one 
state has certain effects on the performance of another one. In this sense, the co-
existence and interaction of a multitude of actors on the ground depends on the 
diplomatic machinery designed by the EU through the Lisbon Treaty that takes into 
consideration functions of diplomacy such as communication/dialogue, 
interdependence, recognition etc. 
Scholars have emphasized that when important national interests are at stake 
member states often opt to avoid EU-level instruments and act unilaterally with 
member-states often choosing to act according to their respective economic (mainly 
                                                   
21 In her research Koenig (2011) distinguishes between 4 different forms of coherence: vertical, horizontal, institutional and 
multilateral. Given that horizontal and multilateral coherence deal with policy coherence and coherence vis-à-vis external actors 
which are outside the scope of this thesis, only vertical coherence and institutional coherence are referred to in this section to 
conceptualise relevance and capabilities. 
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energy and trade) or security interests (Rummel and Wiedermann 1998; Bosse & 
Schmidt-Felzmann 2011; Thomas 2012). Cooperation with member-states can be 
interpreted as a new and core diplomatic function of a diplomatic representation such 
as the Delegation. The issue of leadership, for which the EU has been criticized pre-
Lisbon is addressed by this function. These are linked to the concepts of field and 
habitus that are   key notions in Bourdieu’s (1997) theory of practice22. Fields are 
made of unequal positions and refer to players that are dominant and others that are 
dominated and to the power relations that derive from their interaction and “are 
defined by the stakes which are at stake” (Jenkins 2002 as cited in Pouilot, 2008). By 
assuming the function of the Presidency, also in political affairs, via showing strong 
leadership and through engaging in cooperation, a more strategic approach between 
the EU and MS actions on the ground can be assumed. The Treaty itself entails that 
EU diplomatic actors, both the MS embassies and the Delegations in third countries 
“shall cooperate and shall contribute to formulating and implementing the common 
approach” (art. 32). Therefore, in this thesis, the issue of corporate practices is of 
relevance; these are not the actions of a single actor but rather of a community of 
actors, whose members enter patterned relations due to their similar background 
dispositions (Adler & Pouliot, 2011). This, in turn, relates to habitus, i.e. socialised 
norms or tendencies that guide behaviour and thinking, that is created and 
reproduced unconsciously “without any deliberate pursuit of coherence […] without 
any conscious concentration” (Bourdieu 1977, p. 170). This helps understand the 
corporate practices over time, especially since habitus is shaped by past events. 
Academic literature has pointed out that it is this “mutually exclusive juxtaposition” of 
the EU and national level has been contested throughout the European integration 
theories (Bicchi & Bramberg, 2016, p. 396). And this is what the empirical analysis in 
this thesis will be looking at: the cooperation between the diplomatic actors on the 
ground and the corporate practices that exist. 
 
                                                   
22 It is the work of Adler and Pouliot that serves as the main source on the practice turn in IR that is used for shaping the 
analytical framework in this thesis. The work of Bourdieu, although a major inspiration for scholars working on the practice turn, 
does not figure prominently here due to that fact that the focus of his sociological study is power. However, in the 
conceptualisation of the criteria relevance and capabilities, Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘field’, ‘habitus’ and ‘capital’ were used to 
finetune these criteria. 
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3.3.3. Capabilities 
Lastly, organisational management and the practice turn in IR literature talks about 
resources23. When it comes to (diplomatic) actorness, scholars discuss the EU’s 
capabilities or capacity (Smith, 2015; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, Barston, 2013). As 
defined by Bretherton and Vogler (2006), capabilities refers to EU’s ability to mobilise 
or use resources in order to effectively react to its environment. Efficiency and 
financial viability both refer to resources. Financial viability explains that any 
organisation, for profit or non-for-profit depends on its ability to generate resources in 
order to meet its functional requirements in the short, medium and long-term 
Lusthaus et al. (2002). Efficiency evaluates the cost-effective production of results. 
Beyond a financial assessment, resources and instruments as dimensions 
envisaged by the EU capabilities refer to further aspects such as: shared 
commitments to values; domestic legitimation of decisions relating to external 
policies; ability to identify priorities and formulate policies in a consistent and 
coherent manner and the availability and capacity to use policy instruments 
(Sjöstedt, 1977 as cited in Bretherton & Vogler 2006). An assessment can be made 
based on the EU’s ability to use appropriate instruments and techniques that will add 
value to diplomatic actions on the ground. 
Establishing and maintaining overseas diplomatic offices is not solely linked to one’s 
international identity but represents an essential resource as a means of 
communication, source of information, and key contact-point for promotion of 
interests abroad. Information and communication is a key resource for both strands 
of literature: for the practice turn accumulating diplomatic capital in the form of 
information links to influence (Adler-Niessen, 2008), from an organisational 
management perspective, information becomes an asset that makes it possible to 
perform or make others do things (Rieker, 2009). The obligation of both national 
embassies and the EU Delegations to “step up cooperation by exchanging 
information and carrying out joint statements” (art. 35) as well as to cooperate in 
ensuring that EU positions and actions are complied with and implemented (art. 35) 
rely heavily on communication, a quintessential function for diplomacy (Neumann, 
2008). In both bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations communication is 
                                                   
23 Performance literature considers efficiency and financial viability of an organization as important dimensions to analyse 
performance. See Lusthaus et al., 2002 
70 
omnipresent; the diplomatic community relies on information-gathering, information-
negotiating and identifying other actors’ intentions especially in an era of complex 
international relations (Nicoloson, 1963; Berrige, 1995; Leguey-Feilleux, 2009). 
Moreover, diplomatic capabilities imply sharing of information such as exchange of 
political information (Rijks & Whitman, 2007). 
Through examining the EU’s diplomatic capabilities, the assessment of performance 
explores whether the EU’s instruments are fit for purpose in supporting the conduct 
of the EU’s foreign policy and whether there is a distinction between European and 
national diplomatic resources (Rijks & Whitman, 2007). It also examines the 
interaction between the EU and MS actors in terms of creating synergies between 
the actions of the different EU actors present in Eastern Europe; which, in turn, 
reflects on institutional coherence (as Koenig, 2011 coins it). Without creating, 
sustaining and mobilizing capabilities, little aggregation of individual or collective 
purpose can be accomplished (March and Olsen 1998). Organisational management 
literature puts emphasis on several dimensions of capabilities, one of which refers to 
competencies and knowledge on the part of individuals, professions and institutions. 
Individuals have competencies from their education and training while institutions 
encrypt knowledge in rules and traditions. Competence and knowledge is therefore a 
result of a combination of recruitment policy, leadership, skills, training programs and 
the extent to which it draws upon policy analysis provided by institutes. The practice 
turn in IR literature also discusses diplomatic capital as “the resources that count as 
a valid currency for exchange in a field” (Adler-Niessen, 2008, p. 670). These 
resources refer to both the political and social capital (authority, competences, 
reputation, power, institutions) that are constantly renewed (ibidem). As Bourdieu 
(1997) also emphasized - capital can be social, cultural or symbolic, implying that 
capital extends beyond material assets. Therefore, an analysis of capabilities will 
examine the dedicated diplomatic capital in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, including 
the examination of a communication infrastructure, of institutional dynamics, 
competences and knowledge, hence both the political and social capital that it 
implies. 
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3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has established the analytical framework of this thesis. It has discussed 
the notion of performance that is a key term transgressing different intra and inter-
disciplinary boundaries and focused on practice as the unit of analysis. Therefore 
addressing the central research question posed in this thesis, namely – to what 
extent has the EU developed as a successful diplomatic actor after the inauguration 
of the EEAS? – builds on two strands of literature, that of organisational studies and 
that of the practice turn in IR/EU studies. Instead of accounting for European 
diplomacy, this analytical framework allows us to better understand accounts of EU 
diplomatic practices via three criteria - effectiveness, relevance and capabilities. The 
latter are also relevant to the three working assumptions that have been proposed at 
the end of Chapter two (see section 2.3.2.) that generally show how we expect the 
EU to manifest itself as a successful diplomatic actor. First of all, looking at 
performance implies examining and evaluating EU diplomatic practices against pre-
set goals in line with the way we have operationalised effectiveness. Hence, the 
expectation of the first assumption (post-Lisbon EU diplomacy with an institutional 
distinctiveness is able to articulate its own stated objectives) is that on the ground 
the Union Delegation fully embrace its diplomatic function of representation in all 
aspects of external relations as the Lisbon Treaty prescribes. And, that in Eastern 
Europe, there is an ability of European and national institutions (i.e. EU Delegation 
and MS embassies) to implement the ENP policy goals of promoting democratic 
governance in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. Second of all, performance is 
assessed in relation to ongoing relevance, operationalised in terms of cohesion and 
cooperation among member-states. Consequently, the expectation of the second 
assumption (the changes in post-Lisbon diplomacy imply convergence of member 
states actions and build up coherence) is that for the EU as a diplomatic actor, acting 
collectively should become especially relevant as there is a direct prerogative of 
cooperation among EU Delegations and MS embassies on the ground. And thirdly, 
analysing performance implies a screening of capabilities and to understand how 
these pertain to the diplomatic realm. Hence, the third assumption (the level of 
supranational activism through post-Lisbon diplomacy strengthens EU capabilities) 
assumes that a successful EU diplomatic actor is manifesting strong capabilities on 
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the ground with a strong diplomatic esprit de corps, a strong communication network, 
with strong competences and knowledge.  
Before discussing these assumptions in Chapter 7, the thesis first turns to presenting 
throughout Chapters 4, 5 and 6 the empirical evidence collected during the field-work 
conducted in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. Each empirical chapter follows the 
same structure. Firstly, a brief background of the relationship between the EU and 
these countries is outlined. Subsequently, evidence is presented vis-à-vis the three 
criteria: effectiveness, relevance and capabilities. The data regarding the first 
criterion, effectiveness, has been collected in relation to the ENP goals as well as to 
the Lisbon Treaty goals (as operationalised in section 3.3.1.) and will be presented in 
this order. Finally, each chapter will present an interim conclusion on the empirical 
evidence presented without going into a detailed discussion of findings. Later, in 
Chapter 7, all findings are brought together and the discussion shows the application 
of the three criteria. This is the chapter that will firstly compare and contrast the 
findings on the 3 individual case-studies; and secondly will revisit the set of working 
assumptions presented in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 4. EU diplomatic performance in 
Moldova 
The relationship between Moldova and the EU took shape and form relatively late. 
Moldova gained its independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
is the poorest country in Europe (Worldatlas, 2015) situated on the EU’s immediate 
border. The institutionalization of the EU-Moldova relationship started in 1994 with 
the negotiation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which entered 
into force only in 1998. It was not until 2004, with the ENP (Commission, 2004) that 
the EU-Moldova relationship experienced a fundamental change: the EU developed 
Country Strategy Papers, including for Moldova, included it in the ENP, and in 2005 
signed the Moldova-EU Action Plan (AP). The implementation of the Plan would 
result in an approximation of Moldovan legislation, norms and standards to those of 
the EU. Since 2009, Moldova has been included in the EU’s more ambitious 
partnership, the Eastern Partnership (EaP), described as entailing ‘a growing 
responsibility to the partners, to help them address the political and economic 
challenges that they face and to support their aspirations for closer ties.’ 
(Commission, 2008, p.2). Besides responding to the need for differentiation among 
the ENP countries, the EaP responded to the EU’s main interests of better 
governance, stability and economic development on its Eastern borders. It is within 
the EaP framework that negotiations on the EU–Moldova Association Agreement 
started (AA, signed in 2014) that aim at enhancing the institutional links with the EU 
and form the current umbrella for Moldova-EU relationship took place.  
On the ground, the Commission representation, established in October 2005, was 
mandated to implement EU external aid programmes such as those focused on 
support of democratic governance, poverty reduction and economic growth 
(Delegation, 2009). In 2006 the representation of the Commission employed project 
managers, provided training in Brussels for them and afterwards launched a fully 
operational representation while the political staff was placed in the Commission 
representation in Kiev (interv. 1). Post-Lisbon, the Commission representation 
transformed to a fully-fledged diplomatic representation as a Union Delegation, 
holding the status of a diplomatic mission and officially representing the European 
Union in the Republic of Moldova.  
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In order to discuss the diplomatic performance of the European Union in Moldova 
according to the three established criteria: effectiveness, relevance and capability, 
this chapter presents the empirical evidence collected in relation to these criteria. 
Adopting a historical approach, the chapter starts with a brief overview of Moldova-
EU relations. As set out in chapter 3, effectiveness is a criterion that is assessed on 
two dimensions, one that explores the degree of democratic governance in Moldova 
and the other that investigates the diplomatic practices of representing the Union in 
Moldova. The relevance section evaluates how EU and member-state embassies in 
Moldova have cooperated and contributed to formulating a common approach, and 
the capabilities section focuses on diplomatic capital, presenting evidence on the 
EU’s diplomatic resources and instruments on the ground. Hence, this chapter 
presents, in a structured manner, the empirical evidence collected during the field-
work conducted in Moldova as well as based on the study of secondary sources 
(such as policy briefs, legislation, national and international reports as well as 
academic findings from scholarly literature on Moldova-EU). A discussion of these 
findings will be presented in Chapter 7 that will clearly show the application of the 
three criteria that have been discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
4.1. Background of EU-Moldova relations 
Adopting a historical approach, this section provides a brief overview of the 
development of Moldova-EU relations, the institutionalisation of this relationship under 
the PCA, the ENP and EaP respectively and the development of the diplomatic 
representation of the EU and of national representations.  
 
4.1.1. From PCA to ENP 
The PCA Agreement that entered into force in 1998 aimed at supporting Moldova’s 
efforts to strengthen democracy, develop its economy through encouraging trade 
and investment as well as to provide a suitable framework for political dialogue. The 
PCA marked a turn in the cooperation between Moldova and the EU: it was the first 
institutionalisation of their political relations, it provided a framework for political 
dialogue, trade liberalization and even harmonization of legislation. The PCA defined 
a new model for the relations; a model that could be described as good neighbourly 
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relations as part of which the Union assists its weaker partner by supporting 
democratic and market reforms, among other measures (PCA Moldova, 1994). Even 
though the PCA provided a framework to support Moldovan efforts to consolidate its 
democracy and develop its economy so as to complete the transition to a market 
economy, except for TACIS, it did not have a country-specific focus or instrument 
(TACIS was the EU’s technical assistance instrument for all countries in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States). 
Authorities in the Moldovan capital, Chisinau, developed an interest in European 
integration immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, yet, in the early 
90s, no comprehensive policy vis-à-vis the EU was developed. After electing a 
communist government in the early 2000, for the first three years, Moldova pledged 
its commitment to the East. A political turn of the Communist government towards 
the EU happened in 2003, the year when Moldova was included in the ENP. The 
ENP did not lead to new contractual relations between the EU and Moldova; 
however, the ENP Action Plan signed in 2005 set out a roadmap for enhanced 
relations based on conditionality. The priorities of the Action Plan (AP) were much 
wider in scope. They included the perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a 
significant degree of integration (a stake in the EU’s Internal Market) and the 
possibility for Moldova to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and 
programmes and participation in Community programmes; an upgrade in the scope 
and intensity of political cooperation and the opportunity for convergence of 
economic legislation; the continued reduction of trade barriers; and increased 
financial support through technical assistance (ENP Action Plan, 2004, p. 2–3). The 
EU formally required Moldova to adopt the EU acquis. Subsequently, Moldova 
initiated a pro-EU reform agenda in line with the ENP Action Plan in the areas of 
political dialogue, justice and home affairs, economic and social politics, commerce 
and settlement of the Transnistrian conflict24.  
 
                                                   
24 Transnsitria is a breakway region from Moldova and consideres itself an (unrecognized) independent state: it broke away 
from the former Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union in 1990 with a short war between the Moldovan and 
Transnistrian side taking place between March and July 1992. Today it retains its independence due largely to the military 
support provided by the Russian 14th Army. A cease-fire led to the creation of a three-party Joint Control Commission, 
consisting of Russia, Moldova, and Transnistria, which supervises a demilitarized security zone on both sides of the Nistru 
River. It has been a “frozen conflict” ever since. 
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4.1.2. From ENP to EaP and the Association Agreement 
Since 2009, Moldova has been included in the EU’s more ambitious partnership, the 
Eastern Partnership (EaP), that included, in its bilateral track, the prospect of an 
Association Agreement (AA), initialled at the EaP summit in Vilnius in November 
2013. Replacing the former PCA, the EU–Moldova AA aimed at enhancing the 
institutional framework with the EU and deepening political association and 
economic integration, implying reciprocal obligations and rights. Overall, the scope of 
the AA is considered comprehensive, balanced and broad in scope. To a certain 
degree it is comparable to the 35 chapters that an EU candidate county must 
negotiate before accession: although structured differently, the AA covers almost all 
issues incorporated in the 35 chapters25. It is a highly ambitious document that 
expects a wide range of reforms to be implemented, a high degree of participation in 
EU programmes and in regional development, cross-border and civil society 
cooperation. It is a reform agenda aimed at regulatory approximation to the EU, 
political association and economic integration. The EU and Moldova have also 
concluded negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
(DCFTA). The main objective of the DCFTA is to bring Moldovan legislation closer to 
EU legislation in trade and trade-related areas26. The DCFTA – the EU’s new 
generation of FTAs – is ‘deep’ in the sense that it requires partners to adopt up to 
80% of the EU’s trade and trade-related acquis. 
Some of the areas have been higher up on the political agenda of the Moldovan 
government during negotiations, such as cooperation in the sphere of freedom, 
security and justice (hereafter FSJ) and trade and trade-related matters. The 
framework of the FSJ chapter within the AA is based on the Justice and Home 
Affairs section within the Action Plan, but is perceived as more comprehensive and 
more ambitious by local stakeholders (interv. MD 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 12 and 13). It 
represents a reform agenda in the fields of justice, internal affairs and human 
                                                   
25 The EU-Moldova Association Agreement counts over 1000 pages and consists of the followings: A Preamble as an 
introductory statement of the Agreement, setting out the Agreement’s purpose and underlying philosophy; seven Titles: General 
Principles; Political Cooperation and Foreign and Security Policy; Justice Freedom and Security; Trade and Trade-related 
Matters (DCFTA); Economic and Sector Cooperation; Financial Cooperation with Anti-Fraud Provisions, as well as Institutional, 
General and Final Provisions; 35 Annexes setting out EU legislation to be incorporated by a specific date and four Protocols. 
26 Title IV: Trade and trade-related matters has the following objective: 'The Parties shall progressively establish a free trade 
area over a transitional period of maximum 10 years starting from the entry into force of this Agreement' and includes the 
following articles: 1. National treatment and market access for goods; 2. Trade remedies; Technical Barriers to trade; 3. 
Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary measures; 4. Customs and trade facilitation, 5. Establishment, Trade in Services; 6. Current 
Payments and movement of capital; 7. Public Procurement; 8. Intellectual Property; 9. Competition; 10. Trade related energy; 
11. Transparency; 12. Trade and sustainable development. 
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rights27. Furthermore, the issue of mobility and visa liberalization, as components of 
the FSJ, have been widely addressed by Moldova and the EU; and as a result, 
formulations on the FSJ have been included in such a way as to represent the 
progress made in the area of the visa dialogue (Caras 2011). The main focus here is 
on integrated border management, visa liberalization and security standards, as well 
as reform in the judicial and police fields – which are closely related to human rights 
issues and combating corruption (Commission 2008). There has been less 
negotiation concerning the Transnistrian issue, which remains a central point within 
the political dialogue and reform, cooperation in the field of foreign and security 
policy chapter of the AA. All these areas involve a high degree of legislation 
harmonization or in some cases even initiation of new legislation, i.e. adopting EU 
legislation in areas like environment, trade, education or transportation. In turn, this 
indicates the strong reform commitment undertaken by the Moldovan government 
when it initialled the AA. 
 
4.1.3. EU and MS diplomatic representations in Chisinau 
As shown in Chapter 2 (Table 5, section 2.2.2.) the European diplomatic system in 
Moldova by 2015 consisted of 15 representations – 14 national embassies and 1 
Union delegation as presented in Table 7 below. Member-states such as Germany, 
Romania and France were larger, having a bigger number of diplomatic personnel 
accredited with the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs while the Baltic states, 
United Kingdom and the Chech Republic had a smaller number of diplomatic 
personnel. The EU Delegation had the largest number of personnel accredited in 
Moldova, yet, not all of them were diplomats: as Table 6  showed, only 11 came from 
EEAS (Chapter 2, section 2.2.2.). The categorization of a diplomatic representation 
as small, medium or large is based on the evidence collected during fieldwork 
conducted in Moldova and on the interviewees’ specification regarding their own 
diplomatic missions or vis-à-vis the other missions and reflected on their staff 
capacity solely (and it seemed that an embassy with 10 diplomats and more was 
considered large).  
                                                   
27 The reform agenda includes issues such as: cooperation on migration, asylum and border management; cooperation on the 
fight against illicit drugs; money laundering and terrorism financing; combating terrorism; movement of persons; preventing and 
combating organized crime and corruption and other illegal activities. 
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Table 7. National and EU diplomatic missions in Moldova: 2015 
 Embassy/Delegation 
No. of diplomatic 
staff28 
Size 
EU member-
state embassies 
Bulgaria 9 medium 
Czech Republic 6 small 
Estonia* 1 small 
France 11 large 
Germany 18 large 
Hungary 7 medium 
Italy 5 small 
Latvia 2 small 
Lithuania 4 small 
Poland 10 large 
Romania 15 large 
Slovakia 2 small 
Sweden 7 medium 
United Kingdom 5 small 
EU EU 20** large 
Total 15 
Notes: 
*Estonia had only an office of the embassy in Moldova and not a fully-fledged embassy 
**this number does not include the press and information officers which were not part of the EUD before 
2015 
Source: Data compiled by the author in 2014 and updated in 2015 based on the website of the Moldovan 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Whereas the Commission representation in Moldova opened only in 2005 and 
upgraded in November 2009 to a fully-fledged Union Delegation with the 
appointment of Dirk Schuebel, a German diplomat, as the first Head of the EU 
Delegation to Moldova; some level of intersection between the EU and Moldovan 
counterparts was made possible via the TACIS office opened in 1999. TACIS stands 
for the technical assistance programme implemented by the European Commission 
to help members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (such as Moldova) in 
their transition to democratic market-oriented economies. The intersection between 
the Moldovan and the EU counterpart was rather technical in nature: the 
Commission representation in Kiev was responsible for EU relations with Moldova till 
2005 and, to ensure TACIS implementation, a branch of the Kiev representation was 
opened in Chisinau in late 1999 (Europeaid, 2000). This meant oversight over 
                                                   
28 In this table the number of diplomatic staff reflects solely to the national diplomats accredited in the host-country and does not 
reflect the total number of employees of the embassy or delegation. 
79 
activities in 7 sectors and 4 facility instruments that summed up to €186.45 mil from 
1991 till 2006 allocated via TACIS (ibidem). With the ENP, the European Union has 
designed instruments that foster the relationship with Moldova such as the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) and from 2014 the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). The EU’s support to Moldova through the ENP for 
2011–2013 was €273.7 million and for 2014-2015 was €221 million as Table 8 
indicates.  
 
Table 8: EU financial aid to Moldova 1991-2014 (indicative amounts) 
Programme  
Total amount 
(million euro) 
TACIS (1991–2006) 186.45 
ENPI (2007–2010) 209.7 
ENPI (2011–2013) 273.1 
ENI (2014-2015 only) 221 
Source: Baltag & Bosse (2016, p. 67) and authors' compilation of data from NIP Moldova (2011–2013) and the 
European Commission Annual Action Programme for Moldova for 2015 (Commission, n.d.; Commission, 
2015b) 
 
Before 2005, an opening of a fully-fledged representation in Moldova was impossible 
due to budgetary constraints as the TACIS country strategy paper for Moldova 
explains (Europeaid, 2000). With no Commission representation in Moldova till 2005, 
most diplomatic contact points were with Brussels or Strasbourg: the first EC-
Moldova Cooperation Council was held in Brussels in July 1998 and the first EC-
Moldova Parliamentary Cooperation Committee was held in Strasbourg in October 
(Commission, 1999). This changed with the opening of the Commission 
representation which was given the status of a diplomatic mission and officially 
represented the European Commission in Moldova. The latter was mandated to 
promote the political and economic relations between Moldova and the European 
Union and to participate in the implementation of the European Union's external 
assistance programmes (mainly TACIS, ENPI), which focused on supporting 
democratic development and good governance, supporting regulatory reform and 
administrative capacity building, and supporting poverty reduction and economic 
growth (Delegation, 2009). The mandate of the Union Delegation remained quite 
similar and will be discussed in section 4.3. 
80 
Observations of the diplomatic activities in Moldova (but also similar in Ukraine and 
Belarus) attest that besides their traditional diplomatic role of representing, being a 
node of communication and contact, dealing with bi- and multilateral relations in 
traditional ways, diplomatic representations have been very active in engaging in 
trade diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy and have acquired new 
activities such as donors. National diplomats have dealt with political relations and 
political development related activities such as political reporting, developing of the 
political agenda and political networking; have been involved in negotiations with 
local ministries on bilateral and EU issues; have dealt with economic related affairs 
from reporting on economic issues to promoting of national economic interests, such 
as trying to improve or increase national investments to the host country but also 
helping national investors that face difficulties in the host countries. Also, part of their 
activity has been to deal with cultural promotion, gathering and processing 
information, attending different local events and engaging with the local public 
beyond the capital cities. There have also been internal, administrative issues that a 
diplomat has to deal with. And finally, another aspect of their activities has been 
involvement in providing development aid assistance, monitoring and evaluating the 
progress on the reform agenda of the host countries, as well as building bridges and 
creating partnerships29.  
 
4.2. Effectiveness: sustainability of ENP goals 
This section presents information related to the first criterion – effectiveness. 
Effectiveness, as operationalised in the analytical framework (Chapter 3), is about 
goal attainment. In the EU’s neighbourhood goal attainment is linked to both the ENP 
and the Lisbon Treaty. The ENP is an umbrella framework for the EU’s relations with 
its neighbours in the East that took form, as the previous section showed, in the form 
of the Association Agreement. Moldova, part of the ENP, has embarked on a 
process of convergence to EU rules and norms and their adoption and application in 
its national system. Hence, the first part of this section will examine the sustainability 
of democratic standards in Moldova through identifying the level of Moldova’s 
adaptation to EU rules and norms between 2010 and 2015. It will also explore the 
                                                   
29 Observations made based on the field-work conducted in all three countries as well as from studying the embassies 
webpages and facebook pages.  
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activity of the national embassies and the Union Delegations in this sense. The 
second section then turns to the post-Lisbon changes related to effectiveness. As 
the analytical framework emphasized, on the ground, the Commission representation 
has been upgraded to a fully-fledged Union Delegation that represents the Union in 
Moldova. Here, the focus is on presenting data relevant to this goal. 
 
4.2.1. Level of adaptation/alignment to EU rules and norms 
The AA represented a new step in the development of the Moldova-EU relationship 
and it also can be interpreted as a reform agenda aimed at regulatory approximation 
to the EU, political association and economic integration. Taking into consideration 
the emphasis on the political association and economic integration, the empirical 
analysis will focus on two areas covered by the AA: justice, freedom and security 
issues and trade and trade-related matters. Given this context, the analysis of the 
sustainability of ENP goals in Moldova, that of democratic governance in Moldova is 
examined in relation to the level of adaption to EU rules and norms, i.e. 
approximation to the EU acquis.  
 
Table 9. Approximation rate of EaP countries to the EU: Moldova 
*approximation indices (1=best performer; 0=worst performer) 
Sector cooperation Moldova Georgia Ukraine Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus 
Deep and sustainable 
democracy 
0.76 0.73 0.61 0.61 0.29 0.27 
Independent judiciary 0.83 0.88 0.47 0.73 0.27 0.24 
Freedom, Security and Justice 0.99 0.90 0.86 0.64 0.60 0.42 
Source: Author’s compilation based on EaP Index 2014 
 
Moldova has been considered a frontrunner in the ENP and EaP due to its high level 
of compliance with EU rules and norms. The EaP Index also shows Moldova as the 
best performer and top reformer in terms of approximation between 2010 and 2015, 
coming in first among the six EaP members (see Table 9). This refers to how closely 
the institutions and policies of a country resemble those of the EU member-states, 
how they converge towards EU standards and whether these are in line with EU 
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requirements. As Table 9 shows, Moldova scored highest in the area of democracy 
and FJS, and relatively high as regards deep and sustainable democracy. 
 
Table 10. EU acts transposed into Moldovan legislation, 2007–2013 
Field 
No of adopted acts 
(normative and 
legislative) 
Agriculture and Rural development (incl. veterinary and zoo-technology) 83 
Industrial policy and internal market 26 
Environment, consumers and health protection 22 
Freedom, Security and Justice 12 
Work employment, equal chances and social policy 9 
The right to establish and freedom of offering services 8 
Enterprise law 7 
Transportation policy 4 
Energy policy 4 
General, financial and institutional matters 3 
Competition policy 3 
Customs Union and free movement of goods 2 
Fishing policy 2 
Economic and monetary policy and free circulation of capital 2 
Foreign Relations 1 
Other (taxation; science, information, education and culture etc.) 0 
Total 188 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the database of EU transposed acts available on the website of the 
Moldovan Ministry of Justice: http://justice.gov.md/tabview.php?l=ro&idc=225  
 
According to experts’ evaluation, by 2015, Moldova had made very good progress in 
laying down a comprehensive legislative framework, one more compatible with the 
regulatory environment and putting it in the lead (EaP Index, 2014). The relevant 
legislative framework was largely in place, with some of its elements pending 
approval by the Parliament (interv. MD 6, 13). According to EU evaluation, despite 
the need for certain improvements, the instruments adopted and the drafts were 
largely in line with European and international standards (Commission, 2012). As 
data from the Centre of the Harmonization of Legislation [with the EU acquis] show, 
up to 2013 Moldova had adopted 188 normative and legislative acts (see below 
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Table 10). The Moldovan monitoring reports from 2014 show that “out of 288 actions 
planned to be completed by June 30th, 2014, 173 were completed and 115 continue 
to be unrealized, which constitutes, respectively, a percentage ratio of 60% to 40%” 
(ADEPT & Expert-Grup 2014, p. 4) which is regarded as a positive trend. 
On the sectoral level, Moldova had conducted a wide range of reforms in accordance 
with EU standards. As regards good governance and the rule of law, the Moldovan 
government had progressed reforms in the justice sector and adjacent areas such as 
migration and border management according to the strategy for the justice sector 
reform to be implemented in Moldova till 2015 (interv. MD 6). The highlight within 
these reforms was the arrest, on corruption charges, of five judges in early 2014– the 
first time in the history of the country (Leancă, 2014). In the sector of migration and 
border management, several additional reforms were carried out. Take, for example, 
document security (including biometrics): since 2011 Moldova issues only biometric 
passports, and a new law on protecting personal data was passed in accordance 
with EU standards. In the area of irregular immigration (including re-admission), 
Moldova developed an Action Plan and implemented the Integrated Border 
Management Strategy. A precondition for effective fight against illegal migration or 
customs fraud, as expected by the EU, is the introduction of integrated border 
management (Canciani, 2009). Moldova modernized its border management 
procedures in compliance with the EU concept of integrated border management, 
based on the adoption of regular strategies and plans (interv MD 18). Establishing 
integrated border management impacted on such key policy areas as trade, 
customs, visa and mobility of persons. Moreover, there has been a drastic reform of 
the police. The border police forces were demilitarized and incorporated into the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, salaries were increased, and disciplinary procedures were 
initiated against police officers accused of implication in corruption cases. Most 
changes were made in line with FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union) regulations as agreed with the EU (Commission, 2015c). 
Progress was made also in relation to democracy promotion and respect for human 
rights. As regards human rights and fundamental freedoms, Moldova ratified and 
made progress in implementing several international and European instruments, as 
required by the EU, such as the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant 
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Workers, the UN Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
UN Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons. It also created a Reception 
Centre for Asylum Seekers and a Temporary Placement Centre for Foreigners. 
Among the most sensitive legislation that was passed were the Law on Equal 
Opportunities and the reform of the Anti-Corruption Centre (interv. MD 18). As 
Moldovan monitoring reports show, at the end of 2013 the government adopted a 
new draft law on the people’s advocate as well as progressed in organizing the 
activity of community mediators for Roma-populated communities and continued 
efforts to promote the social inclusion of persons with disabilities (ADEPT& Expert-
Grup, 2013). Another successful change was the incorporation in the National 
Human Rights Plan 2011–2014 of the recommendations of the Universal Periodic 
Review. As a general evaluation for the period 2005-2014, progress reports 
emphasized that the Moldovan legislation had improved so that it prohibited 
discrimination based on race, sex, disability, ethnicity or social status (Botan et al., 
2015). 
On the other hand, Moldova’s track record also had certain deficiencies. Moldova 
lagged behind in the implementation of reforms (interv MD 3, 8, 9, 10) and, to cite 
the former Prime Minister Iurie Leancă (2014), ‘we need to do our homework’. 
Implementation of EU norms in some cases remained a challenge due to the lack of 
the necessary financial and human resources and a vision for a mainstreaming 
approach or political will (interv. MD 2, 12, 13, 17, 18). It is important to differentiate 
policy areas: as some Moldovan civil servants emphasize, the pace of reform was 
slower in certain areas than others because some entailed political costs, whereas 
others were more technical in nature (interv. MD 2, 12). Data from the Centre of 
Harmonization at the Ministry of Justice show that there was no real effort to create a 
roadmap for governmental decision-making, with a clear timeframe; moreover, there 
was insufficient coordination of all relevant ministries to fulfil EU obligations (interv. 
MD 2, 12, 13).  
Table 11 below assesses Moldova’s progress 2005–2012 in the areas of democracy, 
human rights and rule of law with the ratings given by national experts themselves. 
According to the authors, the Moldovan authorities were undertaking reforms for the 
sake of reporting back to the EU; Moldova still lagged behind in areas like ensuring 
democracy and the rule of law: ‘adoption of the legislation framework is not always 
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followed by the development of effective mechanisms for human rights protection, 
while strengthening the existing mechanisms is not perceived as a priority. This 
approach of "half measures" does not allow an effective protection of human rights’ 
(Botan et al. 2013, p. 24). 
 
Table 11. Moldova’s progress 2005–2012 
Areas as established within the ENP AP 
*approximation indices (0=lowest score; 5=highest score) 
Rating established 
Nr value30 assessment 
Democracy and rule of law (democratic institutions, judicial system, 
administrative capacity and other sub-areas) 
2.3 modest 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms (minority rights, children’s 
rights, freedom of expression, prevention of, and the fight against, 
the trafficking in human beings, ill-treatment and torture and other 
sub-areas) 
2.6 moderate 
Settlement of the Transnistrian conflict (border security, civil society 
and democracy and other related areas) 
1.5 minor 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on national evaluation of Moldova’s progress (Botan et al. 2013) 
 
The report highlights that there are deficiencies in carrying out the judicial reform 
which leaves room for interference by interest groups, political involvement and 
corruption. Additionally, many actions foreseen in this area have not been 
implemented. The 2015 report further highlighted that despite having a solid legal 
framework for promoting human rights, Moldova demonstrated significant lacunae 
during the implementation process, a problem highly interconnected with a poor 
justice sector in the country (Botan et al. 2015).  
 
4.2.2. The role of diplomatic actors in Chisinau 
Generally speaking, between 2010 and 2015 the diplomatic community in Moldova 
channelled its effort to try to create a proper climate and atmosphere that might bring 
peace and development in the host country, especially for the young generations. 
Through many of their activities, diplomats were aligned in their efforts to be of help 
to Moldova in implementing its European vocation and achieving its European 
aspiration, which in practice meant helping Moldova to go further on the European 
                                                   
30 Progress has been estimated by civil society representatives responsible for monitoring the Moldovan reform process 
according to EU standards on a level from 0 to 5, 0 being the lowest and 5 being the highest, as well as relevant assessment – 
regression, no progress, modest, moderate, high. 
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path and achieve some results in transforming its economy, society, rule of law, 
freedom and other proper conditions to develop the country (interv. 25-32; 38-41). 
National as well as European diplomats tried to deal with local authorities in Moldova 
and their mission was to develop diplomatic relations, to promote common ideas, 
where such a stance is possible: “sometimes we have to work in a state where there 
is quite significant differences of understanding of the work we are doing and we look 
for possibilities to develop the relationship even if the position are different” (ibidem). 
Data collected from the field-work conducted in Moldova shows that operationally, 
there was no big difference between the practices of national or EU diplomacy in 
reaching the earlier mentioned efforts in Moldova. The difference, as one EU 
diplomat explained, was in working at the EU level and representing the interest of 
the EU and all member-states: “the scope of the interest is broader this needs to be 
taken into account and coordinated internally within the EU (the interest) – this is an 
important aspect and this is mostly done in Brussels within the COEST working 
group where policy towards Eastern Europe is coordinated” (interv. 26). For national 
diplomats, “either national or EU, the message is similar” (interv. 27), the difference 
was that for a member-state’s diplomatic mission it was about representing your own 
country and, hence, subordination was to the national headquarters, from where they 
received their instructions.  
In Moldova, the EUD was the largest single donor for development assistance in 
Moldova (see data from Table 8), hence it had high leverage in the context of 
cooperation with the government and according to the Delegation’s staff, this “makes 
the EU a natural leader on the ground” (interv. 39). The Delegation on the ground 
was constantly in touch with local stakeholders and was involved in organizing 
regular meetings with Moldova’s leadership, with representatives of the government 
and different ministries and played an important role in coming to an agreement 
regarding the budgetary support offered by the EU to Moldova (interv. 1; see data in 
Figure 3 below). The Delegation also played a great role in reporting on Moldova’s 
progress within the ENP and EaP in relation to carrying out of specific reforms 
results of which can be seen within the ENP Progress Reports for the relevant years. 
A screening of Moldova’s progress was reported in both positive and negative terms.  
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As result of the positive progress, the EU–Moldova political dialogue continued to 
deepen throughout 2011 - 2015 and contacts between high-level officials intensified. 
For example, the first visit to the Republic of Moldova of HE Baroness Catherine 
Ashton, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-
president of the European Commission was organised in 2011; in April 2012 
President Timofti paid a visit to Brussels, reciprocated by European Commission 
President Barroso in November. In February 2012, Commissioner De Gucht opened 
negotiations in Chisinau on establishing a DCFTA, and Commissioner Malmström 
met three times with the Moldovan Prime Minister in 2012 (Commission 2006a, p. 2). 
On the other hand, the Delegation became more outspoken when Moldova did not 
deliver. For example, Pirkka Tapiola, the Head of the EU Delegation in Chisinau 
between 2013-2017, spoke more about the negative tendencies from justice rather 
than about Moldova’s successes in the area of human rights defence at the 
reception organized by the EU Delegation to mark the ending of a conference in the 
area of human rights in Moldova, which had involved experts from the EU, the 
OSCE, the UN, but also the Council of Europe (Jurnal, 2016). 
When talking about the activity of their missions, diplomats emphasized that their 
main focus was “to have stable neighbours, less migration pressure, less human 
trafficking, stable political environment, stronger institutions and a better security 
Figure 3. EU budgetary support offered to Moldova 2007-2015 
 
Source: European Court of Auditors (2016). EU assistance for strengthening the public 
administration in Moldova Special Report no.13, p. 8, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union 
88 
environment” in a country like Moldova (interv. 39). The traditional way of developing 
diplomatic bilateral relations, as some diplomats argued, is through trade and cultural 
cooperation, but also via providing development aid assistance, especially in 
Moldova, a country in transition with a commitment to reforms to be conducted by 
the political class (interv. 25-32; 38-41). For example, countries like Poland, “as part 
of the European attitude […] aim at sharing prosperity, promoting concrete projects, 
developing democracy, creating good conditions of development for society, 
education, health. We help to renovate some schools, some hospitals, these are not 
big projects, but important” (interv. 28). Germany developed a large portofolio on 
legal cooperation, on modernization of public services, on water management and 
assistance to the different ministries through bringing in advisors on European 
integration.  
But today, as noted in chapter 2, diplomatic interaction is highly diverse and 
diplomacy has expanded beyond representation, communication or negotiation in 
times of war and peace (section 2.2.1.). Besides their traditional diplomatic role, 
therefore, national embassies and the EU delegations have become very active in 
their roles as donors and have developed a strong relationship with civil society 
organisations, not just the governments. In Moldova this has implied organising 
events with and for civil society organisations, organising grant competitions as well 
as consulting them in their areas of expertise or delegating to them the organisation 
of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum31. One key instrument that the EU 
has designed to upgrade civil society to key stakeholders in implementing reforms is 
the Civil Society Forum within the EaP. Moldova is active within the Civil Society 
(CS) Forum, the EU platform for EaP civil society cooperation, where common 
approaches on different democracy and good governance initiatives, including 
human rights, have been discussed. The fact that in 2013 the Forum was hosted in 
Moldova and not in Lithuania (the EU MS country hosting the Presidency) bore 
witness to Moldova’s progress on the reform agenda as well as its active 
participation in this framework. The Moldovan national CS platform had been very 
active in proposing items on the policy agenda of the EaP, more active and 
advanced than the other national platforms: it was Moldova that produced policy 
                                                   
31 The Eastern Partnership Forum is a regional civil society platform facilitating democratic reforms. For the first time such a 
Forum was organized outside of the EU country holding the Presidency in 2013, when it was decided to be organized in 
Chisinau, Moldova 
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proposals on education, on integration of volunteers and on the ERASMUS+ 
programme (interv. MD 17, 19 and 20). 
Through their activity as donors, diplomatic actors invested in strengthening reforms 
and fostering democratic developments in Moldova. For example, the Delegation 
launched calls for proposals for projects in pursuit of common agendas for human 
rights and democratic reforms, of enhancing the inclusiveness and pluralism of civil 
society, of promotion of freedom of expression and freedom of the press or fostering 
the dialogue between civil society and national and local authorities (CNP, 2011). 
The overall objective of Swedish32 policy was to reduce poverty in developing 
countries via offering support to civil society actors. This support was mainstreamed 
through capacity development of civil society organisations and developing their 
legal and institutional environment (MFA Sweden 2009). The policy aimed at 
“strengthen[ing] democracy, equitable and sustainable development, and closer ties 
with the EU and its fundamental values” (ibidem). More specifically, for Moldova, the 
overall objective of such support aimed at deeper integration with the EU (Embassy 
Sweden, 2011). It is noteworthy that the policy guidelines were based on several 
principles, one of them being close cooperation with the EU Delegation and 
strengthening the civil society role in the EU integration agenda. The Czech Strategy 
specified its European involvement in the programming of financial instruments such 
as the ENPI while locally, in Moldova, the Czech embassies set out to work as 
facilitators in implementation of EU development projects (ibidem). It also explained 
that cooperation with civil society would take place on an individual level, directly 
with nongovernmental organisations, and through the established system of 
cooperation – the Czech Forum for Development Cooperation. For Moldova, there 
were several sectoral priorities established for cooperation – environment, 
agriculture and social development (MFA CZ, 2011). For the Polish counterpart, 
developing civil society, promoting democracy and fostering free media and human 
rights were one of the main guidelines for providing aid (MFA Poland, 2010).  
Besides contributing to the general EU budget from which the EU provides 
assistance to countries like Moldova (data presented in Table 8), Ukraine and 
                                                   
32 In 2009, these countries happened to held the Presidency of the EU (January-June: Czech Republic and Juy-December: 
Sweden), this however had little significance over the innitiatives mentioned here to portray the donor activities performed by 
the MS which where a continuation of the previous innitiatives launched by their respective MFAs. 
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Belarus, member states also developed bilateral strategies and instruments 
designed for their relationship with local civil society. To name just a few: in Moldova, 
between 1999 and 2011 the United Kingdom funded bilateral projects in Moldova in 
the sum of c. mil. €44 (British Embassy, 2011); Sweden, through the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) allocated €13 million between 
2011-2014 (State Chancellery , 2013) and the Czech Republic €14 million between 
20011-2017 (Embassy CZ, 2014). To further bilateral cooperation, the Swedish 
government decided on a long-term commitment for continued support to EaP 
countries detailed in its Strategy for 2014-2020, according to which Swedish support 
to Moldova would amount to 14 million Euros annually (Embassy Sweden, 2015). 
Even a smaller embassy, such as that of Slovakia, for example, offered non-
repayable financial contribution from the SlovakAid programme in sum of 10,000 
EUR per project (Embassy SK, 2017). 
The empirical information collected in Moldova shows that there had developed an 
institutionalised form of interaction between the EU and national diplomatic actors, 
also in their role as donors (see Table 12). The data collected during the field-trips 
can be used to construct a typology of a communication infrastructure. This typology 
groups meetings based on level (participation based on diplomatic rank), focus 
(participation based on topic), membership (participation based on group affiliation), 
and formality (degree of ceremonialism of the meeting). Whereas data was initially 
collected in 2011, field-trips to Moldova in 2013 and 2015 confirmed that these 
meetings continued to take place under the same headings.  
Participation based on level reflects the diplomatic ranking of the attendees and 
referred to regular EU-MS meetings which were the HoMs meetings or the weekly 
meetings of the Heads of Delegations (HoD): the average of these meetings 
between 2011 and 2015 have been every two weeks (interv. 29). Also part of this 
category were the meetings of the deputy HoDs and those of the counsellors. The 
regular meetings were hosted by the Delegation; when they referred to relations with 
local civil society they gathered together representatives of the diplomatic missions 
(except the HoD) as well as the representatives of MS aid agencies. The HoD 
meetings were more frequent, were arranged in relation to most important 
developments in these countries and usually required unanimity.  
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Table 12: Communication infrastructure between MS embassies and EUD in Moldova, 2011-
2015 
Typology Heading Frequency 
Level 
EU–member states general meetings 
(1) HoMs: Meetings of Heads of 
Delegation (HoDs) 
Weekly: 
every week on political issues, 
occasionally on civil society issues 
(approx. two–three times per year) 
(2) Deputy HoDs meetings 
Monthly 
(3) Counsellor’s meetings 
Monthly: 
at least once every two months  
six per year 
Topic 
(1) Thematic EU (donor) meetings / 
Sectoral cooperation 
Monthly, also can be quarterly, called on 
the following topics: 
- Justice sector reform 
- Development and aid 
- Human rights 
- Trade/Economic development 
- Transnistria 
(2) Consultations with other EU donors 
Called based on necessity 
(3) Member states’ roundtables 
Group 
affiliation 
EU (donor) meetings within regional frameworks of cooperation 
(1) Visegrad Group (or V4) once per year 
(2) Nordic group (or Nordic Plus) occasionally 
Formality 
(1) Formal events 
Organized based on the yearly agendas 
of EU delegations and member states’ 
embassies; at least one event per actor 
(2) Non-formal events Information not disclosed 
Source: Author’s compilation based on fieldwork conducted in Moldova between 2011 - 2015 
 
Participation based on topic reflected the focus of the diplomatic meetings and were 
considered sectorial cooperation by diplomats (interv. 39). The thematic (EU) donor 
meetings had a specific agenda, were narrow in scope and were conducted at the 
level of the counsellors based on their sectorial specialisation. The consultations with 
other (EU) donors were meetings distinctive for the EU delegation and were called 
before launching its regular local calls for proposals for civil society project funding. 
National embassies hosted round-tables, a type of meet and greet event, where civil 
society actors were invited in order to get acquainted with the diplomatic donor 
community and vice-versa. Group affiliation participation was based on membership 
of a particular group. In Moldova (as well as in the other countries) these have been 
identified as regional groups such as the Visegrad Group and the Nordic Plus group. 
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More details on the specifics of the two groups are presented in section 4.4., under 
‘relevance’. Last but not least, the EU diplomatic actors also interacted within formal 
and non-formal events such as those organised by relevant stakeholders in each 
country as well as lunch, dinner or an “occasional coffee”. Participation was not 
mandatory, nor was it exclusive to EU counterparts only. These events provided an 
opportune framework to exchange recent information or brainstorm on new activities, 
thus mainly a networking possibility. 
Despite differences in typology, according to the interviewees, all these meetings 
aimed at sharing information, presenting strategies, programmes and projects, 
insights from consultations with local organisations and other activities pertinent to 
civil society support; the participants aimed at coordination. This coordination was to 
be achieved through sharing of diplomatic resources; the meetings representing the 
primary mechanism for this. National diplomats explained that: “communication 
about our individual activities presented in the form of oral reports is the main 
activity” (interv. 8). Yet this brief account of the types of meetings shared by EU 
diplomatic actors in Moldova does not account for the challenges faced by them 
while jointly accessing this communication infrastructure. Also, diplomats indicated 
that as result of the interaction in these meetings was “the common message sent to 
the Moldovan authorities: to tie Moldova closer to our countries and to come closer 
to the EU market” (interv. 38). The most frequent examples of the issues discussed 
in the meeting to achieve a common position or deliver a common message referred 
to the human rights situation in Moldova, the justice sector reforms or the situation in 
Transnistria (interv. 41, 38, 39). One such example was the sanctions regime 
established for Transnistria, namely, the Romanian counterpart was able to set up a 
report on this matter to which both the EU and the member-stated commonly agreed 
(interv. 41). 
The way diplomats engage in these meetings relates to the discussion that is carried 
out in section 4.4. regarding the second criterion, relevance; while how this 
infrastructure becomes a resource is discussed in section 4.5. regarding capabilities, 
the third criterion. Before that, we now turn to investigating the diplomatic practices 
of representing the Union in Moldova, the goal to be attained according to the Lisbon 
Treaty and of interest to the first criteria, effectiveness.  
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4.3. Effectiveness: representing the Union 
Post Lisbon, the EU Delegations acquired legal recognition that upgraded the former 
Commission representations to full-blown EU delegations, an integral part of the 
EEAS tasked to represent the Union and act in close cooperation with member-
states diplomatic and consular missions (art. 221 TFEU). The task of representing 
the EU as a whole given to the EUD has been embraced by both the Delegation and 
the MS embassies. Hence, the main division of tasks regarding representation is 
straightforward: the EUDs represent the interests of the EU as a whole, while every 
MS represents its own interests which are based on bilateral relations with the host 
country (here: Moldova). The responsibility of representation and coordination has 
been taken over by most delegations from early 2010 (European Council, 2010); this 
was mainly possible due to the fact that in Moldova the Commission representation 
was present before Lisbon and had been involved in coordinating certain activities or 
meetings and representing the EU context. 
Retrospectively diplomats recalled that at the beginning of the Lisbon Treaty there 
was not much change as the EEAS as an organisation was not active in 2009 and 
this meant that locally, the member-state holding the Presidency had to be in touch 
with Brussels and their Permanent representation in Brussels and be in direct 
contact with DG Relex and DG Trade (interv. 28, 29, 30, 41). This was coupled with 
the Presidency’s role of coordination and representation of the interests of all 
member-states in the host country. The practical result of the Treaty, as a diplomat in 
the Delegation explained, was that there was no Presidency and the EU chaired the 
meetings and represented member-states at the EU level in relation with the host 
country (interv. 26). Hence, the role of the Delegation became extremely important 
after the Lisbon Treaty since there was no rotating Presidency: “immediately after 
the Lisbon Treaty they were not so active and the rotating Presidencies were 
involved but had less work to do and gradually the role of the Delegation has grown” 
(interv. 28). Some emphasized that this gave them an advantage to focus on their 
own priorities in Moldova: “the role of the Delegation is crucial as member-states can 
put more emphasis on other fields of importance to them like ecology or climate 
change or any other area” (interv. 29). 
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In regard to representation in particular, in Moldova, EU diplomacy became ‘the 
common denominator’ (interv. 29) in member states’ bilateral relations with the host 
country. Interviewees mentioned in several instances that the Lisbon Treaty made 
the EU Delegation the analogue of the conventional embassy with a political agenda 
with emphasis on issues of security and human rights and political affairs (interv. 28, 
29). In the local media it was the voice of the EU Head of Delegation that resonated 
in society and was taken as that of the EU Ambassador (interv. 28). As the EU 
diplomat explained, “The EU Delegation is seen as a very important interlocutor for 
the EU and brings a high profile for media exposure in the country, especially since 
there is a multidimensional relationship with a neighbouring country that embraces 
deeper relations in the light of the AA and DCFTA” (interv. 26). And, because the 
EUD represented the largest single donor for development assistance in Moldova, it 
had high leverage in the context of cooperation with the government and “this makes 
them a natural leader” (interv. 39). 
Post Lisbon, with a decline in the role of the EU Presidency, meant that the EUD 
took over the coordinating role, including in the Community areas. Whereas the initial 
expectations were that this would be a highly difficult logistical effort for the newly 
established delegations, in practice, the level of engagement with the member state 
embassies was relatively high. There was a positive change post Lisbon of a better 
coordination and a higher level of involvement of all parties (interv. 41). Before the 
Commission representation was established in 2005, there were few member-states 
involved in generating a platform for cooperation: “UK was most active, they also 
were offering a lot of assistance. Now, in general, assistance has decreased with the 
exception of Sweden and Germany. France has a complementary input with small 
but quick contributions” (interv. 32). Officers from the Delegation recalled that there 
was not much diplomatic activity regarding local coordination with the member-states 
and it was with the Lisbon Treaty that the role of the Delegation increased (interv. 
32). At the same time, national diplomats shared the post-Lisbon practices where 
“the Delegation takes the lead when a paper needs to be drafted and they cannot 
and should not do it on their own - then they look for volunteers among member-
states” (interv. 30).  
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In practice, the EU Delegation was the one that had the permanent Presidency in a 
host country (interv. 31). Post-Lisbon, it was the Delegation that hosted the HoMs 
meetings (HoD meetings in Table 12) and, depending on issues, another range of 
meetings on economic, development, political matters that were grouped in sectorial 
groups (meetings by topics in Table 12). There was also an increased engagement 
of development counsellors meeting: these did not meet always but had a regular 
frequency. Officers in the Delegation exemplified that “there are the bi-weekly Head 
of Delegation meetings chaired by the HoD of the EU Delegation, there are meetings 
of political officers, development and cooperation officers that meet at least once a 
month and also ad-hoc or for events” (interv. 31). For example there could be the 
economic counsellor’s meetings that made general observations on the economic 
trends in Moldova and were hosted more often in comparison to the one on consular 
affairs that happened four times a year only. It was the EUD that had the role of 
chairing these meetings and setting the agenda, to which comments could be added. 
Sometimes there were even meetings for more acute issues; and then for lunch 
meetings the EUD also invited someone external who was also dealing with these 
issues in this sector: IMF, WB or others (interv. 38, 39). Some noticed that, as result, 
the intensity of daily work had increased (interv. 27). This change came about 
because each country used to hold the Presidency and chair meetings, but now the 
Delegation ran the meetings and had to be in charge. 
The Delegation itself perceived its role as that of a coordinator and manager, hence 
the meetings were the responsibility of the EU (interv. 25, 26) and “we (the 
Delegation) reflect on the position taken in Brussels and act as interlocutor” (interv. 
26). It was common practice that the Delegation had meetings with different DG 
representatives when these were visiting and thereafter presented the results to the 
member-states, including their first remarks on any statements or reports, and 
collected viewpoints from the member-states (interv. 27). Reflecting on their practice 
of diplomacy post-Lisbon, interviewees emphasized the effectiveness that came from 
the chairing role embraced by the Delegation as result of the withdrawal of the 
Presidency function. The Delegation took the lead when a document needed to be 
drafted, this could be in the form of a paper or a report; the process also involved 
member-states, some of which helped to develop these reports through offering 
comments (interv. 27, 30). According to national diplomats, the Delegation would 
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take on board these reports, “it does not do anything against it, we work in a collegial 
way and there is an opportunity for them to voice their opinions. In Moldova, there is 
no difference in views unlike my experience in Tunisia where views were based on 
economic issues and that is why opinion diverged: the Italian-French one versus the 
Anglo-Saxon one. The issues in Moldova of good governance, transparency, 
democracy or human rights are less important and then common interests prevail” 
(interv. 30). 
In assuming this leading role, the Delegation formalised the practices of cooperation, 
according to representatives of the EU Delegation (interv. 31, 32). According to 
national diplomats, the main instrument of the EUD were the common meetings 
which acted as a coordinating instrument (interv. 41). The Delegation would discuss 
and conduct consultations with member-states; MS would get instructions from their 
capitals and then the common position was presented in Brussels: “we consult for a 
common position or a certain position” (interv. 31). The culture of reporting together 
became a shared practice among the Delegation and national embassies. Diplomats 
confirmed that “the Delegation takes on board our opinions, on Transnistria for 
example, it is considerate of our know-how and that it is an added-value” (interv. 30). 
It was the common meetings that allowed for the opportunity to draft reports together 
and for the Delegation to take a lead as one of the EU diplomats stated “we are 
representing all member-states and the role of the Delegation is to lead” (interv. 31). 
In this way, as interviewees noticed, not only discussions were initiated but also 
common démarches could be made (interv. 41). 
National diplomats put emphasis on the fact that centralization happened with this 
type of activity performed by the Delegation that resembled that of a secretariat and 
“are happy to have the EU Delegation present in Moldova. For us, a small embassy, 
it is helpful to have access to more resources and more people. The role is that of 
the rotating Presidency, activities are coordinated by the Delegation which makes it 
easier and better as a process and it is good to keep this dynamic of the diplomatic 
activity; for example idea-sharing is a positive emphasis” (interv. 27). Others 
reiterated this point explaining that for the Delegation it was easier to organize the 
work of cooperation with Brussels than for national embassies who had national 
obligations and had to, first and foremost, represent their state. This secretarial role 
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can also be quite a logistical burden for member-states, therefore they welcomed the 
fact that the Delegation had embraced this function: “in my previous post in Central 
Asia, where there was no EU Delegation I had to host meetings on the premises of 
our embassy and also, at times, had to represent other member-states; all the 
different complications could be avoided if there was a Delegation” (interv. 29). 
It is important to note, that post-Lisbon developments not only focused on the Union 
Delegations representing the Union, but also the Treaty anticipated that in third 
countries, the EU Delegation would step up their cooperation with the member-state 
embassies towards a common approach (art. 32). Therefore, the next section, 
focuses on the diplomatic practices that developed in this sense in Moldova. 
 
4.4. Relevance: ‘common approach’ in Chisinau 
Relevance is a criterion that asseses corporate diplomatic practices as 
operationalised in Chapter 3, in relation to member-states embassies and the EU 
delegation formulating and implementing a common approach. What comes across 
from the material in the previous sections in this chapter and the interviews 
conducted in Moldova is that for both sides, the EU and the national diplomats, the 
common approach, stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty, referred, in the conduct of their 
diplomatic activity, to a common message or a common position vis-à-vis the local 
authorities. The way the process usually worked, as diplomats explained it, is that 
every member-state would send a person or a team to the COEST33 working group 
in Brussels, where they met regularly and worked together, and this is the place 
where the formulation of the common approach happened: “in this proceedings and 
through the dialogue in the working groups we try to achieve common ground” 
(interv. 28). On certain issues, reports from Brussels would be sent to the Delegation 
who, in turn, presented the draft to the member-states and afterwards inserted their 
input. In this process, member-states tried to find some answers for important 
                                                   
33 COEST is The Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia handles all aspects of EU relations and cooperation with 
countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Its work also includes frameworks for multilateral cooperation, such as the ENP 
and the EaP. This Council working party (nr. C.9) examines the legislative proposals by the European Commission in its field of 
expertise that are sent to the Council of Ministers. This body is composed of experts from each member state and is chaired by 
the delegate of the country holding the rotating six-month presidency of the Council. After examination the proposals will be 
forwarded to the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). Whereas no evidence was collected on the information flow between the 
Delegations and COEST, data shows that that information from MS embassies are transferred to COEST via the MFAs and 
their respective representations in Brussels. No information has been disclosed regarding the extent to which COEST works on 
the reports that come from the Delegations themselves. 
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questions regarding how to deal with certain issues or how to promote European 
values in Moldova: “there is a creative dialogue among member-states in this sense” 
(ibidem). Evidence shows that besides Romania, the UK, Sweden and Poland were 
involved in drafting reports which were then circulated and discussed. The work was 
done at the Deputy Head of mission level or it could be at the level of First Secretary, 
as in the case of Romania, for example (interv. 30). 
Although coordination was more a matter for the capitals (interv. 27) the diplomats in 
host countries were the ones who implemented the results. What happened on the 
ground then, was joint action (interv. 31). EU diplomats shared their experience in 
this sense and stated that member-states were not reluctant to cooperate: “the 
tendency is to not overlap but to complement each other. Sweden, for example, 
being a big donor in Moldova makes sure that the programs implemented by them 
take this into consideration. As a Swedish diplomat explained, in Moldova “there is 
also the issue of joint programming34 that now focuses on everyone getting onto 
speed; conducting a common analysis of the situation and complementing each 
other as well as possible in order not to duplicate our efforts” (interv. 38). A 
Romanian diplomat also underlined that through joint programming, better support 
could be brought to Moldova by the diplomatic community (interv. 41).  
During the 2010-2015 period, there were several positive examples that illustrate 
such a trend in diplomatic activity. Germany and Sweden scaled up their assistance 
and they teamed-up and divided a considerable amount of money into concrete 
actions. Another example is a pilot project started in 2014 was upgraded in 2016 with 
funds from Germany, Sweden and Romania were channelled for regional cohesion 
activities on developing a pipeline and the EU extended the project through a 
financial input (interv. 31). On migration and asylum there was a range of projects 
initiated by Romania: in 2014 Romania started a project on migration that developed 
into a common project conducted together with the EU. A part of the money came 
from the Romanian side and the other from the EU’s budget support provided to 
Moldova. In another range of projects, in the context of visa liberalization, Romania 
was invited by the EU to get involved; an involvement requested due to the added 
value of having a Romanian counterpart (interv. 41). Another similar example of joint 
                                                   
34 Joint programming implies the joint planning of development cooperation by the EU development partners working in a 
partner country. 
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actions and programming was the Austrian and German cooperation on water 
management projects that the EU also topped-up financially (interv. 31). There were 
also co-financing agreements between Germany, Sweden, Romania, the EU, which 
did not come with an obligation: “every member-state can decide how to implement 
this; it is mainly an exercise where every party can learn and it is a task not easy to 
accomplish” (interv. 39). 
Empirical evidence showed that the common approach during the period 2010-2015 
was not a single approach, it was different depending on area as there was more 
member-state interest on certain issues, but it has been noted that there was a 
general priority on listening and providing input (interv. 39). And the fact that post-
Lisbon there was higher level of involvement of the EU Delegation (as highlighted in 
the previous section) and in general all members of the EU diplomatic community 
present in Moldova played their part in reaching this common approach (interv. 41). 
This was coupled with the fact that the frequency of meetings (presented in Table 
12) could be adjusted on the go and the coordination meetings were well balanced 
(interv. 39). Some also emphasized the size of the diplomatic community in Moldova 
as another driver towards a common approach: “there is a like-minded small 
diplomatic community which is unified in its position in terms of how to deal with the 
government; and this is different from my previous experience and I find this situation 
unusual if I compare it to my previous posting in Tunisia” (interv. 30). National 
diplomats considered that it was important to have the Delegation provide this 
instrument of exchange of information through the common meetings (interv. 39, 41). 
Especially because “the general common approach is to encourage Moldova to 
implement the provisions of the AA […] and to solidify the EU message towards 
Moldovan authorities, to increase our visibility and to have a common frontline” 
(interv. 41). Moldova’s European aspirations became a driving force for the EU’s 
common approach: “every national embassy does certain things in the bilateral 
dimension of diplomacy but we work as a team in helping Moldova on its European 
path and the Delegation’s role is big and important” (interv. 28). It seems that the 
performance of the common approach depended on the success of Moldova in 
implementing reforms and of developments in the region (interv. 27). 
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Nonetheless, there was a duality in the nature of diplomatic practice in Moldova 
between 2010-2015. For instance, France or the Czech Republic could have 
different opinions, but on the main topics the position was the same and this 
remained central in establishing a common position. Some diplomats argued that it 
could be more influential for the common approach when member-states had 
different views on policy issues (interv. 39). Clearly, the common position did not 
happen ad-hoc, it was the result of debate and the sharing of ideas amongst 
participants in the meetings hosted by the Delegation. As some diplomats clarified, 
“the common position is the product of continuous consolidation; own position 
becomes closer to the common one due to closer cooperation, there are some 
nuances, some have more remarks, but overall everyone is more supportive” (interv. 
27). The other facet of this is that, given that the diplomatic community in Moldova is 
small, not every member-state was represented and it is not clear how the position of 
the missing member-states was taken on board (interv. 41). They were, by definition, 
represented by the EU, but they did not have the same opportunity to take part in the 
debates or the on-going discussions. Some interviewees also raised the issue of the 
frequency of the meetings which might be counterproductive to the purpose it was 
supposed to serve, i.e. ensuring that member-states did not interfere with each other 
bilaterally: “having too many meetings results in producing meeting notes rather than 
joint actions” (interv. 39). It was also time-consuming: “when you get involved in this 
you cannot engage in something else” (interv. 30). Diplomats in the Delegation also 
observed that member-states had different time schedules or the timing did not 
correspond to their national programming, hence, what happened in practice was not 
joint programming; more time and harmonization of themes was needed (interv. 31). 
So avoiding differences was rather impossible (interv. 27). 
At the same time, the approach, interest and political weight was different when 
sometimes different member-states would promote some people or their own 
interests (interv. 29). Member-states might have different tactics or reasons for 
promoting coordination (interv. 27). What becomes obvious in the Moldovan case, 
for example, is that Western European member-states were less interested in this 
country than the Central European ones, whose internal situation, individual 
approach and economic situation have a real impact in Moldova: “Romania is an 
eloquent example, whose voice is being heard, but, other actors might have more 
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possibilities for action” (interv. 29). The scope of action played a role as well as the 
expertise: who specializes on what, on environment or energy, could become a 
dividing line in achieving complementarity, for example (interv. 31). As a French 
diplomat clarified, “the France-Germany cooperation is not really working as there is 
too much asymmetry. They have specific policy objectives that we do not share. 
Moreover, on policy advising, the Germans are very involved on advising the 
Moldovan authorities, hence very involved in Moldovan internal politics” (interv. 40). 
Affinity to a certain group of countries can also create a dividing line on the matter of 
common positions. Evidence showed that the interaction among EU diplomatic 
actors often resulted in different interest constellations. Member state embassies in 
Moldova (but also in Ukraine) admitted that they cluster into different groups of 
interest: it was the EU donor meetings within regional frameworks of cooperation (as 
presented in Table 12) that offered the platform for doing so. The Visegrad Group 
(Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia), commonly known as the V4, 
“reflects the efforts of the countries of the Central European region to work together 
in a number of fields of common interest within the all-European integration” 
(Visegrad Group, 2013). The other regional framework, the Nordic Plus Group, 
represented a group of the ‘like-minded donors’ (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark 
the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands) that were committed to enhancing aid 
effectiveness - from which emerged the principle of ‘good donorship’ (Norad, 2006; 
interv. 18, 19). These two groups exhibited various examples of formulating a 
common approach and implementing it, i.e. sharing resources and engaging in joint 
projects (for instance, the V4 reconstruction of summer camps in Moldova). It is 
important to note that these groups did not include the Delegation which was not 
invited even as an observer to these meetings. During the common meetings, under 
the auspices of the EUD, these groups did not report on their collective activities, 
strategies or plans. It also happened that countries chose to cooperate under the 
pressure of certain issues such as minorities or illegal migration. Or it may be that 
member states clustered non-formally, under certain themes. In Moldova, Poland, 
Sweden, Romania and, on occasions, Lithuania coordinated together on EaP related 
issues, outside EUD premises. 
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For the Baltics, the easiest cooperation in the period studied was with the Baltic 
colleagues and it came naturally: “we know the region, we have experience, we have 
big interests for the host-country and there is high flow of information among us” 
(interv. 27). For the Swedish counterparts it was often the case of collaboration with 
like-minded partners, especially in the instance when their natural allies from the 
Nordic group do not have a diplomatic mission in Chisinau (e.g.: the Netherlands or 
Finland) : “we try to have contacts with the Baltics and the Estonian counter-part who 
is hosted by us. We are in a position of finding other like-minded partners, like 
Poland or Lithuania and sometimes other Central European colleagues. The 
approach to the EaP and its understanding is different to different member-states 
and this has more to do with national interests” (interv. 38). Diplomats also 
mentioned that in the case of their colleagues that have dossiers on Moldova, but 
operate from their Bucharest or Kiev representations, the Delegation ‘is of no help’ in 
assisting member-states missions to Moldova that do not have diplomatic missions 
in Chisinau (interv. 27); so they prefer to contact their natural partner (e.g.: the Dutch 
would call on the Swedish or the German counterpart). Diplomatic missions like 
Germany for instance, did not like multilateral cooperation and preferred a bilateral 
approach (interv. 40). The same held true for Poland with their “go-it-alone” tactics 
who preferred to pursue a parallel national agenda (Baltag & Smith, 2015). Others, 
like the UK, were at the centre for drafting reports because they wanted to influence 
the process (interv. 30). Some (Poland, Romania, Hungary or Slovakia) lobbied the 
EUD strongly; being very active in pushing for their own interests since, as 
neighbouring countries of the host countries, they felt more confident in their national 
line of diplomacy than in the EU one. Being so focused on the primacy of their 
national diplomatic expertise often hampered the pursuit of a common approach and 
could be seen as short-sighted. This, in turn, left room for mistakes: such as 
confusing instances of bilateral track diplomacy with the (EU) multilateral one. The 
fact that Romania is Moldova’s advocate in the EU is well-known, yet its actions on 
the ground could be seen as provocative by other members of the diplomatic 
community: “in Moldova, Romania advises the Moldovan authorities, so information 
from the general meetings leaks to the Moldovan government and this leads to 
reluctance to cooperate; and become less transparent” (interv. 40). Diplomats 
therefore mentioned that in the case of Romania specifically there were certain 
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peculiarities related to their national interests in Moldova (interv. 38) and they 
became reluctant to cooperate with them or to share certain information (interv. 40). 
As a reflection regarding the common approach, national diplomats stressed the 
importance of having more common lobby strategies in cooperation with the local 
authorities, which they expected to come as an initiative from the Delegation (interv. 
39, 40). Some highlighted that the Delegation was keeping a close eye on the 
developments in the country (meaning that the Delegation was taking note of the 
stagnation of reforms in Moldova), but it seems that the headquarters (referred to in 
the interviews as Brussels) wanted a more ‘rosy picture’, therefore “coordination of 
MS include checking the notes that tailor the EUD reports” (interv. 38). It was 
sometimes the case that the Delegation was unaware of certain problematic 
situations that member-states were facing: this was the case of a French national 
being suspected of terrorism and sent to France without getting in touch with the 
French embassy or the Delegation. Whereas the French counterpart informed the 
Delegation about the situation, “the Delegation does not know how to deal with such 
instances as coordination is not working on policy or political matters, but mainly on 
aid” (interv. 40). The weakness of Moldova–EU diplomatic relations during the period 
under examination seems to lie in the exercise of lobbying the Moldovan authorities 
as a common front. For the EU Delegation in Moldova, the common approach was, 
in the context of different EU member states’ interests, the result of a compromise 
between a more technical and a more political approach towards the host country: 
“the Delegation is very focused on technical aid coordination” (interv. 40). Even if 
technical aid took most space in the diplomatic cooperation between member-states 
and the Delegation, diplomats noticed over time that the Delegation itself was 
reluctant to upgrade the cooperation to joint programming (ibidem). Others 
experienced that fact that the Delegation would not let member-states see ‘their 
cards’ so “we cannot look into the recommendations given (…) or the reports that go 
to Brussels” (interv. 39). Furthermore on this issue member-states questioned 
whether the Head of Delegation could be double-hatted when he needed to present 
a unified message and needed to be clear where this message was coming from 
(interv. 38, 39). In Chisinau, some national diplomats found that what was lacking 
was cooperation on policy matters.  
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Formulating and implementing a common approach, as can be observed from the 
data presented here, took place within the communication infrastructure presented in 
Table 12 (section 4.2.2.) that had developed over time in Moldova and became a 
major resource. In order to examine this issue, the communication infrastructure as 
well as other political and social capital that the EU has at its disposal on the ground 
is presented in the following section. 
 
4.5. Capabilities: diplomatic resources in Chisinau 
Earlier in this chapter, we presented a wide and varied typology of the 
communication infrastructure of the EU Delegation and member-state embassies in 
Moldova (Table 12). These meetings constituted the mechanism of cooperation, 
provided a common communication infrastructure and accounted for some degree of 
institutionalized diplomatic practices. Empirical evidence shows that EU diplomatic 
actors between 2010-2015 engaged in a high degree of information-sharing 
including written and oral reports, formal and informal data, as well as exchange of 
personal contacts. As a result, the EU Delegation started to play a more central role 
in becoming an informational network hub. National diplomats stated that these 
information exchanges should be further regularized and better centralized (interv. 3, 
6, 30). 
Political officers in the Delegation explained that the Delegation provided an 
information network to all member-states, and, if the latter were interested, then they 
could have access to information on particular issues. For the Delegation, this was a 
resource that was at the disposal of the member-states and could be used as a 
public relations tool by them. It became a PR tool especially because MS were given 
access to idea-sharing and report-drafting on such major events as the Vilnius 
summit and also post-Vilnius, which was of political importance for the EU and for 
Moldova (interv. 32). Member-states also noted that this was a good tool for 
cooperation with the EUD and “the EU ambassador tries to really include everyone 
and he is convinced that without EU members, the EUD does not matter. The focus 
is on collaboration and coordination” (interv. 38). The Delegation itself also 
considered that with these meetings, there was more visibility to be gained by the EU 
as a whole (interv. 32). Activities of these meetings were coordinated by the 
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Delegation which made it easier and better as a process and created a good 
dynamic in the diplomatic activity in Moldova, with an emphasis on idea-sharing 
(interv. 27). Diplomats indicated that the Delegation in Moldova had used this 
resource, the communication infrastructure, in a very effective manner (interv. 29, 
38). As some recognised, “the different common meetings are useful for exchange of 
opinions and information and also useful in terms of logistics as they host frequent 
meetings of the EU officials that visit Moldova and we do not have to have such a 
responsibility” (interv. 29). Another aspect which was appreciated by national 
diplomats was the openness of these meetings: “everyone knows what the 
Delegation is writing in terms of the general political message and it is these 
meetings that create the general political narrative” (interv. 40).  
Nonetheless some pointed out a criticism related to the content of these meetings 
being aid-driven. Diplomats noted on several occasions that in Moldova the conduct 
of diplomacy was aid-driven and the EU delegations had bigger operational sections 
than political units (interv. 25; 40). The legacy of Commission representations and a 
certain path-dependency was thus observed in Moldova. On the one hand, the 
Commission offices were established as information offices and the EU delegations 
came to embrace fully the traditional communication function; on the other hand, the 
EU delegations have also embraced more technical tasks, such as project 
management, as the Commission offices were established as operational offices. To 
reiterate, before the Lisbon changes, staff in the Commission representation, were 
responsible, on a daily basis, for EU aid implementation, with little to no coordination 
with the member states. There were positive developments post-Lisbon in the sense 
that it resulted in a wide communication infrastructure, coordinated by the EU 
delegation and open to all EU member states. In Moldova, there were a lot of donor 
coordination meetings during the period under examination, and the EU played a 
crucial role in them (interv. 38, 40). To a large extent the practice of aid-driven 
activities remained and the communication infrastructure served as a helpful 
resource for conducting this type of diplomacy. 
As Figure 4 below shows, in the opinion of interviewees, the Delegation’s activities 
between 2013-2015 were divided among operational, administrative, and political 
and diplomatic issues. Only approximately 10 per cent of the work was seen as 
related to the main functions of traditional diplomacy such as gathering, synthesizing 
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and producing information, intelligence and counter-intelligence, producing reports 
and policy advice for headquarters, representing EU interests through engaging in 
public diplomacy, or developing economic and commercial cooperation through 
engaging in trade diplomacy (interv. 25). Approximately 50 per cent of activity (the 
Commission legacy) was seen as focused on operational activities or what can be 
coined as sectoral diplomacy tasks, such as project management in the areas of 
good governance and democratization, economic cooperation and social and 
regional development, and infrastructure and environment-related developments. 
 
 
As previously mentioned, diplomatic practice has diversified and expanded to the 
extent of embracing new functions, such as acting as a donor. Out of all the 
meetings that took place in Moldova, the ones which focused on policy were the 
meetings of the Head of Delegations (see Table 12). However, these had a loose 
format, did not have a pre-set agenda and embraced an open-discussion format; as 
result these did not focus on EU policy per-se, but mainly reflected an exercise of 
exchange of views on certain policy issues. These meetings continued to be used for 
project coordination, and focused a lot on avoiding overlap of projects and 
contradictions among MS as donors. Diplomats noticed that these meetings, instead 
Figure 4: Structure of Work in EU Delegation in Chisinau 
 
 
Note: The data provided in this Table is based on the interviewees’ own perception: they evaluated the 
structure of work of the EU delegation upon reflection of their assignments during the duration of their 
official posting and provided an estimate. 
Source: authors’ compilation based on fieldwork conducted in Moldova 2013-2015 
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of identifying lobby directions in the relationship with local authorities, for instance, 
focused mainly on donor-driven subjects, which some identified as a weakness 
diplomatic practice in Moldova (interv. 39, 40). As a French diplomat in Moldova 
emphasized, the EU Delegation in Chisinau relied on a lot of technical aid 
discussions, which is rather outside of what cooperation between the member states 
and the EU should entail and ‘this is not really how diplomacy functions’ (interv. 40). 
Since a working group or common meeting on policy matters among EU member-
states was not established, it seems that aid-driven diplomacy was the practice that 
was mostly encouraged and embraced by the Delegation. This is not an atypical type 
of diplomacy but rather matches with the priorities that stem from the ENP and EaP. 
Some interviewees even argued that the type of diplomacy depended on the Head of 
the Delegation (full list of HoDs in Chisinau is presented in Table 13) whether he 
geared it toward politics or mainly focused on the technical cooperation level (interv. 
39).  
 
 
Some noted, for example, that the Head of Delegation meetings (presented in Table 
12) were frequent and were focused on information-sharing due to the personality of 
Mr. Tapiola, the EU Ambassador in Chisinau from 2013 (interv. 40). Yet, the 
question that national diplomats posed is that of uncertainty and sustainability: it was 
not certain whether this diplomatic practice would be further embraced by 
subsequent ambassadors (interv. 27). In retrospect, the 1st Head of Delegation (to be 
read: Head of Commission representation), Mr. Cesare de Montis, was not really 
active and engaged with the local community when that was strictly necessary, 
Table 13: Head of EU Delegation in Chisinau: 2005 - 2015 
Nr. Name Period in office 
1. Cesare de Montis* October 2005 – November 2009 
2. Dirk Steffen Schuebel November 2009 - April 2013 
3. Pirkka Tapiola April 2013 – September 2017 
Note: 
*Cesare de Montis was Head of Delegation of the Commission Representation in Chisinau 
Source: authors’ compilation based on fieldwork conducted in Moldova 2013-2016 
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mainly through attending selected events. As political officers in the Delegation 
recalled: “he was focused on the technical implementation rather than on political 
activism which resulted in no policy-shaping or similar related activities” (interv. 25). 
The Delegation gained a higher profile and became more active with the 
accreditation of the second HoD, Mr. Dirk Steffen Schuebel, in November 2009, and 
the Delegation continued to be engaged through the activity of Mr Schuebel’s 
successor, Ambassador Pirkka Tapiola (ibidem).  
As a general observation, human resource issues were recurrent for both the 
national and Union diplomatic representations: for example, being understaffed or 
not sufficiently trained in EU policy-making. For national embassies, the issue of 
esprit de corps was mainly linked to most embassies being understaffed. Most 
embassies in Chisinau were and are small to medium-sized, with only two or three 
diplomats on board. This implies that the latter could not manage the growing 
intensity of  diplomatic activity in Moldova. Taking this into account, raises the 
question of availability, involvement and visibility for member-states with small 
embassies like that of Lithuania or the Czech Republic in Moldova. The situation was 
quite different for a Romanian or German embassy which had the capacity to follow 
different subjects and themes and attend common meetings, if they wished to do so 
(interv. 28, 29, 30). As one diplomat mentioned: “we manage to network with all EU 
colleagues” (interv. 30). Another factor when it comes to human resources is the age 
range, experience accumulated of all participants and their language skills: being a 
skilful diplomat and knowing Romanian or at least Russian is extremely important. 
The downside is a meeting with too many experts on the same subject, which 
diplomats qualified as counterproductive (interv. 27). Or the situation where only one 
member-state has the expertise, as was the case of the UK on Transnistria: “the 
Delegation takes on board our opinions on Transnistria as it is considerate of our 
know-how and that is an added-value for us” (interv. 30). Personal charm and 
personality  could matter just as much: “cooperation is of course dependent on the 
people (…) and some embassies work closely because of personalities, much more 
than others” (interv. 38). In Moldova some of the stronger diplomatic personalities in 
terms of communication and presence belonged to the British, Swedish, Polish and 
the EU Delegation while others were more reserved such as the Romanian 
embassy, although it played a big role in Moldova (interv. 30, 38, 40, 41). 
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Establishing a European esprit de corps is an issue that is not uncommon in the 
Delegations, just as much as it is in the EEAS (Pomorska & Juncos, 2013; Juncos & 
Pomorska, 2014). Post-Lisbon, the Delegations on the ground were supposed to 
have one-third of their personnel from the EEAS and the member-states and thus, to 
bring the ‘diplomatic’ into the work of the EU delegations which was not the case pre-
Lisbon. Figure 5 shows the Delegation’s organigramme before the Lisbon changes. 
Although it was referred to as the Delegation in Chisinau, pre-Lisbon it was the 
representation of the European Commission whose activity did not involve traditional 
diplomacy: as one employee of the Delegation remembered: “back then, there were 
no political affairs” (interv. 1). Before Moldova, the HoD worked in the European 
Commission representation in Venezuela and held several posts within the DGs for 
Development and External Relations. The size of the Delegation was rather small, 
only 21 staff members, out of which 14 were hired locally (and were Moldovans) 
operating in the Operations, Contract and Finance Sections and the Administration 
Section. 
 
 
Figure 5: Internal organisation of the EU Delegation in Chisinau pre-Lisbon 
 
Source: authors’ compilation during the fieldwork conducted in Moldova in 2011 and 2013 (interv. 1 and 25) 
and based on the old website of the Commission representation in Moldova 
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As one can see in Figure 5, the biggest section was the Operations Section (linked 
to DG DevCo) with 8 team-members and the smallest being the Political and 
Economic section with only 1 staff member. This Section was in charge of promoting 
political and economic relations with the EU through participating in meetings and 
increasing awareness of the EU’s programmes and was not mandated to coordinate 
political matters, not even with DG Relex (interv. 1). Besides this, as part of its 
mandate the Delegations’ staff (especially in the Political and Economic section and 
in the Operations section) were responsible for monitoring the implementation of 
primarily the ENP instruments (such as the AP). This implied a high degree of 
reporting on the progress made by the Moldovan counterpart on its democratic 
governance reforms, both on FSJ and on trade-related matters; this being done 
without a Trade Section or a trade officer as part of the Delegation. The structure of 
the EU Delegation post-Lisbon is shown in Figure 6 (below). 
Post-Lisbon the HoDs appointed to Moldova were both national diplomats: Dirk 
Schuebel (2009-2013) was a diplomat from Germany who had previously served as 
Head of Political, Press and Information Section and Acting Head of the Delegation 
of the European Commission to Ukraine and was subsequently Head of Division for 
the EaP at the EEAS. Pirkka Tapiola (2013-2017) was a Finnish diplomat appointed 
to the Delegation in Moldova after he served as an EEAS adviser on development 
issues in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and had previously worked as a Finnish 
diplomat in Ukraine. Empirical evidence showed that in comparison to pre-Lisbon, 
the situation in the Delegation had gradually improved and already in 2013 there was 
more knowledge within the Delegation and better trained operational staff who read 
reports, analysed, evaluated and provided feedback, which brought more 
transparency, accountability and quality to the overall management of the Delegation 
(interv. 25). The staff in the Political section had also increased and was reformed 
into the Political, Press and Information Section without containing ‘trade’ in its title 
but acquiring a Trade Officer as part of this Section. Later, in 2016, the team had a 
new addition: the Press and Information Officer. The general staff number of the 
Delegation also grew by 16 team-members and formed a total of 37 staff in 
comparison to the previous 21. Out of the total number of staff, 26 came from the 
Commission and 11 came from the EEAS as previously shown in Table 8 (Chapter 
2, section 2.2.2.). Just as pre-Lisbon, the Operations section was the biggest one, 
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counting 17 members which represented 48% of the total staff in the Delegation. If 
pre-Lisbon all officers in this Section were locally hired, post-Lisbon, only 4 out of 13 
were Moldovans. 
 
 
It is curious to note that the Trade Officer was locally hired, was positioned under the 
Political Section while his reports, on the progress that Moldova has made on trade-
related matters in the AA, for example, were submitted internally to the Operations 
Unit (DG DevCo) whereas his position was formally under DG Trade (interv. 25). 
There was also the issue, in 2013, of a questionable choice of diplomats: the Deputy 
HoD and Head of Political Unit was a former cultural attaché to China who had no 
knowledge of the local languages in use or the political realities. Under his duties 
were also trade-related issues for which he needed to report to DG Trade and not 
the EEAS without having a political officer as member of his Section (interv. 25). 
Figure 6: Internal organisation of the EU Delegation in Chisinau in 2013-2015 
 
Note: the Press and Information Officer position is highlighted in grey in the Table as to emphasize that such a 
post was missing in 2013 and was acquired in late 2015 
Source: authors’ compilation during the fieldwork conducted in Moldova in 2013 and 2015 and based on the 
new website of the Union Delegation in Moldova 
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However, interviewees acknowledged that post-Lisbon there were trained diplomats 
coming from the member-states and the EEAS to the Delegation and, together with 
the people from the Commission, already present in the Delegation, this created a 
mixture between national and Commission personnel (interv. 26). Political officers in 
the Delegation considered that this had enhanced the work of the Delegation as 
there were new people and new perspectives that, generally speaking, strengthened 
the effectiveness of the Delegation and improved cooperation with member-states 
(ibidem). Yet these were national diplomats, who were former employees of their 
MFAs and who, after spending four years in the host country, would return not to the 
EEAS in Brussels but to their national MFAs. Whereas technically this might not 
seem a problem in third countries, the EU delegation staff perceived this initially (in 
2011) as negative: national diplomats found it difficult to detach themselves from 
their background, so they were preaching national diplomacy instead of European 
diplomacy and following national interests (interv. 1). In 2015, this sentiment was 
shared by the Delegation’s staff to a lesser extent.  
At times what became visible was the fact that member-states had little knowledge 
or understanding about how the Commission worked or had little knowledge of the 
internal structure of the Delegation, which made cooperation confusing or frustrating 
when it came to reporting to DG Trade or DG DevCo for the staff in the Delegation 
(interv. 25). In this sense, member-state diplomats have also pointed out that one 
could sense a form of competition between the Commission-side and the EEAS-side 
in discussing issues such as joint programming (interv. 39). Others referred to them 
as tensions that resembled the ones in Brussels, namely when member-states 
witnessed certain internal dynamics in the Delegation which were labelled through 
comments such as “it is what DG Trade does and what can you expect? Instructions 
are not so good, but this is DG Trade!” (interv. 30). As one project manager in the 
Delegation noticed, “before Lisbon there was unity as everyone was under the 
Commission, post-Lisbon there is a division of staff under MS (EEAS) and under the 
Commission” (interv. 25). 
During the fieldwork conducted in Moldova, it became obvious that there was a 
general issue of intra-Delegation coordination in which tensions in Brussels 
transmitted themselves to the delegation and on-the-ground diplomacy. The so 
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called Brussels ‘turf-war’ was an institutional issue on the ground that echoed 
Brussels inter-institutional dynamics: internally, the Delegation reflected the tensions 
between the European Commission and the EEAS in Brussels. Structurally, there 
were two parts within the Delegation: the Commission part, represented by the DG 
DevCo and the DG Trade personnel35; and the EEAS part, represented by national 
diplomats. This was a huge logistical challenge. When the EEAS was established 
the idea was to have all foreign policy instruments under one roof, which did not 
happen in the case of the Delegation in Chisinau. For instance, within each EU 
delegation there is a public procurement office, which is also staffed by Commission 
personnel. The EEAS did not have its own budget until 2011, and the Commission 
refused to provide professional advice to the EEAS personnel within the EU 
delegations. EU delegation staff had to learn the basics of running public tenders 
and writing contracts, which was not part of the job description of a political officer 
(interv. 1). Another interesting post-Lisbon development, as a result of the turf wars 
in Brussels, is that after abolishing the position of the EUSR in Moldova, who had a 
separate budget and information network, the institutional memory of that position 
was not transferred to colleagues in the Delegation (interv. 32). This implied that the 
political officer who was tasked with Transnistria would have to do an enormous 
amount of work and basically start from scratch.  
The European Commission staff worked on technical issues in the area of good 
governance, rule of law, education, corruption and energy, which are sensitive 
matters and which are all very political in nature. The EEAS personnel were in 
charge of the political agenda, however, there were  instances when these were not 
consulted on the reports on the sectoral issues monitored by the Commission 
personnel in the Delegation – these were sent directly to Brussels, bypassing the 
political officers. Assistance is the institutional responsibility of the Commission and 
DG DevCo is a big actor with instruments in foreign policy in this sense. As political 
officers in the Delegation observed, there was little coordination and little coherence 
between DG DevCo and the EEAS (interv. 32). And even though the HoD is double-
hatted, in practice, the Ambassador could not know, influence or be informed about 
the drafting procedures adopted by the DG DevCo personnel; could not participate in 
tenders; and there is no decision-making participation since these institutions are 
                                                   
35 Until recently (2015), the EU Delegation in Chisinau did not have a trade officer. 
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different. As a result of this, the DG DevCo unit informed the political unit in the 
Delegation ‘just as much as they informed the public’, meaning that it was sent 
directly to the HoD for signing, without giving an opportunity to the political officers to 
provide feedback (interv. 25, 32). 
To reiterate, in Moldova, EU diplomatic capabilities changed post-Lisbon (2010-
2015) with certain positive dynamics as well as facing certain challenges. There was 
a strong communication infrastructure coordinated by the Delegation and at the 
disposal of member-states, where diplomatic exchanges took place. The Delegation 
in Chisinau grew in size and, most importantly, had an increasing number of 
diplomats as staff members, the first being the second head of Delegation, Mr. 
Schuebel, appointed in November 2009. Yet, the development of the Delegation also 
brought with it the so called Brussels ‘turf-war’: an institutional issue on the ground 
that echoed Brussels inter-institutional dynamics. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
This Chapter has presented, in a structured manner, the empirical evidence 
collected during the field-work conducted in Moldova as well as evidence collected 
from the study of secondary sources such as policy briefs, legislation, national and 
international reports as well as academic findings from scholarly literature on 
Moldova-EU. Adopting a historical approach, the development of Moldova-EU 
relations has been laid out. It showed that there has been an institutionalisation of 
this relationship under the PCA, the ENP and EaP respectively and since 2005 the 
diplomatic representation of the EU has laid its foundations in Chisinau, alongside 
national embassies already present in Moldova. Structurally the evidence has been 
presented according to the three criteria – effectiveness, relevance and capabilities – 
operationalised in the previous chapter.  
Effectiveness, operationalised as goal attainment, has been presented on two 
dimensions: one that explores the degree of democratic governance in Moldova and 
the other that investigates the diplomatic practices of representing the Union in 
Moldova. The analysis of the sustainability of ENP goals in Moldova highlighted that 
when it comes to democratic governance, Moldova was advancing between 2010-
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2015 in relation to the level of adaptation to EU rules and norms, i.e. approximation 
to the EU acquis, as stipulated in the AA. Yet, in its path to reforms, many actions 
were not implemented and the data presented here highlights that despite having a 
solid legal framework, Moldova manifested significant lacunae during the 
implementation process. Whereas the heavy burden of implementing reforms lay 
with the Moldovan counterpart, the AA implies commitment from the EU counterpart 
as well. The activity of diplomatic actors on the ground channelled their effort to try to 
create a proper climate and atmosphere that could bring peace and development in 
Moldova. Through many of their activities, diplomats were aligned in their efforts to 
be of help to Moldova in implementing its European vocations and achieving its 
European aspiration. When discussing their activity in Moldova diplomats 
emphasized their main focus – having stable neighbours. One big role that EU 
diplomatic actors played on the ground resulted from their donor activities. The 
empirical information collected in Moldova showed that there was an institutionalised 
form of interaction between the EU and national diplomatic actors in their role as 
donors that accounted for a communication infrastructure, where the EU Delegation 
played a central role. This role became more visible post-Lisbon, after the EU 
Delegation acquired legal recognition that upgraded the former Commission 
representation to full-blown EU delegations, an integral part of the EEAS that has 
been tasked to represent the Union. This task, as evidence has revealed, was 
embraced by both the Delegation and the MS embassies.  
The way the EU and national diplomats engaged in these meetings is related to the 
discussion regarding the second criterion, relevance. Post-Lisbon developments 
focused firstly on the Union Delegations representing the Union, but the Treaty also 
prescribed that in third countries, the EU Delegation should step up its cooperation 
with the member-state embassies toward formulating and implementing a common 
approach (art. 32). Relevance as a criterion assessed corporate diplomatic practices 
as operationalised in Chapter 3. In Chisinau, the common approach referred to a 
common message or a common position vis-à-vis the local authorities. In practice, 
what was happening as result of cooperation between member-states and EU 
diplomats was joint action. Throughout 2010-2015 there were already several 
positive examples that supported such a direction of diplomatic activity: for instance 
Germany and Sweden scaled up their assistance. Nonetheless, there was also a 
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duality in the nature of the diplomatic practice in Moldova: the approach, interest and 
political weight of member-states was different, and this became visible when 
member-states promoted some people or their own interests. What became evident 
is that diplomatic actors had different tactics or reasons for promoting coordination. 
Some embassies, like Germany for instance, did not favour multilateral cooperation 
and preferred a bilateral approach; and the same held true for Poland, with its “go-it-
alone” tactics, who preferred to pursue a parallel national agenda. Others, like 
Romania, have been criticised for having double standards: they feel comfortable 
pushing for their own interests based on their affinity to the country and, in some 
cases, leaking EU information to the Moldovan counterpart which, in turn, diminishes 
its credibility as an EU partner for cooperation. 
From the data presented, it became obvious that formulating and implementing a 
common approach took place under the framework of the communication 
infrastructure presented in Table 12 (section 4.2.2.) – it became a major resource for 
the diplomatic community in Chisinau. Hence, in its final section, this chapter 
examined the EU’s diplomatic capabilities on the ground: the communication 
infrastructure as well as other political and social capital. The Delegation became 
stronger in maintaining the communication infrastructure as an information channel 
for all the members in the diplomatic community and provided the European general 
line without dictating policy to MS embraces; hence, becoming an information node. 
Yet, evidence also showed that the interaction among EU diplomatic actors resulted 
in different interest constellations such as the Nordic Plus or the Visegrad. The 
reasons for clustering were not directly disclosed by the interviewees, yet some 
pointed out a criticism related to the content of these meetings as being aid-driven. 
Indeed, an analysis of the work carried out by the Delegation presented in Figure 4 
showed that according to interviewees, only approximately 10 per cent of the work 
related to the main functions of traditional diplomacy whereas approximately 50 per 
cent of activity (the Commission legacy) was operational activities or what can be 
coined as sectoral diplomacy tasks, such as project management. While there was a 
certain degree of path-dependency in this sense, the Delegation grew in size and 
acquired diplomatic personnel that moved from rather technical implementation to 
political activism and engagement with local stakeholders. Nonetheless, the biggest 
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team within the Delegation remained the Operations section that was responsible for 
aid-driven diplomacy. 
It seems that in the period studied, there were, almost simultaneously, positive 
developments in Moldova, as result of the post-Lisbon changes, as well as 
challenges. The challenges were not necessarily new, but followed patterns already 
known regarding EU performance in general: such as inter-institutional tensions or 
member-states forming groups of interest constellations. A thorough discussion of 
these findings and what they mean for EU diplomatic performance is carried out in 
Chapter 7, after presenting the empirical evidence on Ukraine and Belarus in the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 5. EU diplomatic performance in 
Ukraine 
The relationship between Ukraine and the EU has followed a similar path to the one 
of Moldova and the EU described in Chapter 4. Ukraine, just like Moldova, gained its 
independence in 1991 and initially remained oriented towards the East inter alia 
because the bulk of its economic transactions that continued to take place with the 
East, especially Russia, who was also the main supplier of energy (gas, electricity, 
coal and oil products). The EU itself did not show a great interest in Ukraine: EU 
membership or enhanced relations as those proposed to the CEE countries were not 
on its agenda at the time. In the first half of the 90s, the EU still saw Ukraine as part 
of the Russian security community and welcomed its accession to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Initially, the Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement (TCA) concluded between the European Community and the USSR in 
1989 provided a temporary framework for relations. The negotiations of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1993 brought about the 
institutionalisation of the Ukraine-EU relationship. The intensification of relations and 
a fundamental change in Ukraine-EU relations happened, as in the Moldovan case, 
with the launch of the ENP and the signing of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan (AP) in 
2005. The AP contained a list of comprehensive reforms that Ukraine was expected 
to implement in line with the EU acquis. The EaP further strengthened and 
diversified the relations that lead to the signing, in June 2014, of the Ukraine-EU 
Association Agreement. 
In Kiev, the European Commission opened its Delegation as early as September 
1993. Its mandate included, inter alia, the promotion of political and economic 
relations between the EU and Ukraine by maintaining relations with the government 
of Ukraine and its institutions, the monitoring of the progress of PCA implementation 
and participation in the implementation of the EU’s assistance projects, such as 
TACIS. It was also mandated till 2005 to monitor the implementation of the PCA in 
Moldova and to oversee TACIS implementation and the work done by the TACIS 
Office in Chisinau. It also was the liaison office for cooperation with Belarus (till 
2008). With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Delegation of the 
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Commission was transformed into the Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, 
with the status of a diplomatic mission, and started to officially represent the EU. 
The discussion of the diplomatic performance of the EU in Ukraine is presented in 
this chapter in the same structural logic as the previous one. The chapter starts with 
a brief outline of EU-Ukraine relations and subsequently presents the empirical 
evidence gathered according to the three established criteria in the analytical 
framework (Chapter 3): effectiveness, relevance and capability. The second and 
third sections of this chapter discuss effectiveness on two levels, one that explores 
the degree of democratic governance in Ukraine and the other that investigates the 
diplomatic practices of representing the EU in Ukraine. Data on relevance is 
presented in the fourth section, which evaluates how the Union Delegation and 
member-state embassies in Ukraine cooperate towards formulating a common 
approach. Finally, evidence in relation to the EU’s diplomatic resources and 
instruments on the ground is presented in the fifth section, under capabilities. In 
conclusion, the chapter summarises the empirical evidence presented based on the 
field-work conducted in Ukraine as well as based on the study of secondary sources 
(such as policy analysis, progress reports, legislation as well as academic findings 
from scholarly literature on Ukraine and the EU) without discussing the application of 
the three criteria, which will be done in Chapter 7. 
 
5.1. Background of EU-Ukraine relations 
This section provides a brief historical overview of the development of Ukraine - EU 
relations, the institutionalisation of this relationship under the PCA, the ENP and EaP 
respectively and the development of the diplomatic representations of the EU and of 
member-states. 
5.1.1. From PCA to ENP 
Ukraine expressed its interest in the European Union soon after its independence; 
this was a foreign policy choice that would open new prospects for cooperation with 
developed countries and bring modernization and socio-economic development 
(Kuzmin & Maksymenko, 2012). And even though the EU conditioned the 
negotiations of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) on Ukraine 
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obtaining a nuclear-free status36, Ukraine was the first one to sign a PCA in June 
1994. The PCA provided a framework for political dialogue between the parties that 
also established the path for economic and trade cooperation (PCA Ukraine, 1994). 
Already in 1996 Ukraine declared that EU membership was one of its strategic 
objectives and in 1998 president Kuchma signed a ‘Strategy on Ukraine’s Integration 
with the European Union’, which formally proclaimed membership of the EU as 
Ukraine’s long-term strategic goal (Wolczuk, 2003). The PCA replaced the 1989 
agreement regulating trade with the Soviet Union and was the first form of 
institutionalisation of political relations with Ukraine (and also Moldova, as discussed 
in Chapter 4) without offering the prospect of EU membership. The main instrument 
under the PCA was TACIS (EU technical assistance to the CIS), administered by the 
European Commission, that aimed at helping the transformation of Ukrainian society 
and economy. Through this instrument the EU became the largest provider of 
external assistance to countries like Ukraine and Moldova (Zagorski, 2002). The 
PCA and as of 2004 the ENP defined a new model for the relations between EU and 
Ukraine: one of good neighbourly relations, where the Union would assist its weaker 
partner by supporting democratic and good governance reforms, among other 
measures, laid down within the EU-Ukraine Action Plan (AP). 
Despite the fact that the EU became the largest international donor to Ukraine, 
instruments such as the PCA were not conducive to systematic change; and until the 
ENP, EU-Ukraine relations have been described as declaratory (Korosteleva, 2012; 
Wolczuk, 2003). With the ENP came the Action Plan that represented an agenda of 
political and economic reforms with short and medium-term priorities (Commission, 
2004). The AP priorities targeted reforms in such areas as political dialogue, justice 
and home affairs and people to people contacts37. Through the ENP, the EU 
expected Ukraine to reform in line with the EU acquis based on the implementation 
of the AP, a non-legally binding document, with the main burden carried out by the 
neighbour country. This implied that Ukraine was formally required to adopt the 
                                                   
36 A nuclear-free status implied closing the Chernobyl AES, providing security measures of the new reactors and signing an 
Agreement between USA, Russia and Ukraine regarding the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine. Trilateral Statement 
and accompanying annex, signed by Kravchuk, Yelstin and U.S. President Bill Clinton in Moscow on January 14, 1994 (Pifer, 
2011; Kuzmin & Maksymenko, 2012) 
37 Some examples of AP chapters are: (I) Political dialogue and reform: democracy and the rule of law; human rights and 
fundamental freedoms; cooperation on foreign and security policy, conflict prevention and crisis management; regional 
cooperation; (II) cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs: migration issues; border management; fight against organised crime; 
drugs; money laundering financial and economic crime; police and judicial cooperation; (III) People-to-people contacts: civil 
society cooperation; cross-border and regional level cooperation. 
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acquis. In this sense, there was a large similarity with the process the candidate 
countries had to go through but without the prospect of membership; which came as 
a disappointment for Ukraine which had declared its membership aspirations. As 
result of negotations of the AP, Ukrainian authorities accepted the ENP as a 
temporary framework for relations – a pre-candidate phase for Ukraine (Wolczuk, 
2009). This institutionalization of relations led to the creation of the post of Deputy 
Prime Minister for European Integration, a European Integration Department within 
the Cabinet of Ministers, a State Department for Legal Approximation and the 2004 
constitutional changes that gave the Ukrainian Parliament new legislative 
opportunities in the process of European integration. Ukrainian politicians embraced 
the ENP-reform agenda as their ambition was to be referred to as an associate or a 
full-fledged member in the EU’s strategies towards Ukraine (Kopiyka & Shynkarenko, 
2001). 
Through the ENP, the European Commission proposed to move beyond mere 
cooperation to a significant degree of economic integration in return for concrete 
progress in terms of legal approximation, detailed in the AP, adopted for three years. 
In March 2007, Ukraine was the first ENP country to start negotiations on a new 
Association Agreement (AA) as part of a general revision of the bilateral legal 
framework. Negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
(DCFTA) were only launched in February 2008 after Ukraine’s accession to the 
WTO. A political agreement was reached in December 2011 and the AA was 
initialled in March 2012. During these negotiations and before the entry into force of 
the AA, the democratic reforms conducted in Ukraine followed the 2009 EU-Ukraine 
Association Agenda, the official policy document which replaced the original ENP 
Ukraine Action Plan. 
 
5.1.2. From ENP to EaP and the Association Agreement 
The EaP further institutionalised political cooperation between the EU and Ukraine, 
in particular through the conclusion of the new AA. The AA was a new generation of 
agreements that came to replace the outdated PCA. The AA acknowledged Ukraine 
as a European country that shared common history and values with the MS 
(Association Agreement, 2014) and it was with Ukraine that the DCFTA was first 
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codified in an AA38. The shadow of the membership perspective has been one 
persistent feature of the Ukraine-EU relations: Ukrainian politicians often doubted the 
EU’s commitment to democratic values, arguing instead that the EU should  be 
concerned more with its economic interests (Shumylo-Tapiola, 2012). Days before 
the Vilnius summit (November 2013), Ukraine announced that it would not sign the 
AA (which was initialled in March 2012) in order “to ensure the national security of 
Ukraine and to recover trade and economic relations with the Russian Federation” 
(Governmnet of Ukraine, 2013) which resulted in a complex civil and politic turmoil 
within the country39. And while some scholars emphasized that the ‘taproot of 
trouble’ regarding the crisis in Ukraine is the NATO military enlargement coupled 
with EU’s expansion Eastward and the back-up of the Orange revolution in 2004 by 
the Western powers (Mearsheimer, 2014); others highlighted that these events are 
not about Russia, NATO or realpolitik but rather about a President like Putin and his 
‘unconstrained, erratic adventurism’ in politics (McFaul, 2014). The causes and 
nature of the turbulent developments in Ukraine are discussed by more recent 
literature that distinguishes between four main factors: (1) institutional and political 
instability in Ukraine that allowed oligarchic structures to challenge state authority; 
(2) division within society between preference toward Eastern (Russia) and 
respectively Western (EU) orientation; (3) Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 
March 2014; (4) Russia’s support of the separatist movements that lead to warfare in 
the Eastern regions of Donbas and Lugansk in the spring of 2014 (Bátora & Navrátil, 
2016). The turmoil led to the dismissal of President Victor Yanukovych in February 
2014 and the establishment of an Interim-Government under the leadership of 
Arseniy Yatsenyuk; a government which had as short-term objective the signing of 
the AA. In March 2014, the Ukrainian government provisionally signed the AA after 
intense negotiations and frequent visits by top EU officials and foreign ministers of 
EU member states. The final signature by the newly elected President Petro 
Poroshenko of the entire agreement happened in June 2014, after which the 
ratification procedure for the entire agreement could be initiated. This is not to say 
that the crisis is over, but, as a scholar recommended, “the best way to avoid an 
                                                   
38 In comparison, after negotiations concluded with Ukraine in November 2011, the European Commission authorized to open 
negotiations with Moldova in March 2012. 
39 This thesis acknowledges the events that shattered Ukraine in 2013-2014 but does not conduct a thorough analysis of the 
crisis per se, which is outside the scope of the thesis. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter in sections 5.4. and 
5.5., however, brings forward details of the EUD and MS actions during the crisis in discussing the common approach and 
diplomatic capabilities in Ukraine specifically. 
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escalation of radical political confrontation inside Ukraine is not to resolve the big 
geopolitical questions but to defer them” (Sestanovich, 2014, p. 174); which seems 
to be the current pace of the EU-Ukraine relationship. 
The AA is a comprehensive document both in terms of scope and level of detail, 
counting circa 2,140 pages, with 46 annexes, 3 protocols and a joint declaration 
published in the Official Journal (Association Agreement, 2014). As is the case of the 
Moldovan AA, the DCFTA is part of the AA and sets the level of ambition of this 
relationship as high as Ukraine’s gradual integration into the EU internal market 
(Association Agreement, 2014, art. 1). The detailed AA provisions imply alignment of 
Ukrainian laws and policies with the acquis in the field of common foreign and 
security policy as well as in the area of freedom, security and justice (FSJ). And 
additionally, it requires extensive legislative and regulatory approximation including 
sophisticated mechanisms to secure the uniform interpretation and effective 
implementation of relevant EU legislation in the area of trade. The relationship is 
dependent, as in the case of Moldova, on the progress of implementation of the 
reforms that stem from the AA and the level of convergence with the EU achieved in 
political, economic and legal areas. Consequently, Ukraine became involved in a 
high degree of legislation harmonization and had to show commitment to reforms 
resulting from initialling the AA. 
 
5.1.3. EU and MS diplomatic representations 
In Ukraine during the period under study there was the largest European diplomatic 
community in Eastern Europe: the EU Delegation and most member states had 
diplomatic representation in Kiev with the exception of Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Malta, as could be seen in Table 5 from Chapter 2 (section 2.2.2.). There were 24 
national embassies out of a total of 77 diplomatic representations accounted for by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (and the EU Delegation) as presented in 
Table 14 below.  
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Table 14. National and EU diplomatic missions in Ukraine, 201540 
 Embassy/Delegation 
No. of diplomatic 
staff41 
Size 
EU member-
state embassies 
Austria n/a* small* 
Belgium 5 small 
Bulgaria 14 large 
Cyprus 3 small 
Czech Republic 11 large 
Denmark 3** small 
Estonia 9 medium 
Finland 8 medium 
France 6 small 
Germany n/a*** large 
Greece n/a n/a 
Hungary 14 large 
Italy 8 medium 
Latvia 6 small 
Lithuania 10 large 
Netherlands, the 8 medium 
Poland 9**** large**** 
Portugal 2 small 
Romania 13 large 
Slovakia 12 large 
Slovenia 6 small 
Spain 6 small 
Sweden 12 large 
United Kingdom***** n/a n/a 
EU EU 12****** large 
Total 25 -- -- 
Notes: 
*no data about the diplomatic staff is disclosed on the website, the interviewee referred to their embassy as 
a small one in terms of their diplomatic staff in 2015 (interv. 44) 
**data based on the interview conducted in 2016 on information about the embassy in 2015, no data is 
disclosed on the website (interv. 46) 
***the website of the German embassy indicates that there were 62 Germans working at the embassy, 
without an indication how many were diplomats accredited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 
****data based on the Polish website from 2013; information was not disclosed at a later stage; the 
interviewee referred to their embassy as a large one in terms of their diplomatic staff (interv. 21) 
*****no data was disclosed on the embassy’s website or during the interviews 
******this data accounts only for the HoD and the Heads of all the sections within the Delegation and does 
not include the political officers or the managers within the different sections; for the total number of staff 
within the Delegation see Table 21 
Source: Data compiled by the author in 2013 and updated in 2015 based on the website of the Ukrainian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the webpages of national embassies 
 
                                                   
40 The numbers shown here are estimates and reflect data collected on the ground during interviews and based on the data 
shown on their websites in 2011, 2013 and 2016 when the author spent her field-work time in Kiev 
41 In this table the number of diplomatic staff reflects solely the national diplomats accredited in the host-country and does not 
reflect the total number of employees of the embassy or delegation. 
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While data in the table above indicates a number of 12 people in the EU Delegation 
in Kiev, it only refers to the data shown on the Delegation’s website in 2013 and 
2015 and accounts for the Head of the Delegation and the heads of the sections 
within the Delegation and does not include the political officers or managers for 
example. The interviews conducted in the Kiev Delegation revealed that the Union 
Delegation had the largest number of personnel accredited in Ukraine (interv. 16 and 
20). A former Austrian diplomat explained that there were two factors that 
determined the size of a Delegation: the political importance of the relationship and 
the level of EU assistance to a given country: “which plays an even greater role” 
(Lehne, 2015, n.p.). Ukraine was among the countries who were large aid recipients 
(see data in Table 17 below) and the EU’s Delegation in Kiev was about as large as 
the ones in China, Russia, and the United States; the largest EU Delegation is the 
one in Turkey with 140 staff members (ibidem). As Table 15 below shows, there was 
a total of 102 people working in the Delegation in 2015, with most of the personnel 
coming from the European Commission. 
 
Table 15. Distribution of EEAS and Commission staff in the EU Delegation in Ukraine, 
2015 
EU Delegation in Kiev 
Staff 
Commission EEAS Total  
74 28 102 
Source: Data withdrawn from Bicchi & Maurer (2018), Table 2, page 16 (staff numbers have 
been provided to the authors by EEAS staff in March, 2016) 
 
The Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine was opened in Kiev in 1993 
and had the status of a diplomatic mission and officially represented the European 
Commission. In the first 10 years of its existence, the Delegation grew from having 6 
staff members, working from hotel rooms in the National Hotel in Kiev to 75 people of 
14 different nationalities in 2006 (Delegation, 2007a). It also increased its status from 
managing projects such as TACIS to becoming the largest donor, counting the 
implementation of 1000 EU-funded projects in Ukraine worth circa €1,2 billion 
(ibidem). As part of the ENP, the EU increased its support to a wide range of 
capacity-building activities aimed at strengthening civil society as well as holding 
dialogues with non-state actors on a wide range of issues including democratisation, 
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respect for human rights and freedom of expression, women’s rights, education and 
the environment (Delegation, 2007b). EU financial support also focused on trade and 
trade-related issues, on approximation of legislation to EU standards, on judicial 
reform; on energy and the environment. After TACIS, as in the case of Moldova, 
financial assistance in the form of grants to help Ukraine implement the Action Plan 
was provided mainly by means of the ENPI: € 964 million was allocated between 
2007 and 2013. The data presented in Table 16 shows the support provided by the 
EU according to its planning based on the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and two 
national indicative programmes (2007-2010 and 2011-2013). Based on the 
developments in Ukraine in 2014 that led to a political crisis and civil unrest, no new 
CSP or NIP was announced, yet, the Commission approved a €365 million "Special 
Measure" (in grants) for 2014, the highest annual amount ever committed for Ukraine 
(Commission, 2015d). 
 
Table 16: EU financial aid to Ukraine 1991-2014 (indicative amounts) 
 Total amount 
(million euro) 
TACIS (1991–2001) 1,072 (billion euro) 
TACIS (2002-2006) 212 
ENPI (2007–2010) 494 
ENPI (2011–2013) 470 
ENI (for 2014 only)* 365 ("Special Measure") 
Note: *since the turmoil in Ukraine, the EU has not announced an indicative plan for the following period 
within the ENI 
Source: authors' compilation of data from NIP Ukraine (2004–2006), CSP Ukraine 2002-2006; 2007-
2010 and 2011-2013 and the Court of Auditors Special Report on EU assistance to Ukraine, 2016 (NIP 
Ukraine 2004–2006; Court of Auditors, 2016) 
 
Besides project management and donor activities conducted by the Commission 
representation, it considered public relations of importance and was involved in 
public diplomacy activities such as conducting press briefings for Ukrainian 
journalists to provide them with first-hand information about the mandate and the 
activities of the Delegation in Ukraine as well as about the EU’s new European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the state of affairs in EU-Ukraine relations after the 
enlargement of the European Union (Delegation, 2007a). It also organised study 
visits to the EU institutions in Brussels in order to provide Ukrainian journalists with 
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first-hand information and impressions about the EU institutions and EU-Ukraine 
relations. Through events such as Europe Day or EU Information Bus tours, the 
Commission representation would spread information about the EU in general or 
about EU-Ukraine relations more specifically. Or it would also organise exhibitions 
that brought together both national and regional EU-funded projects representing 
cooperation in the spheres of agriculture, support and development of renewable 
sources of energy, strengthening regional social services, civil society development 
and others. 
Field-work conducted in Ukraine allows us to observe that the diplomatic activities of 
national embassies in the period 2010-2015 were not limited to their main functions 
as embassies stipulated in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
(United Nations, 1961) such as representation, defending state interests, negotiation 
or information-sharing. On a daily basis embassies were engaged in trade, cultural 
or public diplomacy; in developing their political agendas, building bridges and 
creating partnerships, in negotiations with local authorities. Similar to observation 
made in Moldova (see Chapter 4, section 4.1.), national diplomats were also 
involved in providing development aid assistance, monitoring and evaluating the 
reform agenda conducted by the Ukrainian government. But such an activity was not 
uncommon for the Commission Delegation in Kiev. Generally speaking, judging from 
the fact that the Commission Delegation was mandated to monitor the progress of 
the PCA implementation and the participation in the implementation of the EU’s 
assistance projects, its daily operations were about managing these technical and 
financial programmes (like TACIS) and monitoring progress of the cooperation 
agreements such as the PCA and later the AP. In addition to their technical-aid 
activity, they also took over some diplomatic tasks and competencies such as public 
diplomacy or becoming the base for all visiting high-level EU officials in Ukraine; 
these diplomatic dimension became stronger after the Lisbon Treaty and the switch 
to a fully-fledged Union Delegation in Kiev, discussed in section 5.3. 
 
5.2. Effectiveness: sustainability of ENP goals 
In this part of the chapter empirical evidence vis-à-vis the first criterion, effectiveness 
is presented. As operationalised in Chapter 3, effectiveness looks into goal 
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attainment and is assessed on two dimensions. Therefore, in the first section, an 
exploration of democratic governance in Ukraine is performed based on the level of 
adaptation to EU rules and norms. As the full application of the AA/DCFTA was set 
to start on January 1st, 2016, the degree of the level of adaptation to EU rules and 
norms presented in section 5.2. evaluates empirical evidence only up to 2015. The 
point of reference here is the ENP Action Plan with Ukraine and the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agenda. It was under the ENP that Ukraine embarked on a path of 
convergence to EU rules and norms and their adoption and application into its 
national system. Also, the activity of national embassies and the EU Delegation in 
this area is presented. In the second section, the Lisbon Treaty is the reference point 
in discussing effectiveness. The focus is to explore how the EU Delegation in Kiev 
embraced the representation function since the upgrade from Commission 
representation to a fully-fledged EU Delegation. 
 
5.2.1. Level of adaptation/alignment to EU rules & norms 
Monitoring reports outlined that under the ENP Ukraine was initially showing some 
progress in the area of institutional reform (Commission, 2009)42, but the pace of 
reforms was slow or even stagnated. The slow pace was due to, inter alia, the size of 
domestic costs, several challenges being – limited resources available, political 
crises, institutional underdevelopment and low administrative capacity (Commission, 
2009; Baltag & Romanyshyn, 2011). As part of the EaP, Ukraine, alongside 
Moldova, was one of the top performers in terms of the country’s approximation to 
EU rules and norms as can be seen in Table 17 below. Whereas Ukraine was the 
first out of the EaP countries to initial the AA, a number of reforms in the areas of the 
democracy and the rule of law still required more tangible results in comparison to 
Moldova, for example (EaP Index, 2014). The EU progress report from 2013 
emphasized that Ukraine’s rate of alignment had actually decreased (Commission 
2014c) and its reform record was poor. Ukraine did not address most of the key 
reform areas and little progress was achieved in the area of migration, asylum, visa 
liberalisation, and justice reform (ibidem). With the leadership of Yanukovych, 
Ukraine entered a phase of ‘rhetorical integration’ (Solonenko, 2010); the Ukrainian 
                                                   
42 Ukraine showed positive record in conducting democratic elections in 2006 and 2007 as well as in the area of freedom of the 
media 
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leadership embraced anti-democratic trends and tightened its control over civil 
society, freedom of the media and of assembly; hence the state of civil unrest that 
emerged in Ukraine (interv. UKR 14, 15, 16). 
 
Table 17. Approximation rate of EaP countries to the EU: Ukraine 
*approximation indices (1=best performer; 0=worst performer) 
Sector cooperation Moldova Georgia Ukraine Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus 
Deep and sustainable 
democracy 
0.76 0.73 0.61 0.61 0.29 0.27 
Independent judiciary 0.83 0.88 0.47 0.73 0.27 0.24 
Freedom, Security and Justice 0.99 0.90 0.86 0.64 0.60 0.42 
Source: Author’s compilation based on EaP Index 2014 
 
Ukraine signed various documents that regulated the relationship with the EU, which 
involved further harmonization of legislation, and revision of normative acts; every 
ministry adopted special EU-oriented strategies to incorporate EU norms and 
standards (interv. UKR 1, 4, 6, 9). In 2003, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted “The 
European choice. Conceptual principles of strategy of economic and social 
development of Ukraine 2002-2011”, Ukraine’s main document that aimed at 
integration into the EU. As early as 2004 Ukraine adopted its National Strategy on 
Integration to the European Community as a main framework that outlined Ukraine’s 
internal priorities in approximation to the EU and the strategy of economic and social 
development for 2004-2015 “In the way of European integration” embracing 
objectives such as institutional transformation and convergence to EU standards, 
implementation of socio-economic and political standards and hence, improving the 
quality of life of the population. 
The pace of adaptation accelerated after 2014 with the newly elected President, 
Petro Poroshenko, after the political and civil turmoil and the newly formed 
government led by Evgenyi Yatzenyuk. Scholars noted that the public administration 
reform gained momentum in 2014 with the ‘State Building Contract’ that could 
potentially lead to development of more reliable and stronger structures for 
coordination of EU integration (Bátora & Navrátil, 2016). EU progress reports from 
2016 emphasized that in 2015 Ukraine had carried out unprecedented reforms 
across a number of sectors of the economy and society, while its democratic 
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institutions had been further strengthened (Commission, 2016). Ukraine initiated a 
number of important legislative and institutional changes in the area of anti-
corruption reforms: the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) - a new law-
enforcement agency - started the first investigations of high-level corruption cases in 
December 2015, following the appointment of the Head of the Specialised Anti-
Corruption Prosecution Office (SAPO); both being fully operational. Another 
example, of key importance for both, Ukraine and the EU, is the energy sector 
reform. Ukraine adopted a series of laws based on the stipulation in the AP and the 
Association Agenda, some dating back to 2008 and 2009. These transposed into 
national laws (list provided in Table 18), that aimed at bringing the gas sector 
legislation into full compliance with the rules of EU energy market, had a 
considerable dynamism since 2014 and the set of laws adopted in 2015 would 
improve the climate for investment in the Ukrainian energy market, as stated by 
Commissioner Štefčovič, in charge of Energy Union (Štefčovič 2015 as cited in 
Bátora & Navrátil, 2016, p. 29).  
 
Table 18. Legislative acts transposed on energy and energy efficiency in Ukraine 2008-2015 
Energy sector Legislative acts transposed 
Market of nuclear fuel and 
nuclear technology 
 The Law of Ukraine “About licensing activity in the field of 
nuclear energy use” from February 11, 2010 №1874- VI 
 The Law of Ukraine “About Amendments to the Law of 
Ukraine “About Nuclear Energy Use and Radiation Safety” 
about regarding supplementing nuclear installations on 
December 20, 2011 №4175-VI 
 The Law of Ukraine “About handling of spent nuclear fuel on 
location, design and construction of centralized storage facility 
for spent nuclear fuel on domestic nuclear power” on February 
9, 2015 №4384-VI 
Natural gas market 
 
 The Law of Ukraine “About natural gas market” on July 8, 
2010 №2467-VI 
 The Law of Ukraine “About natural gas market” on April 9, 
2015 №329-VIII 
Electricity market 
 The Law of Ukraine “About principles of functioning Ukraine 
electricity market” dated October 24, 2013 №663-VII 
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Market of alternative energy 
sources 
 The Law of Ukraine “About Amendments to Some Laws of 
Ukraine on the establishment of “green tariff” of 25 September 
2008 №601- VI 
 The Law of Ukraine “About amending some laws of Ukraine to 
promote the production and use of bio-fuels”: from May 21, 
2009 №1391-VI 
 The Law of Ukraine “About Amendments to the Law of 
Ukraine “About Electric Power Industry to stimulate the 
production of electricity from alternative energy sources” from 
December 20, 2012 №5485-VI 
 The Law of Ukraine “About amending some laws of Ukraine to 
ensure competitive conditions of electricity from alternative 
energy sources” from June 04, 2015 №514-VIII 
Source: author’s compilation based on the websites of the NGO “Municipal Energy” and the website of the 
Parliament of Ukraine (Verhovna Rada of Ukraine) 
 
Ukraine actively cooperated with different EU agencies and programmes: it was also 
active within the CS Forum, the EU’s platform for EaP civil society cooperation 
where it discussed common approaches on different democracy and good 
governance initiatives, including human rights and where, alongside its Moldovan 
counterpart, Ukrainian civil society was active in proposing policy initiatives. It 
showed activism within European programmes, as stipulated in the AP and the 
Association Agenda, such as Tempus and the 7th Research Framework Programme 
(FP7) and participated in different cross-border cooperation programmes such as the 
Poland-Belarus-Ukraine (2007-2013) or Hungary Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine one 
(2007-2013). Additionally, there was strong bilateral cooperation with EU member-
states and other international bodies such as UNDP or the Council of Europe in the 
field of good governance and the rule of law.  
As result of several institutional reforms, Ukrainian public institutions had, to a certain 
degree, restructured: the line ministries created departments that either directly 
worked on the EU such as the Directorate general for the European Union within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as in the Presidential Administration or the 
Parliament; these directorates were given extra prerogatives on cooperation with the 
EU43. Institutionally, Ukraine enjoyed the highest intensity of political dialogue and 
                                                   
43 As early as 1993, an Interdepartmental Committee on European Communities matters has been created within the Ukrainian 
Cabinet of Ministers, followed in 1998, by an EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council headed by the Ukrainian Prime minister. This 
lead to the creation of departments of cooperation with the EU in public institutions (sub-committees or working groups) as well 
as a Committee of Parliamentary cooperation and a National Agency on Development and European Integration. In 2003 the 
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sectoral cooperation with the EU despite receiving less funding per capita (EaP 
Index 2013, pp. 44-45). From 1997, high-level political meetings such as the 
Ukraine-EU Summits were held annually; since 1998 regular meetings of the EU-
Ukraine Cooperation Council as well as the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Committee with 
its relevant sub-committees took place. In addition twice-yearly meetings of the 
foreign ministers, of political directors and the COEST group were held (Mission of 
Ukraine to the EU, 2012).  
Intensive cooperation patterns emerged also in the field of security: besides a high 
degree of consultations and meetings44, Ukraine proposed participation in 
peacekeeping operations, offering the EU the use of its military aircraft and of the 
country’s potential in the EU Tactical Battle Groups and as of 2011, it was the only 
NATO-partner country to have participated in all NATO peacekeeping operations45 
(Badrak, 2016). Ukraine aligned with 23 out of 62 EU CFSP declarations 
(Commission 2012b, p. 8); there were regular EU-Ukraine consultations on crisis 
management, including further implementation of the “Seville” Arrangements for 
Consultation and Co-operation between the EU and Ukraine in EU-led crisis 
management operations. The legal framework was also in place: Ukraine adopted 
the Arrangements for Consultation and Cooperation between the European Union 
and Ukraine on Crises Management, complemented by Agreement between the 
European Union and Ukraine on Security Procedures for the Exchange of Classified 
Information and Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine Establishing a 
Framework for the Participation of Ukraine in European Union Crisis Management 
Operations (Badrak, 2016). 
Public institutions approved new normative documents and internal rules which 
aimed at outlining the direction of adaptation to key EU standards (interv. UKR 1, 6, 
9, 13). This, in turn, allowed Ukraine to participate in a wide range of EU projects46. 
Already in 2013 the Center for the Adaptation of Civil Service to the standards of the 
                                                   
State Council for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration was created and tasked to coordinate its economic, political, security 
and legislative integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. 
44 Twice a year meetings at the level of Working Group for global disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control 
(CONOР/CODUN) and Working Group for conventional arms (COARM) take place (Mission of Ukraine to the EU, 2012) 
45 Ukraine participates in the following operations: Kosovo (Kosovo International Security Force – КFOR), Afghanistan 
(International Security Assistance Force in Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – ISAF, Iraq (NATO Training Mission– NТМ-І) and 
Mediterranean (NATO Antiterrorist Operation Active Endeavour), (Badrak 2016). 
46 At present moment the Center for the Adaptation of Civil Service to the standards of the EU counts 66 Twinning projects 
developed; the Center also indicates that central and regional authorities as well as social organizations from Ukraine are 
recipients of TAIEX assistance, as well as a beneficiary of the CIB, comprehensive institution building mechanism in sum of at 
least EUR 43,37 mil., all EU programs (Center 2013).  
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EU counted 66 developed Twinning projects, as well as a beneficiary of the CIB, the 
comprehensive institution building mechanism in sum of at least EUR 43,37 
mil.(Center 2013). The Center also indicated that central and regional authorities as 
well as social organizations from Ukraine had become recipients of TAIEX 
assistance  - a EU technical assistance programme that supported public 
administrations with regard to the approximation, application and enforcement of EU 
legislation. However, empirical evidence also showed that Ukraine had not left 
behind its (formal) institutional Soviet heritage; the changes in favour of European 
norms rather represented window-dressing: “we do technical paperwork like 
translations or preparing for trips and conferences instead of implementing the EU-
reform agenda (…) as civil servants we are obliged to follow (other) directives of the 
Ukrainian government” (interv. UKR 11). Enjoying growing political ties with the EU 
did not change Ukrainian domestic patterns in favour of EU norms: “ministries are 
the same as they used to be, it is a very Soviet style bureaucracy when we compare 
it with European procedures or standards” (interv. UKR 10).  
While in Moldova it seemed that the EU-driven reforms, through participation and 
socialization within different programs and projects had positive effects, in the case 
of Ukraine the same effects did not occur. Ukrainian institutions and political elites 
remained locked in a phenomenon called by researchers ‘post-Sovietness’ (IWP, 
2012). The average age of the cabinet was 53 years, similar to the Moldovan one 
during the communist regime47; which implied that most of their adult lives, the 
politicians and civil servants existed under decomposing socialism and their value 
system was formed under USSR education. As the IWP study explained, this 
Ukrainian elite is characterized by practices of legalization of shadow capital, money 
laundering and converting power and connections into a capital (IWP, 2012, p. 12). 
This came in sync with the low degree of Europeanization of Ukrainian institutions as 
well as the low degree of willingness to converge to European reforms.  
In contrast to the above, Ukrainian civil society became a driving force of EU reforms 
in the country, opposing the decision of President Yanukovich in 2014 not to sign the 
AA: “today it is only the people of Ukraine who stand ready to sacrifice their lives for 
European rights and freedoms” (Journalist, 2014). According to civil society 
                                                   
47Between 2001 and 2009, under the Presidency of V. Voronin, the average age of the Moldovan parliamentary elite was 55 
years and of the governmanetal one was 53.  
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representatives, Ukrainian citizens in Kiev, Lvov or Odessa were struggling for the 
future of their country – one that would be European-style, based on the rule of law 
or one which would be Russian-style, based on rule of the oligarchy and a shadow 
economy (interv. UKR 14, 15, 16). The conservation of a post-Soviet social system 
in Ukraine and the anti-democratic way of governing, the state’s inability to perform 
in areas such as protection of human rights and basic freedom and its shift towards 
Russia in November 2013 through not signing of the AA deepened the growing 
distrust felt in civil society (interv. UKR 3, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16). At the same time, 
Ukrainian civil society questioned the EU’s commitment to fostering democracy in 
Ukraine or a real advancement in their relations: they were dissatisfied with the low 
level of the information campaign undertaken by the EU Delegation in Ukraine in 
relation to the AA, and its slow reaction to the violent actions by the Yanukovych 
government against the protestors (interv. UKR 3, 10, 11). They also doubted EU 
instruments such as TAIEX or TWINNING as their experts did not foster pro-EU 
change: “they mainly come and go with their knowledge, do not provide continuity 
but mainly jobs for EU citizens” (interv. UKR 10). As a Ukrainian official explained: 
“the EU reform-agenda is very large and difficult to comply with, the financial 
capacity does not allow us to implement what is given, thus I and my other 
colleagues are against this association agenda as it is costly: additional work, not 
enough people or resources to facilitate its implementation” (interv. UKR 4). 
 
5.2.2. The role of diplomatic actors in Kiev 
The activity of the diplomatic community in Ukraine between 2010-2015 revolved 
around Ukraine’s agenda for integration to the EU. Diplomats’ major tasks were 
related to political developments in relation to the progress and the reform agenda of 
Ukraine and they developed instruments to support democratization, good 
governance and the rule of law, and the human rights reforms (interv. 18). Their 
activities in Ukraine focused on bilateral relations that happened within the broader 
EU context, as one Polish diplomat explained (interv. 21) and as one Swedish 
diplomat emphasized: “I deal with political affairs and political reporting, with 
establishing of our agenda and networking and negotiation with the ministries on 
bilateral interests as well as on EU agenda” (interv. 22). This was also visible in 
public diplomacy activities as they engaged with the Ukrainian mass media or 
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universities and held discussions on EU integration (ibidem), or directly supported 
projects and events that related to the Ukrainian reform agenda; for example the 
Belgian embassy supported the activities of the Ukrainian-Belgian Centre for 
Environment and Human Health which conducted research for a variety of projects 
that study the soil, Carpathian plants, Carpathian water sources and other 
environment related projects (interv. 43). Austria had been working on increasing 
financial support in Ukraine, even though it was not a target country in their 
development cooperation strategy. They had channelled their effort to supporting 
both Ukraine and the EUD on projects aimed at fighting corruption, vocational 
education training and rural development as well as in agriculture and agriculture-
related projects (interv. 44).  
National diplomats found different means to align their efforts with Ukraine’s 
processes of implementing reforms under the AA and achieving its European 
aspirations. As members of the EU, Swedish diplomats promoted the benefits of the 
AA and tried to push the Ukrainian authorities towards signing the Association 
agreement: “For Sweden, common values are very important, at the end of the day it 
is Ukraine’s choice, it is a societal choice, and if they want to sign then they need to 
show that they share these common values and we are not ready to take the 
geopolitical point of view, we want them to show some tangible progress in the areas 
of the AA. We are considered as hardliners, when it comes to common values of 
course, but we are also most ardent supporters of Ukraine and its integration in the 
EU and we think that we need to stand firm on our values.” (interv. 22). Germany’s 
priority in Ukraine was also strong on implementation of reforms by Ukraine and their 
activities involved, inter alia, working on projects in their interest areas such as 
energy efficiency, anti-corruption and protection of journalists (interv. 47). Smaller 
embassies, like the Belgian one, for example, focused on public diplomacy activities 
in Ukraine and considered building contacts between institutions in Belgium (both 
national and EU) and Ukraine important: “We facilitate the Ukrainian stakeholders 
and relevant actors to participate in workshops in Belgium and interact with Belgian 
industries for example. This also comes as an effect of implementation of European 
reforms. We find it important for the Ukrainian side goes to Brussels where all 
Belgian and EU institutions are and to put them in touch – to learn, for instance, from 
the Belgian counterparts how they implemented reforms” (interv. 43).  
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Data collected from the fieldwork conducted in Ukraine (2013-2016) showed that, 
operationally, there was no difference between the practices of national or EU 
diplomacy in their focus of activities in Ukraine. As one Polish diplomat argued: 
“[The] EU represents the interests of all its MS as a block. Every MS has its own 
interests which are not covered by the EU and hence bilateral relations are different 
from one country to another, but EU diplomacy, in turn, is the common denominator 
in relations with Ukraine.” (interv. 21). National diplomats reiterated during interviews 
that the reforms in Ukraine were a big part of their diplomatic agenda and that it was 
also the EU prerogative to promote this agenda. National diplomats became like-
minded on the question of reforms that Ukraine had to undertake and as result, 
echoed the EU messages to Ukraine, which they coordinated among themselves 
(interv. 22, 24, 42, 44, 45). Their daily activity involved monitoring closely 
developments in Ukraine such as visa-liberalisation actions and the ratification of the 
AA and providing support that would get Ukraine closer to the EU standards (interv. 
42).  
An Austrian diplomat highlighted the fact that “Austria cannot influence the political 
discourse in Ukraine without the EUD as our diplomacy is focusing on bilateral affairs 
and growing the network of contacts and then on conveying the common EU 
approach as we understand it. The EU Delegation, on the other hand, does not have 
to focus energy on bilateral diplomacy and only focus on the EU agenda” (interv. 44). 
Therefore the premises of EU diplomacy conducted by the EUD were seen as more 
global and acting from the standpoint of European integration (interv. 45). The 
intention of EU diplomatic activity in Ukraine, as was stated by EU diplomats in the 
Delegation was “to have closer relations with Ukraine via the offer of the AA and 
Ukraine is one of the most important neighbours from its Eastern partners” (interv. 
23). The diplomat further explained that since Ukraine showed interest in having 
closer cooperation with the EU and completed the negotiations with the WTO in 
order to open negotiations on DCFTA, this implied that the EUD’s diplomatic task 
was to work closely with authorities, on a daily basis, and to support Ukraine to 
deliver on the benchmarks and to fulfil them. For the EUD, this meant being 
constantly in touch with the Ukrainian MFA and other ministries representing the 
government, but also sharing information on the EU, such as explaining the AA and 
the DCFTA (interv. 16). 
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During the period under study, the EU became the largest donor of development 
assistance to Ukraine (see data in Table 16) and this implied diplomatic work centred 
on heavy monitoring of the progress made by Ukraine and how the practical 
measures had been adopted (interv. 19). In the case of Ukraine, the EU offered a 
framework for political association and economic integration within the AA, which 
was a political commitment to come closer to the EU and was reflected in EU 
financial assistance in form of grants and loans as Table 19 below shows.  
 
 
Hence the Delegation in Kiev was preoccupied with ongoing issues in the country 
and followed closely all developments and progress made on reforms. A screening 
of Ukraine’s progress on implementation of reforms was conducted by the EUD staff 
on a daily basis; both the negative and positive aspects of the developments in 
Ukraine were then transformed by the EUD into specific and detailed reports sent to 
Brussels. In response to the crisis in Ukraine, EU set up, in April 2014, The Support 
Group for Ukraine48 which drew on the work done by the Delegation on the ground 
and its experience in supporting reforms in Ukraine. It was established by the 
European Commission to ensure that the support provided was focused and 
concentrated on the Association Agenda as well as providing additional strategic 
                                                   
48 The activity report for 18 months cand be read here: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/neighbourhood/pdf/key-documents/ukraine/20161028-report-sgua.pdf  
Table 19. EU financial assistance offered to Ukraine 2007-2015 
 
Source: European Court of Auditors (2016). EU assistance to Ukraine, Special Report no 32, p. 11, 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 
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direction to already existing in country day-to-day donor coordination. The work of 
the Support Group was channelled on the ground via the Delegation: by providing 
advice directly; by bringing in experts from other European Commission services; by 
deploying experts provided by the Member States; and by bringing to bear the 
substantial grant assistance made available by the European Commission. Two of 
the four main conclusions of the Activity report of the Support group referred to 
further strengthening coordination and creating synergies with the member-states on 
ongoing assistance and its programming, with the aim of increasing the overall 
impact of EU action (Commission, 2016b). 
Similar to the case of Moldova, in Ukraine, the diplomatic interaction was highly 
diverse and diplomacy as a result expanded beyond representation, communication 
or negotiation as presented in Chapter 2 (sections 2.2.1.). Besides their traditional 
diplomatic role, national embassies and the EU delegations became very active in 
their roles as donors and developed a strong relationship with civil society 
organisations, not just the governments. Through their activity as donors, diplomatic 
actors invested in strengthening reforms and fostering democratic developments in 
Ukraine. In contrast to work undertaken by national embassies, these activities, 
which were rather technical in nature, came in a more natural manner to the EUD, 
who took over the former Commission representation portofolio which was mainly 
managing EU assistance. Therefore, given the increasing financial assistance that 
the EU offered to Ukraine (see Table 16, 19), the Delegation was overseeing 
projects carried out across a wide range of sectors, regions and cities in Ukraine on 
support for democratic development and good governance, regulatory reform and 
administrative capacity building, infrastructure development and other areas (interv. 
16, 19, 20, 48). 
Besides contributing to the general EU budget from which the EU provided 
assistance to Ukraine (data presented in Table 16 and 19), member states also 
developed bilateral strategies and instruments for providing development assistance. 
Denmark, which had one of the smallest embassies in Ukraine, offered support 
through the Neighbourhood Programme, which was centred on development aid 
assistance to EE neighbours in the East and South-East; and Ukraine was one of the 
priority countries. The objective of the program was to promote open democratic 
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justice based on stable political and economic development in neighbouring 
countries, and the embassy contributed to different projects in the area of legal 
reforms, capacity building of companies in the agricultural sector as well as support 
during the crisis on human rights issues, constitutional reform and others. For the 
2013-2017 programme, Denmark allocated a total sum of 1 billion DKK (the 
programme includes 14 countries) which is approximately €1.3 million (Embassy DK, 
2015). The activities of the medium-sized Dutch embassy, focused, in this sense, on 
capacity-building and strengthening of the civil-society and governments in ENP 
countries through the MATRA programme. In Ukraine, this programme was 
implemented in order to support the transition and reform processes towards a 
pluriform democracy with distinct participation of civil society and specifically with the 
objective of supporting the Ukrainian reform agenda towards approximation to the 
EU. In addition, the Dutch Embassy made funds available in support of initiatives 
that promoted implementation of fundamental freedoms and protection of the rights 
of groups of people that were subject to discrimination (Embassy NL, 2014). 
Between 2008 and 2014, the Dutch allocated a total of €36.5 million to the EaP 
countries through the MATRA programme and €6.1 million through the Human 
Rights Fund with the highest expenditure in Ukraine – circa 30% (MFA NL, 2015).  
Data also revealed that between 2008-2013 the UK funded bilateral projects for civil 
society in the amount of ca. €1,350,000 (British Embassy Kiev 2013) and the 
Swedish embassy budgeted around €25 million for projects between 2011-2013 via 
its Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) (MFA Sweden, 
2009). The Swedish policy, entitled “Policy for Support to Civil Society in Developing 
Countries within Swedish Development Cooperation” outlined the Swedish strategy 
on civil society in its partner countries mainstreamed through capacity development 
of civil society organisations and developing their legal and institutional environment 
(MFA Sweden, 2009). Specifically, for Ukraine (but also Moldova), the overall 
objective of such support aimed at deeper integration with the EU. In both countries, 
the Sida Agency, shared its expertise, know-how, experience, lessons learned and 
ideas with its main European partner, the EU Delegation. A Swedish diplomat, 
member of one of the largest MS embassies present in Kiev, emphasized that 
“Sweden is one of the biggest bilateral donors in Ukraine, and we spend, through 
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Sida, about €25 mil EUR/year49, and we do close coordination with the EU, as the 
main goal is to promote EU integration on different sectors – we focus on democratic 
governance, which is mostly working with civil society these days” (interv. 22; 
Embassy Sweden, 2015b) 
The empirical information collected in Ukraine, showed similar practice to that 
discovered in Moldova: an institutionalised form of interaction between the EU and 
national diplomatic actors, including in their role as donors (see Table 20 below). The 
data collected during the field-trips to Kiev were used to construct a typology of a 
communication infrastructure. This typology groups meetings based on level 
(participation based on diplomatic rank), focus (participation based on topic), 
membership (participation based on group affiliation), and formality (degree of 
ceremonialism of the meeting). Whereas data was initially collected in 2011, field-
trips to Ukraine in 2013 and 2016 confirmed that these meetings continued to take 
place under the same headings. These meetings represent a communication 
infrastructure through which the staff from MS embassies and the EUD interacted, 
shared information on their activities in Ukraine, presented their strategies and 
programmes as well as insights from consultations with local actors such as civil 
society organisations.  
 
Table 20: Communication infrastructure between MS embassies and EUD in Ukraine, 2011-
2015 
Typology Heading Frequency Description 
Level 
General EU–member states meetings 
(1) HoMs: 
Meetings of Heads 
of Delegation 
(HoDs) 
Weekly: 
every week (or every 2 
weeks) on political issues, 
occasionally on civil society 
issues (approx. two–three 
times per year) reflects the diplomatic 
ranking of the attendees 
(2) Deputy HoDs 
meetings 
Monthly: 
on average every 2 weeks 
and at least once a month 
(3) Counsellor’s 
meetings 
Monthly & quarterly 
                                                   
49 Data interview refered to data till 2013. This data remained the same for 2014 and 2015, as indicated on the embassies 
website: https://web.archive.org/web/20150816124541/http://www.swedenabroad.com:80/en-
GB/Embassies/Kyiv/Development-Cooperation/Development-Cooperation-with-Ukraine  
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Topic 
(1) Thematic EU 
(donor) meetings 
Monthly (some quarterly)  6 to 
12 per year on the following 
themes:  
- Political (and Human 
Rights) issues 
- Development cooperation 
issues 
- Energy & transport issues 
- Press & information issues 
- Economic / Commercial 
counsellors issues 
have a specific agenda 
and are narrow in scope 
(2) Consultations with 
other EU donors 
organised based on necessity 
distinctive for the EU 
delegation called before 
launching its regular local 
calls for proposals for civil 
society project funding 
(3) Member states’ 
roundtables 
a type of meet and greet 
event, where civil society 
actors are invited in order 
to get acquainted with the 
diplomatic donor 
community and vice-versa 
Group 
affiliation 
EU (donor) meetings within regional frameworks of cooperation 
(1) Visegrad Group 
(or V4) 
Twice a year formally to several 
times per year informally  
Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia 
(2) Nordic group 
(or Nordic Plus) 
Twice a year and on ad-hoc 
basis 
Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, the 
UK (also Norway and 
Canada are part of Nordic 
Plus) 
(3) Baltic group on ad-hoc basis 
Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia (occasionally 
joined by Finland and 
Sweden) 
Formality 
(1) Formal events 
organized based on the yearly 
agendas of EU delegations and 
member states’ embassies; at 
least one event per actor 
events organised by 
relevant stakeholders in 
each country as well as 
lunch, dinner or an 
“occasional coffee” 
(2) Non-formal events Information not disclosed 
Source: Author’s compilation based on fieldwork conducted in Ukraine between 2011 - 2016 
 
The meetings happened at the level of Heads of delegations and missions and 
deputy Heads as well as at the level of counsellors. The HoMs and deputy HoD 
meetings took place with regularity twice and once a month respectively and dealt 
with the general framework of relations with Ukraine;  interviewees referred to these 
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as the more general meetings, which covered all important developments in relation 
to the AA agenda in the 2010-2015 period (interv. 18, 24, 42, 44). The thematic 
meetings involved the counsellor level on different thematic topics such as: human 
rights, development cooperation, energy and transport, economic and commercial 
and press and information. Depending on local developments in Ukraine, some of 
these meetings were as frequent as once a month; others occurred to a lower 
frequency, once every 3 and even 4 months. Altogether, this sums up to 7 different 
types of meetings that were reoccurring at least 8 times per month. This is to 
illustrate that a medium-sized embassy like the Netherlands, for example, managed 
to participate in 5 (two of which are HoMs and the deputy HoD meetings) and a large 
embassy like Germany managed to attend all of them (interv. 18, 47); while smaller 
MS embassies such as the Danish or the Austrian attended the HoMs and the 
deputy HoD meetings most often and had less possibility to attend the rest of the 
meetings, usually choosing the ones that were most relevant for their bilateral 
portfolio (interv. 44, 46). 
The Visegrad and the Nordic Plus groups belonged to the regional frameworks of 
cooperation in Ukraine and were identical in terms of membership to their 
equivalents in Moldova (presented in Table 12, Chapter 4, and described in section 
4.4). Although there was cooperation among the Baltic diplomats in Moldova, there 
was no formalised interaction under the Baltic group affiliation, which was present 
and active in Ukraine. The way diplomats engaged in these meetings relates to the 
discussion about relevance that will be carried out in section 5.4.; while how this 
infrastructure became a resource is discussed in relation to capabilities in section 
5.5. Before that, we now turn to investigating the diplomatic practices of representing 
the Union in Ukraine, the goal to be attained according to the Lisbon Treaty and of 
interest to the first criterion, effectiveness. 
 
5.3. Effectiveness: representing the Union 
The Council note 17770/1/09 on EU diplomatic representation in third countries 
indicated that the responsibility for representation and cooperation was taken over by 
the EU Delegation in Ukraine from 1 January 2010 (European Council, 2010). Post-
Lisbon, the EU delegation acquired legal recognition that upgraded the former 
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Commission representation, established in Kiev in 1993, to a full-blown Union 
delegation. This task of representing the EU as a whole that has been given to the 
EU delegations was embraced by the Delegation in Kiev as well. This was mainly 
possible due to the fact that the Commission representation in Ukraine also fulfilled 
duties of representation, together with the Presidency, but this was limited to non-
CFSP issues. The pre-Lisbon Delegations, as presented in sections 5.1.3. and 
5.2.2., carried out a large variety of tasks: presenting and implementing EU policies 
and also assisting the rotating Presidency locally. The Lisbon Treaty, then, gave the 
Delegations a formal role in external representation and cooperation with MS (art. 
221 TFEU).  
The main division of tasks regarding representation became straightforward: the EU 
delegation represented the EU in areas of exclusive and shared competences, while 
every member state represented their own interests bilaterally with the host country. 
Reflecting on the Delegation’s activity pre-Lisbon, one of the political officers in the 
Delegation recalled that the task of the Presidency was a challenge and sometimes 
‘a disaster’ when it was taken over by a small member-state embassy that had 
limited diplomatic personnel or had no experience, as national diplomats were 
focused only on bilateral relations (interv. 16). A Belgian diplomat clarified that this 
was a tricky position for their embassy, which was rather small, and the solution was 
to engage in intense cooperation with the Commission representation, giving them 
the lead on certain topics because they lacked the manpower (interv. 43). Therefore, 
as a Presidency, for a small embassy in Ukraine, to represent 25 MS was a huge 
challenge, and it was a matter of both human resources and know-how: “national 
diplomats posted here were not aware of the EU agenda and the context of relations 
with Ukraine within the Association Agenda from the EU’s standpoint, but mainly 
from a national perspective” (interv. 16).  
All interviewees put emphasis on the way the Lisbon Treaty affected their diplomatic 
work in Ukraine which was related to the technicalities that came with the duties of a 
rotating Presidency. Post-Lisbon, national diplomats perceived this as a positive 
change as it was difficult for them to be involved in the huge amount of tasks that 
came with this role and it was difficult for all embassies, small and large, as it was a 
‘heavy burden’ (interv. 21). Some did not have the manpower (interv. 43), others did 
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not have the necessary financial or technical resources and ‘had to do a lot by way 
of oral diplomacy’ in cooperation with other embassies and even “sometimes we 
have to explain how the EU works to our own staff” (interv. 17). National diplomats 
also recalled instances when there were issues on the agenda that many MS could 
not cover, and it was more logical for the Delegation to represent the MS in these 
matters, especially in meetings with local authorities (interv. 22). As result, the 
change of the rotating Presidency from member-states to the Delegation was 
perceived by some as ‘a blessing’ (ibidem).  
Being responsible for the rotating Presidency, meant having a coordinating role and 
a leading role for the MS in establishing contacts in the diplomatic community as well 
as with the local authorities. With the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon and the 
inauguration of the EEAS, Delegations have been charged with representing the 
whole Union and are delegated external representation on CFSP matters, originally 
the responsibility of the Presidency. The diplomats in the EU Delegation in Kiev 
stated that “after the launch of the EEAS this is the role of the EUD and we are 
carrying the leading role on this and it works smoothly especially since we were 
present in Ukraine before and we have been involved in coordination. The Lisbon 
Treaty came as a reminder as well: not to have 2 leading actors on the ground” 
(interv. 23). This means that, with taking over the Presidency tasks in representation 
and coordination, the EU Delegations became responsible for all EU competences, 
including the CFSP: according to political officers in the Delegation, this provided 
continuity to EU actions in Ukraine, which used to be a challenge in the pre-Lisbon 
setting (interv. 16). 
The Council Decision establishing the EEAS50 had also foreseen that the Union 
Delegations would work closely with the MS embassies and share information in 
addition to their representation role. So, assuming the role of the Presidency, 
implied, in practice, chairing and coordinating the vast number of meetings for all EU 
actors present in Ukraine. For the EUD, the Lisbon Treaty also meant more work: 
“we started to coordinate more and have a lot of meetings with the MS – we had to 
organize meetings and events, to find compromises and engage in work that 
resembles the Council in Brussels” (interv. 16). The Delegation in Kiev, hence, 
                                                   
50 Council of the European Union, “Decision Establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action 
Service (2010/427/EU)”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 201/30, 26 July 2010 
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became responsible for maintaining the framework of cooperation with member-
states (interv. 23). This task came with a logistical burden as officers in the 
Delegation had to negotiate and find a date that suited everyone in the diplomatic 
community, which could be ‘a nightmare’, especially when the person in charge had 
to accommodate the schedules of all 25 ambassadors (interv. 16, 19, 23). As one 
officer exemplified: “we have learned to be a bit dictatorial -  and if they cannot come 
we ask them to delegate someone” (interv. 16). The other logistical task was 
reporting – the EUD had to write minutes of the meetings and to report back to 
Brussels; in these type of assignments, interviewees mentioned that they did not 
provide comments on the positions of the MS nor any advice, just reporting, i.e. 
stating the facts (interv. 16). Diplomats, therefore, appreciated this work performed 
by the EU not only because it ‘made the embassies’ life easier’ but also because the 
EUD was doing it better than the national representations and was relying on a 
bigger number of staff than the embassies (interv. 22). Some even emphasized that 
MS should seek the services provided by the EUD to a bigger extent as post-Lisbon 
it is, de facto, becoming more influential as an institution in Ukraine (interv. 24).  
Diplomats seemed to share the opinion that the EUD was performing a good job of 
holding coordination meetings (interv. 22, 43, 47) and even highlighted that this was 
a good service provided by the EUD to the MS (interv. 42). Political officers in the 
Delegation observed that, post-Lisbon, the role of MS had decreased since the 
coordination meetings are chaired by the EUD, which had the biggest number of 
staff and hence a bigger and specialized capacity (interv. 16, 48). According to them, 
the EUD in Kiev resembled a Secretariat, used as a ‘back office’ by the MS: “this 
implies constant talks, meetings, interactions, phone calls, emails; it is mainly a job 
with a high degree of communication” (interv. 16). On a daily basis, the EUD staff 
gathered information, analysed it, collected information from MS and local 
stakeholders and explained the details to both parties. Member-states observed the 
high degree of professionalism shown by their colleagues in the EUD and 
appreciated the effort that went into coordination (interv. 22, 45). The EUD staff were 
also proud of the fact that it was the EU Delegation that had the expertise on how to 
represent the EU, on a concrete practical level: “we have this practical knowledge 
and MS acknowledge this expertise and through this, we gain their trust in 
representing the EU and, by extension, them” (interv. 16). 
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In practice, the cooperation became formalized and the Delegation in Kiev had the 
leading role in organizing the common meetings: a wide variety ranging from 
meetings attended by the ambassadors such as the HoMs to the thematic ones such 
as trade, attended by economic counsellors (interv. 45). The Delegation’s activity in 
Kiev of coordinating the wide and diverse meetings, as presented in Table 20, made 
it embrace a network rather than a hierarchical structure. But, “this also comes as a 
reflection of the many DGs represented within the Delegation and the different policy 
areas we are dealing with  - justice, development and cooperation and others” 
(interv. 19). The network structure was a strong point for the Delegation, especially in 
their effort of keeping all MS on board: this meant that countries with a portofolio on 
visa-liberalisation or on trade or on human rights were provided with a setting for 
information-sharing (interv. 18). Given the focus of EU-Ukraine relations on the 
signing of the AA, member-states supported its leading role: “it has access to 
decision-makers and to all relevant stakeholders” (interv. 46). Given the EUD’s high 
profile on the rule of law and the judiciary, for example, member-states agreed to 
only be informed and were not concerned with the fact that the EUD did not discuss 
its programme in this area with them (interv. 18). They also noticed, that during the 
crisis in Ukraine, member-states were engaging with local actors without conducting 
a needs-assessment exercise: “so after the EUD took over the donor coordination 
meeting (to deal with the crisis in Ukraine) that information-sharing became more 
frequent and a consortium was created on certain specific topics, such as anti-
corruption, judicial affairs and others. The EUD is now inviting Ukrainian experts that 
can speak to the EU diplomatic community in one forum. So these working meetings 
are very practical for all sides. In the donor assistance meetings, the human rights 
and the economic meetings there are frequent meetings with the Ukrainian side 
through which the Delegation brings attention to issues which are not yet made 
public” (interv. 46). 
Evidence collected in Ukraine in 2013 and 2016 has shown that the appreciation for 
these coordination meeting grew and member-states acquired, in addition to the 
instrument of bilateral diplomacy, the EU one, through which they could achieve their 
foreign policy objectives in Ukraine. If an embassy wanted to initiate a meeting on a 
topic relevant to it, that did not fall under any of the meetings presented in Table 20, 
it would request the premises of the Delegation and their know-how on the subject 
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matter (interv. 24). In the framework of meetings coordinated by the Delegation, 
even though the agenda was offered by the Delegation, MS embassies could make 
adjustments and propose points of discussion (interv. 22, 24). These meetings were 
useful as they represented a framework for coordination: diplomats saw what others 
were doing and were getting a common view on the developments in Ukraine and 
were working on démarches together, as a follow-up to the debriefings (interv. 45).  
Nonetheless, as an EU political officer noted, member-states did not appreciate it 
when the Delegation took the lead on matters that were of national interest to them, 
such as migration, education or visas and in these cases; so the EUD was monitored 
by the MS (interv. 16). Given the fact that the Lisbon Treaty expects the Delegations 
to step up their cooperation with the member-state embassies toward a common 
approach (art. 32), the next section will bring forward the diplomatic practices that 
exist in this sense in Ukraine. 
 
5.4. Relevance: ‘common approach’ in Kiev 
In this section, evidence is reviewed in relation to corporate diplomatic practices in 
Ukraine in order to assess relevance, the criterion that focuses on the formulation 
and implementation of a common approach by the EU Delegation and member-state 
embassies (for details of the operationalisation in the analytical section: see Chapter 
3). What comes across from the interviews conducted in Ukraine, is that similarly to 
the Moldovan case, decision-making is done in Brussels, whilst the common 
approach is worked out at the level of COREPER and the COEST working groups 
and then at the level of the Council. Member-states considered that the gist of actual 
coordination took place in Brussels and not so much on the ground, hence some 
understood the common approach as the effort of keeping to a consistent message 
that came from Brussels and of fostering a common understanding among national 
representations (interv. 44). Hence, the common approach for the EU Delegation 
was “the way that we act on the ground […] and that we do what we are instructed 
from Brussels, and the MS do not interfere in this process: for example in the AA 
negotiation on the ground, there are no interferences from MS, as they are only 
observers” (interv. 16). The framework of the common approach, as understood on 
148 
the ground, was enacted via the meetings, especially through the practice of 
debriefing at the HoMs meetings (interv. 19).  
Even though national diplomats stated that, in practical terms, it was not clear what 
the common approach was about as most of the guidelines and positions were 
streamlined in Brussels (interv. 45), from the conduct of their diplomatic activity it 
appears that the common approach was, for them, to have a common position on 
Ukraine. For example: for the Austrians, it was about a common understanding, for 
the Germans it was about speaking with one voice, for the Danes it was about unity 
among member-states, for the Poles and the Belgians it was about a unified position 
- on Ukraine (interv. 21, 43, 44, 46, 47). The common approach referred to having a 
common platform where discussions between diplomats took place, such as during 
the meetings coordinated by the EUD, where individual member-states presented 
their positions and after discussion could, thereafter, present the EU position to the 
host country in a united way (interv. 21). Some put the emphasis on the fact that on 
the ground it was easier to join a common opinion, as result of participation in the 
meetings, even if some member-states were not completely aware of the details of 
the developments in Ukraine (interv. 44). And, that in practice, the common 
approach could be observed during the common meetings where MS shared their 
approach on different issues in Ukraine and where they worked on common 
guidelines (interv. 46). Political staff in the Delegation also emphasized that the 
implementation of art 35(C) concerning the common approach could be observed 
through the activity of member-states in Ukraine and their contribution on shaping a 
common EU position (art. 16). For them, this seemed a natural development since in 
Ukraine there was the same view on the AA being a tool for transformations in 
Ukraine (interv. 19). A Czech diplomat developed the argument further, arguing that, 
within the coordination meetings organised by the EUD on all different levels, 
national diplomats tried to look for any differences between the EU and national 
policies and sought support on EU policies and instruments such as the AA; hence 
“we can, at this level, find some coherence among us” (interv. 24). 
In the practice of diplomacy in Ukraine, the common meetings led the way to 
complementarity among all actors. The EU maintained different forms of dialogue 
with Ukraine, and in preparation to these dialogues, the MS were consulted by the 
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Delegation on how to approach developments in different sectors such as the justice 
sector or the human rights. As one Dutch diplomat recalled, “we prepared the papers 
jointly: together with the Delegation and the experts from Brussels and we discussed 
them with the local authorities. And it would be impossible to do this bilaterally” 
(interv. 18). This seemed to be an instance when using complementarity was quite 
successful (ibidem). Evidence further showed that, in practice, the common 
approach was best exercised in the HoMs meetings where the place and opportunity 
was given to everyone to talk about concerns on Ukraine and developments in the 
country as well as on the human rights situation. These were the most frequent 
meetings organised by the HoD and all EU ambassadors participated, as Table 20 
presented. Even more so, the points raised in these meetings and the discussions 
culminated with the development of the HoMs report that was, thereafter, transmitted 
to Brussels: “the meetings where member-states are most interested in are HoMs 
and the thematic ones - Political and human rights issues. These are the meetings 
where the most advanced form of cooperation happens with developing a report at 
the end” (interv. 48).  
A prominent example of the common approach within the HoMs meetings as well as 
the Political and human rights meetings was the cooperation between member-
states that resulted in the Cox-Kwasniewski mission. In May 2010, the Ukrainian 
Prosecutor General’s Office had opened a series of criminal cases against the 
Ukrainian politician and former Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko. In 
October 2011 she was charged with abuse of power in connection with her approval 
of a Russian gas contract in 2009 and was sentenced to seven years in prison. The 
EU diplomatic community in Ukraine initiated a joint exercise of monitoring: “a few 
MS proposed, in the HoMs meetings, to launch an observation exercise of this case 
and the EU Delegation took the lead on this. We CC-ed everyone on the issue, we 
have agreed on our schedules and every MS has drafted memos on the matter. Out 
of 24 MS present on the ground, about 14-15 represented the core team while some 
have been observers in this case only once” (interv. 23). This joint exercise was one 
of the main points on the agenda of the meetings at the level of the HoDs and 
Deputy HoDs. However, after 3 months this task became an exhausting one and not 
every MS was happy to attend the meetings as there were no developments in 
Ukraine on the matter. Yet, this became a good example of burden-sharing between 
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the Delegation and the MS: “this gave the feeling that we are one group and we 
could show unity” (ibidem). Most observations continued on the level of the deputies. 
Thereafter, in June 2012, the Cox-Kwasniewski mission was launched on the 
initiative of the European Parliament with the sole purpose to resolve the issue of 
“selective persecution” exemplified by Yulia Tymoshenko’s case, which remained a 
key obstacle to signing the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU at 
that time. During this mission, both the EU delegation and the MS embassies played 
a key role in monitoring the local developments in the Tymoshenko case and serving 
as contact points for the Cox-Kwasniewski visits in Ukraine. 
Another example of the common approach provided by all interviewees was the 
Europe Days event when the EU Delegation brought together all MS, every year in 
May (particular details provided in interv. 17, 43, 45, 46, 47). Europe Days have 
been officially celebrated in Ukraine since 2003 and co-organised by the EU 
delegation and MS embassies in cities around Ukraine. In 2015, for example, 
Ukrainian citizens had the opportunity to participate in quests and flash-mobs, 
training sessions on applying for EU grants and discussions on EU integration with 
the main focus on the idea that Ukrainians themselves must take the initiative to spur 
the development of their state (EU in Ukraine, 2015). Other examples of public 
diplomacy activity initiated by the Delegation were the series of events where the 
Delegation invited MS to participate in sharing information and practices on Erasmus 
and the DCFTA (interv.46). 
Evidence of joint action on the ground came also at the initiative of member-states 
and the Stronger Together campaign served as a positive example of “a real 
common project” (interv. 43). The Dutch, the Swedish and the British claimed 
ownership for this campaign (interv. 18, 22). In 2012, the British Embassy funded a 
project to determine how Ukrainians perceived the EU and to raise their awareness 
of the benefits that signing the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, including a 
DCFTA, would bring. On the basis of this research, the UK created a blueprint for a 
possible communications campaign, in which Ukrainian, EU and international 
partners could work together (Embassy UK, 2013). As the British Ambassador 
stated: “the research that we funded has shown that we need to consolidate and 
coordinate our efforts to provide comprehensive information about the EU and 
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present clear and well-defined arguments in favour of EU integration” (ibidem). 
Subsequently, the Swedish embassy took the initiative to transform this research into 
a comprehensive information campaign and they obtained support from Brussels, 
where there was concern that there was not enough done on informing the Ukrainian 
public people about the AA: “sometimes, when we feel very strongly about 
something and we feel that Brussels needs to focus more attention to these areas 
then we draft the HoMs report” (interv. 22). Similarly, the Dutch explained the 
benefits of this campaign, but also drew attention to the fact that the EU partners 
started it rather late (the campaign started in September 2013, 2 months before the 
scheduled signing of the AA in Vilnius). However, inspired by the UK embassy, the 
Dutch emphasized the quite diverse approach of public awareness-raising involving 
EU ambassadors: “we also have the DCFTA road-shows when the national 
ambassadors go throughout the country on talks, interviews and public appearances 
on explaining the AA” (interv. 18).  
Between 2010 and 2015, the political officers in the Delegation emphasized, they 
always cooperated with the MS embassies and “in general there are no 
troublemakers and it depends on the local conditions – in Ukraine the diplomatic 
environment is friendly – we meet for lunch and dinner also and we share 
information or provide MS with the information they require” (interv. 23). The 
Delegation organised joint meetings with the local authorities in Ukraine, co-
organised with the MS which was holding the Presidency of the Council in Brussels. 
The Delegation also identified that there were member-states that tried to influence 
the Delegation’s positions such as Poland, Romania, Slovakia or Hungary, hence, 
the Delegation hosted bilateral talks with them to acknowledge the importance of 
their competences in this region (interv. 16). And although the MS seemed happy 
about the EUD taking leadership post-Lisbon, they were still trying to preserve their 
own visibility, their autonomous position: “Great Britain has its own interests, own 
agenda, says something but does something else, then it is difficult to identify the 
real interest. Netherlands is very open, straightforward, transparent, together with 
Germany and Sweden they do not behave like those major donors to the EU budget 
(even if they are): they are very generous, distant from lobbying their own interest 
unlike Poland, Romania or Hungary. The immediate neighbours of Ukraine have an 
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agenda, so they use EU diplomacy for their own interests, yet being too sure of their 
expertise makes them commit mistakes” (ibidem).  
Nonetheless, member-states tried to create synergies between their own national 
diplomacy and that of the EU. National embassies considered that they knew certain 
practices regarding the conduct of diplomacy in Ukraine: “Sometimes the EUD 
comes with questions and we know how to solve this effectively given our expertise 
and time spent here as a diplomatic entity. For instance, it makes no sense to write 
letters or notes to national authorities trying to solve an issue, I would propose to 
embrace a demarche approach to make the counterparts meeting with you, to listen 
and take a punch because you need to be very aggressive in order to achieve 
something and not to be very polite and nice and Western-like behaviour but more 
aggressive” (interv. 24). The diplomatic démarches are a form of diplomatic 
correspondence delivered to the appropriate official of the government and generally 
seek to persuade, inform, or gather information from a foreign government. 
Considering the practice of writing letters or notes to the national authorities trying to 
solve an issue is a futile exercise, diplomats shared their practice on a demarché 
approach: “for instance, there are not that many démarches here in comparison to 
Moscow where we were doing this once a month. There are démarches on LGBT 
but this makes no sense, because with LGBT we need public events instead of 
démarches” (ibidem). 
Empirical evidence showed that there is a tendency to form group affiliations in the 
diplomatic community in Ukraine (also shown in Table 20): according to some it 
seemed that “too many embassies means formation of groupings” (interv. 42). Some 
noted that such constellations emerged on the basis of their geographical proximity 
to Ukraine and not so much for their political ambitions (interv. 18). The Visegrad 
group included Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, commonly 
known as V4, which as in in Moldova exhibited various examples of formulating a 
common approach, a lot of which was reflected in their public diplomacy activities. 
The V4 had a strong cooperation in Ukraine and proposed certain events, were 
meeting with local authorities and were engaging with the media and advocating for 
similar things; all of these in relation to Ukraine were done in line with the EU agenda 
on the AA (interv. 21). As was already presented in Chapter 5, the V4 set up a 
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common Fund (Visegrad Fund 2013); considered an example of strategic 
cooperation based on similar interests: “there are meetings planned for strategic 
coordination and redirecting funds to both projects and individuals” (interv. 12). 
Diplomats also highlighted the Nordic group (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, the UK) and the Baltic group (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) as 
the two other entities which were active in Ukraine. As noted in Chapter 5, in 
Moldova as well as in Ukraine, the Nordic group led on the matter of the ‘good 
donorship’ principle. This principle referred to coordination as the main goal between 
the members on sharing similar standards, on logistical aspects in particular (similar 
reporting, auditing etc.) and on complementing each other’s work.  
According to Nordic diplomats, the Baltics in Ukraine have played an important role – 
they exchanged with the Ukrainian counterparts their examples on reforms, and they 
offered national advisors to work with Ukrainian institutions on reforms (interv. 45). 
Evidence showed that there was also strong cooperation between the Nordic and 
Baltic groups. There were regular Baltic-Nordic lunches; diplomats stated that “there 
is a high level of trust: discussing who heard what and who says what, we do 
agreements on the phone even, and there is coordination of joint activities such as 
common conferences or visits” (interv. 42). In 2014, for example, the foreign 
ministers of the eight Nordic and Baltic countries - Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden – met in Tallinn, as Estonia was 
leading the Nordic-Baltic cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy which 
resulted in the meeting of the 6 EU ambassadors in Kiev (without Iceland and 
Norway) for exchange of information on developments in Ukraine and was an 
example of good coordination among EU partners (ibidem). Also, after Russia’s 
occupation of Crimea, there was a common Nordic view that the security situation in 
their vicinity had notably deteriorated and, on the ground, a stronger Nordic-Baltic 
cooperation resulted in activities conducted in Crimea which increased their visibility 
in the region (ibidem). Outsiders to the group also mentioned that in the conflict 
region the Baltics had been involved and specifically noticed that Lithuania became 
extremely active (interv. 42). 
Diplomats also stated that both the Baltic and the Nordic group had a good image in 
Ukraine; some argued that their common cooperation, although taking place on an 
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ad-hoc basis “is mutually beneficial to work together towards the Ukrainian 
authorities as we can offer a multiplier effect for Ukraine” (interv. 45). Once a year, 
members of the 2 groups organised the Nordic Business Days, where speakers of 
the forum provided their updates regarding the investment climate and progress of 
reforms as well as shared success stories and opportunities in Ukraine (ibidem). One 
diplomat even noticed that on behalf of the Ukrainian authorities there was a 
preference for attending events organised by EU member-states and that the ones 
organised by the Baltic-Nordic group were given importance (interv. 42). The Nordic 
members explained that their most frequent meetings happened in their capitals 
where positions were coordinated, that they had a database through which they 
shared sensitive information: “what unites us is a similar societal background, same 
bilateral interests in Ukraine” (interv. 46). This reflected on the ground, where they 
offered joint services to their citizens in third countries, they shared their reports and 
invited common guest speakers. Although they have a Nordic Council which is the 
official body for the inter-governmental cooperation of the Nordics through which 
they seek Nordic solutions, on the ground their cooperation was flexible, not 
hierarchical and not so formal and was mainly a framework for working together in 
Ukraine, reflecting a shared feeling that “together we are stronger” (interv. 45). They 
explained that in Ukraine, they had common interests to pursue, hence their joint 
collaboration was reflected via the regular lunches, common events such as 
exhibitions and organisation of common meetings with local authorities and 
networking events in the banking, forestry and telecommunications fields as well as 
the presence, in Ukraine, of Nordic companies which were cross-owned (ibidem). 
Some referred to the constellation of the ‘like-minded’ in looser terms and not 
necessarily belonging to a group but rather “when it comes to Ukraine it means that it 
is a matter of geography and this can be Nordic-Baltic together with Poland and the 
MS bordering Ukraine. We have a keener interest and we are fairly like-minded” 
(interv. 22). However, evidence also showed that there were differences within the 
like-minded groups of member states. For instance, regarding the signing of the AA, 
some of the Baltics, the eastern MS and the ones bordering Ukraine took the 
position that the AA should be signed at any costs, while Sweden or the Netherlands 
disagreed. In this sense, Sweden belonged to the like-minded Nordic countries 
together with the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Germany (that is not officially a 
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member of the Nordic group). Similar observations were made about the Visegrad 
group. The Visegrad group tried to be more visible in terms of public diplomacy and 
different projects, student mobility as well. One member of the Visegrad noted that 
they were divided by topic area around which a group of interested countries could 
converge or diverge: “Poland is pushing for its own directive and this is visible on the 
ground and in Brussels. For instance, Polish are outspoken on sensitive political 
matters and without consulting anyone they announced that there might be a 
possibility for Ukraine to sign the AA next year (2014). Subsequently Ukrainian 
politicians took this as a departure point in their demarchés, which is not necessarily 
supported by everyone else in the diplomatic community. And definitely this was not 
the position of the EU” (interv. 24). Outsiders noticed that despite the fact that the 
Visegrad group was institutionalised, its members were not politically aligned on the 
issue of Ukraine and Russia’s interference in Ukraine, hence there was divergence 
(interv. 43). In contrast, in less sensitive areas, like LGBT, there was no ‘cognitive 
dissonance’ (interv. 24). 
In Ukraine, between 2010 and 2015, there were also other, sporadic, joint 
collaborations among member-states. There were instances of a common 
cooperation between Benelux, represented on the ground by the Dutch and Belgian 
embassies. In 2014, the three Benelux foreign ministers called for the protection of 
minorities and the need to strengthen autonomy in Ukraine. They visited the Maidan 
place in Kiev to place a wreath in memory of the victims of the clashes of February 
and expressed solidarity with the Ukrainian people. During the 2015 visit the 
ministers of foreign affairs of the 3 countries discussed the situation in Ukraine, while 
at the same time promoting the reform agenda: “there are a number of volatile 
situations on the EU’s borders. Ukraine is struggling with enormous challenges. 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the EU are there to assist Ukraine as 
much as possible” (Reynders, 2015). For these 2 meetings, the embassies 
coordinated the common programme, rotated which country took the lead and also 
hosted meetings with CS actors and informal meetings for the Benelux ministers with 
the colleagues from the EUD and some MS embassies (interv. 43). In addition, the 
Benelux member-states took part in the non-formal events (lunches, dinners) of the 
Club of the French speaking diplomats that brought together Belgian, Romanian, 
French, Hungarian and German diplomats (ibidem). Some cooperations were ad-
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hoc, issue based: there was temporary Danish-Belgium cooperation on a brewery 
where both parties encountered the issue of labelling bottles in terms of the 
competition policy and they shared their experience with the Ukrainian interested 
parties (interv. 46).  
Others, although also issue-based, are rather cooperations chosen based on the 
personal preference of the member-state. For example, Germany did not belong to 
any of the groups and cooperated closely with Poland on decentralisation and 
humanitarian aid. This was a choice made since the V4 group did not have the 
greatest political impact, according to the Germans, and had competing interests 
within the group, hence cooperation was solely with Poland (interv. 47). Whereas the 
Nordic group is more cohesive internally, Germany chose to collaborate with the 
most active member, Sweden, on judiciary reform (ibidem). In Ukraine, Germany 
resembled Poland in Moldova by choosing “go-it-alone” tactics. The Baltics 
highlighted that while their main partners were the Baltics, the Nordics and the 
Visegrad, they tried to collaborate with all, yet “with Germans I cannot make 
connections […] G7 is more important to them. Germany is reluctant to share and we 
have no binding elements with them” (interv. 42). In Ukraine, Germany was very 
active in the multilateral fora that involved the G751 and was seen as the local 
leader52 (interv. 42, 44, 47). Germany included Sweden, a non-G7 member, in their 
G7 démarches (interv. 47); as some have noted the Nordics usually co-signed the 
G7 statement and it seemed that “there is a willingness to coordinate with the 
countries that are economically active in Ukraine” (interv. 44).  
Like Germany, Austria also had preferential treatment when it comes to joint 
cooperation. Austria was not part of any of the groups mentioned in Table 20 and 
was not a member of the G7 either, and preferred ad-hoc collaboration based on its 
evaluation of the diplomatic activity in Ukraine. According to them, Visegrad was the 
least cohesive group, the Baltics were a more congruent one, but had diverging 
opinions on certain Ukrainian developments, whilst the Nordic one is a group of 
natural allies and is the most coherent (interv. 44). Although they met and shared 
information with all member-state, their cooperation projects were established based 
                                                   
51 G7 is a group of countries with the 7 largest advanced economies in the world. Its members are Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States. It was founded to facilitate shared macroeconomic initiatives by its 
members in response to the collapse of the exchange rate 1971.  
52 In 2015 Germany held the chair of the G7 hence such a development reflects as well on Germany’s priorities. 
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on who was strong on the issue in Ukraine and so far, they indicated “good relations 
with the G7 members” (ibidem), which means Germany, Italy, France and the UK. 
The “go-it-alone” tactic was also common for Poland, which pursued a parallel 
national agenda in Moldova, and also did so in Ukraine. The most prominent 
example of derogating from the common position was the Polish one on the issue of 
the Tymoshenko case. The lowest common denominator in the Tymoshenko case 
were the Council conclusions, to which all MS had agreed; in the meetings the 
common EU position was agreement on a set of conditions, to which Poland also 
agreed. As the political officer in the Delegation noted, thereafter, certain member-
states, especially Poland stated that the EU should go ahead and sign the AA 
regardless of the conditions established (interv. 16). Diplomats then mentioned that 
what can be observed in Ukraine is that although the Delegation invited everyone to 
the common meetings, only 2/3 of the MS usually attended and were “the same 
suspects: Germany, France, the UK; and we work on démarches together vis-à-vis 
our Ukrainian partners” (interv. 47). 
Despite instances of ‘go-it-alone’ strategy, what can be observed is that the 
communication infrastructure, most often than not, became the medium through 
which the common approach, as understood by the diplomatic community in 
Ukraine, was shaped and took the form of a common event, joint visits of European 
officials to Ukraine, joint HoMs reports and even a common position. Further 
examination of the communication infrastructure as a resource, together with other 
political and social capital available on the ground is conducted in the following 
section.  
 
5.5. Capabilities: diplomatic resources in Kiev 
Between 2010 and 2015, the main resource of the EU Delegation, that has 
developed over time was the communication infrastructure presented in Table 20 in 
section 5.2.2. of this chapter. Evidence collected on the ground and presented here 
thus far shows how these meetings in which both EU and national diplomats are 
involved accounted for some degree of institutionalised diplomatic practices in 
Ukraine. The Delegation became an information hub and for its staff it was key to 
have, on the ground, well informed diplomats, with a clear understanding of what are 
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the key problems to be assessed in Ukraine or what are the key sources of 
information that should be targeted by them “and to have them on the same side, on 
the same page, understanding clearly what are our (EU) objectives” (interv. 20). The 
wide and varied typology of meetings implied, for the Delegation, a daily 
maintenance of the communication infrastructure. This included, inter alia, 
organisation and coordination of the meetings at different levels and on the different 
topics, interaction with national diplomats via emails, phones as well as negotiation 
and establishment of the agenda, taking minutes and writing reports and providing 
feedback to the MS and collecting their feedback (interv. 16, 20, 23). Being the 
leading actor, hence, came with the burden of the secretarial responsibility: “we keep 
a mailing list with all responsible persons in the different sectors to ensure that we 
invite them to all the meetings. We prepare the agenda of the meetings and MS have 
the right to propose points of discussion to the agenda which are raised and 
discussed in the meeting” (interv. 23); and it was the agenda that presented difficulty: 
“[it] is a nightmare to find a date that would suit everyone” (interv. 16). 
National diplomats noticed that as result of being the main coordinator of these 
meetings, the EUD became more valued not only by MS but also by local actors as 
this role gave the Delegation more political weight given the importance of the AA in 
the relationship between Ukraine and the EU, “hence the EUD is seen as an EU 
embassy; the EU ambassador is very active in making statements and is pro-active 
in engaging with local actors and with Brussels. These statements usually reflect our 
position as well” (interv. 46). The Delegation seemed to have a system in place 
(interv. 22) and it considered itself responsible for the framework of cooperation 
provided by these meetings (interv. 23). The Delegation organized coordination 
meetings at different levels in terms of diplomatic ranking as well as on different 
topics: these were meetings at the level of HoDs, of the deputy HoDs, of information 
officers, on trade and even on administrative issues and also, when needed, 
established ad-hoc working groups. These meetings (with the exception of the ad-
hoc ones) had a regular character of monthly, bi-monthly or quarterly gatherings 
(interv. 23; also Table 20). National diplomats put emphasis on how the HoMs, 
deputy HoD and the counsellor-level meetings became a fora for sharing opinions 
and exchange of opinions: “everybody gets an invitation to these meetings and gets 
a chance to explain their views” (interv. 21) and “we have a system of where we can 
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share reports, a system where we can share information, we have coordination on 
the ground” (interv. 22). The information network provided by the EUD to the MS, 
was therefore the place for coordination in the areas of relevance to them and 
sharing and receiving information. Information was a resource sought by MS in these 
meetings especially since “things have improved in the manner that they(the 
Delegation) got more resources and they can attend more meetings locally and they 
can cover things that MS cannot and they make our lives easier” (ibidem). The 
Delegation was aware of this and stated that “we exchange certain information with 
the MS, even when they have questions or want to discuss certain issues and we do 
this via the mailing list”. 
The Delegation was dedicated throughout 2010-2015, according to the interviewees, 
to sharing information but also to stimulating discussion and coordinating with the 
MS: “when we issue press releases, MS are given the opportunity to comment and 
then we distribute it to the local media and we place it on our website” (interv. 23). 
The previous section also emphasized that the common approach was exercised via 
these meetings where all EU ambassadors engaged in debriefing to the extent that if 
someone was missing than they debriefed via the phone. The HoMs meetings in 
particular were considered the most eloquent example as they resulted in joint 
reports: “the HoMs meetings draft a report, jointly prepared with the ambassadors of 
the national embassies present in Ukraine and focus on the most important affairs in 
the country, which are then sent to Brussels (via COREU)” (ibidem). The reports 
were shared through the common system – AGORA and COREU network - which 
carries communications related to CFSP and derives from the French term 
CORespondence EUropéenne. It involved exchanges of reports within the diplomatic 
network; most were political reports coming from the HoD. COREU allowed for a flow 
of information and these reports were prepared jointly by the HoD and the 
ambassadors of the MS (interv. 19). One national diplomat explained that AGORA is 
the electronic high security mail correspondence between the EU and MS embassies 
used by diplomats in order to have access to documents: “when we prepare updates 
on the human rights report, for example, we retrieve the draft, we share our views, 
then there is a meeting to discuss the views, then there is a re-write of the draft and 
we send it back through AGORA” (interv. 18). The Delegation considered that in this 
way, it provided a framework that fostered a good discussion and the added-value 
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was that MS could provide their own input and offer their know-how (interv. 23). Also, 
because “in the HoMs meetings it is agreed to speak without reservations and then, 
there are different issues brought under one umbrella” (interv. 48). 
Member-states appreciated the high frequency and the many formats of the 
meetings, including formation of informal groups where they could take the lead on a 
subject area (interv. 44). And the fact that the discussions varied from political to 
non-political matters, especially for a country like Ukraine, that will not become a 
member-state and is implementing EU-driven reforms, the information-sharing was 
answering the need for having more coherent policies: “not all MS have a similar 
information from their own, national sources” (interv. 24). Some emphasized that if 
there was a bigger issue at hand from a national point of view, then the MS informed 
the EUD and via the common meetings a bigger transmission belt of information was 
formed (interv. 44). The sharing of information was perceived as a valuable practice 
especially for the smaller member-states (interv. 24, 42, 43, 44). For some, the main 
asset was to share information in order to have a common understanding that then 
resulted in feedback conveyed to their capitals and to Brussels (interv. 44). For 
others, it was important to send, as a national state, their policies and understand 
how they were different so that the EUD could take them into account because, on 
the ground, the implementation of foreign policy was key (interv. 24). Another 
positive effect of the meetings for member-states, was the interaction, in these 
meetings, with local experts invited to inform the diplomatic community on the 
internal developments in Ukraine (interv. 42, 43, 44, 47). The latter was considered 
by national diplomats as an added-value because this gave them the opportunity to 
streamline their views on the issues in the country; especially when the level of 
information was diverse among MS embassies, some knowing very little and others 
having a lot of details (interv. 47). As these meetings involved debriefings MS valued 
this as a learning exercise – participants reported on what they had done, who 
visited Ukraine and what was their vision regarding local developments (interv. 43). 
The Delegation offered member-states meetings on every topic possible - energy, 
economic affairs, media, development cooperation and others shown in Table 20; at 
different levels -  HoDs, deputies, political and economic counsellors and 
administration counsellors; and with high frequency - in all these varied 
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configurations diplomats would meet at least once a month. Nonetheless, some 
noted that the coordination role assumed by the EU was ‘a little too good’: “there are 
too many coordination meetings and then all I have to do is attend meetings and little 
time is left to do my job as a diplomat” (interv. 43). Others pointed out that 
attendance at the meetings was not very high, at the counsellors level, 1/3 of the 
embassies were not present (even the big MS such as France and Germany were 
not present for example) and were of interest for smaller MS such as Belgium, Latvia 
or Austria (interv. 42). The Delegation made the same observation: “member-states 
can be overwhelmed with the number and variety of meetings, for example there are 
only 13 MS attending the press meetings […] or we share the agenda of the 
meetings but the capacity question is always present – MS embassies do not have 
enough capacity” (interv. 48). As one diplomat confirmed: “the reports produced by 
the EUD can be accessed by the MS and amended by us, but we do not always 
have the manpower to do so” (interv. 43). For others, it was not necessarily the 
manpower requirements, but rather the content of the meetings that made them less 
attractive: “The information shared at the meetings is not new for us [..] and while the 
positive aspect of these meetings is the invitation of experts, we already know them 
and there is no input for us and no Eureka moment” (interv. 42). The Delegation 
explained that attendance was not mandatory in order to be considerate of the 
capacity of all national embassies present in Ukraine, therefore, post-meetings they 
shared information with MS, for example “we have the weekly HoMs reports with MS 
shared on a secure channel, which is thereafter agreed by all Heads of missions and 
sent to Brussels” (interv. 48). Yet, one diplomat pointed out that that not all 
embassies present in Ukraine were connected to the EU encrypted system (interv. 
47). 
Sharing of minutes of the meetings was not a practice observed on the ground, when 
one embassy participating in the meetings requested a report from the Delegation on 
that meeting it was given the response that ‘this is not normal practice’ (interv. 18). 
The Delegation itself mentioned that “the minutes of the meetings are kept internally 
and are not shared” (interv. 19). As result, member-states relied on their national 
colleagues who were either their ‘allies’ or the ones next to whom their embassy was 
located: the Dutch would ask the German, the Danish or the Swedish counterparts, 
the Latvians would ask the Lithuanians, Austrians – the Swedish or the German, the 
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Czech would ask the neighbouring embassies such as Hungary or Italy (interv. 18, 
24, 42, 44). The diplomatic community itself was divided on the matter, some saw 
this as an opportunity for the EUD to become more transparent: “the EUD is making 
the agenda of these meetings, MS are engaged and share their views and concerns. 
And I think that this would be a point where the EUD could be more transparent in 
their communication with us: there could be a formula that they write notes and this 
would be with no diplomatic connotation, but for the purpose that we can track who 
said what and what is their position. It would be useful to have minutes and points of 
actions. We get lost and we cannot always attend, hence we do not always know 
whether we are expected to do something” (interv. 18). Others considered that this 
was an individual responsibility of the member-states, that there was never a need 
for minutes and that this would be an ‘unnecessary burden’ for the Delegation 
(interv. 22, 24, 47). 
Information-sharing and reporting is not solely a core function of the Delegation in 
relation to its headquarters, the EEAS, but also, in relation to its member-states on 
the ground, in order to ensure consistency as the Council Decision establishing the 
EEAS prescribed. According to the data collected, this culture was still in the making 
between 2010 and 2015, and presented itself as a challenge for both parties. 
Political officers in the Delegation observed that the culture of sharing had not yet 
been established and was most efficiently exercised by only a few MS: “member-
states do not share reporting as they write reports in their mother tongue and they 
debrief during the meetings orally, hence not all details are included” (interv. 19). 
National diplomats reiterated that information-sharing was a key-ingredient for policy 
shaping (interv. 44, 45). And although there was no policy shaping done on the 
ground, information-sharing, which was centralized via the EUD, was important in 
relation to Ukraine, as member-states were sharing comments on their support 
provided in Ukraine (interv. 45). Since the message that went to Brussels came from 
the EUD, national diplomats hoped that “the EUD includes the input that comes from 
MS so that the impact on policy-shaping happens” (interv. 44). Contrariwise, the EU 
Delegation sent reports to Brussels with no implication from the MS (with minor 
exceptions), as diplomats reported (interv. 21, 45).  
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Internally, within the Delegation, the political officers were responsible for collecting 
information and processing it which was then delivered to the Head of Delegation 
who processed it at the highest level, given the fact that the HoD interacted with the 
main stakeholders in Ukraine: the Prime Minister, the President, the ministers and 
other key actors (interv. 20). National diplomats mentioned that Mr. Jan Tombiński, 
the current HoD (the list of HoDs in Kiev is provided in Table 21), was a very open 
person, who was very involved and created a level of mutual trust among diplomats 
(interv. 42). His activity and professional attitude was remarked on by several 
diplomats also in relation to the host country, Ukraine where he was pro-active in 
engaging with local actors and with Brussels as well as in making statements; which 
were a reflection of the national positions (interv. 46). For some, the role of the HoD 
was clear: he played the role of the coordinator among member-states and was 
speaking on behalf of the EU, as an ‘advisor of the EU to Ukraine’, when stressing 
the importance of the need for reforms; messages that reflected the decisions taken 
in Brussels (interv. 43, 47). 
Member-states also noticed that there was a duality in the nature of positions taken 
by the HoD on Ukraine and that there was a lack of clarity, in the diplomatic 
community, regarding the EU Ambassador (interv. 16, 18, 24). One political officer in 
the Delegation also stated that for those member-states that had linkages with 
Eastern Europe, and Ukraine more specifically, made them become ‘hostage of their 
past’ and that reflected on the position of those EU ambassadors which came from 
the neighbouring country like that of Mr. Tombiński, a Polish diplomat (interv. 16). In 
2013, the Delegation in Ukraine, based on the action of the HoD, pursued a 
Byzantine-style diplomacy (the word ‘byzantine’ is used here to describe devious 
actions from the Byzantine Empire: intrigue, plotting, and bribing), like some of the 
national member-states neighbouring Ukraine: “for example, in the process of 
negotiation of the AA (negotiations with the Ukrainian counterpart) everything you 
say or do can be used against you and can be taken out of the context; therefore a 
Polish HoD pursuing national interests and not listening to EU political officers from 
the EUD has prejudiced the image of the EU in Ukraine. The ambassador is Polish, 
so he defines and represents rather Polish MFA interests rather than EU” (ibidem). 
Others, including the Polish diplomats, objected stating that the HoD presented the 
EU position and spoke on behalf of the EU and proposed a division of labour among 
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all EU ambassadors based on individual expertise and taking turns in the leading 
role in certain dossiers on Ukraine (interv. 21, 47). 
 
 
The lack of clarity, in the diplomatic community between 2010 and 2015, was also 
related, as in the Moldovan case, to establishing a European esprit de corps and to 
the internal way of working in the Delegation. As presented in Chapter 2 (section 
2.2.2.), post-Lisbon, the Delegation staff comprised Commission staff (DG RELEX, 
DG DevCo and DG Trade personnel), Council Secretariat staff and seconded 
national diplomats. Political staff typically came from the Council or the Member 
States as seconded national diplomats, whereas operational staff were often former 
Commission staff. Figure 7 below shows the pre-Lisbon organigramme of the EU 
Delegation which was the representation of the European Commission in Kiev, 
responsible for relations with Ukraine, Moldova (till 2005) and Belarus (till 2008). The 
Operations staff (DG DevCo) was the biggest element and together with Political 
(DG RELEX) and Trade (DG Trade) sections were in charge of the mandate of the 
Delegation on promoting political and economic relations between the EU and 
Ukraine. This meant everyday monitoring of the progress of the implementation of 
the PCA and later the ENP Action-Plan with Ukraine, and participation in the 
implementation of the EU’s assistance projects, such as TACIS (interv. 15). 
 
                                                   
53 Based on the data collected on the ground, an incomplete list of the HoDs is presented accounting for the last 3 HoDs. 
Table 21: Head of EU Delegation in Kiev: 2004 - 201553 
Nr. Name Period in office 
1. Ian Boag* 2004 – 2008 
2. José Manuel Pinto Teixeira** 2008 - 2012 
3. Jan Tombiński 2012 - 2016 
Notes: 
* Ian Boag was Head of Delegation of the Commission representation in Kiev 
**José Manuel Pinto Teixeira experienced the transition period from Commission representation to Union 
Delegation 
Source: authors’ compilation based on fieldwork conducted in Ukraine 2011-2016 
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Post-Lisbon, not only the structure of the Delegation changed but also all staff were 
placed physically in one building, which gave the staff an opportunity to meet: “we 
have now moved to one building - the Commission staff (DG Trade and DG DevCo) 
together with the EEAS staff and the Administration staff - instead of the 2 different 
buildings we used to be in” (interv. 23). The structure of the Delegation changed, in 
the sense that it had, in 2013, 1/3 of national diplomats with a Political Section 
separated from the Press and Information Section (see Figure 8). The HoD, the 
deputy HoD and the Political sections were all positions filled by different (national) 
diplomats who were working on the EU-Ukraine agenda: “we, in the Delegations are 
detached from the national level and are thinking about the broader European 
interests and, it happens that our colleagues, diplomats in the MS are critical about 
our work. But our mission is to look at the broader picture than the national overview, 
and be considerate of the European perspective” (interv. 16).  
Out of a total of 102 people working in the Delegation in 2015, 28 were EEAS 
personnel and 74 were Commission personnel (see data in Table 16, section 5.1.3.). 
Figure 7: Internal organisation of the EU Delegation in Kiev pre-Lisbon 
 
 
Source: authors’ compilation during the fieldwork conducted in Ukraine in 2011 (interv. 15) and based on the 
website of the Commission representation in Kiev (currently archived) 
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Among the staff in the Delegation itself there was a clear distinction between 
sections: in the political section were the representatives of the EEAS whereas 
everyone else were considered Commission personnel. Officers in the Delegation 
noted that the Delegation was not one single unit but rather composed out of two 
internal parts: EEAS and DG DevCo (interv. 16). The exception was the Trade and 
Economic section that was positioned, internally, between EEAS and Commission, 
due to the nature of its dossier – the trade dossier was a political one given the 
negotiations on the AA, out of which the DCFTA was approx. 80% (interv. 20). 
 
 
Post-Lisbon, the sub-sections within the Operations section also changed in their 
focus, a change related to the EU-Ukraine negotiations on the AA/DCFTA and thus 
not related directly to the Lisbon Treaty. In 2015, sub-section 2 change its focus from 
Sustainable Development to Economic Cooperation, social and regional 
development. The Head of Operations Section, also known as HoS for Cooperation, 
referred to his dossier on Ukraine as well, meaning cooperation with Ukraine, 
Figure 8: Internal organisation of the EU Delegation in Kiev 2013 -2015 
 
 
Source: authors’compilation during the fieldwork conducted in Ukraine in 2013 and 2016 (interv. 16, 20, 23, 48) 
and based on the website of the EU Delegation in Kiev in 2013 and in 2015 (currently archived)  
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primarily dealing with central and local authorities with a big part of his agenda on 
decentralisation issues.  
During the fieldwork conducted in Ukraine, it became obvious that tensions between 
institutions in Brussels are reflected in the Delegation and on-the-ground diplomacy. 
One tension referred to the ‘turf war’ within the EEAS – between people inside the 
EEAS and people from the national diplomatic service (interv. 16, 20). The latter 
spent, on average, 4 years in the Delegation, were employees of their respective 
MFAs and would return back to their home capitals, bypassing Brussels. In Kiev, this 
created a degree of mistrust between staff coming from Brussels and staff coming 
from the national capitals to the Political section: “some colleagues are not very 
happy to see them and have them on-board, even if they come from the same 
country, there are differences between them regarding working culture, 
understanding of EU intricacies, and they do not listen to the advice given” (interv. 
16). The activity of the Delegation staff coming from the national diplomatic service 
showed that they had little knowledge about how Brussels worked and about the 
European practices (interv. 20). A second tension was related to the relationship 
between the EEAS and the Delegation. Although political officers believed that 
information should be exchanged equally and frequently between them and the 
EEAS, in practice, information flows were more frequently directed to Brussels than 
to Delegations (interv. 16, 20). This meant that political officers were not informed 
about the policy thinking in Brussels and about the most relevant issues on the 
political agenda, which made some in the Delegation think that “we (EUD and the 
EEAS) live in detached parallel worlds: we (EUD) do diplomacy the way we define it 
here, they (EEAS) do it the way they define it there (in Brussels)” (interv. 20). 
The third tension echoed the inter-institutional dynamic between EEAS and certain 
DGs in the Commission, such as DG DevCo. The Operations section in the 
Delegation (DG DevCo) worked, due to the nature of the relationship with Ukraine, 
on either highly sensitive issues or on political ones – corruption, energy, education – 
and on this sectoral cooperation level, their reports went straight to Brussels without 
input from the political officers (EEAS): “we have the possibility to see the reports a 
couple of days before they are published, but at that point, they are already 
approved in Brussels, so there is not much we (political officers) can do […] and 
these reports need to be checked with the political section” (interv. 16). According to 
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interviewees, the institutional frictions became a logistical challenge for the staff 
working in the Delegation. For instance, within each EU delegation there is a public 
procurement office, which is also staffed by DG DevCo (Commission) personnel. 
The EEAS did not have its own budget until 2011, and the Commission refused to 
provide professional advice to the EEAS personnel within the EU delegations. The 
EEAS personnel had to learn the basics of running public tenders and writing 
contracts, which was not part of the job description of a political officer, while there 
were 15 people in the Delegation dealing with these affairs on a daily basis (interv. 
15, 16). 
When the EEAS was established the idea was to have all foreign policy instruments 
under one roof, which did not happen in the case of the Delegation in Kiev. The 
practice of (not) sharing information came up as an issue internal to the Delegation 
and some labelled this as a ‘Brussels culture’, even in the cases of staff working in 
the Operations section that had never worked in Brussels, “they act in a similar 
manner: on a regular basis they hide information or simply do not share” (interv. 20). 
Some explained that the Operations section also hired local staff, who are 
supervised by Commission staff (DG DevCo) who do not speak the local language 
(interv. 16). Besides adopting the ‘Brussels culture’, local staff also worked on 
monitoring the progress of reforms in Ukraine and evaluating, in 2013, “the ‘huge 
progress’ Ukraine achieved in certain sectorial cooperation matters and how some 
Ukrainian ministers are ‘great reformers’” (interv. 16). This, in turn, resulted in huge 
criticism from Brussels and the member-states, but “since no one consulted with us, 
the EEAS staff in the Delegation, it was already too late” (ibidem).  
For member-states, the institutional tensions were not a major concern since they 
seemed to have developed their personal contacts with ‘the relevant people’ in the 
Delegation and had access to the Delegation that responded to their needs (interv. 
22, 47). What some pointed to as criticism was related to the content of the meetings 
coordinated by the Delegation as being aid-driven. Diplomats noted on several 
occasions that in Ukraine (like in Moldova) the conduct of diplomacy was aid-driven 
and the EU delegations had big Operations sections with a vast development 
cooperation dossier (interv. 18; 21, 24). As Figure 9 below shows, in the opinion of 
interviewees, the Delegation’s activities between 2013-2015 were divided among 
operational, administrative, and political and diplomatic issues.  
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Only approximately 15 per cent of the work was seen as related to the main 
functions of traditional diplomacy such as gathering, synthesizing and producing 
information, intelligence and counter-intelligence, producing reports and policy 
advice for headquarters, representing EU interests through engaging in public 
diplomacy, or developing economic and commercial cooperation through engaging in 
trade diplomacy (interv. 20). Approximately 50 per cent of activity (the Commission 
legacy) was seen as focused on operational activities or what can be coined as 
sectoral diplomacy tasks, such as project management in the areas of good 
governance and democratization, economic cooperation and social and regional 
development, and infrastructure and environment-related developments. The legacy 
of Commission representations and a certain path-dependency was thus observed in 
Kiev. The Commission delegation had been implementing more technical tasks, 
such as project management, since it was established; and only later started to 
implement public diplomacy activities, mainly to promote and raise awareness on the 
EU implemented projects in Ukraine (details presented in section 5.1.3.). Thus, 
before the Lisbon changes, staff in the Commission representation were responsible, 
on a daily basis, for EU aid implementation, with little coordination with the member 
states. There were positive developments post-Lisbon in the sense that it resulted in 
Figure 9: Structure of Work in EU Delegation in Kiev 
 
 
Note: The data provided in this Table is based on the interviewees’ own perception: they evaluated the 
structure of work of the EU delegation upon reflection of their assignments during the duration of their 
official posting and provided an estimate. 
Source: authors’ compilation based on fieldwork conducted in Ukraine in 2013 
15%
50%
35%
100%
Political & Diplomatic affairs Operations Administration
170 
a wide communication infrastructure, coordinated by the EU delegation and open to 
all EU member states. In Ukraine, there were a lot of donor coordination meetings 
during the period under examination, and the EU played a crucial role in them 
(interv. 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 24). To a large extent the practice of aid-driven activities 
remained and the communication infrastructure served as a helpful resource for 
conducting this type of diplomacy. And this is not necessarily an atypical type of 
diplomacy but rather matches with the priorities that stem from the ENP and EaP. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter was collected during the field-work 
conducted in Ukraine as well as evidence collected from the study of secondary 
sources such as policy briefs, legislation, national and international reports as well as 
academic findings from scholarly literature on EU-Ukraine relations. The 
development of the bilateral relations between EU and Ukraine had been 
institutionalised first under the PCA, and then under the ENP and EaP respectively 
with the Association Agenda being at the core of this relation in the period under 
study. In Kiev, the European Commission had opened its Delegation as early as 
September 1993 and it served as liaison office for Moldova, till 2005 and for Belarus, 
till 2008. In order to discuss diplomatic performance, the evidence was presented in 
a structured manner according to the three criteria – effectiveness, relevance and 
capabilities – as operationalised in the analytical framework (Chapter 3). 
The second and third sections of this chapter discussed effectiveness on two levels, 
one that explores the degree of democratic governance in Ukraine and the other that 
investigates the diplomatic practices of representing the EU in Ukraine. 
Effectiveness, conceptualised generally as goal attainment, explored the level of 
democratic governance in Ukraine based on the level of adaptation to EU rules and 
norms. The point of reference here was the ENP Action Plan with Ukraine and the 
EU-Ukraine Association Agenda. To discuss how the EU Delegation in Kiev was 
embracing the representation function since the upgrade from Commission 
representation to a fully-fledged EU Delegation, the Lisbon Treaty was taken as 
reference point in discussing effectiveness.  
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In the case of Ukraine, the EU offered a framework for political association and 
economic integration within the AA which was a political commitment to come closer 
to the EU through aligning to the EU acquis. Monitoring reports outlined that, under 
the ENP, Ukraine was initially showing some progress, but the pace of reforms was 
slow or even stagnated. The pace of adaptation grew with the newly elected 
President, Petro Poroshenko, after the political and civil turmoil and the newly 
formed government led by Evgenyi Yatzenyuk.The activity of the diplomatic 
community in Ukraine was therefore focused on Ukraine’s integration agenda to the 
EU. National diplomats found different means to align their efforts to Ukraine’s 
processes of implementing reforms under the AA and achieve its European 
aspirations. The Delegation in Kiev was also preoccupied with ongoing issues in the 
country and had closely followed all developments and progress made on reforms. In 
response to the crisis in Ukraine, the EU set up The Support Group for Ukraine to 
ensure that the support provided was focused and concentrated on the Association 
Agenda as well as providing additional strategic direction to already existing in 
country day-to-day donor coordination. The empirical findings further showed a 
practice of an institutionalised form of interaction between the EU and national 
diplomatic actors, including in their role as donors presented in Table 20 as a 
typology of a communication infrastructure. These meetings were coordinated by the 
Delegation that played a central role in their organisation as well as in embracing the 
task of representing the EU. 
To assess relevance, evidence collected discussed corporate diplomatic practices in 
Ukraine in order to present the formulation and implementation of a common 
approach by the EU Delegation and member-state embassies. Even though national 
diplomats stated that, in practical terms, it was not clear what the common approach 
was, from the conduct of their diplomatic activity it resulted that the common 
approach was, for them, to have a common position on Ukraine. It was the common 
meetings that led the way to complementarity among all actors: the EU maintained 
different forms of dialogue with Ukraine, and in preparation to these dialogues, the 
MS were consulted by the Delegation on how to approach developments in different 
sectors. Findings showed that the common approach was best exercised in the 
HoMs meetings where EU ambassadors, after sharing information, wrote a joint 
report which was, thereafter, sent to Brussels. Several prominent examples of the 
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common approach were: the Cox-Kwasniewski mission; the Europe Days event and 
the Stronger Together campaign. 
Empirical evidence also showed that there is a tendency to form group affiliations in 
the diplomatic community in Ukraine (presented in Table 20). The Visegrad group 
that includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, exhibited various 
examples of formulating a common approach, a lot of which was reflected through 
their public diplomacy activities. The Nordic group led on the matter of the ‘good 
donorship’ principle and the Baltic group that included Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia 
were jointly cooperating in formal and informal settings. Some member-states such 
as Germany or Austria, on the other hand, chose a “go-it-alone” approach and have 
been selective in their joint collaborations, preferring to cooperate on an ad-hoc 
basis. The “go-it-alone” approach was also common for Poland, which pursued a 
parallel national agenda in in Ukraine with the most noticeable example of 
derogating from the common EU position on the issue of the Tymoshenko case. 
An examination of the communication infrastructure, and of social and political 
capital, was performed in the final section of the chapter where evidence on the third 
criterion, capabilities, was presented. Despite instances of ‘go-it-alone’ strategy, 
findings showed that the communication infrastructure became the medium through 
which the common approach was taking place and was the main resource of the EU 
Delegation. This, in turn, made the Delegation become an information hub. National 
diplomats noticed that as result of being the main coordinator of these meetings, the 
EUD became more valued not only by MS but also by local actors. The diplomatic 
community also made use of the common encrypted system of sharing reports - 
AGORA and COREU network. Through this communication infrastructure, the 
Delegation offered a framework that fostered a good discussion and the added-value 
was that MS could provide their own input and share their know-how. Evidence 
further showed that the content of the meetings coordinated by the Delegation in 
Ukraine was aid-driven. Diplomats noted this on several occasions and that the EU 
delegation had a big Operations sections with vast development cooperation 
dossiers. An analysis of the work carried out by the Delegation also indicated that 
approximately 50 per cent of activity was seen as focused on operational activities 
and only approximately 15 per cent of the work was seen as related to the main 
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functions of traditional diplomacy. What became obvious during the fieldwork 
conducted in Ukraine, is that in terms of capabilities, the tensions between 
institutions in Brussels are reflected in the Delegation in Kiev. One tension referred 
to the ‘turf war’ within the EEAS – between people inside the EEAS and people from 
the national diplomatic service; a second tension was related to the relationship 
between the EEAS and the Delegation; and a third one echoed the inter-institutional 
dynamic between EEAS and certain DGs in the Commission, such as DG DevCo. 
To sum up, in Ukraine, EU diplomatic performance has embraced post-Lisbon 
(2010-2015) certain positive dynamics as well as facing certain challenges. The 
latter, are not necessarily new developments, but already follow similar issues 
emphasised in the literature on EU performance in general: such as institutional path 
dependency, inter-institutional tensions or member-states forming groups of interest 
constellations. In Chapter 7 a thorough discussion of these findings will be 
conducted, also in light of the evidence presented on Moldova (chapter 4) and on 
Belarus (chapter 6). 
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Chapter 6. EU diplomatic performance in 
Belarus 
Unlike Moldova or Ukraine, the relationship between Belarus and the EU followed a 
different path. In the early 90s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, both the EU 
and its member-states recognised the independence of Belarus and established 
diplomatic relations with their Eastern neighbour. The parties started the negotiation 
of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1995 which would represent 
the institutionalisation of the relations between EU and Belarus, yet the PCA was not 
ratified. After the 1996 referendum in Belarus that expanded the power of the 
President Lukashenko in an undemocratic manner, the development of relations 
between EU and Belarus were conditioned by the progress in the areas of 
democracy, respect of human rights, and the rule of law in Belarus. Thereafter, 
followed a period of isolation of Belarus by both the EU and the member-states and 
the EU’s political relationship with Belarus became largely dominated by sanctions 
for the last two decades. The PCA has remained frozen since 1996 and 10 years 
later the EU presented a ‘Non-Paper’ comprising 12 points for essential reforms in 
Belarus with which the Lukashenko regime had to comply would become the 
reference document in the rapprochement of their relations (Commission, 2006). 
And, on the background of the growing Russia-Ukraine energy crisis in 2008 came 
the pragmatism of including Belarus into the EaP, conditioned by it fulfilling the EU 
demands. Full participation in the EaP was prevented due to the policies and actions 
pursued by the Belarussian authorities and it was only participating in the multilateral 
track. 
In response to the release of prisoners, electoral code reforms and positive reforms 
in the independent media, the European Union temporarily suspended travel 
restrictions and in 2008 the Council reaffirmed its position on deepening relations 
with Belarus conditional on the country demonstrating more concrete steps on the 
path to democratization. The rapprochement in EU-Belarus relations was marked by 
the opening of the EU Delegation in Minsk in March 2008, initially as the Delegation 
of the European Commission to Belarus. After the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in December 2009 the Delegation officially represented the European Union 
and with the status of a fully-fledged diplomatic mission. 
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The diplomatic performance of the European Union in Belarus is discussed 
according to the three established criteria in the analytical framework: effectiveness, 
relevance and capability. This chapter presents, in a structured manner, the 
empirical evidence collected in relation to these criteria. The chapter starts with a 
brief overview of Belarus-EU relations and then, in the second section discusses the 
first criterion, effectiveness. As operationalised in Chapter 3, effectiveness is a 
criterion examined on two dimensions, one that explores the degree of democratic 
governance in Belarus and the other that investigates the diplomatic practices of 
representing the EU. How EU and member-state embassies cooperate in Belarus 
and contribute to formulating a common approach is discussed in the fourth section, 
that refers to the second criterion, relevance. Finally, the fifth section evaluates the 
communication infrastructure and the political and social capital present on the 
ground, hence discussing the evidence on the third criterion, capabilities. Overall, 
this chapter brings forward evidence collected during the field-work conducted in 
Belarus as well as the analysis based on the study of secondary sources (such as 
policy briefs, legislation, national and international reports as well as academic 
findings from scholarly literature on Belarus-EU). A discussion of these findings will 
be presented in the next chapter (7) that will clearly show the application of the three 
criteria that have been discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
6.1. Background of EU-Belarus relations 
A brief historical overview of the development of Belarus - EU relations, the attempts 
to institutionalise this relationship under the PCA, the ENP and leading to EaP 
respectively, as well as the development of the diplomatic representations of the EU 
and of member-states, is presented in this section. 
6.1.1. From PCA to isolation 
In its Foreign Policy Doctrine from 1993, Belarus prioritised its European direction, 
which led to the negotiation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 
with the EU in 1995. However, the PCA was not ratified and the development of 
relations between EU and Belarus was conditioned by the progress in the areas of 
democracy, respect of human rights, and the rule of law in Belarus (EU-Belarus, 
n.d.). The PCA was quickly ratified by the Belarusian parliament, but, after the 1996 
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referendum that allowed President Lukashenko to amend the constitution in a 
manner that undermined the constitutional role of the parliament and expanded the 
power of the presidency (meaning that the power was concentrated in the hands of 
one man), the EU ceased its relations with Belarus (Ioffe, 2011; Potocki, 2011; 
Korosteleva, 2012). 
As result, the EU also paused the implementation of the TACIS programme for 
Belarus and the bilateral relationship froze, being regulated only by the TCA 
concluded with the Soviet Union in 1989 (Korosteleva, 2012). In 1997 the EU 
introduced its first sanctions against Belarusian authorities (above the rank of deputy 
minister) and limited assistance to projects that dealt with combating the effects of 
the Chernobyl disaster (Ioffe, 2011). The EU imposed the travel bans in response to 
the regime’s effort to evict the diplomats of some member states from their 
residences in the Drazdy neighbourhood in Minsk in 1998 (Ditrych 2013). The 
reduced technical assistance to Belarus, which ranked among the countries 
receiving the smallest amount under TACIS, affected the movement of people and of 
information flow which became limited: as some indicated, by 2006, fewer than 1 in 
20 Belarusians visited an EU country and by 2001 the state was controlling all 
domestic radio and television broadcasting (ibidem). While the relationship with EU 
was decreasing, there was a rapprochement with the East, mainly Russia, with 
whom Belarus signed a number of important bilateral agreements between 1995 and 
1999 (Korosteleva, 2012). The latter secured Belarus several economic benefits that 
allowed Lukashenko to achieve sustainable growth, lower unemployment and secure 
wages and pensions (White et al., 2005). Belarus experienced such growth that, by 
2005, it became the leader among ex-Soviet states with a GDP growth rate 
outpacing even its western neighbours (Potocki, 2011). 
In 1999 Lukashenko was considering a rapprochement with the European Union and 
created an Intrastate Committee on participation in European integration; he also 
spoke strongly in favour of a ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy which reflected his 
frustration about the slow progress with the Russia–Belarus Union. However, the 
parliamentary elections in Belarus in October 2000 were widely criticised as 
undemocratic and non-transparent by the Troika, a shorthand term for the 3 
international actors – the EU, the Council of Europe (CoE) and OSCE (Krivosheev, 
2003; Korosteleva, 2012). After a CoE report uncovered the disappearance in 1999–
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2000 of four Belarusians, including two politicians, a businessman and a 
cameraman, the EU issued a ban in 2004 on the Belarussian officials suspected of a 
crucial role in that disappearance from travelling to the EU; the ban was expanded in 
2006, following another fraudulent presidential election, and for the first time, 
President Lukashenka himself was put on the EU blacklist (Ioffe, 2011; Ditrych, 
2013). And while Moldova and Ukraine have been included in the ENP and were 
offered Action Plans and technical assistance continuously from the very beginning, 
Belarus did not welcome the ENP. Due to the authoritarian regime of President 
Lukashenko, who ruled the country ‘by decree’ since 1994, Belarus was not offered 
an Action Plan and the EU conditioned the relationship on Belarus demonstrating its 
commitment to democracy, respect for the rule of law, good governance and the 
respect for human rights, including minority rights. Antidemocratic developments and 
human rights violations led the EU withdrawing Belarus (despite initial opposition 
from some central European member states) from the EU’s generalised scheme of 
preferences (GSP) as a response to its failure to comply with International Labour 
Organization (ILO) conventions (Ditrych, 2013). 
 
6.1.2. From isolation to EaP  
The PCA has remained frozen since 1996 and 10 years later the EU presented a 
‘Non-Paper’ that comprised 12 points for essential reforms in Belarus to which the 
Lukashenko regime had to comply (Commission, 2006b). According to the 12 points, 
Belarus was expected to take measures aimed at democratisation which included, 
inter alia, transparent elections, freedom of expression and association and release 
of political prisoners (ibidem). Without having a PCA in place or an Action Plan, as in 
the case of Moldova and Ukraine, the 12-points represented the reference point in 
EU-Belarus relations and the first form of institutionalisation of their bilateral 
relations. In 2008, Lukashenko publicly acknowledged that the EU demands had 
been heard and the Belarusian authorities took the decision to release the political 
prisoners (Vieira, 2013). After pursuing a policy of isolation (but occasionally 
maintaining trade relations) and then adopting several restrictive measures towards 
the undemocratic leader of Belarus, the EU was ‘ready to deepen its relations with 
Belarus’ (EEAS, 2011) with the opening in 2008 of an EU Delegation in Minsk and in 
2009 inclusion of Belarus in EaP activities. This was considered as a step forward in 
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unfreezing EU-Belarus relations and according to some, “marked the peak of the 
EU’s policy of ‘pragmatic engagement’ with Lukashenka” (ODB, 2012). 
The relationship with Belarus was built by the EU based upon adopting European 
values through political, social and economic reform that would, in turn, allow the 
building of regional security, stability and prosperity (Commission, 2006b). While 
these values were central in European political rhetoric and represented key 
elements in the ENP and EaP (Belarus is a participant in the latter), research 
highlighted that the “security threats emanating from Belarus” have been a central 
theme in the reinvigoration of relations with Belarus (Bosse, 2009, p.217). At the 
moment of launching the ENP, the EU was hesitant about engaging with Belarus and 
hence sending ‘a signal of support for policies which do not conform to EU values’ 
(Commission, 2003), but stressed that Belarus could become an ENP member as 
soon as it had fulfilled the previous EU requirements on committing to democracy, 
good governance and respect for human rights. It was the policies pursued by the 
Lukashenko regime that made the EU pursue limited cooperation with Belarus in the 
framework of the ENP with all funded programmes aiming at supporting civil society 
and benefitting the people of Belarus (Commission, 2005). A major tool for promoting 
its values was through supporting civil society (CS), independent media, offering 
humanitarian assistance and therefore achieving democratization. Assistance on this 
dimension came through the ENPI, however as scholars noted, “major projects aim 
to improve border management” (Bosse, 2009, p.221). Nonetheless, these were 
seen as positive steps in bilateral cooperation that opened up the possibility for 
sector-specific cooperation in Belarus and, on the background of the growing 
Russia-Belarus energy crisis in 2008, the pragmatism of including it into the EaP was 
welcomed by both parties (Vieira, 2013). 
In response to the release of prisoners, electoral code reforms and positive reforms 
in the independent media, the European temporarily suspended travel restrictions on 
some officials and encouraged the intensification of technical cooperation with 
Belarus (European Council, 2008). The Council thereafter reaffirmed its position on 
deepening relations with Belarus conditioned by the country demonstrating more 
concrete steps on the path to democratization (European Council, 2009). In May 
2009, Belarus joined the Eastern Partnership initiative and participated mostly in the 
multilateral track of the EaP, with the only bilateral track being the Visa-Facilitation 
179 
and Readmission Agreement negotiations. Full participation in the EaP was 
prevented due to the policies and actions pursued by the Belarusian authorities and 
restrictive measures were imposed by the EU in 2004, 2006, 2010 and 2012 in 
connection with human rights violations and crackdowns on peaceful demonstrators 
(European Parliament, 2016). Belarusian representatives, thus, took part in the 
activities of all four multilateral EaP platforms: “Democracy, Good Governance and 
Stability”, “Economic Integration and Approximation with EU Sectoral Policies”, 
“Energy Security” and “Contacts between People”, but were excluded from the 
bilateral track. Aa a result, by 2010, Belarus was participating in more than 30 EU 
projects and programmes on a bilateral and regional level (Potocki, 2011). 
 
6.1.3. EU and MS diplomatic representations in Minsk 
The overview of the EU diplomatic network in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus 
presented in Table 5 (Chapter 2) showed that in Belarus, by 2015, there were 15 
national embassies and the Union Delegation present in Minsk. As Table 22 below 
shows, the embassies with the biggest numbers of personnel were those 
representing Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Italy and the Czech Republic. Nonetheless, 
it is important to note that the largest numbers within the biggest embassies were 
employed in the counsellor section: for example, there were only 5 diplomats dealing 
with political and economic affairs and press relations in the Italian embassy (out of 
11), 4 diplomats dealing with political and economic relations in the Hungarian 
embassy (out of 12) and 5 in the Latvian representation (out of 11). This is to say, 
that in terms of diplomatic personnel, most embassies varied between small and 
medium-sized; and diplomats in national embassies and the Delegation noted that 
the community of diplomats dealing with political and economic affairs in Minsk was 
rather small (interv. 33, 34). 
The EU Delegation opened in Minsk in March 2008 as the Delegation of the 
European Commission to Belarus and after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
in December 2009 was officially renamed as the Delegation of the European Union 
to Belarus with the status of a diplomatic mission and officially representing the 
European Union. The EUD in Minsk was also considered small by the diplomatic 
community and by the staff in the Delegation (interv. 33, 34, 37). While data in the 
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table below indicates a number of 13 people in the EU Delegation in Minsk, this only 
refers to the data shown on the Delegation’s website in 2014.  
 
Table 22. National and EU diplomatic missions in Belarus: 2015 
 Embassy/Delegation 
No. of diplomatic 
staff54 
Size 
EU member-
state embassies 
Austria* n/a small 
Bulgaria 4 small 
Czech Republic 10 large 
Estonia 2 small 
France 4 small 
Germany 6** medium 
Hungary 12 large 
Italy 11 large 
Latvia 11 large 
Lithuania 16 large 
Poland 6 medium 
Romania 2 small 
Slovakia 5 medium 
Sweden 3 small 
United Kingdom n/a n/a 
EU EU 13*** large 
Total 16 
Notes: 
*Austria had only an office of the embassy in Belarus with a resident ambassador; a fully-fledged embassy 
opened in the end of 2015 
**this number accounts only for the post of the ambassador and the Head of the 5 departments within the 
embassy 
***this data reflects the information collected during the fieldwork in Minsk in 2014, an update can be seen 
in Table 23 below 
Source: Data compiled by the author in 2014 and updated in 2015 based on the website of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Belarus and the webpages of the national embassies 
 
As Table 23 below indicates, the Delegation has employed towards 2015 a total of 
27 members of staff and, indeed, in comparison to the other two Delegations (in 
Chisinau and Kiev), the one in Belarus was numerically the smallest (see Table 6, 
Chapter 2). 
 
 
 
                                                   
54 In this table the number of diplomatic staff reflects solely to the national diplomats accredited in the host-country and does not 
reflect the total number of employees of the embassy or delegation. 
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Table 23. Distribution of EEAS and Commission staff in the EU Delegation in Belarus, 
2015 
EU Delegation in Minsk 
Staff 
Commission EEAS Total  
17 10 27 
Source: Data withdrawn from Bicchi & Maurer (2018), Table 2, page 16 (staff numbers have 
been provided to the authors by EEAS staff in March, 2016) 
 
Given the specific background of relations between the EU and Belarus presented at 
the beginning of this chapter, the mandate of the Delegation was mainly focused on 
two directions: one of establishing a dialogue with the Belorussian authorities and 
other stakeholders (civil society organisations, universities, local media) on 
economic, social, governance, human rights and other policy issues, and developing 
and maintaining contacts with them (including representatives of the business 
community); and the second one on explaining the European Union position to 
national authorities in Belarus and raising awareness about the EU, its institutions 
and programs implemented in Belarus within the framework of the ENPI (Delegation, 
2010). Also, one of the core tasks of the Delegation was to support the preparation 
and implementation of the technical assistance programs financed by the EU 
(ibidem). The Delegation also operated in close cooperation with the National 
Coordinating Unit which was established by the Belarusian Government in 1992 (to 
assist with the programming and implementation of the EU technical assistance 
through the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus). In 
1997, with the assistance of the European Commission, this became the  TACIS 
National Coordinating Unit in order to manage the EU Tacis Programme in Belarus 
(Coordinating Unit, 2014). The priority areas within these programmes referred to 
sustainable economic growth, energy efficiency, environmental protection and 
improving living standards in Belarus (ibidem).  
Although Belarus was not one of the neighbouring countries included in the ENP, the 
EU offered financial assistance via the technical assistance programme implemented 
by the European Commission to help members of the CIS, including Belarus, to 
transition to democratic market-oriented economies. Altogether, between 1991 and 
2006, Belarus received €229 million (Table 24); this volume of EU technical 
assistance to Belarus represented more than 40% of all the technical assistance 
provided to Belarus, which made the EU the single largest donor of assistance to this 
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country in 2006 (Delegation, 2010). Due to political developments in the country, in 
1997, EU suspended cooperation with the Belarusian authorities in the absence of 
convincing efforts to proceed with the necessary democratic reforms and offered 
Belarus assistance in two specific areas: human rights protection and freedom of the 
media in the process of democratization (European Council, 1997). Afterwards, the 
1997 General Affairs Council conclusions on Belarus were updated by the November 
2004 and November 2005 GAERC conclusions which stated that EU assistance 
would seek to “promote shared democratic values between the people of the EU and 
Belarus by intensifying people-to-people contacts and by strengthening good 
neighbourly relations across borders (e.g. through student and scientific exchanges, 
scholarships, youth travel, contacts between small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
training local authority officials, etc.)” (NIP Belarus, 2007-2013, p.16). Since 2007, 
Belarus was part of the ENPI instrument through which the country was allocated 
initially €20 million for the period 2007-2010 with two priority areas - “Social and 
Economic Development” and “Democratic Development and Good Governance” - 
and with a 70% - 30% distribution between these. Following the positive 
developments in EU-Belarus relations in 2008, the overall allocation was increased 
to €30 million (ibidem). With the launch of the EaP, there was a wide range of 
instruments in use for projects in Belarus and up to 2013, the EU’s support increased 
to €281 million as can be seen in Table 24 below.  
 
Table 24: EU financial aid to Belarus 1991-2014 (indicative amounts) 
 Total amount 
(million euro) 
TACIS (1991–2004) 221 
TACIS (2005-2006) 8 
ENPI (2007–2013) 281 
ENI (for 2014- 2017)* 71-89 
Note: *this is an indicative allocation based on the EEAS Strategy Paper for Belarus 2014-2017 
Source: authors' compilation of data from NIP Belarus (2007–2013), Strategy Paper and Multiannual 
Indicative Programme for EU support to Belarus 2014-2017 (Commission, 2014; NIP Belarus 2007-
2013) 
The negotiations for opening the Delegation of the European Commission took place 
over 3 years and in 2008, the decision regarding the opening of the Commission’s 
Delegation went hand in hand with the sudden release of six internationally 
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recognised political prisoners (Guedes Vieira, 2008). This was considered as a 
rapprochement in the EU-Belarus relations with a nuanced pragmatism on both 
sides: for Belarus this meant an alternative to its relationship with Russia and for the 
EU a direct channel of communication between Belarus authorities and Brussels 
(more details in section 6.2.2.). Until 2013, the Delegation worked according to the 
stipulations of the National Indicative Programme for Belarus for 2007-2013 and the 
Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2010. Accordingly, EU assistance to Belarus was 
concentrated mainly on the areas of food safety, energy, environment, higher 
education, as well as on civil society, media and the social domain. Part of the 
Union’s assistance focused on the areas of Belarus which were affected by the 
Chernobyl disaster and on measures of nuclear safety. In addition, with EU support, 
Belarus was involved in regional and cross-border cooperation projects: Poland-
Belarus-Ukraine, Latvia-Lithuania-Belarus and the Baltic Sea Region (Delegation, 
2010). The Delegation also engaged in some generic public diplomacy activities 
which were very basic: information posted on the Delegation’s website, maintaining 
of newsletters, publications and brochures about the European Union and about EU-
Belarus relations. Journalists could subscribe to the Delegation's mailing list and 
regularly receive EU news including a weekly EU newsletter and a biweekly EU-
Belarus Cooperation Newsletter (ibidem). 
Field-work conducted in Belarus in 2014 showed that the diplomatic activity in this 
part of Eastern Europe focused on creating contacts and building bridges between 
the two countries (interv. 35) with the most important areas being trade and public 
diplomacy (as can be seen in section 6.2.2.). Given the period of isolation of 
relations between the EU and MS and Belarus, the conduct of diplomacy became 
more active from 2008 onwards and the substance of the diplomatic practice 
concentrated on the main functions of diplomacy – representation, negotiation and 
communication. The function of representation was mostly focused through 
embassies focusing on representing their member-states and the policies of their 
country in Belarus as well as understanding and reporting to their capitals on the 
policy of the Belarusian government; that of negotiation – on negotiating different 
agreements such as the one regarding the creation of the Latvian-Belarusian 
Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation; 
and communication, which implied exchange of communications, issuing of press 
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releases, conducting press conferences, seminars and press briefings (interv. 33, 34 
,35, 36, 37; Embassy LITH, 2014). The way the traditional forms of the conduct of 
diplomacy further developed in Belarus is discussed in section 6.2.2. 
 
6.2. Effectiveness: sustainability of ENP goals 
As in the cases of Moldova and Ukraine, a discussion of effectiveness, the first 
criterion operationalised in the analytical framework of this thesis, is carried out in 
relation to goal attainment that is assessed on two dimensions. In the first section, 
the EaP is a reference point in order to examine the level of alignment of Belarus to 
EU rules and norms. As explained in the previous section, Belarus, although part of 
the ENP, was not offered an Action Plan, which is the EU’s roadmap for reforms for 
its Eastern neighbours; it was however included in the EaP and the bilateral 
relationship was conditioned by the commitment of Belarus to democratization of the 
country. In the second section, the reference point is the Lisbon Treaty that 
upgraded the Commission representations to Union Delegation that are tasked to 
represent the EU in third countries. After a discussion about the role of national 
embassies and the EU delegation in relation to sustainability of ENP goals in 
Belarus, the focus is shifted to exploring how the Delegation in Minsk embraced the 
function of diplomatic representation. 
6.2.1. Level of adaptation/alignment to EU rules & norms 
 
The Eastern Partnership aimed at building a common area of shared democracy, 
prosperity, stability and increased cooperation for EaP countries, including Belarus. 
Multilateral cooperation under the EaP, in which Belarus took part, involved the EU 
institutions, the member-states and the 6 EaP partner countries – Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. It took place 
across a wide array of issues, ranging from democracy, good governance and 
stability to economic issues, energy security and contacts between people; guided 
by four thematic platforms, supported by various expert panels, flagship initiatives 
and projects (EEAS, 2014). 
Belarus showed the poorest scores on all dimensions of cooperation due to its low 
level of alignment to EU rules and norms as Table 25 below shows. The quality of 
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governance in Belarus exhibited lack of professionalism and impartiality; while some 
of the EaP countries were developing institutions for policy formulation and 
coordination with the EU with detailed procedures for processing and evaluating 
policies, Belarus was lacking, for instance, bodies to coordinate cross-sectoral 
policies (EaP Index, 2011). Given the fact that Belarus suffered from a monopolised 
legislature, in terms of elections it did not meet the standard of democratic elections, 
which reflected the weak rights and capacities of the legislature in relation to the 
executive branch: “the legislature in Belarus lacks any rights that might ensure it and 
its members some institutional independence, and its president can even appoint a 
share of the members of the Savet Respubliki at his discretion” (ibidem, p. 23). In 
2013-2014, Belarus continued to demonstrate the biggest failings in ensuring fair, 
free and transparent electoral campaigns and remained the least committed to 
reaching democratic election standards. (EaP Index, 2014).  
 
Table 25. Approximation rate of EaP countries to the EU: Belarus 
*approximation indices (1=best performer; 0=worst performer) 
Sector cooperation Moldova Georgia Ukraine Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus 
Deep and sustainable 
democracy 
0.76 0.73 0.61 0.61 0.29 0.27 
Independent judiciary 0.83 0.88 0.47 0.73 0.27 0.24 
Freedom, Security and Justice 0.99 0.90 0.86 0.64 0.60 0.42 
Source: Author’s compilation based on EaP Index 2014 
 
Two years after participating in EaP activities, the human rights situation in Belarus 
was continuing to deteriorate (Freedom House, 2012). This was a deterioration in the 
aftermath of the presidential elections in December 2010 (won by Lukashenko) that 
followed demonstrations which were violently repressed by the government. In 
contrast, prior to the 2010 elections, the Belarusian authorities allowed some 
independent civil society activity: fewer political activists were imprisoned on political 
grounds, and (pro-Western) civil society started to cooperate under the umbrella of 
the EU's EaP Civil Society Forum (Bosse, 2012). In 2011-2012, travel bans were 
imposed on 243 individuals and the assets of 32 entities were frozen; also an arms 
embargo and a ban on the export of equipment that could be used for internal 
repression were initiated. The EU also promised to quadruple funding for civil society 
projects in Belarus and secured the adoption of a Human Rights Council resolution 
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on the domestic situation of the country (Ditrych, 2013). In 2014, according to the 
Freedom House report, Belarus was included on the list of most repressive countries 
in the world (Freedom House, 2014); and its human rights record qualified it as a 
‘black hole’ on the European map (European Parliament, 2016). 
Although Belarus was the first EaP partner country to submit over 20 project related 
to the issues of energy, transport and transit as well as border management and 
infrastructure (Korosteleva 2012), its progress of reforms remained low. Belarus 
retained and implemented the death penalty, and torture remained a broadly used 
mechanism on prisoners; there was no effective judicial control and the authorities 
exercised a complicated system of legislation in relation to NGOs that allowed them 
to criminally prosecute civil society leaders. Furthermore, in 2012, Belarus imposed a 
ban on leaving the country on a number of prominent opposition leaders and civil 
society activists (NIP Belarus 2007-2013; EaP Index, 2014, European Parliament, 
2016). And while NGOs in Belarus contributed to policy formulation, their opinion 
was not taken into account and civil society had limited possibilities to play a role in 
providing checks and balances on government power (ibidem). Furthermore, in 
December 2014, amendments made to the Law on Mass Media in Belarus were 
adopted without public debate; these allowed the Ministry of Communication to block 
public access to websites without a judicial review (European Parliament, 2016). 
Still, some improvements in EU-Belarus relations took place after 2013: Belarus 
participated in the EaP Vilnius Summit in November 2013, ratified the readmission 
agreements with Russia and Kazakhstan and declared its readiness to start EU 
visa-liberalization negotiations (Astapenia, 2013). A key component of the EaP is 
mobility of the citizens of the EU Eastern partner countries in a secure 
environment, provided through visa facilitation agreements, and the development of 
rules for managing the return of irregular migrants through readmission agreements 
(Commission, 2015e). In June 2014, the EU and the Republic of Belarus started to 
negotiate visa facilitation and readmission agreements and launched negotiations on 
the Mobility Partnership in 2015 (Commission, 2015e; European Parliament, 2016). 
The latter offers the most complete framework for bilateral cooperation between the 
EU and its partners, based on mutual offers of commitments and project initiatives 
covering mobility, migration and asylum issues (European Commission, 2015e). This 
was possible due to the previous cooperation on border management issues 
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between the EU and Belarus. As mentioned in the previous section, a series of 
large-scale projects were carried out with EU financial help: 26 border management 
projects were implemented in Belarus from 1999 to 2014 (Yakouchyk & Schmid, 
2016). Cross-Border Cooperation initiatives, such as the Latvia–Lithuania–Belarus 
programme, implied not just strengthening the surveillance capacity of the border, 
but also numerous initiatives aimed to create and enhance people-to-people 
contacts in the border regions (ibidem).  
Empirical evidence shows that cooperation among politicians was not as intense as 
in technical sectors, where contacts among officials between Brussels and Minsk 
deepened. A working arrangement between FRONTEX and the Belarusian State 
Border Committee was initiated in this time-frame, and the EU and Belarus 
maintained a policy dialogue on customs, integrated border management and law 
enforcement, as well as combating illegal migration and smuggling (Frontex, 2009; 
Bakowski, 2012). Some commentators have emphasized that Belarusian 
authorities were eager to learn European practical solutions to existing problems, 
especially because in addition to the purely technical training sessions, occasional 
anti-corruption training sessions for border management officials from Belarus were 
organised (Yakouchyk & Schmid, 2016). 
Furthermore, according to the EaP Index, in 2014, Belarus showed most progress 
when it came to improving the quality of public administration, which is a 
precondition for the implementation of effective, sustainable reform in different 
sectors in any country (EaP Index, 2014). And, since 2015, legislation in Belarus has 
allowed for civil society participation in drafting legislation in the fields of 
entrepreneurship, the environment, youth, and social policy (EaP Index, 2015).In the 
area of market economy, and especially the quality of the business climate, Belarus 
has been the leader among EaP countries in terms of ease of resolving insolvency 
issues, and made progress so that businesses can be established quickly, both in 
terms of time and monetary costs, thus allowing free entry to the market, and offered 
the strongest guarantees for contract enforcement (EaP Index, 2014; EaP Index, 
2015).  
Certain positive developments in the area of human rights were seen in the summer 
of 2015 when the EU and Belarus held a dialogue on human rights in Brussels 
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where discussions centred on a range of issues, including the establishment of a 
National Human Rights Institution, freedom of expression, assembly and association, 
the death penalty and the fight against torture and ill-treatment as well as children's 
rights (EEAS, 2015b). According to the press release released by the EEAS on this 
subject, the talks demonstrated the commitment of the EU and Belarus to deepen 
their relations in the area of human rights, followed by discussion on building trust, 
promoting reforms and developing cooperation (ibidem). The release of 6 political 
prisoners by President Lukashenko in August 2015, including Mikola Statkevich, his 
opponent in the presidential election from 2010, was greeted by EU HR/VP, Federica 
Mogherini and Commissioner for ENP and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes 
Hahn as ‘a long-sought step forward’ and was seen as important progress in the 
improvement of relations between Belarus and EU (EEAS, 2015c). As result, in 
October 2015, the EU temporarily lifted sanctions on Lukashenko, 169 other 
Belarusian officials and three entities (European Parliament, 2016). The progress in 
improvement of relations led to Belarus hosting peace talks on Ukraine in Minsk in 
2015; this was the first time since 1941 and 1973 that German and French leaders 
set foot in Minsk (Gubarevich, 2015). 
 
6.2.2. The role of diplomatic actors in Kiev 
As presented in this chapter earlier, the diplomatic activity of both the member-states 
and the EU Delegation was focused mainly on representation, negotiation and 
communication. According to national diplomats, their activity in Belarus was about 
the development of bilateral relations and ‘spreading good ideas, in this type of 
country this is very important’ (interv. 34); and about building relations and bridges 
(political, economic, cultural) between the countries (interv. 35). In their daily activity, 
diplomats explained that the exchange of ideas was key in order to understand and 
report on Belarusian government policies as well as to understand the differences 
and agreements between the two countries and protect and promote their national 
interests (interv. 36). Furthermore, diplomacy was used as means of solving both 
positive and negative issues in inter-state relations, especially since a function of 
diplomacy is to identify solutions (interv. 37). For EU diplomats, their diplomacy was 
guided by a similar narrative to that of the national diplomats; the conduct of EU 
diplomacy in Belarus was “about establishing and developing of bi- and multilateral 
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ties in maximum amount of sectors and issues through using several instruments 
and tools: personal contacts, engagement with authorities and communication” 
(interv. 33). 
Due the nature of the overall EU-Belarus relationship, which went through a period of 
isolation, diplomatic relations were also kept to a minimum. An increase in interaction 
can be seen since 2008 and especially after Belarus became part of the EaP; this 
was also a period when several MS established fully-fledged embassies in Belarus in 
parallel to the opening of the Commission representation in 2008. Although the 
activity of the diplomatic community in Belarus followed traditional diplomacy, MS 
embassies and the Delegation channelled their bilateral interaction with Belarus in a 
manner that supported Belarus’ democratisation progress within the EaP framework. 
This can be seen in the priorities that the embassies stated on their web-pages: for 
example, the Czech embassy was mandated to develop the bilateral relationship 
with the Republic of Belarus while respecting internationally recognized values in the 
area of democracy and human rights; to search for export, investment and 
privatization opportunities in Belarus, and to provide assistance to Czech companies 
in establishing contacts in Belarus; to promote Czech culture, development of 
Czech-Belarusian cultural exchange and provide consular services for citizens of the 
Czech Republic (Embassy CZ, 2015). At the same time its priorities in Belarus 
referred to supporting active Belarus membership in the Eastern Partnership and 
active support for civil society (ibidem). 
German-Belarusian relations developed at first positively with diplomatic relations 
developing after 1992: the German embassy was among the first to open in Minsk in 
1992 (MFA Belarus, 2015), and until the mid-1990s mutual visits were actively 
carried out and numerous ministerial meetings were held on both sides. In 1997 
when the Council introduced its first sanctions against Belarusian authorities, the 
German Bundestag and the Federal Government repeatedly called on Belarus to 
progress in the field of democracy and with no progress from Belarus, it led to the 
restriction of political relations. A rapprochement in relations started in 2008 and was 
interrupted after the presidential elections in December 2010, when Germany 
criticized the Belarusian authorities for use of force by the authorities against 
demonstrators and representatives of civil society and the imprisonment of 30 
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demonstrators (MFA Germany, 2015). These events had an impact not only on the 
process of democratization and rapprochement with Germany, but also with the EU. 
The progress in improvement of relations since 2013, as evidence showed earlier, 
led to Belarus hosting peace talks on Ukraine in Minsk in 2015, when German 
leaders, such as Angela Merkel visited Minsk; a visit at such a high level for the first 
time since the visit of Adolph Hitler in 1941. This visit was followed by other high-
level visits at the level of ministers (Embassy Germany, 2015). 
The Baltic states developed their relationship with Belarus as early as 1991. Latvia, 
for example, signed a Declaration on Principles of Good-Neighbourly Relations in 
1991 and opened its embassy in Minsk in 1993 (MFA Latvia, 2015). There was 
active cooperation among countries in economic, in particular transit, cross-border, 
cultural, educational and scientific, border control and management, environmental 
protection, cooperation between municipalities and people-to-people contacts fields. 
For Latvia, it was important to develop Belarus as a democratic, economically and 
socially stable country with respect for human rights and the rule of law, especially 
because it is its neighbour. A number of high-level visits, including at the level of 
prime-ministers took place starting in 1994,and then in 1995 and in 2009, with the 
highest number of working visits at ministerial level taking place between 2013 and 
2015 (ibidem). In contrast, diplomatic relations between Estonia and Belarus were 
established in 1992 and in 1995 Estonia opened a General Consulate in Minsk. The 
Estonian embassy, however, was established only in 2009 (Embassy Estonia, 2015). 
The first high-level visits to Minsk and Tallinn, respectively, took place as soon as the 
embassy was established with visits at the level of ministers taking place in 2009, 
2013 and 2014. Also, in 2015 parliamentary cooperation between the two countries 
was established. These high-level visits were working visits in sector cooperation 
areas such as agriculture, forestry but also culture (ibidem). 
In 2015, Austria was the last member-state, in the timeframe of this thesis, that 
opened a fully-fledged embassy in Minsk, even if it had already recognised the 
independence of the former Soviet Union states, including Belarus, in 1992. The 
diplomatic relationship with Belarus increased in parallel with the improvement in 
relations between Belarus and the EU and since 2013, the bilateral exchange of 
visits became more active at the political level (Embassy of Austria, 2015). Austria 
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had maintained diplomatic relations with Belarus from its embassy in Moscow and 
only at the end of 2013 established an Austrian Honorary Consulate as result of the 
growth of Austrian investments in Belarus (ibidem). According to the Austrian 
ambassador, “embedded in the EU, together with our EU partners, we work to 
consistently shape EU-Belarus relations based on shared values and interests” 
(Bayerl, 2015). The visits of high-level Austrian officials to Belarus took place in 2015 
when issues of regional and international cooperation were discussed and the 
parties agreed on a series of steps to deepen cooperation between the two countries 
and to intensify the dialogue between Belarus and the European Union (ibidem). 
The mandate of the EU Delegation post-Lisbon was focused along similar lines to 
those pursued by the Commission representation. The Delegation was tasked with 
establishing a dialogue with the Belorussian authorities and other stakeholders (civil 
society organisations, universities, local media) on economic, social, governance, 
human rights and other policy issues and develop and maintain contacts with them. 
Also, the Delegation was mandated to represent the Union; this meant, on a daily 
basis, explaining the European Union position to national authorities in Belarus and 
raising awareness about the EU, its institutions and programs implemented in 
Belarus within the framework of the ENPI (Delegation, 2015). EU financial 
assistance, presented in Table 24, focused on supporting the needs of the 
population and democratisation in priority areas such as social inclusion, regional 
and local development. Bilateral assistance to Belarus was, since the EaP, 
complemented by thematic and regional programmes in the following fields: 
education (Tempus, Erasmus Mundus), the eradication of landmines, waste 
governance, air quality, nuclear safety - Chernobyl, and TAIEX; and special 
additional financial measures were allocated for support to civil society (interv. 33). 
Already in March 2012, a European Dialogue on Modernization with Belarusian 
society was launched that involved, via specific projects, over 747 non-governmental 
organizations alone who engaged in EU-level activities (Korosteleva, 2016). In 2013, 
for example, through the Dialogue two new programmes for Belarus were initiated: 
BELMED, supporting reforms in the health care system (€8 million), and RELOAD-2, 
offering support for regional and local development in two regions – Grodno and 
Minsk (€3.5 million) (ibidem). 
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As a result of Belarus’ participation in the EaP, member-states also oriented their 
diplomatic work towards supporting non-governmental organisations. The embassy 
of the UK emphasized in 2014 that they encouraged Belarus’ full participation as a 
member of the Eastern Partnership and worked on providing support for improving 
the situation in the areas of human rights and the rule of law (Embassy UK, 2014). 
Germany established a German-Belarusian joint venture in Minsk (in 1994) through 
which a variety of intercultural work in the field of education was undertaken; and 
civil society contacts were developed in areas such as history, media, environment 
and social aspects; all of which contributed to the formation of democratic structures 
and enhancement of the rule of law (Embassy Germany, 2015). France also 
reiterated its dedication to Belarus's progress in respect of human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law. It established the Franco-Belorussian Center for European 
Studies - a joint project of the French Embassy in Belarus and the University of 
Bordeaux – that offered training in social sciences and law for students (those who 
completed the courses offered at the Center obtained diplomas awarded by the 
University of Bordeaux) (Embassy France, 2015).  
The Czech Republic organised a series of seminars in order to familiarize Belarusian 
teachers and researchers with the Czech experience in the area of education and 
media education. The seminars were a result of the cooperation between the Czech 
Association for International Affairs and the Belarusian National Institute for 
Education. The Czech Embassy in Minsk was also involved in supporting art in 
Belarus and, in 2014, held a ceremonial presentation of medals and honours 
awarded to Belarusian children at the 42nd International Children's Art Exhibition in 
Lidice (Embassy CZ, 2015). The Embassy of Latvia in Minsk and its consulate in 
Vitebsk were involved in organizing exhibitions, concerts, college exchange visits, 
and stimulating work in the field of cultural communication. For example, from 2014, 
the Latvian-Belarus Cooperation Program in Science and Technology was 
implemented, allowing the development of 6 scientific and technical cooperation 
projects with a total funding of €256 552 (Embassy Latvia, 2015).  
Estonia conducted bilateral projects mainly through the Estonian Center for Eastern 
Partnership that offered seminars and trainings for representatives of Belarusian civil 
society organizations, covering various areas of the reform of public administration 
for example. At the same time, several Estonian non-profit organizations carried out 
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various projects in Belarus, in fields such as entrepreneurship education or the 
development of the involvement of citizens. From 2002, Estonia organized seminars 
and supported the organization of conferences for Belarussians. For example, in 
2008, 2011 and 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia supported the 
organization of Belarusian diaspora congresses in Tallinn (Embassy Estonia, 2015). 
The Estonian Development Cooperation Plan for Belarus budgeted €249,740 in 
2013 and €241,242 for 2015 and stipulated that Belarus would remain a long-term 
priority partner country until at least 2020 (ibidem). 
In 2014, Lithuania prioritised developing business cooperation and organised events 
for the business community in Belarus. Such events were organized at the 
embassy’s initiative, with the active participation of the Lithuanian Business Club in 
Belarus, the Belarusian European Business Association and the Business Council of 
Lithuania and Belarus. Such events, were considered by the Lithuanian ambassador 
as an opportunity for the representatives of the business community to share their 
views on business cooperation between Lithuania, Belarus and the EU, and the 
influence of regional factors on economic cooperation. Furthermore, at the initiative 
of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Economic Cooperation Council and the Lithuanian 
Business Club, a number of events were organized for both trade and investment 
cooperation and transport, logistics, tourism, innovation and agriculture; activities 
coordinated by the Commercial Attaché of the embassy. The Lithuanian Business 
Club in Belarus had about 50 Lithuanian companies and Lithuanian businessmen 
operating in Belarus as members (Embassy of Lithuania, 2014). In 2015, the 
embassy of Lithuania carried out projects on the social and economic activity of 
women and networking between the EU and Eastern Europe which were dedicated 
to promoting women's entrepreneurship and social and economic activity. 
One national diplomat emphasized that despite their different bilateral projects 
carried out in Belarus, their diplomatic views were the same at national and EU level 
(interv. 37). On the ground, the activity of the diplomatic community was carried out 
within the EU framework, where discussions took place on developments in Belarus 
as well as cooperation among member-states (interv. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37). As findings 
showed, in practice, there were several working groups created by the EU 
Delegation in Minsk: on Assistance and cooperation, on Schengen, on Sanctions, on 
economic relations and on human rights (interv. 33). Table 26 below shows a 
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categorization of the institutionalized forms of interactions between the EU and 
national diplomatic actors that represented the beginnings of a centralized 
communication infrastructure led by the EUD.  
 
Table 26: Communication infrastructure between MS embassies and EUD in Minsk, 2014 
Typology Heading Frequency Description 
Level 
General EU–member states meetings 
(1) HoMs: Meetings of Heads 
of Delegation (HoDs) 
Information 
not disclosed 
reflects the diplomatic ranking of 
the attendees 
(2) Counsellor’s meetings 
Topic (1) Thematic EU meetings 
have a specific agenda and are 
narrow in scope; are taking place 
on the following themes:  
- Assistance and cooperation 
- Sanctions 
- Schengen issues 
- Economic counsellors issues 
- Political (and Human Rights) 
issues 
Group 
affiliation 
EU meetings within regional frameworks of cooperation 
(1) Visegrad Group (or V4) 
Information 
not disclosed 
Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia 
(2) Nordic Group (or Nordic 
Plus) 
Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, the UK 
Source: Author’s compilation based on fieldwork conducted in Belarus in 2014 
 
The EU Delegation created several working groups where diplomats regularly met. 
The HoMs meetings took place at the level of Heads of delegations while 
participants in the Counsellor’s meetings were counsellors responsible of specific 
dossiers such as economy or human rights, for example. Out of the thematic 
meetings, the oldest one was the Schengen one (established in 2010). Within this 
group, post-Lisbon, participants noticed an extremely tight cooperation: “it achieved 
several goals, now there is a visa list of common supporting documents, there is a 
harmonized approach to issuing visas, it follows the recommendations of the Council 
and there are proper statistics in place” (interv. 33). The meetings of the Heads of 
Delegations (HoMs) represented as well a united group that worked in a challenging 
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environment. The meetings on sanctions reviewed the sanction list for Belarus. The 
group on human rights was fairly new, it started its activity in 2012 and “focuses on 
solidarity, an increased approach on events happening in the country, including the 
issue of political prisoners” (interv. 33). The most recently established group was that 
of the economic counsellors, created in June 2014, which held its first meeting in 
November 2014. 
A discussion on the way in which diplomats engage in Minsk on formulating and 
implementing a common approach (i.e. discussion on relevance) is carried out in 
section 6.4. while empirical evidence regarding diplomatic capabilities is discussed in 
section 6.5. The following section will briefly account for the diplomatic practices 
present in Minsk in relation to representing the European Union in Belarus, as 
prescribed in the Lisbon Treaty and presented in the operationalisation section of 
this thesis in relation to effectiveness. 
 
6.3. Effectiveness: representing the Union 
The upgrade from Commission representation to Union delegation in third countries, 
according to the Council note 17770/1/09, meant that the latter took over the 
responsibility for representation of the Union and was expected to act in close 
cooperation with member-states. In Minsk, this meant that the functions of the 
rotating Presidency became the responsibility of the Union Delegation; this brought, 
according to the staff in the Delegation “more formalization, centralization of 
meetings, agendas, organisation of follow-up meetings and initiatives” (interv. 33). 
National diplomats emphasized that the change was valuable for the diplomatic 
community through the regular meetings and exchange of information that was 
happening on the ground (interv. 35). For national embassies, the Lisbon Treaty 
changes did not influence their work to a large extent, because it was more work for 
the Delegation in coordinate the community (interv. 34, 37). Some even compared 
the work done by the Commission representation and that of the Delegation, 
emphasizing that under the Commission representation the relationship between 
embassies and the representation was described as a teacher-pupil one whereas 
with the Delegation there was more learning and socializing (interv. 37). 
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EU diplomats emphasized that in Minsk, the role of the Delegation was to be at the 
service of the member-states – organizing meeting, writing reports, delivering 
information  - which was appreciated by the member-states (interv. 33). National 
diplomats put emphasis on this role of the Delegation, especially because “the 
Delegation is a central point for all member-states; it is not a referee or a mission 
that tries to impose, it is the voice that gets the best dialogue in terms of results vis-
à-vis local authorities through a cooperation of member-states, through common 
decisions” (interv. 37). With the disappearance of the role for national embassies in 
chairing and organizing meetings as the Presidency, the role in coordinating all EU 
actors on the ground and creating different working groups became the Delegation’s 
responsibility. In practice, this implied less work for the embassies and a stronger 
lead for the Delegation, hence more centralization. As the EU diplomat explained, “it 
is the Delegation’s focus on making it functional” (interv. 33). Even though the 
Delegation’s capability was still in continuous formation, member-states were 
engaged in order to increase their activity in Minsk. Member-states particularly 
highlighted the high degree of transparency in information-exchange coming from 
the Delegation in Minsk even in the cases when some diplomats could not attend the 
meetings, and that the Delegation tried to organize all meetings in such a way that all 
could participate (interv. 37). 
Given the development of EU-Belarus relations starting from 2008 onwards, both EU 
and national diplomats stated that the effects of the Lisbon Treaty changes had not 
been felt in Minsk as they were in other third countries (interv. 33, 34, 36, 37). The 
first obvious change was the absence of the rotating Presidency which brought more 
centralization and formalization of the cooperation in the hands of the Delegation 
(interv. 33). The fact that there were regular meetings and exchange of information 
was a valued change; however, what national diplomats also noted was the fact that 
in these meetings a lot of time was spent on clarifying what the diplomatic 
community wanted to achieve in Belarus (interv. 35). For some, the fact that 
member-states, especially the newcomers to the EU club, no longer had the 
opportunity to be in the ‘shoes of the Presidency’ represented a negative effect of the 
Lisbon Treaty changes for third countries like Belarus; this was because national 
diplomats considered that it was important for local authorities to see that EU was 
entrusting their member-states with playing such a central role: “in the case of the 
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Lithuanian Presidency, which is post-Lisbon already, as a neighbour, it should play a 
bigger role in Minsk so that in Brussels it can also promote what is happening in 
theatre” (interv. 34). 
At the same time, the role of the Delegation in Minsk was of particular importance as 
most of the embassies (with exception of Polish and German ones) were rather 
small in terms of the number of diplomats present (as presented in Table 22). A 
national diplomat might have a high level of engagement on national priorities in their 
agenda such as trade, cultural or public diplomacy: “I engage in a great deal of 
public diplomacy (so far in 6 months I have met 2000 people, among my other 
activities) and less on the relations directly with the government. I get involved on the 
EU level there where I know that my country has most added value or comparative 
advantage; on all other matters I let colleagues in the Delegation maintain and 
consolidate the dialogue with the government” (interv 36). Therefore, the 
coordination that the EUD provided to the member-states was useful to provide 
structure and focus not only among EU actors but also in relation to the local 
government (interv. 33). As one national diplomat described it “the perception is that 
the Delegation is more involved, more visible in the dialogue with the authorities. If 
before the discussion was mainly technical and less known, now the relationship is 
much better, more constructive” (interv 37). For example, the visa-facilitation 
dialogue among MS had become more pragmatic since the EU delegation assumed 
the chairing role (ibidem). 
This new role, also brought more pressure on the Delegation and, in Belarus, there 
were certain expectations from national diplomats vis-à-vis this role. Some argued 
that the Delegation needed to do more (interv. 34). The concern was that due to 
geopolitical circumstances in the Eastern neighbourhood less attention was given to 
Belarus in Brussels; and diplomats considered that Belarus should be brought back 
onto the agenda in Brussels (ibidem). Others considered that the role of the 
Delegation was to be neutral (interv. 35). This is to say that the Delegation’s role was 
to continuously follow the political discussions and to understand the current state of 
affairs in Belarus. In its role of information node, the Delegation was expected to 
maintain the information channels with all the members in the diplomatic community 
and to provide the European general view (ibidem). For the Delegation, it was 
challenging to be in the role of the chair all the time as this routine job implied that 
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“the Delegation needs to be engaged, to create synergies and to be in close 
cooperation with the member-states and look for ideas for potential initiatives or 
open for the ones coming from the member-states” (interv 33). This implied not only 
chairing but also maintaining  a high degree of coordination capacity, working on 
consensus among member-states and maintaining good relations with the host 
government (ibidem). 
One particular situation showed the importance of the role of the Delegation that 
member-states’ readily acknowledged, when, for example in 2012, Belarus (as a tit-
for-tat response to an expansion of sanctions against it by Brussels) asked that 
certain ambassadors were recalled to their capitals (Poland’s ambassador and the 
Head of the EU delegation). This created a common front in the diplomatic 
community under the auspices of the Delegation, under which they defended their 
interests, and became a united and cohesive group, which resulted in enhanced 
synergy among MS (intev. 33). It also showed the role and importance of the 
Delegation as perceived by the local authorities (since they decided to recall the EU 
Head of Delegation). As a British diplomat argued, “in Minsk then I prefer to talk with 
the local authorities via the Delegation, as this raises our credibility, it is a good trend 
as it shows the common position agreed by the Member states” (interv 36). This 
made the role of the Delegation a central point of reference for all member-states 
(interv. 37) and was seen as useful in their relationship with Belarusian authorities 
and in building consensus among MS (interv. 36). 
 
6.4. Relevance: ‘common approach’ in Minsk 
The changes that the Lisbon Treaty entailed, referred also to the cooperation among 
the Delegation and member-state embassies in third countries (art. 32). In this 
section evidence in relation to relevance as a criterion of diplomatic performance is 
presented and the corporate diplomatic practices on formulation and implementation 
of a common approach, as operationalised in Chapter 3 are brought forward. For the 
Delegation, the common approach is two-fold: towards Belarus and towards the 
member-states. As an EU diplomat disclosed, “the policy itself is shaped in Brussels 
and member-states are shaping part of this policy and in this why we try to have a 
common approach. What is decided in Brussels is the Bible. Member-states then 
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have to implement or respect the ‘modus vivendi’, so it is about the ability to forge 
something in common” (interv. 33). As one diplomat explained: “EU values and 
policy lines are agreed upon in Brussels, the policy lines are shaped in Brussels, 
including shaping general understandings; then reports come straight to the third 
countries and not necessarily to capitals” (interv. 35). 
For those member-states that had been engaged in the diplomatic activity in Belarus 
for a longer time, the common approach was sometimes about even more practical 
things such as assuring that everyone attended events: “ in a small community if all 
attend or none attends this is not only visible but may send the wrong message to 
the third country” (interv. 36). Hence working together ensured the common 
approach for the diplomatic community; this took form of attending public events, 
organizing events together, working together within EU programmes, and therefore 
raised the diplomatic profile of individual member states as well as that of the EU in 
Belarus (ibidem). 
For the Delegation, the common approach became about the member-states’ ability 
to forge something in common which, as result, brought more engagement (interv. 
33). Some national diplomats talked about the ‘common approach’ in a similar 
manner, that it was about a constant dialogue in Minsk and in Brussels to help 
identify the most important points of action: the “common approach is about a 
general understanding that all member-states stick to general political lines agreed in 
Brussels even though there are different opinions and we cannot find strong 
common issues but we have to have one voice” (interv. 35). The common approach, 
hence, was about relating to the general political lines set out in Brussels and if this 
was not possible to achieve on the ground, then diplomats sent requests to Brussels 
to react and look for common lines (ibidem). As one diplomat stated, “the common 
approach is (also) about sanctions, what we do with them. It is about common 
decisions here or in Brussels (…) Sometimes it is about not discussing and not 
changing it on paper but about a general approval, a silent agreement, providing a 
feeling of comfort that it is good to do one thing or another” (interv. 34). 
Post-Lisbon, with the new role of the Delegation, the meetings within the working 
groups (see Table 26) became a useful instrument for the diplomatic community: “we 
are quite unified and then the focus of our meetings is narrow: on political situation in 
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the country, the situation of political prisoners, the issue of sanctions (200 people 
and institutions); therefore being unified is very important” (interv. 36). Sometimes 
there was pressure on the Latvian, Lithuanian or Polish counterparts in third 
countries, from the perspective of their bilateral relations, and in these cases 
especially the usefulness of being part of the working group and being able to 
negotiate and resist this pressure was tremendous. The information flow within these 
groups was high, open and in English: “the openness goes to the extent of sending a 
text-message and you get replies to your questions” (interv. 35). Generally, national 
diplomats argued that in their regular meeting the community was very coordinated, 
rather unified and usually unanimous in their decisions (interv. 34, 35, 36, 37). Some 
diplomats explained that the Belarus political reality was the one that made 
diplomatic coordination either easy when all were ‘on the same page’ or difficult – “as 
access is very limited, access to information, to institutions, to people and influencing 
anyone or any process in Belarus becomes very tricky” (interv 36). In the same way, 
the political landscape in Belarus dictated the realities of the Delegation as well: 
“when it was established, the relationship with Belarus was in a crisis and there was 
no strong relationship with other embassies” (interv. 33). 
A prominent example of cooperation among the EU Delegation and the member-
states resulted in the MOST project that provided professional exchange and 
mobility opportunities between Belarus and the EU. It was a joint collaboration 
between the Delegation and the German and British embassies (the Goethe Institute 
in Minsk and the British Council became the implementing agencies) that aimed at 
enhancing people-to-people-contacts between Belarus and the EU for promoting 
mutual understanding and exchange of best practice in core sectors such as culture, 
education and youth, science and technology (MOST, 2014). Another project that 
was the result of the cooperation between UK, Poland and Germany was the Culture 
and Creativity programme that aimed at supporting cultural and creative industries; 
increasing their contribution to sustainable humanitarian and socio-economic 
development in the Eastern partnership countries. This was a British-led initiative 
with the implementing agencies being the British Council in partnership with the 
National Centre for Culture Poland and the Goethe Institute (Culture Partnership, 
2015). 
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Sanctions and how to proceed with sanctions was a big concern for member-states 
and was the main topic among the diplomatic actors in Belarus. For some, sanctions 
were not effective as they created artificial conflicts and problems (interv. 33). 
According to the Delegation, sanctions had both positive and negative connotations: 
sanctions did not achieve the effects the member-states were looking for such as the 
release of prisoners but created other effects such as exerting pressure on the local 
authorities related to economy and personal image (ibidem). Others were more 
neutral in this respect. They embraced the fact that cooperation took different angles 
while emphasizing that decision-making was very slow and that the EU needed to 
find common understanding and common lines because “it can be frustrating to sit in 
those meetings” (interv. 35). For others then, working closely with other actors such 
as international organisations or local civil society groups, especially on the matter of 
prisoners, facilitated putting things in perspective (interv. 36). An EU diplomat 
reiterated that in such cases, on the ground there was, among MS, a sort of 
‘gentleman’s silent agreement’, meaning that what they agreed on were the 
minimum possible things and their role was then to convince their headquarters 
about them and find solutions (interv. 33). 
The aim of sanctions such as visa-bans and targeted economic sanctions was to 
spur democratization processes in Belarus. However, evidence showed more 
divergence than convergence and MS continued to trade with Belarus and keep its 
economy afloat55: “Belarus declared a €2.5 billion trade surplus in 2011 after trade 
between the two sides (i.e. EU MS) shot up by 76% in the first nine months alone” 
(Nielsen, 2012a). As the Commission’s trade report showed, in 2011, the EU 27 
became the main trade partner of Belarus (DG Trade, 2012). Moreover, some MS 
(Slovenia) chose to veto the EU’s decision to include one Belarusian business or 
another on the so-called black-list based on important ongoing business/trade deals 
(interv BEL 1, 2) or strongly opposed economic sanctions (Lithuania). And as the 
mass-media reported, some European banks (the Royal Bank of Scotland, BNP 
Paribas and Deutsche Bank) continued to invest in the Lukashenko government to 
the sum total of more than $800m (€551m) in Belarusian government bonds (The 
Independent, 2011). 
                                                   
55 EU mainly imports non-agricultural products from Belarus such as fuels and mining products and exports machinery and 
transport equipment (DG Trade, 2012) 
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As Table 26 showed, in Minsk, there were also regional frameworks of cooperation 
such as Visegrad and the Nordic groups. The Slovak, Polish, Hungarian and Czech 
cooperated within Visegrad, through which the latter overcame their Soviet heritage 
and laid the foundations for cooperation and built themselves a Central European 
identity (interv. 34). Despite certain disagreement vis-à-vis Belarus, members of the 
Visegrad group sought coherence: “in certain issues there is divergence of positions: 
there have been small problems in the case of the Ukrainian crisis; there was 
skepticism about sanctions with the exception of Poland which was enthusiastic. So 
political differences are shown. In this situation we take it from regional cooperation 
to bilateral relations, we are trying not to politicize, some issues we decide on a 
bilateral level, such as the issue of minorities for example” (ibidem). The Visegrad 
group released several common statements. In 2013, the V4 members expressed 
the hope that the Belarusian authorities would respond positively to the invitation to 
negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements. They stressed their 
conviction that mobility of people should not be held hostage to undemocratic 
conduct by the authorities. The Visegrad countries also reiterated their commitment 
to the policy of critical engagement towards Belarus, emphasising the need to further 
develop the European Dialogue on Modernisation (V4 statement, 2013). In 2015, the 
V4 stressed the importance of keeping the inclusive nature of the Eastern 
Partnership and strengthening ties with Belarus, and welcomed the actions taken 
since the Vilnius Summit in 2013 in developing individually tailored bilateral relations 
between the EU and Belarus (Visegrad, 2015). 
What came across from the interviews is that the Visegrad group was informing the 
Delegation about its activities and was cooperating with the Nordic group. Historically 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark had a close Nordic cooperation which was still very 
important and exhibited in Minsk. For Nordic cooperation in Belarus, for example, 
represented by the Swedish and Finnish embassies, it was important to be very 
pragmatic and careful about their common lines (intev 35). Although Nordic 
cooperation was less and centralized it was maintained for the purpose of looking for 
common tendencies. In 2011, the Nordic group established an Open Europe 
Scholarship Scheme and European Scholarship Scheme for Young Belarusians that 
offered them an opportunity to acquire a high-quality university education in Europe, 
thus laying foundations for further democratic development of Belarus (Nordic 
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Council, 2011). In 2014, in Belarus, a revival of this cooperation took place through a 
series of initiatives such as the New Nordic Food event where a market place was 
organized in Minsk to promote Nordic food; this was a joint event of the embassies of 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark (the Ambassador of Denmark in the Russian 
Federation is also accredited as a non-resident Ambassador to Belarus). Another 
common event organized by the Swedish and Finnish embassies was election voting 
and the organization of  Swedish and Finnish parliamentary voting in the same 
premises. This was possible due to co-location of the Finnish embassy within the 
Swedish embassy. This was seen as an advantageous solution to the sharing of 
diplomatic resources as well as a means of giving leverage to the Finnish diplomat to 
attend events irrespective of his diplomatic rank – hence he could establish networks 
in higher and lower ranked diplomatic circles (ibidem). 
While these two groups were quite active and were gaining momentum, some 
diplomatic representations argued that there was no coalition of the member-states 
through which interests could be promoted and common points of agreement 
identified (interv. 37). Diplomats emphasized that in Belarus, the closer a MS was to 
this country geographically and historically, the greater was the understanding of the 
local political realities and hence, these countries had a more involved role in the 
common meetings as well (ibidem). Proximity to the region may also be detrimental. 
What came across from the interviews with national diplomats is that some meetings 
were spent on debating minor issues such as participating or not at the celebrations 
of the Independence Day of Belarus and unity could not be reached in the end: “this 
leads to unnecessary debates that lead to unsolved dilemmas and present 
schizophrenia among members. Everyone is trying to show a common face and not 
to be a trouble maker. As consequence, results are more conservative than creative 
and proactive” (interv. 34). 
Although the common meetings organised by the Delegation only developed after 
2010, diplomatic actors made use of those as a channel of communication among 
each other and shared information, hence creating a resource. This and other social 
and political capital present in Minsk is discussed in the following section. 
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6.5. Capabilities: diplomatic resources in Minsk 
The framework for cooperation created by the Delegation in Minsk was fairly new: as 
was indicated earlier, findings showed that the oldest form of interaction that 
engaged all diplomatic actors was the Schengen meeting, established in 2010. While 
the most recent one, between 2010 and 2015, was the meeting of economic 
counsellors who had their first meeting in November 2014. Although interviewees did 
not disclose the frequency of these meetings, they stated that they participated in all 
of them from HoMs to sanctions, to human rights and the others presented in Table 
26 (interv. 34, 35, 36, 37). Given the small size of most embassies in Minsk (see 
Table 22), the Delegation made sure to coordinate the time of the meetings in such a 
manner that everyone could be present; on the rare occasion that someone could 
not attend the meeting on the agreed date, they would be informed by one of the 
colleagues about it (interv. 33, 37). 
Diplomats present in Minsk put a great value on the fact that these meetings had 
become a valuable network where participants were willing to participate, open to 
engage in discussions and reply to questions, even if these were exchanged via text-
messages (interv. 35). They also emphasized that there was a positive practice of 
open information flow among all members of the diplomatic community, including the 
Delegation (ibidem). For smaller embassies, the sharing of information practices 
between colleagues was highly appreciated: due to their small number of diplomatic 
staff, they had to prioritize and choose which of the common meetings to attend. So, 
they relied a lot not only on the reports from the EUD but also on the information 
sharing between colleagues: “from sharing of opinions I sometimes learn a lot, but 
sometimes I close my ears. Overall this communication helps us to have contacts 
and pool information. At the end of the day I think the smaller the embassy the better 
as it is constrained to be proactive, busy and engaged” (interv. 36). In this sense, 
what interviewees highlighted was that the openness to share information was 
especially vis-à-vis smaller member-states, a practice embraced by the Delegation 
as well (interv. 35). 
For the Delegation, as mentioned earlier, designing such a resource was also 
challenging because of the need to be the chair all the time, as this implied a higher 
degree of secretarial duties as well: coordinating of agendas, writing reports (interv. 
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33). EU diplomats mentioned that before-Lisbon in such a task one could rely on the 
commitment of the embassy holding the Presidency ‘who were happy to do it’, while 
post-Lisbon this was routine work for the Delegation “who needs to be engaged, to 
create synergies and to be in close cooperation with the member-states and look for 
ideas for potential initiatives or open for the ones coming from the member-states” 
(ibidem). For member-states, the coordination role of the EUD was seen as useful as 
it provided structure and focus to the group of diplomats (interv. 37); and participants 
were always asked to submit points for the agenda established by the EUD (interv. 
35). 
National diplomats further emphasized that in terms of content the meetings were 
narrow in focus, such as on political situation in the country, the situation of political 
prisoners or the issue of sanctions and diplomats were dealing with sensitive issues 
which meant that ‘being unified’ was of key importance: “there is animosity from the 
host government, so we are hanging together in adversity, relying on each other, and 
needing each other. When a colleague has a problem he gets the answer and 
support from the community” (interv. 36). Others further explained that to an external 
observer there might seem to be inertia in diplomacy since the decision-making 
process in Brussels was very slow and diplomats had to find the middle ground in 
Minsk. Yet, what is to be appreciated is that “in this way we are avoiding big 
mistakes from the beginning. We do not rush to make quick emotional decisions, 
which can happen on a bilateral level, but should be avoided on a multilateral one. 
And then, when a decision is taken in Brussels then it is not able to change it quickly. 
When it is about substance, it is not bad that it happens so slow” (interv. 34). 
Therefore, in Minsk, the aim in the common meetings was to work on consensus 
among MS and create relationships with the local authorities (interv. 36). 
Given the mandate of the Delegation to maintain a dialogue with the government of 
Belarus and with local stakeholders (civil society organisations, universities, local 
media) on economic, social, governance, human rights and other policy issues, the 
HoMs meetings and the role played by the HoD in this sense was important (interv. 
33, 34). As one diplomat noted, “there is also evaluation of what we are doing and in 
the real kitchen of diplomacy ambassadors should be cautious in their statements.” 
(interv. 34). The HoD of the Commission representation in Kiev commented on the 
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opening of the representation in Minsk and stated that the “Head of Delegation 
needs to be able to communicate both with those to whom he is accredited and with 
those by whom he is sent. This is essential to creating a better understanding. From 
such understanding can come some progress” (Boag, 2007). In her public 
appearances, the HoD followed the policy and decisions taken already in Brussels, 
emphasizing, for example, that ‘the release and rehabilitation of all political prisoners 
in Belarus is a prerequisite to a dialogue between the EU and Minsk’ and that ‘no 
modernization is possible unless it is defined and undertaken by the Belarusian 
people themselves’ (Naviny, 2013). And while certain news anchors speculated that 
the HoD did not enjoy the confidence of many Belarusian politicians (Charter 97, 
2015), President Lukashenko met with the HoD, emphasized that he did not meet 
with every ambassador whose mandate is expiring, and praised her work “to 
promote dialogue with the big Europe, help us understand each other better and 
improve our relations” (Lukashenko, 2015).  
 
 
Mrs. Mora was the second Head of Delegation, as presented in Table 27 below, 
however she was the first HoD that was located in Minsk and represented the Union. 
Before her, the Commission was represented by a Chargé d’affaires in Minsk 
whereas the first Head of the Commission representation, Mr. Jose Manuel Pinto-
Teixeira, was resident in Kiev (see Table 21) and remained accredited to Minsk as 
well (ODB, 2007). The latter became in 2008, the HoD of the Commission 
representation in Ukraine till 2012. Some argued that in Minsk, the fact that the Head 
of the EU Delegation was from Latvia was a good decision “as a neighbour she 
understands all aspects we are discussing within the group of 16 embassies present 
Table 27: Head of EU Delegation in Minsk: 2008 - 2015 
Nr. Name Period in office 
1. Jose Manuel Pinto-Teixeira* 2008 – 2011 
2. Maira Mora 2011 - 2015 
3. Andrea Wiktorin 2015 - present 
Note: 
* Jose Manuel Pinto-Teixeira was Head of Delegation of the Commission Representation in Minsk, he was 
resident in Kiev, where he was HoD (see Table 21) 
Source: authors’ compilation based on fieldwork conducted in Belarus in 2014 
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in Minsk – very detailed and openly, in all aspects. Even big countries, Germany, the 
UK and Poland are listening” (interv. 34). Diplomats noted that the openness and 
willingness to cooperate as well as the transparency that the Delegation presents in 
its activity also depended on the HoD, Mrs. Maira Mora.  
Evidence further showed that the link between all the meetings was provided by the 
Head of Political Section who was tasked to chair 3 (Sanctions, Political and Human 
Rights and Economic ones) out of 5 meetings and was present in the other two (see 
details in Table 26). In the case of the Delegation in Minsk, the Head of Political 
Section, who was the second person in the Delegation (see Figure 10 below), was 
the one to create some of the working meetings, such as: the Political and Human 
Rights and the Economic one. According to him, the chairing role, over time, as 
these meetings develop, would be a shared role with the MS through co-chairing 
certain meetings (for example, on human rights) or even taking over the chairing role 
(for example, on Schengen) (interv. 33). 
 
Figure 10: Internal organisation of the EU Delegation in Minsk, 2014 
 
 
Source: authors’ compilation during the fieldwork conducted in Belarus in 2014 and based on the website of the 
EU Delegation in Minsk (currently archived) 
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Figure 10 above presents the post-Lisbon organigramme of the EU Delegation 
based on the field-work conducted in Belarus in 2014. Little information was 
disclosed on the internal organisation of the Commission representation. Based on 
the archived webpage of the latter, in 2010, the delegation was run by the HoD 
residing in Kiev; on the ground, there was the Chargé d’affaires a.i., a political officer 
and a project manager. The situation clearly changed with the appointment of Mrs. 
Mora as HoD to the Delegation to Belarus where she also resided, unlike the 
previous HoD. Whereas no data was available on the individual units in terms of 
size, what becomes apparent from the figure is that the Operations section was the 
largest one. This is in line with the data presented in Table 23 in the beginning of this 
chapter that showed that out of a total of 27, 17 were Commission personnel which 
came, as interviewees confirmed, from DG DevCo (interv. 33). 
On the ground, one of the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty implied that the 
Delegations were supposed to have one-third of their staff from EEAS and the 
member-states that would work together with the Commission staff (DG DevCo and 
DG Trade). Internally, the lines of command were blurred as seconded national 
diplomats stationed in Minsk were, de jure, EEAS staff, but in practice, “I am 
responsible in front of not just the EEAS but also in front of DG DevCo, but I am not 
double-hatted” (interv. 33). Furthermore, evidence showed that within the 
Delegation, there was no visa diplomacy, no cultural diplomacy, and no trade 
diplomacy, just technical and political cooperation as the main activity performed by 
the staff in the Operations (DG DevCo) dealing with the technicalities of the reports 
(ibidem). What becomes obvious from Figure 10 above is that the Delegation was 
lacking an Economic and Trade Section and, as discussed previously, the 
coordination of economic counsellor meetings fell under the Political, Press and 
Information Section. This meant that the Delegation reports were done together on 
issues where the dossiers of political officers overlapped and separately on specific, 
sectoral areas (usually done by the staff in the Operations section), with the approval 
from the Head of Delegation (interv. 33). What was seen as problematic for the 
political officers in the Delegation is that the Press and Information unit under the 
Political, Press and Information Section relied, in their daily activity, on the hired local 
staff and given the sensitive political issues discussed in the meetings, the diplomatic 
personnel also had to conduct strict oversight of the work of the local staff (ibidem). 
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In relation to human resources, a general observation was made in Minsk, common 
to both the national and Union diplomatic representations: that they were 
understaffed or lacking expertise. National diplomats observed that since most 
embassies were small, in some meetings there were only 2-3 diplomats sharing 
positions and opinions (interv. 36). This, in turn, created a vicious circle as the same 
diplomats participated in different working groups and reaching consensus was a 
challenge: “while divergence of opinion is good, as you can recognize the expertise 
of each country, and helps you put things in perspective, most of the time diplomats 
disagree not on goals but on means” (ibidem). Some added to this, that in these 
cases personal charm and personality mattered: “it is about the people, to be friendly 
and understanding; in other cases (working in Central Asia) you have to be more 
convincing and then the diplomatic activity is tense” (interv. 37). But, as one national 
diplomat explained, diplomats resorted to certain tricks when they could not reach 
agreement - they were less specific, used a vaguer language and took a position that 
was not clear and left room for interpretation (interv. 34). Besides diplomatic 
skillfulness, professional experience and know-how were of significant importance to 
the community. What was of central importance for the diplomatic community were 
the language skills (Russian specifically) and the experience accumulated of all 
participants (interv. 37). For example, the Head of Political Section also had to deal 
with trade issues on which he was lacking proper know-how, therefore he preferred 
to co-chair the meetings with a national diplomat. In certain meetings, his lack of 
expertise was a means for convergence among MS “it is not natural for me to chair 
the Schengen group, yet my background helped to be approved by colleagues and 
have confidence” (interv. 33). 
On the ground, the conduct of diplomacy was also affected by the institutional 
tensions in Brussels that reflected in the Delegations. Diplomatic staff found it difficult 
to have two lines of reporting in Brussels – to the EEAS and to the Commission – 
and saw this as creating dividing lines and separation within the Delegation. What 
happened was that as the chairing role was performed by the EEAS or seconded 
diplomats in the Delegations they had to report to the respective DGs in Brussels, so 
“the main chain of command is not the EEAS but the DGs” (interv. 33). The 
respective DGs sent inquiries with precise and specific questions to the diplomats in 
the Delegation in Minsk which required a specific technical expertise that diplomats 
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did not necessarily have. Hence, providing an answer from an expert was a 
challenging task and created dividing walls between the Delegation and Brussels. As 
one EU diplomat explained, what worked to their advantage within the Delegation 
was that the close cooperation was created as the team was small and young, yet 
what was a disadvantage were the administrative barriers within the Delegation that 
reflected the Brussels ‘turf wars’ (ibidem). 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
In Belarus, as empirical evidence presented in this chapter discussed, the 
development of bilateral relations with the EU fluctuated between engagement and 
isolation, was conditioned by the progress in the areas of democracy, respect of 
human rights, and the rule of law in Belarus and was largely dominated by sanctions 
for the last two decades. The period of rapprochement started with Belarus taking 
part in the multilateral track of the Eastern Partnership and the opening of the EU 
Delegation in Minsk in 2008. Findings presented on the diplomatic performance of 
the European Union in Belarus were discussed according to the three established 
criteria in the analytical framework - effectiveness, relevance and capability – and 
assessed in the same structured manner. 
In this thesis, effectiveness is generally operationalised as goal attainment and is 
evaluated on two dimensions. The first one explored the level of democratic 
governance in Belarus based on the level of adaptation to EU rules and norms under 
the framework of the EaP. Findings showed that Belarus had the poorest scores on 
all dimensions of cooperation with the EU due to its low level of alignment to EU 
rules and norms (see Table 25). In 2014, Belarus was included on the list of most 
repressive countries in the world and its human rights record qualified it as a ‘black 
hole’ on the European map. Some improvements in EU-Belarus relations took place 
after 2013: in June 2014, the EU and the Republic of Belarus started to negotiate 
visa facilitation and readmission agreements and launched negotiations on the 
Mobility Partnership in 2015. And, the release of 6 political prisoners by President 
Lukashenko in August 2015, was seen as important progress in the improvement of 
relations between Belarus and the EU. 
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Although Belarus was not one of the neighbouring countries included in the ENP, the 
EU offered financial assistance via TACIS to support Belarus’ transition to a 
democratic market-oriented economy. The volume of technical assistance offered to 
Belarus (Table 24) represented more than 40% of all the technical assistance 
provided to the country, which made the EU become the single largest donor of 
assistance to this country in 2006. Although the activity of the diplomatic community 
in Belarus followed traditional diplomatic functions, MS embassies and the 
Delegation channelled their bilateral interaction with Belarus in a manner that 
supported Belarus’ democratisation progress within the EaP framework. This could 
be seen in the range of their activities in Belarus: Latvia, for example, was active in 
cooperation among countries in economic, in particular transit, cross-border, cultural, 
educational and scientific, border control and management, environmental 
protection, cooperation between municipalities and people-to-people contacts fields. 
The visits of high-level Austrian officials to Belarus discussed issues of regional and 
international cooperation and the parties agreed on a series of steps to deepen 
cooperation between the two countries and to intensify the dialogue between Belarus 
and the European Union.  
On a second dimension, findings showed that the Union Delegation was 
representing the Union and post-Lisbon, the first obvious change was the (absence 
of) rotating Presidency which brought more centralization and formalization of the 
cooperation in the hands of the Delegation. In order to do so, the EU Delegation 
created several working groups where diplomats regularly met, as presented in 
Table 26. The upgrade from Commission representation to Union delegation in third 
countries, also meant that the latter had to act in close cooperation with member-
states. Therefore, to assess relevance, evidence collected discussed corporate 
diplomatic practices in Belarus in relation to formulation and implementation of the 
common approach. For the Delegation, the common approach became about the 
member-states’ ability to forge something in common which, for national diplomats 
implied that the common approach was about a constant dialogue in Minsk and in 
Brussels to help identify the most important points of action. Empirical evidence 
showed several examples of joint EUD and MS collaborations such as the MOST 
project in 2014 or multilateral collaboration between member-states such as the 
Culture and Creativity programme (between UK, Poland and Germany). In Minsk, 
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there were also regional frameworks of cooperation such as Visegrad and the Nordic 
groups which released common statements (Visegrad) and shared diplomatic 
resources on the ground (for example, the Finnish diplomat co-located in the 
Swedish embassy).  
An examination of the communication infrastructure, and of social and political 
capital conducted in the final section of this chapter presented findings on the last 
criterion, capabilities. Between 2010 and 2015, findings showed that the oldest form 
of interaction that engaged all diplomatic actors was the Schengen meeting, 
established in 2010 and the most recent one, was the one of the economic 
counsellors that had their first meeting in November 2014. National diplomats 
present in Minsk put great value on the fact that these meetings became a valuable 
networking and information-sharing opportunity. Given the mandate of the 
Delegation to maintain a dialogue with the government of Belarus and with local 
stakeholders on economic, social, governance, human rights and other policy 
issues), the HoMs meetings and the role played by the HoD in this sense were 
important. Diplomats noted that the openness and willingness to cooperate as well 
as the transparency that the Delegation presented in its activity also depended on 
the HoD, Mrs. Maira Mora. Evidence further showed that on the ground, the conduct 
of diplomacy was also affected by the institutional tensions in Brussels that were 
reflected in the Delegations as the diplomatic staff found it difficult to have two lines 
of reporting in Brussels – to the EEAS and to the Commission. 
As could be seen in this chapter, there were both positive tendencies as well as 
challenges in the conduct of diplomacy in Belarus. The latter, in particular in terms of 
capabilities, were not particularly new but were echoing the Brussels ‘turf-wars’. In 
more general terms, however, the context of relations with Belarus and the 
development of relations from engagement to isolation and to rapprochement 
affected the conduct of diplomacy. These findings, together with the evidence 
presented on Moldova (chapter 4) and Ukraine (chapter 5), will be discussed in detail 
in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 7. Drivers and dividers of EU 
diplomatic performance in Eastern Europe 
After having presented and generally discussed the empirical evidence on diplomatic 
performance in Moldova (Chapter 4), Ukraine (Chapter 5) and Belarus (Chapter 6), 
this chapter aims to bring the findings from the three countries together in order to 
compare and contrast them. As defined earlier in the analytical framework (Chapter 
3), this will be done qualitatively by deriving empirical lessons vis-à-vis the three 
chosen criteria: effectiveness, relevance and capabilities. The exploratory case-
studies conducted in this thesis allowed for the development, during the field-work, of 
an additional set of questions concerned with the understanding of diplomatic 
practices. In addressing them we could acquire information in areas where there was 
limited prior understanding about the conduct of EU diplomacy in Eastern Europe in 
general. This in turn, allowed us to uncover drivers and dividers of EU diplomatic 
performance in Eastern Europe. Given the exploratory nature of this thesis, as 
explained in the introduction (see section 1.3.), the investigation conducted for this 
research was guided by three assumptions (section 2.3.2.). Comparing and 
contrasting the findings from the three countries contributes also to probing the three 
working assumptions and linking the discussion in this chapter with the three 
dilemma presented in Chapter 2. Whereas in the previous three chapters empirical 
evidence was presented on a country by country basis, this chapter will provide a 
discussion of findings on all three countries, i.e. diplomatic performance in Eastern 
Europe. 
A starting point for the discussion of diplomatic performance in Eastern Europe is the 
one of effectiveness. In the first section of this chapter, looking at performance 
implies examining and evaluating EU diplomatic practices against pre-set goals 
(identified in the ENP and the Lisbon Treaty) as well as understanding how the 
everyday practices between 2010 and 2015 informed the EU’s actions. The second 
section will explore relevance or, as operationalized in Chapter 3, the relationship 
between national and EU level diplomats. Looking at performance from the position 
of relevance, allows us to uncover the corporate diplomatic practices that existed on 
the ground in Eastern Europe in 2010-2015, which implies their cooperation 
practices in formulating and implementing a common approach. The third section, 
214 
then, proceeds with a screening of diplomatic capabilities as operationalized in the 
analytical framework. Subsequently, findings on the three case-studies facilitate the 
discussion of the “drivers” and “dividers” in EU diplomatic performance in the fourth 
section. Finally, this chapter concludes with reflections regarding the three working 
assumptions for overcoming EU foreign policy dilemmas via the use of diplomacy. 
 
7.1. Effectiveness: goal-attainment in Eastern Europe 
Effectiveness has been defined in the analytical framework as the ability to fulfil 
goals by an actor. For a diplomatic actor, as operationalised in Chapter 3, the 
purpose is to secure foreign policy objectives. From this perspective, the notion of 
effectiveness encompasses the ability (or failure) to link means and ends by the EU 
in a specific environment, which in the case of this thesis is Eastern Europe. The 
empirical evidence collected on Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus had as reference 
point the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Lisbon Treaty, from which 
we have derived benchmarks against which we can assess performance.  
Based on the findings on Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, we can conclude that there 
is a positive dynamic in relation to EU performance according to the effectiveness 
benchmarks set in this thesis. It is fair to say, that after the inauguration of the EEAS, 
on the ground, the function of representation happened naturally and the EU 
Delegation did not replace national embassies. Opened initially as Commission 
representations: in Kiev in 1993, in Chisinau in 2005 and in Minsk in 2008, post-
Lisbon, the EU delegations acquired legal recognition that upgraded the former 
Commission representations to full-blown Union delegations. Findings showed that 
the task of representing the EU as a whole that has been given to the EU 
delegations was embraced in all three countries. For diplomats within the EU 
delegations, the practice of diplomacy is:  
“[…] the duty to properly represent the interests of the EU citizens, 
businesses, society and the EU member-states vis-à-vis our [Ukrainian] 
counterparts. We have to be able to present them to the public in third 
countries; to present a proper and unbiased picture of the EU, to explain our 
[EU] position, to provide the background of what is going on in the EU, what is 
the position of the EU” (interv. 16). 
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Consequently, the conduct of diplomacy for national diplomats implied representing 
their own country and a constant exercise to “try to influence the situation in order to 
reach the foreign policy goals of my country” (interv. 27). The main division of tasks 
regarding representation is hence straightforward: the EU delegations represent the 
EU in areas of exclusive and shared competences, while every member state 
represents its own interests bilaterally with the host country. 
The responsibility for representation and cooperation was taken over by most EU 
delegations from early 2010. It appeared that embracing this diplomatic function of 
representation provided continuity and built diplomatic capacity — issues that raised 
concerns pre-Lisbon and were associated with the rotating Presidency. Findings 
showed that in Moldova or Ukraine, having the role of the rotating Presidency 
occupied by a small member state could become a diplomatic disaster, especially if 
the member state had no previous experience of this role, was under-staffed and 
was mainly involved in bilateral diplomatic relations. The extreme negative 
consequence of this was that it showed the lack of knowledge of smaller member 
states of the EU context or even the agenda vis-à-vis third countries. From another 
perspective, in Belarus, the fact that EU member states, especially newcomers to the 
EU, will no longer have the opportunity to be in the role of a Presidency was seen as 
a downturn, in the sense that it was important for local authorities to see that the EU 
is entrusting a MS with playing such a central role. 
Post-Lisbon, abolishing the chairmanship of the EU Presidency in host countries 
increased the EU’s visibility, as the EU delegation represented the EU in all policy 
areas where the EU has competence. Whereas it was initially expected that this 
would be a highly difficult logistical effort for the newly established EU delegations, in 
practice the level of engagement with the member states’ embassies on this matter 
was relatively high, also because of the Commission representations’ previous 
activity. Besides, the EU delegations were constantly growing their expertise in 
representing the EU. Member states’ embassies therefore entrusted the delegations 
with the (EU) representation role, while still preserving their watchdog role. This 
came with the EU delegation acquiring diplomats at the level of Head of Delegation 
and in the Political and Economic sections; as well as policy officers who had 
previous diplomatic experience. On the ground, there was a lot of synergy and 
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cohesion in relation to the traditional function of diplomacy among the EU 
delegations and national embassies, including those embassies that had been in 
host countries since the early 90s. There was a general openness towards the 
assumed leading role of the EU delegations, while national embassies were still 
trying to preserve their own visibility or their autonomous position.  
Therefore, contrary to doubts generated by research regarding the new EU 
diplomatic machine (Balfour et al., 2012; Emerson et al., 2011; Lehne, 2011), it 
seems that the Lisbon Treaty changes made the EU’s system of diplomacy more 
robust, as claimed by Smith (2014). This robustness was reflected through the EU’s 
ability to significantly extend its presence in third countries and acquire more explicit 
institutional foundations (ibidem). This, in turn, comes with MS embracing ‘symbolic 
representation’. Scholars explained that the latter referred historically to the practice 
of diplomatic envoys representing rulers without necessarily coming from the same 
polity, which was not uncommon (Jönsson & Hall, 2005). Such a diplomatic practice 
departs from the traditional understanding of representation as ‘acting for others’ 
(acting on explicit instructions and as mere agents) towards ‘standing for others’ 
(diplomats can be perceived as symbols of other things than their own polity) 
(Jönsson, 2008). Hence, after the inauguration of the EEAS, we can account for a 
change in diplomatic practice in Eastern Europe through the deterritorialization of 
diplomatic representation. As Sending, Pouliot and Neumann (2011; 2015) argued, 
the latter is attributable to value-systems where constituents differ in that they are not 
territorially defined – as is the case of the EU and its member-states. 
Furthermore, this openness of MS embassies towards the EUD embracing the 
function of representing the Union is related to the fact that the national objectives of 
the MS are also a product of the negotiations in Brussels and, as Spence (2008) 
emphasized, through EU coordination in Brussels, national diplomats come to share 
objectives among themselves, even when this is ‘the expression of the lowest 
common denominator’ (p. 65). Moreover, while some have pointed out the principal-
agent relations between representatives and represented and that diplomats find 
themselves ‘stranded between constituents’ (Hill, 1991, p. 97), others have 
highlighted that foreign ministries and embassies have become ‘co-participants’ 
(Hocking, 2002, p. 285). Similarly, according to empirical evidence presented in this 
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thesis, MS embassies and the EU delegations became co-participants in 
representing the Union (according to the Lisbon Treaty) as well as in pursuing the 
ENP/EaP agenda on the ground. Or, as Bickerton (2011) argues, one of the main 
functions of the EU foreign policy is to actually be a route of pursuit of national 
strategies (p. 6). 
The activity of both the EU delegations and the MS embassies, in Eastern Europe, 
showed their increasing role in facilitating the achievement of ENP and EaP goals. 
The activity of the diplomatic community in Ukraine during 2010-2015 revolved 
around Ukraine’s agenda for integration to the EU. Diplomats’ major tasks were 
related to political developments in relation to the progress and the reform agenda of 
Ukraine and they developed instruments to support democratization, good 
governance and the rule of law, and the human rights reforms (interv. 18). The 
Delegations also played a great role in reporting on the progress achieved by these 
countries within the ENP and EaP in relation to carrying out of specific reforms which 
can be seen within the ENP Progress Reports for individual countries. Member-state 
embassies focused their activities on specific goals such as “to have stable 
neighbours, less migration pressure, less human trafficking, stable political 
environment, stronger institutions and a better security environment (interv. 39); all of 
which are objectives within the ENP and EaP.  
Based on the background of EU’s relations with the three countries and the 
commitment of Moldova and Ukraine specifically to engage in EU-driven reforms 
according to the AA/DCFTA agenda, findings pointed to the fact that the practice of 
EU diplomacy has to do with shaping or influencing these countries internal 
dynamics. Through their diplomatic activity, both member-state embassies and the 
EU delegations engaged in what Keukeleire et al. (2009) identify as ‘structural 
diplomacy’. The latter is defined by the intensity of the diplomatic activity, a long-term 
approach and embeddedness within a broader range of foreign policy activities. The 
active approach of the diplomatic community in all three countries showed high 
intensity: besides statements, their activity was supported by actions in the form of 
joint monitoring missions (e.g.: the Cox-Kwasniewski mission in Ukraine), joint 
collaborations on education (e.g.: MOST project in Belarus) or joint programming 
(e.g.: water-management projects in Moldova). The long-term approach of the MS 
embassies and the EU Delegation was seen through their engagement from the 
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onset of the ENP and EaP policies and their statements on committing to continue 
providing assistance on European integration reforms beyond 2015. As the policies 
for Eastern Europe (ENP and EaP) developed and considered civil society a 
stakeholder for these countries to implement reforms, the diplomatic interaction in 
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus also became highly diverse (and by extension, 
embedded in further activities). Besides their traditional diplomatic role, even in 
Belarus, where the diplomatic relationship started to develop from 2008 onwards, 
national embassies and the EU delegations became very active in their roles as 
donors and developed a strong relationship with civil society organisations, not just 
the governments. Through their activity as donors, diplomatic actors invested in 
strengthening reforms and fostering democratic developments in these countries.But 
this is only one part of the story in the direction towards EU diplomatic performance. 
Surprisingly, effectiveness does not only reflect on achieving EU foreign policy 
objectives as a set of external goals, but also as internal ones and links to the 
research conducted by Bickerton (2011). In this case, it is less building the EU’s own 
sense of identity than keeping the EaP countries in play as possible future EU 
members with their own European identities without the promise of membership 
given the  enlargement fatigue. This is to say that it is the EU foreing policy that is 
the vehicle for goals, “which is made up of conflictual political relations between 
unstable and functionally disparate institutions” (p. 3).Taking into consideration the 
way in which MS embassies and the EUD act together on the ground, as discussed 
in the next section, certain challenges related to EU corporate diplomatic practices 
are brought forward. Variations in the degree of EUD-MS embassies engagement 
came with the political culture of the EU member states themselves: countries such 
as Germany, Sweden or the Netherlands were very outgoing, flexible, 
straightforward and transparent, which facilitated better cooperation with the EU 
delegation. Others, such as Poland, Romania, Hungary or Slovakia, were more 
traditional, engaging in bilateral diplomacy. 
 
7.2. Relevance: corporate diplomatic practices in Eastern Europe 
Representing the Union as a political entity through the EU delegations is an 
important step forward vis-à-vis EU performance. On the ground, however, the 
challenge for common diplomatic practices revolved around the new amendments of 
219 
the Lisbon Treaty regarding formulating and implementing a common approach (art. 
32). Assessing diplomatic performance in relation to ongoing relevance, implies, as 
defined in the analytical framework (Chapter 3), an examination of the extent to 
which all parties (MS embassies and EUDs) engaged in acting collectively on the 
ground. In practice, this implies engaging in forms of multilateral diplomacy, where 
cooperation is key. Findings in relation to relevance have uncovered patterns of 
corporate diplomatic practices, meaning ‘those practices that are performed by 
collectives in unison’ (Adler & Pouliot, 2011, p. 8). This allowed us to address the 
juxtaposition between the European and the national level that has been challenged 
by European integration theory.  
Findings showed that in Eastern Europe, corporate diplomatic practices have 
transitioned from a hierarchical to a networking form of diplomacy. The varied forms 
of meetings and interactions on the ground (presented in Tables 12, 20 and 26) 
anchored the EU diplomatic actors in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus in networks. 
And whereas the typology of meetings coordinated by the EUDs brought 
formalisation, centralisation and institutionalisation of diplomatic practices on the one 
hand; on the other hand, evidence showed that their development as a need to 
engage with an increasingly diverse range of actors is a manifestation of networking 
as a phenomenon. Between 2010 and 2015, what played a major role in reaching a 
common approach was the fact that that the frequency of meetings could be 
adjusted on the go and was not bound by rigid hierarchical structures. Furthermore, 
it became obvious that diplomatic practices on the ground anchored MS in a 
European setting of networking. Swidler (2001) explained that ‘anchoring practices’ 
work to the extent to which a group identifies with a set of practices “in which 
asserting one’s membership in the community means creating or joining a group 
which then claims [their] spot” (p. 92). Others further showed that some practices 
work as ‘anchoring practices’ when they provide ‘tools’ and ‘resources’ that actors 
need in order to engage with others (Sending & Neumann, 2011). This was possible 
on the ground through designing a network of meetings at different levels (from 
Heads of delegations and missions and deputy Heads to the level of counsellors) 
with different topics (thematic meetings on human rights, development cooperation, 
energy and transport, economic and commercial and press and information) and 
different degrees of ceremonialism (formal and informal). The fact that post-Lisbon 
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there was a higher level of involvement of the EU Delegation (as highlighted in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6), and in general all members of the EU diplomatic community 
present in these countries, played its part in reaching the common approach.  
It can also be argued that the high degree of cooperation put emphasis on the 
emergence of what Hocking and Smith (2016) identify as ‘multistakeholder’ 
diplomatic processes. These processes, as the authors argued, are based on 
inclusiveness and partnership and aim at bringing together all major stakeholders in 
a new form of ‘common decision finding’ (ibidem). For example, for the EU 
Delegation in Kiev, the common approach implied a high degree of cooperation 
established through constant meetings with the EU member states’ embassies, at 
different levels. This new function resembled the Council working procedures in 
Brussels, with the major difference being that, on the ground, there was little room to 
take immediate actions as such directives come from Brussels. Therefore, instead of 
decision-making, on the ground, corporate diplomatic practices were rather a form of 
common decision-finding as the cooperation with MS function quite often became 
the task of acting as the broker of common approaches or common statements. 
Once a common agreement had been reached on the ground, it was easier to act as 
one consolidated team vis-à-vis the host country.  
Evidence further showed that ‘multistakeholder diplomacy’ came with burden-sharing 
as a form of anchoring practices. Mérand and Rayroux (2016) discussed in their 
research burden-sharing of European security practitioners as an example of 
anchoring practices that “define the constitutive rules of interactive patterns in social 
groups. Even if some members of the social group disagree with the dominant rule, 
by criticising it, they actually reinforce the latter’s centrality, as a common point of 
reference for the group” (p. 444). In Moldova and Ukraine, national embassies 
regarded the cooperation performed by the EU delegations positively. On the one 
hand, they were free of the logistical burden that came with the rotating Presidency 
role; on the other hand, they had, in addition to the instrument of bilateral diplomacy, 
the European apparatus (to use in achieving their foreign policy goals). In Belarus, 
for example, there are certain expectations from national diplomats regarding this 
function. Some argued that the EU Delegation in Minsk needed to do more, while 
others considered the EU Delegation’s role to be neutral. For the EU delegations in 
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Eastern Europe, the Lisbon Treaty changes meant more work. This new function of 
cooperation brought more pressure. In Belarus, for example, for the EU delegations, 
this function implied that they needed to follow the political discussions all the time 
and to understand the current state of affairs in the host country. In Kiev and 
Chisinau, this function implied for the Delegations an extensive secretarial task of 
organizing, composing agendas, note-taking, information-gathering and sharing. 
Creating synergies in cooperation for achieving the common approach was a 
challenging task for the EU delegation. EU member states benefited differently from 
common meetings, yet they were not always open about it; which made it difficult for 
the EU delegation to synthesize the results. As Mérand and Rayroux (2016) 
conclude, “practices are not as clear-cut as motives and norms because they are 
enacted by real social actors who play different games at the same time” (p. 457). 
Moreover, the authors also explained that burden-sharing as an anchoring practice 
does not suggest that national interest or strategic considerations or even prestige 
do not matter; all of these are taken into consideration by actors when deciding to 
engage in collective action. In Moldova and Ukraine, for example, some member 
states were not cooperative at all and did not come to meetings. This was for 
different reasons: from more objective reasons, such as lack of personnel, low or no 
knowledge of English (the working language of the meetings), to less objective 
reasons such as not being interested in the issue. Thus, acting as a broker for the 
common approach was not an easy task for the EUDs. It was often rather 
complicated, especially in those sensitive areas where EU member states had 
certain interests, whether migration, education, visas, energy or trade. Some 
(Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia) lobbied the EU Delegation strongly; being 
very active in pushing for their own interests, and as neighbours of the host 
countries, they felt more confident in their national diplomatic line than in the EU 
approach.  
Corporate diplomatic practices, as Adler and Pouliot (2011) defined, refer to the 
actions of a community of representatives whose members enter into regular 
relations within an organised social context. In Eastern Europe, what came across 
the interviews was that corporate diplomatic practices were bound by context or, as 
Adler-Niessen (2008) defined – the diplomatic field. In this sense, the stratification of 
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the diplomatic field in Eastern Europe, understood as a social system consisting of a 
patterned set of practices, was defined by the political development of relations 
between the three countries and the EU. For the EU Delegation in Minsk, the 
common approach was very much about the EU member states that had to 
implement or respect the modus vivendi designed in Brussels, where policy towards 
Belarus had been shaped: ‘what is decided in Brussels is the Bible’ (interv. 33). This 
was due to the recent rapprochement in relations with Belarus that had been largely 
dominated by sanctions for the last two decades. The common approach was thus 
about relating to the general political lines established in Brussels and, if this did not 
happen on the ground, diplomats then reverted to Brussels to react and look for 
common lines. Moreover, in Belarus, side-stepping could actually imply a political 
and diplomatic deadlock, which EU member states thus tended to avoid. For those 
EU member states that had been engaged in diplomatic endeavours for a longer 
amount of time, the common approach was sometimes about even more practical 
things, such as ensuring that everyone attended common meetings and public 
events: “in a small community, if all or none attend, it is not only visible but may send 
the wrong message to the host country” (interv. 36).  
In a different context, in Chisinau and Kiev, some national diplomats find that what 
was lacking was cooperation on policy matters. The weakness of Moldova–EU 
diplomatic relations, for example, was the exercise of lobbying the Moldovan 
authorities as a common front. For the EU Delegation in Moldova, the common 
approach was, in the context of different EU member states’ interests, the result of 
the compromise between a more technical and a more political approach towards 
the host country. Even if technical aid took most space in the diplomatic cooperation 
between member-states and the Delegation, diplomats noticed over time that the 
Delegation itself was reluctant to upgrade the cooperation to joint programming and 
the conduct of diplomacy was aid-driven. Although some national diplomats 
considered that ‘this is not how diplomacy really functions’ (interv. 40), they 
continued to engage in the practice of aid-driven diplomacy. The high involvement of 
both MS embassies and the EUDs in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus in implementing 
and overseeing financial assistance offered to these countries bilaterally or via EU 
channels, meant that the EU diplomatic actors on the ground belonged to a 
community of practice. As Bicchi (2016) explained, the latter is a community based 
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on practice that develops, through its activities specific identity and a set of 
resources specific to the group. In this context, it can be argued that EU diplomatic 
actors acting as donors and engaging in a wide variety of technical-aid cooperation 
meetings and reporting, become an example of community of practice. 
The discussion in this section is also conscious of the fact that emerging practices on 
the ground often stem from already existing practices; as Pouliot and Cornut (2015) 
showed in their research “when change occurs, new and innovative practices need 
to be synchronous with the past in order to resonate in the present” (pp. 306-307). 
The findings that discuss capabilities, the third criterion, bring forward how EU and 
MS diplomats in Eastern Europe routinely shared a practice of information-sharing 
and technical-aid cooperation, and that this was a path-dependent practice as much 
as a practice that was intertwined with the ENP and EaP goals. Hence, in the 
following section, a detailed screening of EU diplomatic resources on the ground is 
conducted. 
 
7.3. Capabilities: a screening of resources in Eastern Europe 
EU capabilities, as discussed in the analytical framework, go beyond establishing 
diplomatic offices overseas; as operationalised in Chapter 3, they refer to the EU’s 
ability to maintain these offices, to mobilise and use resources and to use them in a 
manner that adds value to its diplomatic actions on the ground. An examination of 
resources in chapters 4-6 evaluated information and communication as a diplomatic 
asset, including observations of practices of information-gathering and especially 
information-sharing among diplomatic actors as well as their competencies and 
knowledge. 
An initial screening of resources further shows that the EU diplomatic actors in 
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus between 2010-2015 were anchored in a ‘community 
of practice’. There are three identifying elements of a community of practice: an 
ongoing mutual engagement, a sense of joint enterprise and a shared repertoire 
(Bicchi, 2016); all of which could be observed on the ground. Findings showed a 
wide and varied typology of the diplomats’ communication infrastructure in Moldova 
and Ukraine (presented in Tables 12 and 20) and a developing one in Belarus (Table 
26). These meetings constituted mechanisms of cooperation, provided a common 
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communication infrastructure and accounted for regular institutionalized practices of 
diplomatic interaction. Empirical evidence further emphasized that EU diplomatic 
actors engaged on a regular basis (depending on the format, meetings vary in 
frequency: weekly, monthly, quarterly) in a high degree of information-sharing via 
written and oral reports, formal and informal data, as well as exchange of personal 
contacts. These meetings and the engagement of the diplomatic community during 
these meetings represent elements of a community of practice: ongoing mutual 
engagement (the practice of doing something regularly) and a shared repertoire 
(creating a specific set of tools and resources). Finally, the sense of joint enterprise 
is defined by members’ shared sense of a common identity; the latter refers to “a 
routine of socially meaningful doing [… that bring the group] the sense of joint 
enterprise involved in accomplishing a task” (Bicchi, 2016, p. 464). This could be 
seen, in the fact that the activities of national diplomats in bilateral diplomacy were 
happening within the broader EU context of relations with Moldova, Ukraine or 
Belarus. Therefore, their national agendas were related to political developments in 
relation to the progress of the EU-driven reform agenda of these countries and 
subsequently they developed instruments to support democratization, good 
governance and the rule of law or the human rights reforms. It is important to note 
that the sense of joint enterprise does not imply that everyone has to be in 
agreement, “but there must be a local, contextualised, indigenous response to 
external challenges [to the community of practice]” (ibidem). As an EU diplomat 
stated, in such cases, on the ground there was, among MS, a sort of ‘gentleman’s 
silent agreement’, meaning that what they agreed on were the minimum possible 
things and their role was then to convince their headquarters about them and find 
solutions (interv. 33). 
Research has pointed out the quintessential role of communication for diplomacy, 
and that a key diplomatic task that transforms into coordination is the clear 
communication of intent (Jönsson and Hall, 2005; Neumann, 2008); hence in 
achieving coordination, the crucial skill is communication, which allows one to ‘get 
the right signal across’ (Adler & Pouilot, 2011, p. 9). Based on the evidence 
presented in the empirical part of this thesis (chapters 4, 5 and 6), it is obvious that 
communication was at the core of the diplomatic interaction on the ground and that 
the EU delegations started to play a more central role in becoming an informational 
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network hub. The positive development post-Lisbon in this sense was the extensive 
communication infrastructure discussed above, coordinated by the EU delegations 
and open to all EU member states. Analysts note that sharing of information within 
these meetings is a considered a crucial resource for diplomacy (Berridge, 2015). As 
evidence showed, the reports from the ground in Eastern Europe were shared 
through the common system – AGORA and COREU network - which carries 
communications related to CFSP, and involved exchanges of reports within the 
diplomatic network; most were political reports coming from the HoD. COREU 
allowed for a flow of information between the EUDs and MS as well as between 
EUDs and EEAS.  
But this was not necessarily an emerging practice on the ground; rather, it was one 
that already existed on the ground and was highly visible in Kiev and Chisinau. The 
legacy of Commission representations and a certain path-dependency was 
noticeable in all three countries. On the one hand, the Commission offices were 
established as information offices and the EU delegations embraced fully the 
traditional communication function. On the other, the EU delegations embraced more 
technical tasks, such as project management, as the Commission offices were 
established as operational offices. A delegation’s activities were therefore divided 
among operational, administrative, and political and diplomatic issues. As Figures 4 
and 956 showed, in Moldova and Ukraine, only approximately 10 and respectively 15 
per cent of the work related to the main functions of traditional diplomacy such as 
gathering, synthesizing and producing information, intelligence and counter-
intelligence, producing reports and policy advice for headquarters, representing EU 
interests through engaging in public diplomacy, or developing economic and 
commercial cooperation through engaging in trade diplomacy. In contrast, 
approximately 50 per cent of the activity (the Commission legacy) was related to 
operational activities or what we earlier discussed as aid-driven diplomacy with tasks 
such as project management in the areas of good governance and democratization, 
economic cooperation and social and regional development, and infrastructure and 
environment-related developments. Diplomatic practice in Eastern Europe, hence, 
diversified and expanded to the extent of embracing new functions, such as acting 
                                                   
56 No data has been disclosed about the structure of work of the EU Delegation in Minsk given that the circumstances for 
conducting interviews in Belarus were more diificult, as explained in Chpater 1 (see 1.3.) 
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as a donor. This, relatively new practice of diplomacy, the aid-driven one, was 
reflected in Eastern Europe in the internal structures of the Delegations, both pre and 
post-Lisbon (see Figures 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10). In all three countries, the operational 
sections in the EU delegations were bigger than the political ones. 
A further evaluation of resources reflected on human resources issues, establishing 
a European esprit de corps and institutional turf wars as dimensions of capabilities 
on the ground. As a general observation, human resource issues were recurrent for 
both the national and Union diplomatic representations: for example, being 
understaffed; not sufficiently trained in EU policy-making; understanding, or the 
language of the host country. For national embassies, the issue of esprit de corps 
was mainly linked to most embassies being understaffed. Most embassies were 
small, with only two or three diplomats present. Another factor identifying human 
resources was the age range, experience accumulated of all participants and their 
language skills: being a skilful diplomat and knowing at least Russian was extremely 
important in all three countries. For the EUDs in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, 
having one-third of their personnel from the EEAS brought the ‘diplomatic’ into their 
activity. Yet these were national diplomats, who were former employees of their 
ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) and who, after spending four years in the host 
country, would return not to the EEAS in Brussels but to their national MFA. 
Furthermore, given the number of EEAS staff and Commission staff in the 
Delegations (see Table 6), the latter represented a much larger proportion. 
Another specific diplomatic practice in relation to human resources was also bound 
by the local context. This meant that EU Delegations were hiring local staff who, 
unlike their supervisors, spoke the local language. Usually Commission personnel 
(Operations sections) did not have a requirement to speak the local language. Yet, 
since reports from the Operations section bypassed the EEAS staff, with the 
exception of the HoD, these reports might carry an indirect political message vis-à-
vis the host country. For example, EEAS staff in the EU delegations were surprised 
to read about positive developments regarding reforms carried out by certain 
ministries in the host countries. Such technical reports may therefore tailor a political 
message of approval to those ministries, which, according to political officers in the 
EU delegations, could be seen as an indirect message of political support; and this 
was not necessarily aligned with the EU’s political position in Brussels vis-à-vis the 
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country. EEAS staff in the EU delegations had the possibility of seeing the relevant 
reports a couple of days before they were published, but since the latter had already 
been approved in Brussels, this was merely done for informational purposes. 
Research on EU diplomatic practice has discussed the symbolic power of national 
diplomats, achieved due to their states’ symbolic position versus the potential of the 
symbolic power of the EEAS (Adler-Niessen, 2014). But research also shows that 
the struggle between national diplomacy and the EU’s new diplomatic service 
concerning its symbolic power is unsubstantiated (ibidem). Observations from the 
fieldwork conducted in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus pointed to the fact that the 
struggle over symbolic power is not so much located in the intersection of the 
national and EU levels but rather in the inter-institutional dimension. This links back 
to research conducted by Koenig (2011) that put emphasis on issues related to 
institutional coherence especially when different institutional actors share 
responsibility for the EU’s efforts aborad but act divergently and, therefore, affecting 
EU’s credibility on the international arena. In all three countries, the inter-institutional 
‘turf wars’ echoed Brussels’ inter-institutional dynamics: internally, the EU 
delegations reflected three specific institutional tensions57. One tension was an echo 
of the intra-EEAS tensions – between people inside the EEAS and people from the 
national diplomatic service. The latter spent, on average, 4 years in the Delegation, 
were employees of their respective MFAs and would return back to their home 
capitals, bypassing Brussels. In Kiev, for example, this created a degree of mistrust 
between the staff coming from Brussels and the staff coming from the national 
capitals to the Political section. A second tension was related to the relationship 
between the EEAS and the Delegation. Although political officers believed that 
information should be exchanged equally and frequently between them and the 
EEAS, in practice, information flows were more frequently directed to Brussels than 
to Delegations. And a third power struggle, echoed the inter-institutional dynamic 
between EEAS and certain DGs in the Commission. Structurally, there are two parts 
within an EU delegation: the Commission part, represented by DG DevCo and the 
DG Trade personnel; and the EEAS part, represented by national diplomats or EEAS 
personnel. The European Commission’s staff work on sensitive issues in the area of 
good governance, rule of law, education, corruption and energy, etc., which are all 
                                                   
57 No tensions between officials in the Delegation and DG Near was recorded. 
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very political in nature. The EEAS personnel are in charge of the political agenda, yet 
in the period studied they were most often not consulted on the reports on sectoral 
issues that went directly to Brussels, bypassing the political officers. This, in turn, 
created dividing lines within the EUDs and, as some scholars have already 
emphasized, such institutional conflicts also have a powerful effect on policy outputs 
(Bickerton, 2011). 
 
7.4. Drivers and dividers of EU diplomatic performance 
The exploratory nature embraced by this thesis allowed for the development, during 
the field-work conducted in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, of an additional set of 
questions concerned with the understanding of diplomatic practices. In addressing 
them we could acquire information in areas where there was limited prior 
understanding about the conduct of EU diplomacy in Eastern Europe in general. 
Against the background of the high degree of networking and engagement in 
meetings, the follow-up discussions with diplomats on the ground addressed the 
following questions: What forces drive EU diplomatic actors to engage in joint 
activities and fulfilment of common goals? And which factors hamper this? In this 
section, we analyse the degree of coordination of joint activities among EU 
diplomatic actors and explore the “drivers” and “dividers” in this process. A summary 
of the drivers and dividers of EU diplomatic performance in Eastern Europe is 
presented in Table 28 below, followed by a discussion of each one of them. 
 
Table 28: Drivers and dividers of EU diplomatic performance 
Drivers Dividers 
Bloc diplomacy 
Multistakeholder diplomacy Unilateral diplomatic actions 
Burden-sharing Interest-driven diplomacy 
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Bloc diplomacy 
There are different modes of diplomacy; in large settings, as scholars explain, 
participants form coalitions or blocs, based on regional affinity, shared interests or 
common ideology (Leguey-Feilleux, 2009; Berridge, 1995; Walker, 2004; Barston 
2013). Even though “pooling resources with others is often an effective way of 
achieving your own objectives” (Walker 2004, p. 17), in Moldova and Ukraine, most 
instances of pooling resources were among certain MS, while in Belarus, such 
examples were scarce. The interactions of MS, when it came to formulating and 
implementing a common approach, took place in the different groups which had a 
regional focus. It was the meetings within regional frameworks of cooperation that 
offered the platform for doing so. Three groups in particular have been identified 
(Table 12, 20 and 26):  
1) The Visegrad Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia), 
commonly known as the V4, collaborates in several areas of common interest 
in relation to European integration and aims at developing a broader regional 
cooperation with these countries through implementing projects there. 
Findings showed that this group was present in all three countries and 
formally engaged in joint actions. 
2) The Nordic (Plus) Group, represents a group of ‘like-minded donors’ (Norway, 
Sweden, Finland, Denmark the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands) that are 
committed to enhancing aid effectiveness, on the basis of which has been 
conceived the principle of “good donorship’, which implies a joint action plan 
on harmonization and alignment of donor activities. This group was also 
present in all three countries and engaged in joint collaborations. In Belarus, 
although Nordic cooperation was less centralized it was maintained for the 
purpose of identifying common tendencies in their activities. 
3) The Baltic Group refers to the three Baltic MS: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, 
which do not officially have an institutionalised form of cooperation. Their 
cooperation practices were most felt in Ukraine, where they played an 
important role in exchanging with the Ukrainian counterparts their examples 
on reforms and offered national advisors to work with Ukrainian institutions. In 
Moldova, for the Baltics, the most natural form of cooperation was with the 
Baltic colleagues based on their shared interest in Moldova and the high flow 
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of information between them. However, there was no evidence regarding 
formalised cooperation of the Baltics in Moldova or Belarus. On the other 
hand, evidence showed that there was also strong cooperation between the 
Nordic and Baltic groups. 
The diplomatic engagement and cooperation within these groups can be interpreted 
as both drivers and dividers in terms of diplomatic performance. Drivers, because 
bloc diplomacy involved a high degree of communication and negotiation among the 
embassies and the capitals of these countries to foster bloc cohesion. This meant 
that on the ground, both groups had a high degree of interactions that generated 
solutions to common problems, generated bloc support and provided them with an 
advanced expertise on bloc coordination. Empirical data showed that within these 
two groups, MS reached a level of agreement on common procedures (such as joint 
programming) and were able to link efforts on offering funds to civil society. Dividers, 
because the choice of bloc diplomacy came with the incentive for smaller powers to 
unite in order to take a stand against those who were tempted to run the show. In 
other words, some countries might be uncomfortable with the EU’s central role. 
These groups did not include the EU delegations, which were not invited even as 
observers. During the common meetings under the auspices of the EU delegations, 
these groups do not report on their collective activities, strategies or plans.  
 
Unilateral diplomatic actions 
Engaging in multilateralism is a strong driver for inter-level cooperation in achieving 
common goals (as discussed below on multistakeholder diplomacy). Multilateral 
diplomacy serves several purposes such as coordination, building consensus, 
providing mutual assistance, finding solutions to common problems, managing 
fluidity and unpredictability of diplomatic situations and achieving common goals 
(Barston, 2013; Berridge, 1995; Leguey-Feilleux, 2009). Contrary to these 
expectations of multilateral diplomacy, EU diplomatic actors clearly do not always 
chose to cooperate, share resources or act together to project their interests in third 
countries. Scholars further emphasized that the key principle of multilateral 
cooperation is mutuality, implying participation in joint decision-making to foster 
legitimacy and capacity of the other (Van Langenhove, 2010).  
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As the evidence in chapters 4-6 showed, EU member states were often subtle in 
side-stepping from agreed positions, covering this under ‘miscommunication’. For 
instance, in the case of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, the 
common EU position on the ground was that the Council conclusions were the 
lowest common denominator. However, some EU member states chose to go public 
with statements encouraging the opposite, such as signing the Association 
Agreement with Ukraine regardless of the Council conclusions; this was a diplomatic 
statement approved and instructed by their national capitals and in spite of the 
common agreement established. In Moldova, diplomatic missions such as Germany 
for instance, did not like multilateral cooperation and preferred a bilateral approach. 
The same held true for Poland (in Moldova and Ukraine) with their “go-it-alone” 
tactics who preferred to pursue a parallel national agenda (Baltag & Smith, 2015).  
The unilateral diplomatic actions are considered dividers in EU diplomatic 
performance. Being so focused on the primacy of their national diplomatic expertise 
often hampered achieving a common approach and made these member states act 
short-sightedly. This, in turn, left room for mistakes, such as confusing instances of 
bilateral track diplomacy with the (EU) multilateral approach. The fact that Romania 
is Moldova’s advocate in the EU was well-known, yet its actions on the ground could 
be seen as provocative by other members of the diplomatic community: “in Moldova, 
Romania advises the Moldovan authorities, so information from the general meetings 
leaks to the Moldovan government and this leads to reluctance to cooperate; and 
become less transparent” (interv. 40). They become dividers especially when in 
certain cases, EU diplomatic actors are not led by the solidarity imperative, but rather 
by national interests, personal agendas or strong personalities (who are more 
competitive and ambitious to raise the profile of their national embassies). Findings 
showed cases when MS were guided in their actions by political will - or more 
precisely, the lack thereof. To cite one interviewee, “donor meetings became an 
arena for promotion and marketing of each other’s activities and on top of that there 
is lack of political will to strategically coordinate” (interv. 9).  
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Multistakeholder diplomacy 
Engaging in multistakeholder diplomacy is considered a driver for EU diplomatic 
practice due to its characteristics of inclusiveness and decision-finding and added 
value of unique expertise of stakeholders (Hocking & Smith, 2016). Empirical 
evidence showed how the openness to cooperate of EU diplomats led to avoiding 
overlap and reaching complementarity. In Moldova, the fact that there was a like-
minded diplomatic community in relation to the position towards the Moldovan 
government created opportunities for establishing a common approach, for example. 
In Ukraine, multistakeholder diplomacy was beneficial when diplomats attended and 
engaged in the common meetings where discussions between diplomats took place, 
such as during the meetings coordinated by the EUD. In these meetings, individual 
member-states presented their positions and after discussion could present the EU 
position to the host country in a united way. Some put the emphasis on the fact that 
on the ground it was easier to join a common opinion, as a result of participation in 
the meetings, even if some member-states were not completely aware of the details 
of the developments in Ukraine. The sole purpose of the meetings was to share 
information so that all members of the diplomatic community were on board with the 
current developments. In Belarus, one interviewee emphasized the relevance of 
multilateralism as it gave the opportunity for all diplomatic actors to reach a ‘silent 
agreement’ in relation to the local government (interv. 34). Evidence further spoke in 
favour of competition among MS as a way of acquiring more knowledge and 
achieving results. The network form of diplomacy embraced by the common 
meetings revealed a nuanced pattern of relationships within multistakeholder 
diplomacy in Eastern Europe, which might be described as ‘co-opetition’. As Etsy 
and Geradin (2000) defined, this is a practice when a mix between cooperation and 
competition is taking place among actors. One example was the Stronger Together 
campaign in Ukraine or agreeing on the Council decision on sanctions as the lowest 
common denominator in Belarus. 
 
Interest-driven diplomacy 
In the EU-member state tandem, national interests remain a crucial element when it 
comes to taking actions at European level (Petrov et al., 2012; Rijks & Whitman, 
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2007; Smith, 2003; Whitman & Manners, 2000); and can serve both as a driver or a 
divider. It may not be realistic to expect the ideal situation of an EU-27 speaking with 
one voice through its actions and it may seem more efficient for MS to unite in 
smaller groups or pursue individual actions. However, in practice, the result of this is 
counterproductive, and pursuing interest-driven diplomacy has proven to be a 
divider. Evidence showed earlier that there was little information sharing among the 
three groups present in the three countries or between them and the delegations; the 
meetings were not interconnected, so there was little room for sharing common 
practices across the general EU meetings. Having linkages with one region or 
another, or historical ties, may have had negative repercussions on the conduct of 
diplomacy of certain EU member states and heads of EU delegations in Ukraine, 
Belarus or Moldova, as they became hostages to their own past and did not account 
for the broader European perspective. The use of European diplomacy in the benefit 
of the national diplomatic interest (such as having a Polish ambassador in Ukraine, 
or a Latvian ambassador in Belarus) exhibited, at times, the pursuit of national 
interests and overshadowed the European interests. In addition, member states 
clustered informally, under certain themes. For example, in Moldova, Poland, 
Sweden, and Romania and, on occasions, Lithuania, coordinated together on 
Eastern Partnership related issues. This later led to Poland developing Polish-led 
meetings that ran in parallel with the meetings coordinated by the EUD. Some 
examples of unilateral positions are also a strong message of division not only for 
the EU diplomatic actors but also for the host countries. This division or in some 
instances isolation was visible through the refusal of some member states to 
participate in the common meetings. Or, when within EU framework meetings each 
member state gave priority to its own agenda and was preoccupied by the end-
results of their individual projects, according to which they would be evaluated in 
their capitals. 
 
Burden-sharing 
The practice of burden-sharing in Ukraine was observed during the common 
meetings that led the way to complementarity among actors. A prominent example of 
the common approach within the HoMs meetings as well as the Political and human 
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rights meetings was the cooperation between member-states that resulted in the 
Cox-Kwasniewski mission. During this mission, both the EU delegation and the MS 
embassies played a key role in monitoring the local developments in the 
Tymoshenko case and serving as contact points for the Cox-Kwasniewski visits in 
Ukraine. Although coordination was more a matter for the capitals and decision-
making was a matter for Brussels, what happened on the ground in Moldova was 
joint action. During the 2010-2015 period, there were several examples that 
illustrated burden-sharing in MS diplomatic activity. For instance, Germany and 
Sweden scaled up their assistance and they teamed-up and divided a considerable 
amount of money into concrete actions. Similarly, in Belarus, the example of 
cooperation among the EU Delegation and the member-states that resulted in the 
MOST project represented burden-sharing among the EUD and the German and 
British embassies. In contrast to interest-driven diplomacy, evidence highlights that 
burden-sharing is a driver in EU diplomatic performance and MS embassies and the 
EU delegations seem to have recognised the value of the division of labour between 
them. 
 
7.5. Conclusion: dealing with foreign policy dilemmas through 
diplomacy 
In light of the evidence presented in this thesis and the discussion of findings 
conducted in this chapter we now return to the three working assumptions, the 
research instrument employed in this thesis (as explained in section 1.3. and 
presented in section 2.3.2.). The thesis departed from the central research question: 
to what extent has the EU developed as a successful diplomatic actor since the 
inauguration of the EEAS? The discussion conducted on the international actorness 
of the EU in external relations more generally and in Eastern Europe specifically 
exposed three EU foreign policy dilemmas. The three dilemmas discussed in 
Chapter 2 revealed that EU has major challenges to overcome related to its goals 
(values vs. interests), to achieving coherence and convergence in actions (problem 
of collective action) and related to its political stamina and the range of instruments it 
uses (markets and institutions vs geopolitics). The Lisbon Treaty, by establishing a 
new institutional framework in diplomacy, the EEAS, was intended to address these 
challenges in foreign policy. As already noted in the concluding section of Chapter 2, 
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the general expectation in this sense was that a successful diplomatic actor should 
manage to solve or bypass the three dilemmas through the practice of diplomacy. 
 
1) Post-Lisbon EU diplomacy with an institutional distinctiveness is able to articulate 
its own stated objectives 
The expectation of this assumption was, first of all, that on the ground, the Union 
Delegations would fully embrace the diplomatic function of representation in all 
aspects of external relations, on the one hand. It also implied, on the other hand, that 
MS’ diplomatic representations on the ground would perfectly comfortable with such 
a distribution of roles. Besides the Lisbon Treaty, the ENP was another reference 
point for this assumption as it is the umbrella-framework for the official relations 
between the EU and Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. Hence, the expectation of this 
assumption was that in Eastern Europe, there would be an ability of European and 
national institutions (i.e. EU Delegation and MS embassies) to implement the ENP’s 
set policy goals of promoting democratic governance in Moldova, Ukraine and 
Belarus. To review this assumption, implies to reflect back on the findings collected 
in relation to effectiveness. This criterion for assessing EU diplomatic performance 
has facilitated analysing the EU’s performance based on the evaluation of diplomatic 
practices on the ground against the pre-set goals in the ENP and the Lisbon Treaty. 
Despite the findings revealed by the first foreign policy dilemma, values vs interests, 
which identified a conflicting nature between the normative and material dimensions 
of EU foreign policy, the practice of diplomacy indicated positive developments in 
relation to effectiveness. 
The flaws of the pre-Lisbon institutional system that were often linked to the lack of 
continuity and leadership were addressed through MS embracing ‘symbolic 
representation’. After the inauguration of EEAS, we can account for a change in 
diplomatic practice in Eastern Europe through the deterritorialization of diplomatic 
representation; this implies that MS, as members of the EU have internalised EU 
values, rules and norms and have welcomed the EUDs to represent the EU while 
their preserved their traditional national representation function. This was most 
obvious through the abolition, on the ground, of the system of rotating Presidencies, 
a task performed and coordinated post-Lisbon by the EU Delegations in Chisinau, 
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Kiev and Minsk. Therefore, in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, a strong non-
fragmented leadership of EUD, in this sense, was successfully acknowledged and 
embraced by the diplomatic community; which, in turn, strengthened continuity of EU 
diplomatic practice. 
Furthermore, following the attribution of legal personality to the EU via the Lisbon 
Treaty, the EU Delegations were designed to communicate “values, policies and 
results of its projects toward third country stakeholders” (Duke 2013, p. 25) in 
cooperation with MS embassies. According to the empirical evidence presented in 
this thesis, MS embassies and the EU delegations became co-participants in 
pursuing, in Eastern Europe, the ENP/EaP agenda. 
Data collected from the field-work conducted in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus 
emphasized that operationally, there was no big difference between the practices of 
national or EU diplomacy in reaching the efforts of supporting the democratization 
efforts of these countries in line with EU-stimulated reforms. In their diplomatic 
activities, both EU and national diplomats were involved in providing development 
aid assistance, monitoring and evaluating the reform agenda conducted by the three 
Eastern European governments. Through many of their activities, diplomats were 
aligned in their efforts to be of help to Moldova, Ukraine in implementing their 
European vocation and achieving its European aspiration. Given that Belarus did not 
declare such an aspiration, but since 2008 sought rapprochement in its relations with 
both the EU and the MS, the diplomatic community was committed to channel their 
bilateral interaction with Belarus in a manner that supported Belarus’ democratisation 
progress within the EaP framework. 
 
2) The changes in post-Lisbon diplomacy imply convergence of member states 
actions and build up coherence 
The second dilemma, the problem of collective action, has emphasized how 
disagreement among member-states or member-states and the EU can be 
detrimental to the EU. Divergence of member states’ interests and that of interests 
among Brussels institutions was the most cited reason for the dysfunctionalities of 
the EU’s strategy in international politics. Hence, post-Lisbon, the expectation of the 
second assumption was that, for the EU as a diplomatic actor, acting collectively 
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should become especially relevant since there was a direct emphasis on cooperation 
among EU Delegations and MS embassies on the ground. This was at the core of 
the Lisbon Treaty itself which aimed at greater coherence (i.e. strengthening EU 
coordination in external relations) which was to be achieved specifically through the 
cooperation between the member states’ diplomatic missions and the EU 
delegations in third countries (Article 32 and 35 TEU and 221 TFEU). Therefore, the 
assumption implied that as a successful diplomatic actor the EU relied on the 
practice of multilateral diplomacy where cooperation is key. It is not only in Brussels 
that the EEAS linked national and EU diplomatic efforts but also on the ground, 
consequently the expectations were high in relation to this cooperation.  
Performance, assessed in relation to ongoing relevance, the second criteria 
operationalised in the analytical framework (Chapter 3) produced mixed results. It 
was assumed that EU diplomatic actors in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus (i.e. EU 
Delegations and MS embassies) were engaging in a set of diplomatic practices that 
facilitated their cooperation towards formulating and implementing a ‘common 
approach’ as the Lisbon Treaty expects. Findings showed that, in Eastern Europe, 
there are forces that drive or divide EU diplomatic actors in this process.  
The drivers for EU diplomatic performance, such as engaging in multistakeholder 
diplomacy, burden-sharing and bloc diplomacy were all conducive to cooperation 
practices on the ground. Empirical evidence showed how the openness to cooperate 
of EU diplomats led to avoiding overlap and complementarity through participating in 
multistakeholder diplomacy. Findings showed that in Eastern Europe, corporate 
diplomatic practices transitioned from a hierarchical to a networking form of 
diplomacy that anchored MS embassies on the ground in a European setting of 
networking. This was possible through the EUD coordinating and maintaining a 
network of meetings at different levels, with different topics and different degrees of 
ceremonialism. Evidence further spoke in favour of burden-sharing as a driver in EU 
diplomatic performance as MS embassies and the EU delegations have recognised 
the value of the division of labour between them. On the one hand, MS were free of 
the logistical burden that came with the rotating Presidency role. On the other, MS 
could focus their efforts on joint programming: for example, a pilot project on 
developing a pipeline in Moldova started in 2014 with funds from Germany, Sweden 
and Romania and then, the EU extended the project through a financial input. 
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Without the burden of coordinating the common meetings, which became a central 
task in the EUDs activity, the EU and the national diplomats could focus on 
formulating the common approach, which often meant delivering a common 
message or a common position vis-à-vis the local authorities in Eastern Europe. The 
fact that post-Lisbon there was a higher level of involvement of the EU Delegation, 
played a positive role in reaching the common approach. Against this background, 
the upgraded structural development by the Lisbon Treaty spurred convergence on 
the ground in a manner that led to collective action. 
The diplomatic engagement and cooperation through bloc diplomacy was both a 
driver and a divider for EU diplomatic performance. As a driver, bloc diplomacy 
manifested by the Visegrad, Nordic and the Baltic groups in Eastern Europe, MS 
reached a level of agreement on common procedures (like joint programming) and 
were able to link efforts on offering funds to civil society. As a divider, these groups 
conduct activities in isolation from or in parallel with the EU common meetings. 
Moreover, in all three countries there were internal dividing lines within the Visegrad 
group, for example, with Poland usually having an opposing view and diverging 
towards a ‘go it alone’ strategy. Findings further showed that unilateral diplomatic 
activities and interest-driven diplomacy hampered EU diplomatic performance. As 
evidence revealed the approach, interest and political weight was different when 
sometimes different member-states would promote some people or their own 
interests. In Ukraine, for example, the Delegation identified that there member-states 
such as Poland, Romania, Slovakia or Hungary tried to influence the Delegation’s 
positions and they were still trying to preserve their own visibility and their 
autonomous position. In certain cases, such as that of Great Britain, it was difficult to 
identify the real interest of the MS as it was saying one thing but doing something 
else. In Belarus, evidence showed more divergence than convergence and MS vis-à-
vis the EU’s decision on imposing sanctions. Some MS (Slovenia) chose to veto the 
EU’s decision to include one Belarusian business or another on the so-called black-
list based on important ongoing business/trade deals or strongly oppose economic 
sanctions (Lithuania).  
 
3) The level of supranational activism through post-Lisbon diplomacy strengthens EU 
capabilities 
239 
The expectation of this working assumption was that a successful EU diplomatic 
actor may bypass or solve the foreign policy dilemma through manifesting strong 
capabilities on the ground. The rule-transfer vs geopolitics dilemma exposed EU’s 
conflicting nature in choice of mechanisms in third countries – economic and 
legalistic versus geopolitical ones – that more often than not did not play to its 
advantage. The foundation of the EEAS as a new institution – referred to as the EU’s 
diplomatic arm – meant the upgrade of Commission representations, already present 
in third countries, to Union Delegations. The establishment of the Service brought 
together the diplomatic dimension from the European Commission, the Council and 
the Member States under the umbrella of one institution; an institution that aimed to 
represent the diplomatic service of the EU on the ground via these Delegations (and 
its cooperation with MS embassies). It was clear that the idea behind the Lisbon 
Treaty from the standpoint of this dilemma was to transfer diplomatic tasks to one 
institution with the goal of creating a coherent and effective structure. Hence, the 
third assumption implied that EU diplomatic capabilities should presume a strong 
diplomatic esprit de corps since creating a common European diplomatic culture 
within the Delegations and the institutional turf-wars have been much contested. 
Furthermore, it was not only representing the EU on the ground that mattered here, 
but also the way the communication function of diplomacy was embraced, especially 
since the Treaty expected an increased degree of information exchange among the 
EU Delegations and MS embassies on the ground (art. 35). 
Analysing diplomatic performance thus implies to reflect back on the findings 
collected in relation to capabilities, the third criterion. A screening of diplomatic 
capabilities in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus also delivered mixed results. On the 
one hand, the EU developed a communication infrastructure that was a valuable 
resource for the diplomatic community and the EUD became an informational 
network hub. On the other hand, evidence revealed the struggle over symbolic 
power reflected through intra- and inter-institutional tensions. 
Findings showed that between 2010-2015 EU diplomatic actors engaged in a high 
degree of information-sharing including written and oral reports, formal and informal 
data, as well as exchange of personal contacts. The Delegation started to play a 
more central role and became an information hub. As interviewees disclosed, for the 
EUD it was important to have, on the ground, well informed diplomats, with a clear 
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understanding of what are the key problems to be assessed or what are the key 
sources of information that should be targeted by them; hence a general tendency to 
have the diplomatic community ‘on the same page’ (interv. 20). The communication 
infrastructure also became a resource for both parties. It was at the disposal of the 
member-states and could be used as a public relations tool by them, especially 
because MS were given access to idea-sharing and report-drafting. And a resource 
for the EUD: national diplomats noticed that as result of being the main coordinator 
of these meetings, the EUD became more valued also by local actors as this role 
gave the Delegation more political weight. Yet, given the MS’ drive towards bloc 
diplomacy and unilateral diplomatic action, findings clearly suggest that the EUDs did 
not become ‘the’ network hub and the exchanged information is not exclusive to the 
EU, which is undermined by intra-EU blocs or ‘go it alone’ tactics. Nonetheless, a 
screening of resources further showed that the EU diplomatic actors in Moldova, 
Ukraine and Belarus were anchored, through participating in these meetings, in a 
‘community of practice’. The engagement of the diplomatic community during these 
meeting presented all key elements of a community of practice: ongoing mutual 
engagement (the practice of doing something regularly), a shared repertoire (having 
these meetings as a set of tools and resources) and the sense of joint enterprise 
(defined by members’ shared sense of a common identity).  
Contrary to the expectations of this assumption, observations from the fieldwork 
conducted in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus pointed to the fact that there is a 
struggle over symbolic power exemplified by intra- and inter-institutional tensions 
which were echoes of institutional dynamics in Brussels. Three specific tensions 
have been identified: the first is intra-EEAS tension which on the ground was present 
via the degree of mistrust between the staff coming from Brussels and the staff 
coming from the national capitals to the Political section. A second tension was 
related to the relationship between the EEAS and the Delegation, with information 
mainly being uploaded to the EEAS and the other way around. And a third one - 
echoed the inter-institutional dynamic between EEAS and the Commission 
(especially DG DevCo), where the level of cooperation was constricted by the limited 
degree of report-sharing or consultation on behalf of the DG DevCo personnel 
positioned in the Operations sections of the delegations. In addition, the diplomatic 
staff in the Delegation found it difficult to have two lines of reporting in Brussels – to 
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the EEAS and to the Commission – and saw this as creating dividing lines and 
separation within the Delegation. 
To sum up, this chapter conducted a comparative evaluation of EU diplomatic 
performance of EU diplomatic performance in Eastern Europe more generally and 
revealed that multistakeholder diplomacy, burden-sharing, bloc diplomacy, unilateral 
diplomatic actions and interest-driven diplomacy as key drivers and dividers in EU’s 
attempt to address its foreign policy dilemmas. Hence, it has put forward the 
empirical conclusions of this thesis and reviewed the three working assumptions set 
out at the beginning of this thesis that served as a research instrument. The overall 
conclusion, discussed in the next chapter, will deal with broader issues related with 
the analytical approach and the methodological consideration of this thesis, its 
limitations and agendas for future research.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
The post-Lisbon EU embraced the unification of the diplomatic efforts of the 
European Commission, the Council Secretariat and that of the EU member states 
with the aim of achieving greater coherence, chiefly through the establishment of the 
EEAS. This implied, inter alia, that in third countries, the former Commission 
representations have been transformed into Union Delegations that were mandated 
to represent the EU. Besides this, the Treaty changes opened an opportunity for 
coordination between national and EU level diplomacy in order to obtain a more 
effective collective effort. The 2013 review of the EEAS highlighted the enhanced 
partnership with the member-states (MS) as one of the EU’s strengths. The 2015 
EEAS strategic planning review emphasized that, against the background of the 
challenges in third countries, and specifically in its neighbourhood, EU diplomacy 
should seize the opportunity for coordination between national and EU level 
diplomacy in order to obtain a more effective collective effort. Therefore, the aim of 
this thesis was to critically assess the diplomatic performance of the European Union 
(EU) in its neighbourhood, namely in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus after the 
inauguration of the EEAS. The general research question that guided this research 
was ‘To what extent has the EU developed as a successful diplomatic actor since 
the inauguration of the EEAS?’ This was not a simple question and did not 
necessarily translate into a simple answer, hence the lead research question 
required detailed examination through addressing several sub-questions. The 
analysis conducted in this thesis was, thus, informed by three linked sub-questions: 
how does one study the success of EU diplomacy, how does the EU 
conduct/perform its diplomatic relations in third countries after the inauguration of the 
EEAS, and how has the Lisbon innovation in diplomacy been manifested on the 
ground and has it addressed the main pre-existing challenges? While the previous 
chapter has put forward the empirical conclusions of this thesis, in the concluding 
chapter of the thesis we will take a step back and reflect on the analytical framework 
of this thesis and the methodology used. 
The research started with an analytical literature review that aimed at unwrapping 
the complexity of the European Union through conceptualising the EU as an 
international actor. This, in turn, resulted in a discussion about what the EU 
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professes and how it has achieved it beyond its borders and specifically in Eastern 
Europe. The analysis showed that the EU’s actorness faced specific challenges in its 
neighbourhood that entrapped it in three foreign policy dilemmas; these served as 
background for informing the reader about EU international actorness in Eastern 
Europe. Bringing forward the three foreign policy dilemmas led to proposing a set of 
working assumptions on how the changes that resulted from the Lisbon Treaty, with 
the inauguration of the EEAS, related to a successful EU as a diplomatic actor. To 
answer the overarching questions that guided this thesis and the working 
assumptions, three performance criteria were designed, namely: effectiveness, 
relevance and capabilities. Acknowledging the difficulties of examining performance, 
the three criteria were operationalised through linking, in the analytical framework, 
organizational studies, EU international actorness studies, the practice of diplomacy 
and the practice turn in international relations (IR) and EU studies. 
The added value of such a framework is first of all interdisciplinarity. Organisational 
studies, more generally, are interested in what people actually do. Coupling a 
practice turn with organisational studies in our analytical framework (Chapter 3) 
served as a bridge for different levels of analysis, as scholars have already 
emphasized, this links “the very micro (what people say and do); to the meso 
(routines); to the macro (institutions)” (Miettinen et al., 2009, p. 1309). Furthermore, 
as emphasized in the analytical framework, academic scholarship has also started to 
acknowledge the importance of looking at practices, especially because it allows to 
uncover everyday practices that are not, usually, the focus of scholarly research. A 
practice-oriented approach gave the opportunity to understand what was happening 
on the ground. Since there is limited scholarly knowledge on what is happening in 
diplomacy on the ground, incorporating practices in this analytical framework gave 
the opportunity to discover otherwise practices that are of importance to the general 
knowledge of EU diplomatic performance.  
Hence, this analytical framework adds value through creating synergies between 
organisational management, diplomatic studies and the practice approach and 
creating cross-fertilization. Research by Pouliot and Cornout (2015) has also argued 
in favour of a cross-fertilising exchange between these strands of literature and 
indicated three avenues in this regard: continuity and change; rationality and 
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practicality and the balance between the social and the technical. This thesis goes 
along similar lines. Performance, diplomacy and practice, which more generally tend 
to reproduce themselves, are also subject to co-existing forces of continuity and 
change. Assessing performance, through our analytical framework started from 
uncovering what practitioners actually do, the ways in which they create functional 
patters of interaction based on the already established ways of doing things. One 
example of this was the way in which the practice of engaging in common EU 
meetings anchored the diplomatic community in a community of practice. The way in 
which MS embassies and the EU delegations became co-participants in pursuing the 
ENP/EaP agenda on the ground speaks for rationality and practicality. Simply put, 
national diplomats on the ground mirrored the internalization of EU rules via their 
own process of European integration, therefore, although their national interest may 
diverge and lock them in interest-driven diplomacy, at the end of the day, both 
rationality and the practice of being a EU MS worked hand in hand and not against 
each other; thus their diplomatic efforts in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus were to 
support democratization efforts of these countries based on their relationship with 
the EU. As the empirical discussion emphasized in Chapter 7, through their 
diplomatic activity, national and EU diplomats are constantly involved in establishing 
a balance between the social and the technical. Through their various forms of 
interaction within common EU meetings or the regional frameworks (the three 
groups), diplomats skilfully combine aid-driven diplomacy with démarches and 
political statements towards the local governments. 
Secondly, there is an added value in the empirical findings of this thesis as it 
contributes to the academic literature on performance, practice and diplomacy 
generally and to EU diplomatic performance in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus 
specifically (at the moment of writing this thesis, there is currently no literature on this 
subject). Looking at performance facilitated examining and evaluating EU diplomatic 
practices against pre-set goals as well as understanding how everyday practices 
inform the EU’s actions. It also allowed us to explore the relationship between 
national and EU levels in the new post-Lisbon setting, where the EU delegations 
perform traditional and new diplomatic functions: representing the Union and also 
cooperating with national embassies. And, it allowed us to conduct a screening of 
capabilities and to understand how these pertain to the diplomatic realm. Whereas 
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the Brussels-based part of the EEAS has captured the attention of both academic 
and non-academic literature, through turning its focus to the performance and 
diplomatic practice of the EU in third countries, i.e Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, 
this thesis adds to the scarce scholarly literature in this field.  
A screening of research on theorising the EU’s diplomatic service found that much of 
the academic study (of the EEAS) was surprisingly atheoretical with 30% of 
publications between 2005 and 2014 having no explicit theoretical framework (Adler-
Niessen, 2015). Some may argue that this thesis may fall under the same category. 
Yet, the aim here was to go beyond positivist explanations and to explore the details 
of everyday practices that form and shape the performance of any actor. For that 
reason we designed an interdisciplinary analytical tool and embraced a qualitative 
research-design based on exploratory case studies. In the case of the case-studies 
for this research, field-work was conducted after the establishment of the research 
questions but prior to defining the assumptions, especially important when 
investigating diplomacy, i.e. the practice of diplomacy. And, as some scholars 
emphasized, it “is not primarily about theory, but about the practice of doing 
research” (Bueger, 2014; p. 385; Lequesne, 2015). Such an exploratory 
investigation, then, captured the relationship between the actions and the agents and 
facilitated a broader understanding of diplomacy specifically through an interpretative 
approach of the everyday work of diplomats. Conducting interviews allowed us to 
firstly uncover, to a certain extent, the complexity of their knowledge; and secondly, 
through developing a set of follow-up exploratory research questions, during the 
fieldwork itself, to understand and identify forces that drive and divide EU diplomatic 
performance. Developing such a research design did not allow us to take certain 
things for granted, such as the role of rules and norms in the diplomatic interactions, 
but rather endorsed our understanding of how, through diplomatic practices, rules 
and norms are shaped by what diplomats themselves consider normal and 
meaningful. 
While the use of data from interviews adds strength to the analysis of this thesis, no 
research is free from error and questions of validity and reliability arose. The main 
difficulty resided in the inability to access all EU and national diplomats present in 
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. As a consequence, the empirical chapters portray an 
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unproportioned discovery on the practice of diplomacy. This was particularly obvious 
in Belarus (Chapter 6) where the circumstances for conducting the interviews were 
more difficult as diplomats stated, off the record, that their offices were tapped by the 
local government (as explained in section 1.3.). Taking this into consideration, we 
used triangulation, and backed-up the data from interviews against each other 
(where possible) to cross-check findings. Given that there is no previous research 
conducted on the practice and performance of diplomacy in Moldova, Ukraine or 
Belarus, it was impossible cross-check findings from the interviews with data from 
secondary sources. Another limitation in embracing an exploratory case-study 
investigation, although it helped advance knowledge on the subject under 
investigation, is that it is exploratory. As Yin (1993) explains, “the major problem with 
exploratory case studies is that the data collected during the pilot phase are then 
also used as part of any ensuing case study” (p. 6). To minimize the analytical effect 
of this limitation, process-tracing was used as an analytical device. It helped obtain 
information about well-defined and specific events and processes and inductively 
use the evidence collected to develop the working assumptions. Hence data 
extracted from the elite interviews has been corroborated against other interviews, 
policy papers, Commission and EEAS reports, newspaper articles and existing 
academic literature. 
Our findings showed that in Eastern Europe, corporate diplomatic practices were 
bound by context or, as Adler-Niessen (2008) defined it – the diplomatic field. 
Through its empirical contribution, of probing working assumptions in three 
immediate EU neighbours, it becomes difficult to make generalisations regarding the 
EaP countries to which they belong. For example, the stratification of the diplomatic 
field in Eastern Europe, understood as a social system consisting of a patterned set 
of practices, was defined by the political development of relations between the three 
countries and the EU. We cannot infer, at this point, that the same holds valid for 
South Caucasus neighbours, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In order to do so, 
further research on the EaP countries (including a comparative analysis) in order to 
examine EU diplomatic performance in the EaP is needed. Subsequently, to make 
generalizations, a categorization of the countries should be undertaken in most-likely 
and least-likely cases. Therefore, based on the political relations with the EU, 
Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia could be most-likely cases, while Belarus, Armenia 
247 
and Azerbaijan least-likely cases. Additionally, the validity and reliability of the 
findings presented regarding effectiveness, relevance and capabilities may also be 
tested against alternative criteria. The empirical data presented in the thesis 
indicates that scholars should pay more attention to the diplomatic field in which the 
EU is exercising diplomacy. 
Another limitation of this research relates to its limited cross-fertilisation with the 
European integration and Europeanisation literature. While Europeanisation was not 
the focus of the study it is worth noting that the findings presented in this thesis offer 
great potential for exploring several processes. A discussion of the drivers and 
dividers of EU diplomatic performance could benefit from cross-fertilisation on the 
discussion of the drivers of European integration literature that often captured certain 
cause-effect relationships (for example Exadaktylos & Radaeilli, 2012). In this sense 
it would also be fruitful to compare these findings with the Big Bang enlargement 
progress and evaluate to which extent the legal and institutional relationship between 
the partner countries and the EU drive or hamper EU diplomatic performance. Given 
that the style of this relationship is driven by conditionality, literature on enlargement 
has already showed that EU rule-transfer is more effective when linked to concrete 
rewards in form of EU membership, but also EU financial and technical assistance or 
association agreements. Therefore, the findings of this research would benefit from a 
follow-up investigation that would discuss how effectiveness, relevance and 
capabilities as dimensions of performance would have been influenced (positively or 
negatively) by the progress towards the AA. And, to a similar extent – whether the 
available ENP tools are designed in a manner that offer a clear link between 
conditions and rewards and have a power to shape EU diplomatic performance. 
Furthermore, an intersection with the social-constructivist scholarship on European 
identity, socialization and learning would be analytically beneficial to understand how 
communities of practice, such as those present in EU diplomacy in Eastern Europe, 
foster learning and socialisation processes through cooperation within EU common 
meetings. 
While literature on EU’s role in international affairs has significantly developed in the 
last four decades (Allen & Smith, 1990, 1998; Jupille & Caporasso, 1998; Ginsberg, 
2001; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006 and others), there are still few studies of the EU as 
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a diplomatic actor that analyse the process, policies and outcomes of the EU’s 
diplomatic actorness. Scholarly research dedicated to exploring and unpacking the 
notion of EU performance has also been scarce. Notable examples include the 
studies that analyse EU performance in multilateral institutions (Oberthür et al. 2013; 
Jørgensen & Laatikainen 2013); with focus on EU impact, EU role performance, EU 
legitimacy and EU effectiveness in international affairs (Smith 2000; Ginsberg 2001; 
Van Schaik 2013; Elgström & Smith 2006; Bickerton 2007; Smith 2010b; Vasilyan 
2011; Smith 2013; Romanyshyn 2015; Baltag & Smith 2015); on EU effectiveness 
(Edwards 2013; Bouchard et al. 2013; Smith 2013; Bretherton & Vogler 2013; Smith 
2010; Lavanex & Schimmelfennig 2011; Börzel & Risse 2007). Also, scholars have 
examined the EU’s performance in major multilateral settings (Oberthür & Groen 
2015; Jørgensen et al., 2013), and during negotiations in different policy settings 
(Romanyshyn 2015; Dee 2015; van Schaik 2013). Recent scholarship has started to 
assess the EU as a diplomatic actor post-Lisbon (Koops & Macaj, 2015), the 
evolution, change and challenges of the diplomatic system of the EU (Carta, 2012; 
Duke et al., 2012; Henökl, 2014; Pomorska & Juncos, 2014; Balfour, Carta & Raik, 
2015; Smith, Keukeleire & Vanhoonacker, 2016) and more recently EU diplomatic 
performance (Baltag & Smith 2015; Baltag, 2018), EU diplomatic practice (Adler-
Nissen, 2014;Pouliot & Cornout, 2015; Bicchi & Bremberg, 2016) and EU diplomatic 
cooperation aboard (Bicchi & Maurer, 2018).  
An inherent next step in promoting research on EU diplomatic practice and 
performance, which results from this thesis, would be to further investigate the 
drivers and dividers of EU diplomatic performance. Whereas the findings here have 
uncovered and discussed them, future research could discuss their potential to 
influence, positively or negatively, EU diplomatic performance in key policy fields in 
post-Lisbon era. The findings presented in Chapter 7 raise important questions 
concerning the extent to which EU diplomatic actors can support the progress in the 
ENP countries towards “deep democracy” when there is interest-driven diplomacy 
and unilateral diplomatic actions combined with certain collaborative action among 
them. Firstly, it is questionable how the EU can achieve better coherence in its 
actions externally if it has deficiencies in engaging in joint actions. Secondly, how 
can EU diplomatic actors on the ground influence local governments when there are 
limited political démarches or policy-driven discussions and when there is divergence 
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of member states’ opinions that can lead to bloc diplomacy or ‘go it alone’ tactics? A 
further avenue for research is to uncover further patterns of corporate diplomatic 
practices. The high involvement of both MS embassies and the EUDs in Moldova, 
Ukraine and Belarus anchored the EU diplomatic actors in a community of practice. 
This is a community based on practice that develops, through its activities, a specific 
identity and a set of resources specific to the group. Since all parties are willing to 
engage in an increased level of communication through reporting and information-
sharing, one set of questions can examine how substantive cooperation happens 
within the common EU framework. A second one, can examine the role of the 
communities of practice for developing the EU foreign policy system. Whereas 
diplomats are mainly tasked with implementing foreign policy objectives, the life 
cycle of a policy implies a feedback loop through which diplomats can evaluate and 
also upload points to the agenda-setting for a new or adapted policy. 
The shift of the diplomatic interaction from a hierarchical to a network form of 
diplomacy opens another avenue for research. Whereas network diplomacy per se is 
hardly a new concept, findings here have shown that diplomats engage in 
multistakeholder diplomacy, therefore further evidence needs to be collected in order 
to evaluate the role, rules and norms as well as the impact of such type of diplomacy 
on the ground. Of particular interest for such an investigation could be understanding 
the patterns of ‘co-opetition’, the practice when a mix between cooperation and 
competition is taking place among actors involved in EU diplomacy. On the one 
hand, there is an increased variety of foreign policy actors involved in diplomacy 
outside the Delegations, such as the Heads of Governments, the President of the 
European Council, the European parliamentarians, civil society organisations and 
others. An examination of their patterns of co-opetition with the Delegation in Eastern 
Europe would add value to understanding the practice of diplomacy. On the other 
hand, this could further be linked to an examination of bloc diplomacy. As a driver of 
diplomatic performance, the Visegrad, Nordic and Baltic groups had a high degree of 
interactions that generated solutions to common problems, generated bloc support 
and provided them with an advanced expertise on bloc coordination. Hence, 
research could question how and under what conditions, the latter upgrade (or not) 
their practice to the EU level and with what effects. In addition, and specific to the 
fact that diplomacy is conducted in third countries, further research on the power of 
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EU structural diplomacy and on the use of diplomatic capital presents an opportunity 
for research.  
Against the background of growing diplomatic capabilities on the ground without 
addressing its flaws, it is questionable whether such accumulated capital enables the 
EU to pursue a coherent diplomatic presence. Against this background, future 
research should scrutinize further whether the post-Lisbon changes and the EU 
system of diplomacy are ‘fit for purpose’ in reaching sustainable ENP/EaP policy 
objectives. Moreover, investigating to what extent the Lisbon Treaty innovations 
were the main driving force for effectiveness, relevance and capabilities would allow 
discovery of other factors that are just as important for EU diplomatic performance. 
Research on EU performance in the CEE and Eastern Europe has already 
demonstrated that EU’s performance “cannot be isolated from local and international 
factors that mediate its engagement with partners” (Papadimitriou et al., 2017, p.5). 
Our findings have already emphasized that MS unilateral actions are a divider for EU 
diplomatic performance. Cross-fertilization with research done by Papadimitriou et al 
(2017) can help uncover how “the timing and tempo of the EU’s engagement with 
third countries are an important determinant of its performance, affecting processes 
of policy learning and conditioning its response during crisis management” (ibidem, 
p. 7). It can also furthermore show how significant international “veto players” such 
as the Russian Federation, may limit the scope or compromise EU diplomatic 
performance. As empirical evidence discussed in Chapter 7 showed, in Eastern 
Europe, EU diplomatic performance is described by the mode of aid-driven 
diplomacy and a high degree of path dependency, hence, a next step to conduct 
research would regard hypothesising the Lisbon Treaty (and its innovations) as an 
independent variable and exploring other factors such as aid-driven diplomacy or the 
presence of veto-players as intervening variables in discussing EU diplomatic 
performance. 
To conclude, this thesis would like to consider certain policy implications of the 
research findings. Policy implications add a holistic lens to the meaning and 
interpretation of this research beyond the academic discussion and show how these 
results can be applied to practice. Given that practice was the unit of analysis of this 
thesis, it constituted the object of the knowledge that scholars develop on EU 
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diplomacy generally. Therefore, we strongly believe that such a thesis can contribute 
to building bridges between scholarship and the practitioner’s world. Based on the 
findings of this thesis we propose the following policy recommendations: 
 To develop the diplomatic capabilities within the EUD vis-à-vis coordination with 
MS. To achieve a better coordination, the establishment of a Secretariat that 
would deal with coordination between MS embassies and the EU delegations in 
neighbour countries would be beneficial. This can be done through creating a 
post of a ‘manager for coordination’ or a ‘coordinator for cooperation’. Such a 
post already exists in the EUD in Kiev, but its dossier deals with coordination 
with Ukrainian authorities, not among EU member states. 
 To ensure consistent attendance at meetings. The EUDs and the MS embassies 
should make certain meetings mandatory in terms of attendance, especially 
those of particular importance for the political developments in the three 
countries studied. 
 Given the aid-driven character of diplomacy, which is not a novel practice, the 
common meetings should upgrade from information-sharing to programme 
alignment and implementation of common projects. 
 The EUDs should pursue a dialogue with the regional cooperation networks 
such as Visegrad, Nordic Plus and the Baltics in order to foster joint 
collaborations and share best practices. 
 Member states should upload their practices not only to the regional but also to 
the EU level, especially since bloc diplomacy in Eastern Europe presented a 
relatively high degree of cooperation. 
 The EUDs should map all EU actors in the neighbour countries and consider the 
expertise of particular member states (depending on the region or country). 
Findings here showed that MS pursue interest-driven diplomacy especially in the 
cases where they feel they have the expertise and know-how and add value. To 
avoid divergence and spur convergence, designing a spreadsheet that indicates 
the exclusive expertise of individual MS diplomats present on the ground would 
be beneficial. 
Last but not least, contextualising the findings of this thesis within previous 
research and exploring the avenues for future research helps readers to grasp the 
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significance of our research. Hence, as part of reflecting on what these findings 
mean, the thesis thus has implications not only for the development of theory and 
empirical analysis but also for practice itself.  
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Annexes 
Annex 1: List of conducted interviews 2011-2016, EU diplomatic 
community in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus 
Respondents agreed to offer interviews based on the fact that all interviews were 
made anonymous, that their name and position will not be made available to the 
general public. While the position of the interviewees are provided to internal and 
external examiners only, these are kept CONFIDENTIAL, in this annex. Diplomats 
asked not to disclose their names. 
Nr Date Country Dipl. Repr. EEAS/Comm/MS/Local 
1. 11.03.2011 Moldova EU Delegation Commission/local staff 
2. 14.03.2011 Moldova Embassy of Germany MS 
3. 14.03.2011 Moldova Embassy of Czech 
Republic 
MS 
4. 15.03.2011 Moldova Embassy of Poland MS 
5. 15.03.2011 Moldova Embassy of Poland Local staff 
6. 16.03.2011 Moldova Embassy of the United 
Kingdom 
Local staff 
7. 21.03.2011 Ukraine Embassy of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands 
MS 
8. 21.03.2011 Ukraine Embassy of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands 
MS 
9. 21.03.2011 Ukraine Embassy of the United 
Kingdom  
Local staff 
10. 21.03.2011 Ukraine Embassy of the United 
Kingdom  
Local staff 
11. 21.03.2011 Ukraine Embassy of the United 
Kingdom  
Local staff 
12. 22.03.2011 Moldova Embassy of Poland MS 
13. 22.03.2011 Ukraine Embassy of the Kingdom 
of Sweden 
MS 
14. 23.03.2011 Ukraine Embassy of Denmark MS 
15. 23.03.2011 Ukraine EU Delegation Commission 
16.  12.11.2013 Ukraine EU Delegation Commission 
17.  12.11.2013 Ukraine Embassy of Lithuania MS 
18.  13.11.2013 Ukraine Embassy of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands 
MS 
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19.  13.11.2013 Ukraine EU Delegation EEAS 
20.  13.11.2013 Ukraine EU Delegation Commission 
21.  14.11.2013 Ukraine Embassy of Poland MS 
22.  14.11.2013 Ukraine Embassy of Sweden MS 
23.  14.11.2013 Ukraine EU Delegation EEAS 
24.  15.11.2013 Ukraine Embassy of Czech 
Republic 
MS 
25.  17.11.2013 Moldova EU Delegation Commission/local staff 
26.  17.11.2013 Moldova EU Delegation EEAS 
27.  19.11.2013 Moldova Embassy of Lithuania MS 
28.  20.11.2013 Moldova Embassy of Poland MS 
29.  20.11.2013 Moldova Embassy of Poland MS 
30.  22.11.2013 Moldova Embassy of United 
Kingdom 
MS 
31.  22.11.2013 Moldova EU Delegation Commission 
32.  22.11.2013 Moldova EU Delegation Commission 
33.  10.09.2014 Belarus EU Delegation EEAS 
34.  11.09.2014 Belarus Embassy of Slovakia MS 
35.  11.09.2014 Belarus Embassy of Finland MS 
36.  16.09.2014 Belarus Embassy of United 
Kingdom 
MS 
37.  16.09.2014 Belarus Embassy of Romania MS 
38.  25.06.2015 Moldova Embassy of Sweden MS 
39.  25.06.2015 Moldova Embassy of Germany MS 
40.  25.06.2015 Moldova Embassy of France MS 
41.  26.06.2015 Moldova Embassy of Romania MS 
42.  14.06.2016 Ukraine Embassy of Latvia MS 
43.  14.06.2016 Ukraine Embassy of Belgium MS 
44.  15.06.2016 Ukraine Embassy of Austria MS 
45.  15.06.2016 Ukraine Embassy of Finland MS 
46.  15.06.2016 Ukraine Embassy of Denmark MS 
47.  16.06.2015 Ukraine Embassy of Germany MS 
48.  17.06.2015 Ukraine EU Delegation EEAS 
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Annex 2: List of conducted interviews with civil servants and civil 
society representatives 
Respondents agreed to offer interviews based on the fact that all interviews were 
made anonymous, that there name and position will not be made available to the 
general public. While the name and position of the interviewees are provided to 
internal and external examiners only, these are kept CONFIDENTIAL, in this annex.  
Moldova 
Nr Date Respondents function 
MD-1 17-09-2013 
External consultant to the MFA (UNDP contracted) / Building the 
Institutional Capacity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Project 
MD-2 17-09-2013 
Civil servant, State Chancellery / local public administration 
reforms on decentralisation & financial autonomy 
MD-3 17-09-2013 
Attaché, MFA / analysis, monitoring and evaluation of policies 
unit 
MD-4 20-09-2013 Former vice-minister of regional development and construction 
MD-5 20-09-2013 Consultant, Cabinet of the President  
MD-6 21-09-2013 Ministry of Justice, Chief of Cabinet of the Ministry of Justice 
MD-8 23-09-2013 
Former MFA, migration and development policies and programs 
/ current ICMPD Project officer on Supporting the 
Implementation of the EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission 
Agreements in Moldova and Georgia (REVIS) 
MD-9 24-09-2013 Minister-counsellor, Moldova’s mission to the EU, Brussels 
MD-10 24-09-2013 Secretary I, Moldova’s mission to the EU, Brussels 
MD-11 07-10-2013 Counsellor, minister of Internal Affairs  
MD-12 18-10-2013 Chief of External Assistance Department, State Chancellery  
MD-13 20-09-2013 Head of external relations department 
MD-15 19-09-2013 
Associated expert analyst at Expert-grup; former coordinator 
www.europa.md  
MD-16 20-09-2013 
Senior analyst European Union Institute for Security Studies / 
former analysts at the European Council on Foreign Relations / 
former Advisor to the Moldovan Prime Minister 2010; 2012 
MD-17 18-09-2013 
Program Officer at East Europe Foundation / national 
coordinator of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, Work 
Group People to People Contacts, Education and Culture / 
liaison with MFA on DCFTA and visa liberalisation negotiations / 
former EUBAM ‘Liaison and Border Risk Analysis Office’ project 
assistant 
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MD-18 18-09-2013 
IOM National Adviser to the Moldovan Border Police Department 
/ consulting the government on the EU thematic programme on 
Migration and Asylum in the “Strengthening Migration 
Management and Cooperation on Readmission in Eastern 
Europe (MIGRECO) 
MD-19 19-09-2013 
Public policy consultant at the national participation council / 
Tracking the implementation of the Government Program and 
Action Plan in 2012 / former assistant in EU Twinning Project on 
Intellectual Property Rights 
MD-20 20-09-2013 
Promo-Lex NGO: HR, monitoring, advocacy, Transnistria conflict 
issues 
MD-21 23-09-2013 
National legal consultant / Norwegian mission of rule of law 
advisors to Moldova 
 
 
Ukraine 
Nr Date Respondents function 
UKR-1 15-05-2014 Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 
UKR-2 15-05-2014 Deputy director general, Razumkov Centre 
UKR-3 15-05-2014 Director, Institute of World Policy 
UKR-4 15-05-2014 Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine 
UKR-5 15-05-2014 
Vice President of Policy, The American Chamber of Commerce 
in Ukraine; ex-member of Ukrainian team of negotiators on EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement and DCFTA (confirmed) 
UKR-6 15-05-2014 First Deputy Minister of Justice of Ukraine 
UKR-7 15-05-2014 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 
UKR-8 15-05-2014 Head, Civic organization Europe without Barriers 
UKR-9 15-05-2014 
Directorate General for the European Union, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 
UKR-10 16-05-2014 senior-research fellow, Institute of World Policy 
UKR-11 17-05-2014 RTA, Ministry of Social Policy 
UKR-12 17-05-2014 Deputy, Ministry of Defense 
UKR-13 17-05-2014 
First Deputy Chairman of the Committee of the Verkhovna 
Rada on issues of European integration  
286 
 
UKR-14 18-05-2014 Civil society representative Donetsk region 
UKR-15 18-05-2014 Civil society representative Lvov 
UKR-16 18-05-2014 Civil society representative Odessa region 
 
Belarus 
Nr Date Respondents function 
BEL-1 15-05-2012 Manager, Officer for Democratic Belarus 
BEL-2 15-05-2014 Executive director, Officer for Democratic Belarus 
BEL-3 15-09-2014 Executive director, Liberal Club Belarus 
BEL-4 15-09-2014 Officer, European Cafe Belarus 
BEL-5 17-09-2014 Student Union representative, Mogilev University 
 
  
287 
 
Annex 3: Interview guide 
All interviews followed the guide presented below, lasted 60 minutes on average and 
were thereafter codified (see details in Annex 4) and made anonymous. The elite 
interviews were conducted in a semi-structured form, where questions were asked of 
each interviewee in a systematic and consistent order, but the interviewers were 
allowed freedom to digress and reflected on their diplomatic practice. 
 
Interview guide, diplomatic community (semi-structured) 
1. What does diplomacy mean to you and your daily activity at the mission? 
2. Reflecting on your diplomatic activity in this country, how do they specifically reflect the 
ENP/EaP agenda? 
3. Has the Lisbon Treaty changed or affected in any way the activity of your mission and 
how? 
4. One of the provisions within the Lisbon Treaty is that EU diplomatic actors in third 
countries: “shall cooperate and shall contribute to formulating and implementing the 
common approach” How is this understood and practiced by you? 
5. Could you please provide some examples of this EU-member states ‘common 
approach’ in Moldova/Ukraine/Belarus? 
6. Could you please explain, based on your experience at the embassy, the cooperation 
between the EU delegation and your mission? 
7. Based on your interactions with the EU Delegation, what role does it play in 
Moldova/Ukraine/Belarus? 
8. What type of resources does the Delegation provide in order to foster cooperation with 
and among member-states?  
9. How are these resources used by you specifically? 
10. Could you name some of the instances when was reluctance on behalf of the EU 
delegation or member-state embassies to cooperate?  
 
Interview guide, civil servants and (semi-structured) 
1. Would you characterize the cooperation agreements with the EU to be broad or 
limited? 
2. How many areas do the co-operation with the EU cover ? 
3. Which areas of cooperation do you perceive as the most important for your country 
and why? 
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4. To what extent has your country adapted to EU rules (in the chapters that are actually 
covered in the partnership/association agreements) and norms (in particularly the ENP 
criteria concerning democracy promotion, respect for human rights, rule of law, good 
governance, market economy principles and sustainable development)?  
5. What is the main motivation behind these adjustments?  
6. To what extent are these adjustments implemented and followed up?  
7. Have they led to institutional changes? If so, could you give examples of that?  
8. Does the level of adaptation vary according to different policy areas? If so, could you 
give some examples? 
9. How often and at what level does your country participate in meeting with the EU? 
10. Is there a unit in your country that coordinate this participation? 
11. How would you consider the level of participation in EU programs and policies? 
12. What kind of participation do we talk about – active participation in specific EU 
policies? Contributions in terms of various forms of human, economic or technical 
resources? Or more passive participation like being observers at meetings etc? 
13. Could you mention some kind of participation that you consider to be particularly 
important and explain why? 
14. Would you say that there is a support for in your country (among both the political 
leadership and the most important constituencies) for a closer integration with the EU 
within the framework of the ENP? Why/Why not? 
15. How important is the economic support coming from the EU for the development and 
stability in your country? 
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Annex 4: RQDA and its application 
RDQA is a free software package for Qualitative Data Analysis, which works on 
Windows. It is an easy to use tool to assist in the analysis of textual data which, at 
the moment, only supports plain text formatted data. More details on RQDA can be 
found here: http://rqda.r-forge.r-project.org/  
The Interview data analysis has been done via RQDA that allowed sorting and 
memo-ing of a bigger interview data-set as well as coding the interviews. Using this 
qualitative social research tool provided with the technical methodology for 
systematizing, organizing, and analysing the interviews. This was done in the 
following 4 steps: 
Step 1: Creating a Project. At this step 3 projects where creating that corresponded 
with the three countries where interviews were conducted: Moldova, Ukraine and 
Belarus. 
Step 2: Uploading files. For every project, a number of files, corresponding to the 
number of interviews per country were uploaded to the software. Each file is labelled 
according to the number of the interview and contains all answers collected from all 
respondents. 
Step 3: Coding Data. This process implies creating the codes and then applying 
them to each file individually. After the fieldwork-conducted in the three countries a 
list of codes, corresponding to the three criteria where created as presented in Table 
29 below. Codes where derived from the operationalisation of the three criteria: 
effectiveness, relevance and capabilities. Also, the general interview guide served 
and the answers of the respondents served as reference point (see Annex 3).  
 
Table 29: Codification of interview data on Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus 
Effectiveness Relevance Capabilities 
EFF_LisbonTreaty REL_commonapproach CAP_communication 
EFF_EUDrole REL_MS-EUDcooperation CAP_humanresources 
EFF_ENP REL_MS-MScooperation CAP_institutional 
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If in case of the first two criteria, effectiveness and relevance, these codes were 
identified via operationalisation; in the case of the third criteria, it was possible to 
create the codes based on operationalisation in congruence with the respondents 
interviews. For example, we codified ‘CAP_institutional’, only after the field-work was 
conducted and respondents identified that the intra- and inter-institutional tensions 
were an issue. Each code was represented through abbreviations: EFF stands for 
effectiveness, REL stands for relevance and CAP stands for capabilities (as shown 
in the Table). 
Step 4: Exporting codes. A final step was to export codified data into separate files 
that corresponded to the three criteria effectiveness, relevance and capabilities. 
These, in turn, where introduced in the discussion of the empirical chapters on 
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus (Chapter 4, 5 and 6). 
Besides facilitating the management of transcribed interview data, this package 
assisted the identification and codification of data which served as base for the 
discussion of findings, presented in Chapter 7. In this manner, we were able to better 
identify the forces that drive or divide EU diplomatic performance. 
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Annex 5: EEAS organisational chart 
 
